

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS DISCIPLINARY REGIMES:
IMPLEMENTATION OF
WESTERN SANCTIONS AND LOCAL RESPONSES IN VARIOUS REGIONS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ECE AKSOP

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF AREA STUDIES

OCTOBER 2022

Approval of the thesis:

**INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS DISCIPLINARY REGIMES:
IMPLEMENTATION OF WESTERN SANCTIONS AND LOCAL
RESPONSES IN VARIOUS REGIONS**

submitted by **ECE AKSOP** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of **Doctor of Philosophy in Area Studies, the Graduate School of Social Sciences
of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER
Head of Department
Department of Area Studies

Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Nuri YURDUSEV (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür Taylan KAYA
Necmettin Erbakan University
Department of International Relations

Assist. Prof. Dr. Aylin Günay GÜRZEL AKA
Eastern Mediterranean University
Department of Political Science and International Relation

Assist. Prof. Dr. Talat KAYA
Social Sciences University of Ankara
Faculty of Law

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Ece AKSOP

Signature:

ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS DISCIPLINARY REGIMES: IMPLEMENTATION OF WESTERN SANCTIONS AND LOCAL RESPONSES IN VARIOUS REGIONS

AKSOP, Ece

Ph.D., The Department of Area Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER

October 2022, 324 pages

The dominant definition of sanctions is measures which stop short of war. The vast literature on this topic is bifurcated as some claim sanctions are useful tools that prevent war, some others claim they are useless and have only face value. The case studies elaborated in this research indicate that sanctions fail to attain a policy change on the target, distort smooth flow of daily life of civilians, and sometimes even inflict harm over third parties.

This research does not aim to provide a new definition, help designing more effective measures, or argue that sanctions are destined to fail therefore they should not be implemented. Nor the argument criticizing the senders here can be read as supporting or defending the target countries. Rather, this research aims only to analyze sanctions measures from a social constructivist perspective.

Sanctions as being tools of this display do operate in a zone that is not regulated by international law. Therefore, the argument put forward in this research goes, they do not necessarily stop short of war which is a rule-based game regulated by international law. This, of course, does not mean that wars are better than sanctions; argument here points not to the betterness but to the unregulated nature of sanctions measures. On the contrary, via the case-studies this research concludes that the sanctions are largely used as tools by “Western” powers for their display of power against “non-Western” countries in a Foucauldian sense.

Keywords: Orientalism, Area Studies, Middle East, Constructivist Approaches, Michel Foucault

ÖZ

BİR DİSİPLİN REJİMİ OLARAK ULUSLARARASI YAPTIRIMLAR: BATI'NIN YAPTIRIM UYGULAMALARI VE DEĞİŞİK BÖLGELERDEKİ YEREL TEPKİLER

AKSOP, Ece

Doktora, Bölge Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER

Ekim 2022, 324 sayfa

Yaptırımlar, literatürde savaşın eşiğine kadar gelen ancak savaş aşamasından önce duran önlemler olarak ele alınmaktadır. Mevcut yazının bir bölümü yaptırımları savaş önleyen mekanizmalar olarak görürken, bir diğer bölümü ise işe yaramayan göstermelik araçlar olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada yer alan vaka analizleri, yaptırımların hedefledikleri politika değişikliklerini gerçekleştiremedikleri gibi sivil hayatın akışını bozdukları, zaman zaman da üçüncü taraflara zarar verdiklerini göstermektedir.

Bu çalışma yaptırımlara yeni bir tanım getirmek, daha etkin yaptırım mekanizmaları tasarlanması için öneriler geliştirmek ya da her halükârda başarısız olacak yaptırımların hiç uygulanmamasını savunmak amacını taşımamaktadır. Bu itibarla çalışmada, yaptırımlara sosyal inşacı bir açıdan bakılmıştır.

Çalışmada, söz konusu güç gösterisi içerisinde yaptırımları düzenleyen bir uluslararası hukuk alanı bulunmadığı için, sonuçları itibarıyla yaptırımların savaşmadan duran önlemler olmadıkları; diğer bir deyişle, savaşın belirli kurallarının yaptırımlar alanında bulunmadığı öne sürülmüştür. Çalışmadan, savaşların yaptırımlardan daha iyi yöntemler olduğu şeklinde bir sonuç çıkarılması yerinde olmayacaktır. Aksine, bu çalışmada yürütülen vaka analizleri üzerinden, yaptırımların genellikle Batılı aktörler tarafından, Batı'da yer almayan ülkelere yönelik olarak Foucaultcu bir yaklaşımla disipliner güç gösterisinde kullanılan araçlar olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Oryantalizm, Bölge Çalışmaları, Orta Doğu, İnşacı Yaklaşımlar, Michel Foucault

To My Beloved Families in Turkey, France and Belgium

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During the very first year of my studies in METU, I had the chance to take courses from two of the examining committee members. One was Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev, with his extreme support and deep knowledge, he taught me how to approach issues from different angles and do readings from a critical perspective. He also embraced me as his assistant during my third year, despite the post was regularly open for seniors. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Yurdusev for overtly expressing his faith in me all the time, and walking the academic road by my side from junior years up until today.

The other was Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrıseven. During the last week of the junior-year courses, the graduates literally dived into the seminar room while Prof. Tanrıseven was lecturing; they began clapping and chanting as: “*Oktay Hoca sen bizim her şeyimizsin!*” All throughout the conduct of this research, I have witnessed him earn this chanting over and over again. I would like to express my deepest gratitude for his unique guidance, constructive criticisms, endless encouragements and invaluable insight. Without any exaggeration, absent his support, this research would not have been concluded at all.

With Assist. Prof. Dr. Aylin G. Aka and Assist. Prof. Dr. Talat Kaya, we had a dialogue which this research helped to revive. Prof. Aka eagerly offered to read and edit previous versions of this research; and honored me by saying she would use it as background material for her future courses. I appreciate Prof. Aka’s visits to Ankara from abroad solely for purpose of being present physically by my side.

Coincidentally via this research I also had the chance to discover Prof. Kaya had conducted research on sanctions too. His fresh book analyzing sanctions from commercial law perspective provided considerable insight with regards to the history of sanctions. I would like to express my gratitude to him for his sincere support and constructive inputs for this research.

Last but not least, I am thankful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür T. Kaya. He joined on board despite the final phase coincided with the arrival of his little baby. I would like to apologize from his family for taking his precious time he generously extended for finalization of this research.

This research benefited a lot from the pre-PhD research on trade and security, under the supervision and guidance of Prof. M. Mbengue in 2013. I am indebted to him for his open-minded approach and for letting me merge law with politics and economics. I should also thank Mme Journé for her endless patience in editing previous drafts of the research which directly fed into this one.

My colleagues in Belgium, who formed up my family in Brussels, also deserve to be mentioned here for their contribution to the improvement of my analytical skills. The insight, different perspectives and habit of cross-checking they have given to me built into not only my professional but also private life. Without the WMD/ACDC Team, and especially Mrs Lea, Mr Garvalov, Mr Jammot and Mr Wyatt, nothing would be the same.

Special thanks to George whose warm and supportive approach helped me a lot to expand my horizons as well as to keep open-minded and optimist in professional life. I should not skip thanking Semra, Alia and Sam for facilitating a couple of years under

extremes and being there whenever I needed a hand. Their positive impact on me is still felt deeply in my heart.

My colleagues Engin Kurt and Olgu Atçı shouldered my workload in Ankara especially during the final phase of this research. Together with them, my supervisor Elif Gürsoy have been extremely supportive of my crawling academic studies.

Special thanks also to my family that always kept the tea stocks full...

Nothing would be the same without you. I am indebted for being part of the journey.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xvi
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Scope and Objective	2
1.2. Research Problem	10
1.3. Argument and Methodology.....	14
1.4. Organization of the Chapters	19
2. GLOBAL POLITICS OF SANCTIONS.....	24
2.1. Theoretical Approaches to Sanctions	29
2.2. Sanctions and Actors	41
2.3. Methods of Sanctions	50

2.4.	Effectiveness of Sanctions.....	55
2.5.	Conclusion.....	61
3.	EGYPT.....	66
3.1.	Road to Sanctions.....	69
3.2.	Security Aspect.....	77
3.3.	Administrative and Technical Aspect.....	81
3.4.	Socioeconomic Aspect.....	86
3.5.	Cultural Aspect.....	92
3.6.	Conclusion.....	95
4.	IRAN.....	98
4.1.	Road to Sanctions.....	101
4.2.	Security Aspect.....	109
4.3.	Administrative and Technical Aspect.....	113
4.4.	Socioeconomic Aspect.....	118
4.5.	Cultural Aspect.....	123
4.6.	Conclusion.....	127
5.	RUSSIA.....	132
5.1.	Road to Sanctions.....	135
5.2.	Security Aspect.....	147
5.3.	Administrative and Technical Aspect.....	152

5.4. Socioeconomic Aspect	159
5.5. Cultural Aspect.....	167
5.6. Conclusion.....	173
6. AFGHANISTAN	179
6.1. Road to Sanctions	181
6.2. Security Aspect.....	188
6.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect.....	192
6.4. Socioeconomic Aspect	196
6.5. Cultural Aspect.....	202
6.6. Conclusion.....	207
7. NORTH KOREA	211
7.1. Road to Sanctions	214
7.2. Security Aspect.....	219
7.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect.....	223
7.4. Socioeconomic Aspect	227
7.5. Cultural Aspect.....	232
7.6. Conclusion.....	235
8. CONCLUSION.....	238
REFERENCES.....	254

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE	300
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	301
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU.....	324

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
EUROCONTROL	European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
G7/8	Group of 7/8
G20	Group of 20
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MES	Middle East Studies
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNCITRAL	United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

But somewhere deep down, even the most dedicated human rights professional knows that what can seem urgent and noble is often also tawdry and voyeuristic. Our ethics seems impractical, sentimental, inauthentic. At the same time, our pragmatism stains our piety.¹

“Looking back from an early twenty-first century vantage point, it is easy to forget that there was once a time when the United Nations Security Council could not easily employ its sanctions tool” reads the very first sentence of a law book.² To a student of International Relations (IR), though, forgetting that referred “once a time” is unforgivable as the modern age institutions, including the United Nations (UN) itself, is a child not of World War 2 but also of the Cold War.³

An International Relations student would also know that sanctions are far from being novel tools for the UN; the League of Nations also had it (though employed as an

¹ David Kennedy, *The Rights of Spring: A Memoir of Innocence Abroad* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 10.

² Jeremy Matam Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3.

³ See Eric Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (Great Britain: Abacus, 1995); Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (US: Simon&Schuster, 1994).

experimental tool) and indeed even the ancient Greeks used if not invented sanctions as a part of non-military coercive strategies.⁴

With the prolongation of wars, especially after the World War 1, focus shifted from maintaining human and munition capacity to reducing moral willing of the adversary; in other words, hot conflicts gave way to wars of attrition.⁵ As a consequence, non-combatants were also included directly or indirectly into the war and the separation of “front” from “home” eroded.⁶ This research, being a study of sanctions as disciplinary tools on the selected case studies from various countries, and despite the undeniable dominance of IR, this research will aim to employ interdisciplinarity and bring sociology, psychology, philosophy, law and economics also on board.

1.1. Scope and Objective

“[T]here is no ‘ideal’ region, or any single agenda to which all regions aspire. Regions, like states, are of varying compositions, capabilities and aspirations.”⁷ All regions have stopped being a geographical label long ago; all have their own spatial

⁴ See Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions*, 45-7 for ways and means of ancient and medieval era sanctions. Talat Kaya, *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi* (Ankara: Adalet, 2022), esp 21-34 for a terminology of non-military measures.

⁵ Mehmet Mert Çam, *İran’da İstihbarat Savaşı: Birinci Dünya Davası’nda İran Cephesi’ndeki Psikolojik Harp Faaliyetleri* (İstanbul: İlgı Kültür Sanat, 2016), 37.

⁶ *Ibid*, 171.

⁷ Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective,” in *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luck van Langenhove (London, Ann Harbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 26.

baggage.⁸ The area as the “subject” of the study is “constructed via human action and social relations. Regions [read areas] are manifestations of those actions and are in a constant process of transition.”⁹ For some scholars,¹⁰ region reflects clearcut Eurocentric colonial cartography; hence the states are more or less following a uniform model. Others say states are different, because their path to independence differed from each other. Take the Middle East, wherever the region is located: The British left monarchies behind, while the French republics.¹¹ As the states differed, so did the people. Today, for example, we still use the term “Arab,” yet Arab nationalism, even in its zenith period under Nasser’s handling of the Suez crisis, was not embraced in the region by-hearth. Walt notes that it was still balance of power mechanisms that triumphed; hence states looked for ways of balancing Nasser instead of welcoming the rhetoric of Arab nationalism.¹²

⁸ Anssi Paasi, “Place and Region: Looking through the Prism of Scale,” *Progress in Human Geography*, 28 (2004), and also his “Bounded Spaces in the Mobile World,” *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 93, no. 2 (2002).

⁹ Susan Christopherson, Jonathan Michie and Peter Tyler, “Regional Resilience: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives,” *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 3, no.10 (2010): 4.

¹⁰ Toby Alice Volkman, *Crossing Borders: The Case for Area Studies, Ford Foundation Report* (Publication place information unavailable, 1998); also her *Crossing Borders: Revitalizing Area Studies* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1999).

¹¹ James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.

¹² Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (USA: Cornell University Press, 1990). Also see Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991), for a discussion of omnibalancing.

Barry Buzan claims that there actually is nothing wrong for a European person to see himself as Scottish, British and European all at the same time. However, he well observes that identities still matter as that person would not perceive himself as Scottish and French at the same time.¹³ A similar story goes for the areas covered in this research. Take, for example, the Middle East again: Despite the fact that Qaddafi did not want to send resident diplomats to Egypt (his aim was far from non-recognition of Egypt, rather he thought Arab states were brothers and should not be counted as separate entities; consequently, institutions like “foreign representations” and “embassies” were completely futile), and that Egypt continued to use the name “Arab Republic” in its official title even after the demise of the short-lived United Arab Republic, people keep seeing each other not as parts of greater Arab picture, but rather of smaller national pieces.¹⁴ This is well reflected in an exchange of opinions in al Ahram where a Saudi student, furious of PLO opening an office in Cyprus, blamed Palestinians of being disgraceful. After all the region did for the Palestinian cause, he wrote, they picked not Saudi Arabia but Cyprus, and it was simply unacceptable. The Palestinian reply was no less fierce, it focused on the unavailability of monetary value of lives lost, saying “Saudis give money but we pour our blood,” and adding also that Saudi contribution to the Palestinian issue was nothing more than a lip service, because

¹³ Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 339.

¹⁴ Schulz and Schulz note that most of the attempts for regionalization and cooperation were based on pan-Arab ideologies which aim “to merge ‘artificially divided’ Arab states,” instead of a “pragmatic politico-economic interest.” Therefore, they conclude, “Middle Eastern regionalization seems to be an illusion with no real basis.” Helena Lindholm Schulz and Michael Schulz, “The Middle East: Regional Instability and Fragmentation,” in *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luck van Langenhove (London, Ann Harbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 187-8.

the Saudi interest earnings from deposits only in the US would be well enough to liberate Palestinians within a year.¹⁵

Buzan's observation indicates that when it comes to different regions, one size does not fit all. In this respect, for purposes of analyzing the regions, Area Studies was born in the US as an academic program and assumed the role of "developing a pool of 'international experts to meet national needs'."¹⁶ In this sense, it can be argued that area studies owed a lot to the Cold War. That is to say, the bipolar world system, reflected in power and economic structures, forced the academy clarify the boundaries of the area studies,¹⁷ distinct itself and different from any other social sciences.

One basic problem with this quest for boundaries is that, it is quite difficult if not impossible to define what Area Studies refer to. Typically, one may check out the dictionary definition, which may help understanding what "area" is,¹⁸ yet identifying "the" area one wants to study is pretty much like a headache.¹⁹

¹⁵ Shilbey Telhami, Michael Barnett, *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 14.

¹⁶ Ann Imlah Schneider (2010), "Internationalization vs. Area Studies? (presentation to Association of International Education Administrations)," *International Education Advice*, <http://www.internationaledadvice.org/pdfs/AIEApaper.2010.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2020).

¹⁷ Bruce Cummings, "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29, no. 1 (1997).

¹⁸ Oxford English Dictionary defines area as: "A particular extent of surface, esp. of the earth's surface; a space, region, tract." <http://dictionary.oed.com> (accessed July 31, 2020).

¹⁹ Closest theories to the area studies come from the school of regionalists, whose dominance in academic literature proliferated following the success story of the European integration. Yet even the scholars studying the "Europe" fall into the trap of defining "Europe," a trap most prefers to avoid by referring to the "European Union." However, even those "escapers" need

This research will not prioritize one region; instead, it will take an Area Studies perspective and take one various countries case-studies and try to analyze whether different regions react differently to sanctions, if so how, whether sanctions do succeed or inflict more harm than initiating a policy change in the target country, and try to understand the role of sanctions in international political arena. It will take the definition of the sanctions as a means of settling differences between states falling short of war.²⁰ Nonetheless, it will disagree with the perception that sanctions are mechanisms designed not for punishment, but for the exercise of political pressure with the aim of making sanctioned (target) states change their policies towards certain directions.²¹

Based on this disagreement, this research, as a result of adopting an Area Studies perspective, will analyze the sanctions from the eyes of the sanctioned people and try to establish whether sanctions are punishments, whether they really fall short of war or reflect yet another type of war.

The cases studied in this research tacitly points a preference of Eastern countries. While the intention was not to create or fall into an East/West division, the research

to face the necessity to analyze what and where is Europe, as the EU keeps enlarging and negotiating with other countries to become a part of the club.

²⁰ D'Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 47-8. In this regard, an effective sanction is the one that manages to change the behavior of the target. Note, however, that sometimes the behavior is already about to change regardless the sanctions, or sometimes behavior changes not because of sanctions but of other domestic or external factors. See Gary C. Hufbauer, Kimberley A. Elliott, and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington: IIE, 1990, 2nd edition).

²¹ Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions*, 130.

concluded that sanctions are used mainly by Western countries towards non-Western others. The sanctions as well as the East and the West are all parts of the discourse. The discourse creates and sustains an “us” and an “other;” both identities feed each other. The discourse, from the eyes of an Indian pundit, is a reflection of “your great love for us backward barbarians [and your duty] you have graciously taken up [as] the white man’s burden of chaperoning us.”²² The discourse, from the eyes of a German Muslim ambassador to Morocco, is a “breath-taking arrogance [and] is called ‘cultural imperialism’ by the Muslims” because “[t]he West, despite being in such a trouble, has the nerve to offer itself as the obligatory model for every other nation.”²³

While the creation and maintenance of the West necessitated a study of Orient, the East was also studying its other, namely, the Occident.²⁴ Just like the East, the West has been an output of the discourse: the East, in diplomatic history, “was used with reference to Poland, but after that state ceased to exist as an independent polity,” the East as the problematic other, or with the notorious heading the Eastern Question, became the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ In return, “[t]he ‘Western Question’ also is known as

²² P. Magnus Magnusson, “Life Eternal: I Orient and Occident,” *Social Science* 5, no. 2 (1930): 216.

²³ Murad Hofmann, “Muslims Torn between Occident and Orient,” *Islamic Studies* 37, no. 3 (1998): 384.

²⁴ See, for example, Douwe Fokkema, *Perfect Worlds: Utopian Fiction in China and the West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), esp chap.12 titled as “Chinese Occidentalism: The Nostalgia for a Utopian Past Gives Way to the Idea of Progress.”

²⁵ Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev, “From the Eastern Question to the Western Question: Rethinking the Contribution of Toynbee,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 3 (October 2005). Also see Fawaz A. Gerges, *The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Shadi Hamid, *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East* (Oxford; New York: Oxford

the problem of modernization/Westernization, a problem for the non-European or non-Western states”²⁶ (note how the ‘modern’ is automatically equated with the West, despite the author aims to reevaluate these Questions). Just like the East, the West is a product of philological laboratory; it is “organic and alive ... also a creature being created in the laboratory by philology.”²⁷

The West also is not a monolithic entity. As will be elaborated in following chapters, for the sanctions against Russia, for example, the West was divided as the US and the EU. Indeed, “[t]he very assumption that the US is a typical Western country is an artifact of Occidentalism. The US looks almost as strange to many Westerners from more social democratic societies as it does to African observers.”²⁸ Without ignoring these discursive and changing identifications, this research argues that sanctions are tools used mainly by West against non-West as Foucauldian disciplinary measures aiming to cure a leper other.²⁹

University Press, 2015), and Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013) for discussions on new Middle East.

²⁶ Yurdusev, “From the Eastern Question to the Western Question: Rethinking the Contribution of Toynbee,” 325.

²⁷ Said *Orientalism*, 146. Also see Joseph Massad, “Orientalism as Occidentalism,” *History of the Present* 5, no. 1 (2015), and Typhaine Leservot, “Occidentalism: Rewriting the West in Marjane Satrapi’s *Persépolis*,” *French Forum* 36, no. 1 (2011).

²⁸ Rhoda E. Howard, “Occidentalism, Human Rights, and the Obligations of Western Scholars,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 29, no. 1 (1995): 114.

²⁹ Note that the target and sender do not always correspond to contemporary understanding of East and West. For example, following World War 1, Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy’s annexation of Albania, Bulgaria and Ethiopia respectively, triggered sanctions of League of Nations. Yet annexation of Manchuria by Japan was not sanctioned. Similarly, Qatar has been sanctioned by what is called as Middle Eastern states in 2017. See Kaya Kaya, *Ekonomik*

Looking through the eyes of the local people, it is even possible to name sanctions as wars without rules – in a war, *jus bellum*³⁰ determines the limits. For example, it is not allowed to fight against civilians. In sanctions, however, there is no such legal framework, and as we will see in the following chapters, civilians are the ones that suffer the most under sanctions.³¹ Civilians lose their lives because of lack of means to pursue a healthy diet, or means to conclude financial transactions to import medicines, or sometimes simply because of lack of the spare parts.³²

In this respect, this research will argue that sanctions are serving as a euphemism for wars in modern times. This research will try to provide an insight to the lives of people of sanctioned countries, and to analyze how the measures adopted by third countries affect the socioeconomic life, create administrative and technical difficulties, shape security perceptions and bolster national pride. In doing so, the theoretical perspective will be Foucauldianism and social constructivism, and the argument put forward will

Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi, esp. 34-46.

³⁰ On law of war, see Stephen C. Neff, *War and the Law of Nations* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³¹ I am grateful to Prof Tanrisever for this innovative approach that guided me throughout this research.

³² This issue will be elaborated in detail below, suffice to note that close to 2000 people died in plane crashes mainly because of lack of spare parts due to sanctions. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran Plane Crash in South of Country 'Kills all 65 Onboard',” *Guardian*, February 18, 2018, Sunday; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/18/iran-plane-crashes-asean-airlines-yasuj> (accessed September 6, 2019). Former IAEA Ambassador of Iran Ali Asghar Soltanieh names sanctions as “economic terrorism.” See his speech at “TRT World Forum 2018 – Closing Ranks,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_cN4HEJY98, *TRT*, October 5, 2018 (accessed May 29, 2019). I would like to express my gratitude to him for sparing time during his seminar in Italy in January 2019 to discuss in detail the situation in Iran, people’s as well as bureaucracy’s reactions to the sanctions.

be sanctions as disciplinary tools employed as a display of power by the West against non-Western countries.

1.2. Research Problem

Classical IR theories are based on two main camps: Liberals focus on the possibility of cooperation and peace, and realists focus on anarchy and the resulting security problem. A common point in both theories is that they assume the “actors act in this pre-given world [of conflict or cooperation] according to the demands of instrumental reason.” Hence, these theories form parts of mainstream approaches that are known as rationalist/positivist approaches.³³ Naturally, the alternative approaches like constructivism are known as the non-rationalist/post-positivist approaches.

Constructivism is a recent addition to the International Relations theories. Constructivist approach focuses on “the goals that actors pursue with the power they have, however power is defined.”³⁴ This power relation exactly is the point upon which this research has been built.

Accordingly, the concept of securitization introduces the idea that security threats are not out there in “real world” at international level, but are rather constructed via speech acts. One such, and relevant to our discussion of proliferation, example is global distribution of nuclear weapons.

³³ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.

³⁴ Paul D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs* (USA: Wadsworth, 2010, 3rd edition), 103.

As known, the British nuclear arsenal is far more than that of North Korea and Iran --“(North Korea may have as many as ten; Iran currently has zero), yet most countries consider North Korea’s tiny arsenal and Iran’s potential arsenal to be more threatening than the much larger British arsenal.”³⁵ Rationally thinking, it is hard to find an explanation; but looking from a constructivist perspective, one can see that amity-enmity relations are indeed based on the discursive violence of the West and Foucauldian disciplinary power relations.

According to Michel Foucault, power is not a property to be accumulated; it rather is an effect.³⁶ Focal point in exerting that effect is naming – i.e. “[t]he system of differentiations which permits one to act upon the action of others.”³⁷ Power here has a disciplinary role which includes “naming, judging, isolating and controlling,”³⁸ which is well explained in his narrative of carceration in a town hit by plague back in 17th century. There, naming took place as differentiation of healthy and sick people as reflection of a “constant division between the normal and abnormal,” simply because

³⁵ D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 103.

³⁶ Rainer Diaz-Bone, “Economics of Convention Meets Foucault,” *Historical Social Research* 44, no. 1 (2019): 309.

³⁷ Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 792.

³⁸ Lisa Downing, *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 77.

“[t]he plague [served] as a form ... of disorder” which could be corrected by medical and political measures.³⁹

Applied to the research at hand, Foucault’s approach to power is a mechanism which is to be employed on the basis of a “binary branding;”⁴⁰ i.e. otherization. Building on Foucault, Said notes that the other itself contributes considerably to the identity of the self. In his extensive analysis of how the West kept the non-West/East as “the other,” Said observes that “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.”⁴¹ Just like sick-healthy binary branding, West/non-West binary branding “is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of ‘interests’.”⁴² Foucault notes that “the medical profession is not criticized primarily because it is a profit-making concern but because it exercises an uncontrolled power over people’s bodies, their health, and their life and death.”⁴³ Just like the health system relies on medical professional holding power to discipline and correct human body, “Orientalism depends ... on... flexible positional superiority,

³⁹ Michel Foucault, “ ‘Panopticalism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison.’” *Race / Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts* 2, no. 1 (2008): 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 5.

⁴¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003), 1-2.

⁴² *Ibid*, 12.

⁴³ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 780.

which puts the Westerner in a whole series of relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upperhand.”⁴⁴

The branding system requires what is called as discourse.⁴⁵ Through the discourse, the abnormal is branded, and once branded, the abnormal other needs to, or presented as in need of, being disciplined. It is futile to recite the constructivist theories of discourse and speech-acts here, nonetheless, the branding Foucault mentions can well be translated as securitization for purposes of this research – the West is in continuous attempt to exert “enormously systemic discipline ... to manage – an even produce – the Orient”⁴⁶ from all possible dimensions.

This research will argue that through this branding and the discourse the West exercises policies of preference and exerts disciplinary power, namely, the sanctions, over countries of non-West. Sanctions are measures of flexing muscles. They are results of an ongoing speech-act and securitization process that reproduces the West, henceforth, the non-West/East. Sanctions are employed by securitizing the non-West, the securitization helps building up the image of having the form of power needed to “know[] the inside of peoples minds, without exploring their souls.”⁴⁷ In other words,

⁴⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 7.

⁴⁵ Edward Said, “An Ethics of Language: Review of The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language by Michel Foucault,” *Diacritics* 4, no. 2 (1974): 29.

⁴⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 3. He notes also that Orientalism mainly stands for British and French cultural enterprise; and in post World War 2 they have been replaced by US, with the same approach as France and Britain once employed. *Ibid*, 4.

⁴⁷ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 783. In his discussion of pastoral power, he puts forward that the modern Western state is built upon this pastoral power, which is exercised by knowing inner souls of people and by directing it. He argues that modern state is not above individuals but individuals are accepted in only when they “submit[] to a set of very specific patterns”

this kind of power is exercised with the embedded knowledge⁴⁸ that the intentions of the East are inherently malign. In the end, what differentiates the nuclear weapons Britain actually has from the tiny arsenal of North Korea?⁴⁹ Similarly, what differentiates Britain from Iran? The reply lies in the speech acts that creates security problems, securitization that creates “others,” and “us” that acts upon the problem.

1.3. Argument and Methodology

Sanctions have long been a part of IR as well as the social and philosophical literature on discipline. They tend to be problematic mechanisms, not only because the target can find allies to help circumvention, but also there are third parties that are willing bypass the sanctions, or that are hurt by the measures implemented. In addition, global flows of finance and rise of cross-border mergers makes it difficult to separate “our” corporations from “theirs,” creating the problem of enforcement of the measures. Moreover, even if ideal implementation of export controls is possible, the alternatives

(783). What differentiates Foucault’s approach from classic IR theories is that, while in IR all are sovereign equals – hence all follow in theory those patterns --, in practice at international level we observe what he observes at domestic level – healthy and leper, submissive and maverick, ally and rogue, in short, “us” and “them.”

⁴⁸ Here the word knowledge is used for purposes of staying in line with Foucault. The knowledge here is a negative one, should better be if called as a bias.

⁴⁹ D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 103.

of domestic supply as well as return to black market can hardly be eliminated.⁵⁰
“[B]usiness concerns find a way around economic sanctions.”⁵¹

One thing is clear: When it comes to inducing a policy change in target country, one size does not fit all. This is acknowledged by the literature, and this is why there is a new generation of sanctions, providing alternative methods into the toolbox for the implementation and delivery of different results. Methods differ also depending on the sender. It is possible to implement the sanctions unilaterally,⁵² but also to use the UN for an institutional setting as well as for international legitimacy.

Given the fact that the Security Council resolutions are binding over member states, in theory the simple passage of a resolution and setting up a Sanctions Committee⁵³ to monitor implementation is enough for the target country be subjected to sanctions. But theory rarely meets the practice. Sanctions not always deliver the outcome desired by

⁵⁰ Askari *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy*, 115.

⁵¹ Golnoosh Hakimdavar, *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development* (New York, London: Routledge, 2014), 17.

⁵² Indeed contemporary studies of sanctions history prove that the success of multilateral sanctions is no more than an illusion. Hufbauer *et al.* in their volume argue that US unilateral sanctions proved to be more effective than multilateral sanctions, because multilateral sanctions are complex to put in action. Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

⁵³ To this end, “sanctions committees [set up by the Security Council and serves as a subsidiary organ of it] maintain lists of individuals and entities with respect to the sanction’s purposes and member states can request committees to add or to delete names from the respective list.” Moreover, the states can request exemptions from the measures and the relative sanctions committee. See Sven Bernhard Gareis, *The United Nations: An Introduction* (US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 2nd edition), 130-1. Notice that in theory, there are separate sanctions committees dealing with separate sanctions resolutions and their implementations. In practice, however, these committees, as being comprised of all fifteen members of the Security Council, is one and only one body, which is the Security Council itself.

the sender. First and foremost, in many instances, consequences of the sanctions fall on the shoulders of the people as they have to find ways of coping with socioeconomic hardships. Some authors focus on the target state's political structure for assessing the potential success of sanctions -- claim being that autocracies and dictatorships do not suffer much from the sanctions. Instead, their population, which is not the direct target, pay for the humanitarian costs of the sanctions while the regime's ability to suppress their populations and engage in favoritism increases.

This research reaches at the conclusion that sanctions tend to give birth to a set of non-desired, un-intended outcomes arising mainly from their nature which exempts them from the effective domain of international law. For instance, in Iran, national economy is excluded from international economy, hence civilian planes cannot find spare parts and risk crashing during flight. In case of North Korea, total exclusion from economic and political sphere created an isolated country that experiences the rally-around-the-flag impact, enabling the ruling elite to resist the sanctions and suppress people further. Same rally-around-the-flag impact is there also in Russia, though this time it is not a result of isolation but of pride derived from a history full of strong and solid national resistance. The same element of pride made Afghans proud of living on land of graveyards for empires – but, who wants to live in a graveyard?⁵⁴

Setting scoreboard for effective sanctions, advising for alternative mechanisms as well as blaming or defending the senders and/or targets is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, at this stage question will be why to keep sanctions in toolbox and to resort

⁵⁴ Taiba Rahim, "The Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Responsibility," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 880 (2010): 996.

them frequently given all these side effects and limited impact on changing the behavior of the target in desired way. The answer lies in Foucault's analysis of power – power is not a simple relation between parties, it is not a mere derivation of consent: “Power exists only when it is put into action.”⁵⁵ Sanctions, no matter how effective in correcting the behavior or how destructive on local people, help maintaining the binary branding between West and non-West, serve as a part of the discourse on the West as the normal and the non-West as the abnormal, and sustain the international power structure by putting right to use disciplinary power into the hands of the West.

At first sight, it looks like an easy piece to study sanctions, therefore this research thesis risks turning into an additional brick on the already great pile of sanctions literature. However, this research analyses how sanctions in contemporary era prove to be weapons of preference resorted frequently by the West against the non-West. For such an analysis, IR itself is not enough. Even if it was, this research is conducted not under International Relations Discipline. While the IR takes state and to some extent non-state actors as “subject,” Area Studies focuses on the people themselves. In this respect, it adopts an anthropocentric approach.

Being based on the people, “area” as the subject of the study serves as an umbrella under which lie multiple disciplines. It is not only through the prism of economy, sociology, law, geography, politics, anthropology, history etc but rather a combination of them which is capable of enabling the Area Studies scholar “clarify the assumptions.” Through an interdisciplinary prism, “we can get a much clearer picture

⁵⁵ Diaz-Bone, “Economics of Convention Meets Foucault,” *Historical Social Research* 44, no. 1 (2019): 309.

of what 'the region [read area]' means in different fields and which of the numerous variables affecting regional paths are considered significant."⁵⁶ Still, such a prism can be difficult to attain under the realm of social sciences which is much like a "federation" of disciplines⁵⁷ whose borders are clearly determined. As such, area studies can serve as "working laboratories for interdisciplinary research and teaching."⁵⁸ Indeed, "the political complexities of the late twentieth-century world, and the changes brought about by accelerating worldwide trade and communication, make area studies more urgent than ever."⁵⁹

Sanctions turned out to be a manifestation of the disciplinary power of the West – like Foucault's modern state that is ready to welcome all that is subordinated, international order set by West looks for "individuality [read: sovereign equal "others"] ... shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns."⁶⁰ In this regard, this research will contribute to the literature not only by analyzing the sanctions and their impact, but also by approaching to the issue via construction of the non-West by the

⁵⁶ Christopherson, Michie and Tyler, "Regional Resilience: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives," 4.

⁵⁷ Robert H. Bates, "Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible Synthesis," *Africa Today* 44, no. 2 (1997).

⁵⁸ Maureen O'Neil, "Area Studies is Dead: Long Live Area Studies," *International Development Research Center CCASLS* (1998), <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/15796/108348.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed July 31, 2020).

⁵⁹ Volkman, "Crossing Borders: Revitalizing Area Studies," x-xi.

⁶⁰ Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 783.

West and vice-versa, securitization of non-West and exercise of Foucault's disciplinary power through Orientalism.

1.4. Organization of the Chapters

This research will argue that sanctions are employed by the West against the non-West. As part of this Orientalist approach, the argument will continue, there is a paternalistic relationship in between the parties as the West is portrayed as developed, wealthy, stable, etc; while the non-West is presented as underdeveloped, poor, unstable etc. The two are polar opposites of each other, and for the non-West there is basically no way out; the Orient is considered to be stuck in being the Orient.⁶¹ Take Walt Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*,⁶² in which he made an analogy in between a state and a plane, and argued that (i) traditional society, (ii) preconditions for take off, (iii) takeoff, (iv) maturity and (v) mass consumption are the phases of economic development. In line with his argument, where you began is very important; that is to say, if you are underdeveloped, by the time you reach at the level of today's developed class, today's developed countries will be developed even further so that at the end of the day you will still be relatively classified as underdeveloped.

This perpetual situation of underdevelopment is part of otherization and of paternalism; hence it is inbuilt in the Orientalist discourse which paves the way for the

⁶¹ Onur Bilge Kula, *Batı Felsefesinde Oryantalizm ve Türk İmgesi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018, 3rd edition), esp 116, 175-6.

⁶² Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

disciplinary measures to be employed by the West. Indeed, Edward Said, in building upon

Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, ... identifi[ies] Orientalism ... as a discourse [without which] one cannot possibly understand the enormously systemic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.⁶³

Up till World War 2, Orientalism was mainly a British and French enterprise, “since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did.”⁶⁴ While France and Britain were colonizing, the US is sanctioning. Colonization required waging war; sanctions, as per the literature, stops short of war. The case studies here will show that sanctions indeed are not short of war, they even go beyond the damage that can be done by (or allowed within the limits of) war. Hence, while the methods utilized have been modified, the approach is still the same – exercise of disciplinary power.

With the following case studies, this research will be looking at different facets like the nature (uni- or multi-lateral), purpose (disarmament, nonproliferation, or border fixing), and character (primary or secondary) of the sanctions mechanism, and dwell into the economic relations between the senders and targets.

After establishing all these differences and similarities among the countries in case studies, the research will focus in conclusion part on what actually unites the cases at hand. If the sanctions do not *de facto* stop short of war, if they fail to change the

⁶³ Said, *Orientalism*, 3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 4.

behavior of the target, if no matter how “smart” their design is they still keep inflicting harm to local people, if in contemporary cases even the companies of the sender are affected via closure of an export market, then the question becomes why to maintain sanctions in the toolbox. The answer provided here is the disciplinary power they embed. For disciplinary power to be there, the deviant needs to be identified – here comes into stage speech act and securitization of constructivist theories of IR. Here, for the power to be employed, constructivism is necessary, but the power itself is employed also to construct – it aims not to oppress at first stage; priority rather is to (re)construct thoughts, desires and interests. The next question to be posed in this picture is whether the areas do matter. The conclusion reached is that for constructivism to take place, and for disciplinary power to be exercised, a division between “us” and “them” is necessary. This process of otherization, indeed, proves that the areas do matter.

In the analysis concluded in this research, an overall separation of the non-West from the West in the discourse is observed. This may look like a natural ramification of studying Asia, Africa and Middle East in specific and Area Studies in general; however, in a closer look it is visible that the sanctions are policies of preference for the West. They are policies of preference not for great powers – Russia also is in the league of great powers. As a policy of preference, Russia chooses not to employ sanctions which are defined as measures falling short of war; Russia instead wages a war.⁶⁵ Hence comes the question why the West is prone to stop short of war. The

⁶⁵ I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever for this insightful comment as well as encouragement to include constructivism into the discussion.

answer proposed here relates to a culture of dominance – the measures might be presented as stopping short of war, however in reality the impact they cast go well beyond a hot conflict. Take the case of Iran where exclusion from SWIFT system hindered access to COVID19 vaccines, for example. These types of damages do not take place in a war; because war has its rules of conduct and law of war extends ultimate protection on the civilians. Sanctions, in contrast, take place in peace time, hence, despite being a *de facto* form of economic war, they do not fall under law of war. Being immune from rules of war, sanctions give an upper hand to the sender to display power in a Foucauldian way.

The case studies for this research are Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia and North Korea. Without entering into political and/or historical debates, the countries are roughly taken from various geographical areas of planet earth and selection of the countries is made with regards to the sanctions being contemporary samples as target countries. In this respect, Egypt was sanctioned due mainly to the ambitious plans of Nasser, and being the only Cold War sanctions measures analyzed here, it is an interesting case of non-UN sanctions. Another country that has met with sanctions during Cold War is Iran; however here we will be analyzing the nuclear-related sanctions measures and try to demonstrate how these measures have been employed with a Foucauldian perspective. Same goes with Russia -- the measures imposed by the West after the Crimea case is taken to see the impact of the sanctions on a “great power.” Afghanistan and Taliban-related sanctions are analyzed for purposes of seeing whether Islam has anything to do with the reaction of the society to the measures. Lastly, North Korea is covered in this research with the purpose of uncovering the

normalization of life under sanctions, which have been ongoing since the birth of the country.

After a literature review, the following chapters will first look at the sanctions measures for each country, how the road to sanctions were paved and what type of measures were employed will be summarized. Afterwards, each chapter will analyze the sanctions from security, administrative-technical, socioeconomical and cultural dimensions. In each dimension the non-Western discourse and Orientalist notions, Foucauldian approach to sanctions, paternalism and otherization between the West and the East will be underlined; concluding that sanctions indeed do not necessarily stop short of war, they operate in a grey area unregulated by international law, and they are delicately designed through discourse as a disciplinary measure in order to have the flexibility to go beyond war.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL POLITICS OF SANCTIONS

This research covers economic sanctions.⁶⁶ From this limited perspective, a discussion of sanctions should also envelop a discussion of globalization. At theoretical level, there still exists the principle of sovereignty; however, in practice, globalization envelopes new means and ways to eradicate the Westphalian conceptualization of sovereignty. The financial interdependence giving rise to “butterfly effect” type of a spill over⁶⁷ is just one aspect of eradicating sovereignty. Despite states *de jure* are still considered to be “sovereign equals,”⁶⁸ *de facto* sovereignty has transformed into an “organized hypocrisy.”⁶⁹ The increasing difficulty to control the borders not only

⁶⁶ Even the economic measures have multiple facets like export sanctions (embargoes), import sanctions (tariffs), arms-trade limitations, financial sanctions (asset and/or investment freeze) etc. Hakimdavar, *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development*, esp p. 23. Also see Kaya, *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi*, esp 21-34.

⁶⁷ On the topic of interconnectedness, see *inter* Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Jörg Mayer, *The Growing Interdependence between Financial and Commodity Markets* (Geneva: United Nations, 2009). For a regional point of view, also see David Oladipupo Kuranga, *The Power of Interdependence: Lessons from Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Christopher M. Davidson, *The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence* (London: Hurst, 2010).

⁶⁸ UN Charter, Article 2:1.

⁶⁹ Stephan Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2001), 19. Also see Christopher Bickerton, Philip

against other state(s)'s interventions,⁷⁰ but also against terrorist attacks⁷¹ and even smugglers⁷² significantly mark that globalization cannot be defined only by liberalism – this is why especially since September 11, 2001, realism and its security-based notions (re)gained importance.

September 11, or 9-11, changed the understanding of security considerably. Security is first priority now, it triumphs over all other topics including liberty. Additionally, “security is about life and death, about survival, and the conditions of life depend on

Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch, eds., *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations* (London: UCL Press, 2007); Richard Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problématique,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 2 (1988); and Stephan Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2001), for a criticism of the very concept of sovereignty. Wallace also offers the concept of “pooled sovereignty” to reflect the experience of the EU. See Hellen Wallace, Mark Pollack, and Alasdair Young, *Policy-Making in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 6th edition), esp. chap.4.

⁷⁰ Other than the UN-recognized self and collective defense, recently a new generation of theories arose. Known as “R2P – responsibility to protect,” basic idea behind these theories is that even if the target state does not invite the international community to put an end to the atrocities, and even if there is no consensus of the international public opinion for the need to intervene, there still is a universal “duty of care” to be exercised towards the people of other states. Such an approach marks further erosion of sovereignty in the sense that the leaders are not immune at domestic sphere; they are accountable not only to their population but also to the international community. See Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002); Philip Cunliffe, “Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility,” in *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*, ed. Christopher Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (London: UCL Press, 2007); Christian Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2001), and Louise Arbour, “The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice,” *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008).

⁷¹ The September 11, 2001 is a good example for inability even of oceans to protect a nation from terrorism.

⁷² See Naim’s *Illicit*, where he illustrates aptly how easy it is to operate a nuclear smuggling network at international level. Moisés Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy* (London: Arrow, 2007).

the existence of life itself. Therefore, liberty and democracy as conditions of life are consequential and derivative, as they depend on security for life to exist.”⁷³ And security became such a high-topic that only an exclusive group of experts can handle:⁷⁴ “[t]he fact that within sociology or law departments, security may mean *social* security and refer to the protection of individuals against accidents at work ... by legal regimes of administrative norms, was just incomprehensible.”⁷⁵

This research agrees that security notions triumphed over others. Nonetheless, it will argue that constructivism rather than realism is steering the sanctions. Being used as modern times’ weapon of mass destruction,⁷⁶ sanctions “act[] as unconscionable tool[s] by which stronger regional [or extra-regional] actors may subvert the will of weaker states.”⁷⁷ Despite sanctions are defined as measures short of war, as Woodrow Wilson put it back in 1919,

a nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force ... It is a terrible

⁷³ Didier Bigo, “Delivering Liberty and Security? The Reforming of Freedom when Associated with Security,” in *Europe’s 21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty*, ed. Didier Bigo, Sergio Camera, Elspeth Guild, R. B. J. Walker (England, USA: Ashgate, 2010), 263.

⁷⁴ Bigo mentions about “professional *managers* of unease.” *Emphasis* original. Didier Bigo, “Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon,” in *Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (in)Security Games*, p. 8.

⁷⁵ Didier Bigo, “Michel Foucault and International Relations: Cannibal Relations,” in *Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies of World Politics*, ed. Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo, Frederic Gros (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 39.

⁷⁶ John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (1999): 43–53.

⁷⁷ Hakimdavar, *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development*, 27.

remedy. It does not cost a life *outside* the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgement, no modern nation could resist.⁷⁸

Almost a century later, Noam Chomsky also is of the same opinion as he notes that “[t]he sanctions are virtually a blockade, which is an act of war.” Along with the main argument of this research, he continues: “[i]t is a U.S./European act, not the world’s.”⁷⁹

In other words, despite sanctions are defined as measures being short of war, in practice there is a *de facto* war. It should be noted that the word “war” is frequently employed for diluted meanings to indicate “a campaign, policy or commitment ... [like] ‘War on Drugs’ and ‘War against Poverty’.”⁸⁰ War has its own rules and regulating laws, and even there is a war, as Clausewitz says, there is a continuation of diplomacy.⁸¹ It is argued here that sanctions were introduced into the international toolbox as a popular tool by the West as part of what Halliday calls as “astraturfing;”⁸² and are still resorted quite often by the West against the non-Western countries, demonstrating a Foucauldian disciplinary measure carrying Orientalist notions.

⁷⁸ Quoted in Hakimdavar, *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development*, 79.

⁷⁹ Noam Chomsky and Andre Vltychek, *On Western Terrorism* (New York: Pluto Press, 2013), 124.

⁸⁰ Fred Halliday, *Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror and Jihad have Changed the English Language* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 33.

⁸¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).

⁸² Halliday, *Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror and Jihad have Changed the English Language*, 287. He defines astraturfing as “threat inflation, e.g. fabricating a threat of WMDs and then creating a national security crisis that requires urgent and costly action.”

This chapter is dedicated to a quick review of the literature on sanctions. In all cases, a sanctions measure requires two sides; one is the sanctions imposer, i.e. sender, whereas the other side is the target. Individual countries, country groups as well as international organizations can resort to sanctions. The decision to sanction, even of one single sender, can have basis in the international system as the UN Charter allows utilization of sanctions by individual countries. Yet, countries can also implement sanctions without resorting to the UN. The US and EU sanctions will be taken as “unilateral,” whereas the UN sanctions as “multilateral.”

It should be noted that each sender has its own means and ways, consequently the design of the sanctions measures depends on which actor plays the role of the sender. To illustrate the difference, Kagan for example labels the US as Martian, and the EU as Venutian.⁸³ There have also been scholars criticizing US as being a “trigger happy sheriff.”⁸⁴ Both the EU and US’s methods for sanctioning will be analyzed below together with the evolution of sanctions in time from blanket-type classical sanctions to new generation, so-called smart, sanctions.⁸⁵ Below parts will evaluate on sanctions from theory, actor, method and time dimensions as part of the literature review.

⁸³ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

⁸⁴ Karen A. Feste, *Intervention: Shaping the Global Order* (USA: Praeger, 2003), esp. 18-9. Also see F. Heisbourg, “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad,” *Survival* 41, no. 4 (January 1999): 5–19.

⁸⁵ Halliday defines smart sanctions as “[m]easures that target the leadership of a state and their failures rather than the whole population,” adding that they are “[n]ever known to be effective.” Halliday, *Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror and Jihad have Changed the English Language*, 308.

2.1. Theoretical Approaches to Sanctions

Realism is the main theory of International Relations discipline and dates back to the period of the Peloponnesian War. Back then, the historian Thucydides laid the foundations of realism with his famous words as “might makes right” – i.e. strong do what they can while weak suffer what they must.⁸⁶

In this regard, international relations is an exercise of power, a venture and use of force by the states.⁸⁷ Consequently, politics ends up being a continuous quest for power as “distribution of power is the primary cause of war and peace.”⁸⁸

In any case, realists consider the state as the main actor of the game. Accordingly, states are sovereign equals; hence there is an absence of hierarchy in the international sphere.⁸⁹ Sovereign equality is not only a realist term, it also enjoys an enduring presence in history as “the contemporary Westphalian system holds that sovereign

⁸⁶ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Chaw (Auckland, N.Z.: Floating Pres, 2008).

⁸⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, 5th edition), 27.

⁸⁸ D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 66.

⁸⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 97. As he observes, “national politics consists of differentiated units performing specified functions, international politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities.” Ibid.

states are equal in effectiveness, status and legitimacy. In reality, states are not of equal worth and significance, either militarily, economically, politically or morally.”⁹⁰

Realists perceive this inequality as a *modus operandi* of International Relations. “According to realists, what allows ‘might makes right’ to be an unfortunate but enduring feature of global politics is the absence of a higher authority to protect and dispense justice equitably.”⁹¹ This absence ends up with lack of order in international sphere, which, in turn, ends up with anarchy, a situation where there is no central ruler.⁹²

Realism assumes states also are rational actors, hence they seek for the maximum power to ensure their own security – in the end, in an anarchical world, differences between states “are of capability, not function.”⁹³ In such a context, all one can count on is “self-help.” However, a state’s search for its own security creates insecurity for

⁹⁰ Ramesh Thakur, “Managing the Nuclear Threat after Iraq: Is It Time to Replace the NPT Paradigm?,” in *Arms Control after Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges*, ed. Wagehuru Pah Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo, N.Y., Paris: UNU, 2006), 7.

⁹¹ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism,” in *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 14.

⁹² D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 66.

⁹³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 107.

the others.⁹⁴ This introduces an inherent paradox of realism, known as the security dilemma.⁹⁵

Consequently, a realist reading of international relations gives priority to “security” and therefore pushes for strict sanctions regimes whereby mighty can get what it wants and weaker suffers what it should. However, realism also acknowledges that just like one cannot trust on the target country, one can also not trust on the other sender countries. In the end, the international sphere is not about *pacta sunt servanda*, therefore the target will look for alternative sellers, and sooner or later there will be a state or nonstate actor that is ready and willing to provide the item whose trade is blocked under economic sanctions.⁹⁶

The assumption here is that scarcity will push the prices upwards, increase in the price will attract new actors hence boost competition, and either legitimate or illegitimate sellers will fill the gap. In case of nuclears, for example, the network of A. Q. Khan is notoriously successful in providing not only the materials but also the design, plans

⁹⁴ Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev, “Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: From Realism to Rationalism,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (2006) for a different perspective of realist notions.

⁹⁵ John H Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). He argues that nuclear weapons destroyed impermeability of the sovereign state, so traditional balance of power politics become obsolete. See John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University, 1959).

⁹⁶ This indeed is where the literature on unilateral sanctions steps in. Also see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (II: Washington, DC, 1990, 2nd edition), esp. chap. 2, “Analyzing the Utility of Sanctions.” Authors maintain that due to the difficulty of concerting with others, unilateral sanctions turn out to be more effective. See below part on “Sanctions and Actors.”

and know-how required for a WMD-project.⁹⁷ As a result, if the unavoidable consequence is the target reaching at the item, why should the sender at the first place not supply it, hence collect the benefits the other suppliers would otherwise get?

This brings the liberal theories into the picture. Taking exactly the same conflict-generating “state of nature” assumption of realism, liberalism maintains that by creating state and by getting out of the state of nature, individuals proved that “despite their self-interest, [they] are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society.”⁹⁸ Kant for example, claims that individuals can form a republican peace where states will cooperate because alternative would be “a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried.”⁹⁹

By 1970s, liberal theories began to invest more and more on institutionalism. This line of thinking is closer to the (neo)realist assumptions in the sense that “they accepted anarchy and the rational egoism of states,”¹⁰⁰ yet still looked for ways to ensure cooperation among egoists. In order to ensure cooperation, they focused on solving

⁹⁷ Abdul Qadir Khan network is the most famous black-marketer in the realm of proliferation. See William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan,” *The Atlantic*, 2005.

⁹⁸ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd edition), 96. Kant for example, claims that individuals can form a republican peace where states will cooperate because alternative would be “a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried.” Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, trans. H. S. Reiss and H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 105.

⁹⁹ Kant, *Political Writings*, 105.

¹⁰⁰ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 4th edition), 46.

the problem of free-riding and prisoner's dilemma,¹⁰¹ and introduced institutions as a way to bolster creation and maintenance of an international system that does not succumb into anarchy. "Institutions make up for lack of trust ... [through] providing a flow of information between their member states,"¹⁰² therefore they ease the analysis of gains from the game and enable members the long term interests in cooperation.¹⁰³

There are scholars indeed who are "convinced that international organizations may constrain state behavior and significantly affect international outcomes."¹⁰⁴ Idea is that increased ties and interconnectedness automatically translates itself into cooperation,

¹⁰¹ Needless to list the whole literature here; enough to pay tribute to John Nash. See, *inter alia*, Roger B. Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Robert Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957). Also see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

¹⁰² Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 110.

¹⁰³ Information is an important aspect of international politics. Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz claim that target, being a rational actor, may have perfect information yet still ignore the consequences of sanctions, or underestimated their potency as it calculates sanctions be more costly for the sender than for itself, or it "erroneously believes they will be imposed and sustained regardless of whether it yields." Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby and Detlef F. Sprinz, "When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?," *World Politics* 57 (2005): 485-9. Here assumption of perfect information is important. In an environment of imperfect information, A may believe B is potentially aggressive and impose sanctions. B, then, even if it was a peaceful state, would "be pushed towards a more assertive foreign policy." Dale Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of Cold War 1985-91," in *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence and National Security*, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, Norrin M. Ripsman (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 23.

¹⁰⁴ Paolo Spadoni, *Failed Sanctions: Why the U.S. Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work* (US: University Press of Florida, 2010), xxx. Also see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

because “higher levels of interdependence make the costs of defection more burdensome.”¹⁰⁵

Applying liberalism in order to understand the sanctions is both easy and difficult. To start with, sanctions are commonly classified into three general compartments: import sanctions, export sanctions and financial sanctions,¹⁰⁶ and all of these mechanisms run contrary to the Kantian idea of trade bringing peace. Moreover, as they are used by Western countries and target non-Western ones, they tend to serve for the theory of “clash of civilizations.”¹⁰⁷ Still, it is easy to benefit from liberalism, because cooperation is there at international level. There is the UN which provides global security through its Charter¹⁰⁸ as well as through the Security Council Resolutions.¹⁰⁹ Therefore states cooperate against a common security problem; and the international regimes help preventing cheating.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Spadoni, *Failed States*, xx.

¹⁰⁶ Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 63. Also see chap. 4 of the book.

¹⁰⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London, N.Y.: Simon&Schuster, 1996).

¹⁰⁸ UN Charter Article 51 on collective security is an example of security of a state being provided by the international community, not by itself or its unilateral self-help attempts.

¹⁰⁹ UNSCRs are binding upon members; UN members (at least in theory) have no option to avoid or deviate from implementing the resolutions in due diligence.

¹¹⁰ However, the same cooperation does not stretch to the level of non-state actors. Above the Khan-network has already been mentioned; and it is just the network we know. There probably are many others of smaller or bigger scale that are engaged in the lucrative business of black market; and the more sanctions measures introduced, the more important actors these networks will become. Then, we will be operating in a world of security vacuum – a vacuum where

Here comes the question of defining a security problem. Liberals focus on the possibility of cooperation and peace, and realists focus on anarchy and the resulting security problem. A common point in both theories is that they assume the “actors act in this pregiven world [of conflict or cooperation] according to the demands of instrumental reason.” Hence, these theories form parts of mainstream approaches that are known as rationalist/positivist approaches.¹¹¹ Naturally, the alternative approaches like constructivism are known as the non-rationalist/post-positivist approaches.

As part of these new approaches, constructivist theories entered into the IR debates with the end of the Cold War.¹¹² The failure of rationalist theories in explaining systemic transformations give rise to a new group of scholars “who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically informed theoretical developments.”¹¹³ As a result, in contrast to rationalism, which focuses on economic or military power, constructivism looks at the purpose, i.e. “the goals that actors pursue with the power they have, however power is defined.”¹¹⁴

institutions could not help filling, and where self-help will triumph over liberal notions of trade, common interests, cooperation and peace.

¹¹¹ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.

¹¹² See Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde İngiliz Okulu Kuramı: Kökenleri, Kavramları ve Tartışmaları,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 7, no. 25 (2010), and Barry Buzan, “Culture and International Society,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 1 (2010).

¹¹³ Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in *Theories of International Relations* (US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 219.

¹¹⁴ D’Anieri, *International Politics*, p. 103.

Inspired by sociology, constructivist theories maintain that anarchy is not an unavoidable feature of international reality; it is “what states make of it.”¹¹⁵ This approach is based on the actor’s ability to shape the system, but it does (or can) not deny the fact that the system has the ability to shape the actors’ behaviors too. Hence, constructivist theories unavoidably rest on “the existence of *a priori* reality.”¹¹⁶ Though this seems to be problematic at the theoretical level as the theory does not offer a complete but rather a “limited construction” at international system, a typical example of constructivist theories is securitization.

Securitization is associated with the Copenhagen School, which has Barry Buzan and Ole Waever at its core. According to them, security is a discursive concept that

is drawn from its constitution within *national* security discourse, which implies an emphasis on authority, the confronting –and construction- of threats and enemies, an ability to make decisions and the adoption of emergency measures. Security has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does something – *securitize*- rather than an objective (or subjective) condition.¹¹⁷

A good metaphor to start with explaining his theory is that it takes two to dance, but one to “securitize.” In search for its survival, state as an actor in international arena has always been successful in defining something as the threat, if not as the enemy. It has been an issue deeply elaborated by constructivist approaches to international relations theories. This approach claims that

¹¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992).

¹¹⁶ Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p. 10.

¹¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 213-4.

self-help, power politics, sovereignty, and similar concepts [have] been socially constructed or [have] evolved under the anarchy of international relations and world politics. They are not inevitable or essential attributes of international politics, but rather have been socially constructed.¹¹⁸

This research argues that the choice of politics behind the sanctions is an embedded understanding of “West” as healthy/normal us, and the rest being “non-West” as the leper/abnormal other. The West and non-West discussion is aptly elaborated by Edward Said. In his prominent work *Orientalism*,¹¹⁹ Said analyzed the crippled approach towards the “Orient” in detail. His argument is that the Middle East has been studied through Eurocentric lenses that makes the Middle East perceived as the “inferior other.” This prejudice against peoples and their culture, he maintains, culminated into a justification for imperialism. This prejudice is focal point of this research that will benefit from social critical theories which “seeks to provoke discussions about relations of power and practices of authorization in ways that do not simply condone or justify established categories and classifications.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations and World Politics* (Boston, Mass.; Columbus, Ohio; Indianapolis, Ind.: Longman Pearson, 2012, 5th edition), 249. Also see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 32. Also see Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (Columbia: University of Columbia Press, 1993, 2nd edition); and Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991, 2nd edition); as well as his “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 327.

¹¹⁹ Said, *Orientalism*.

¹²⁰ Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and R. B. J. Walker, “Transversal Lines: An Introduction,” in *International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines*, ed. Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and R. B. J. Walker (London, New York: Routledge, 2017), 4.

Equally important to Said is Foucault. While Said's *Orientalism* will be the guiding approach in this research, Foucault's understanding of discourse and power will help us building the main argument. In the end, "[c]ontemporary forms of (in)security ...aim[s] at guaranteeing the highest possible security and freedom to the majority and ... segregate it from an 'abnormal' minority to be controlled and surveiled."¹²¹ Foucault's study of plague analyzes the processes of branding and dividing the normal from abnormal. Then he studies how the abnormal first is contained and then corrected. Further detailed in the following section, Foucault's binary branding is the starting point of this research. The West-East discursive branding is based not on geography but on politics. This branding presents the West as normal and East as unhealthy, abnormal "other." This branding requires also "supervis[ion] and correct[ion of] the abnormal [which] brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms."¹²² This research will take sanctions as mechanisms designed to discipline the non-West, sustain the binary branding through speech acts and also to maintain the power relations in between the parties. In the end, "[p]ower exists only when it is put into action,"¹²³ and sanctions are used as a tool by the West against the non-West to exercise disciplinary power.

¹²¹ Bigo, "Michel Foucault and International Relations: Cannibal Relations," 50.

¹²² Michel Foucault, "'Panopticism' from 'Discipline&Punish: The Birth of the Prison,'" *Race / Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts* 2, no. 1 (2008): 5.

¹²³ Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 788.

It is worth noting that while Foucault put 17-19th centuries as establishment of a threshold which marks universalization of European/Western discourse,¹²⁴ he did not make references to international sphere or International Relations discipline. “Although Foucault remained silent about IR, IR has not ignored the philosopher-historian, his methods and concepts.”¹²⁵ Nonetheless, most of the engagement were through translations of French originals, hence “some of the terminologies Foucault developed have been in turn cannibalized”¹²⁶ while Foucault,

by proposing different ‘thinking tools,’ ... de facto *cannibalized* political science and IR by ‘devouring’ their topics, by questioning differently sovereignty, territory, population, as well as criticizing the focus on state power, so often reduced to an essence and conceived as a unified and homogenous ‘actor.’¹²⁷

This research, to borrow from Bigo, is yet another attempt to cannibalize Foucault. His concept of disciplinary power, if and when applied fully and successfully at international level, would correspond to Hedley Bull’s world society¹²⁸ or Kant’s

¹²⁴ Philippe Bonditti, “Introduction: the International as an Object for Thought,” in *Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies of World Politics*, ed. Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo, Frederic Gros (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 5.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 8.

¹²⁶ Bigo, “Michel Foucault and International Relations: Cannibal Relations,” 36.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 35.

¹²⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 3rd edition).

perpetual peace.¹²⁹ Nonetheless, contemporary era is close to neither; instead of a world order, world system of Wallerstein¹³⁰ is in place. Wallerstein's theory lies in economics, yet the tension in between core and periphery is visible in political sphere between senders being core and targets being in periphery.

Speaking of Wallerstein, it may be a timely stop to discuss Hegemonic Stability Theory also here. The theory proposes that international system is more likely to be stable when there is one dominant power – hegemon. However, in 21st century, multipolar world, it is different to mention about a hegemon. While according to the theory the hegemon can provide an order that is to the benefit of all, an order that is even more beneficial to small states which exploit the great¹³¹ as they tend to be free riders. In most studies “[t]he security implications of international stability and liberalization in an era of presumed US decline have largely been ignored.”¹³² That is because, despite scholars agree on US hegemony up till 1970s, after that decline of US as *the* hegemon the researches focused not only on eradication of common goods and “largely assumed that what is at stake [is] absolute gains;” but also “exclusively on relations among capitalist countries, ignoring the existence of a largely independent

¹²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Ebedî Barış Üzerine Felsefî Deneme*, trans. Yavuz Abadan and Seha L. Meray (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaası, 1960).

¹³⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Amerikan Gücünün Gerileyişi: Kaotik Bir Dünyada ABD*, trans. Tuncay Birkan (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004).

¹³¹ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard Economic Studies, 2002, 20th printing), 3, 29, 169-70.

¹³² Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 785.

and adversarial Soviet bloc.”¹³³ In other words, by “ignor[ing] relative gains which are at the heart of security studies,” and by prioritizing Western capitalist structure,¹³⁴ Hegemonic Stability Theory¹³⁵ also contributes to a cultural perspective that is defined as Orientalism.

2.2. Sanctions and Actors

Classical approach argues that sanctions are measures stopping short of war, and can/should be resorted when dialogue does not provide desired change in the behavior. Taken as such, sanctions are not mechanisms designed for punishment, but for exercise of political pressure with the aim of making target states alter their policies towards certain directions.¹³⁶

Classical approach goes also for cooperation in sanctions. To put simply, the more countries impose sanctions to a target, the higher the odds for the sanctions to bite. There are, however, two basic problems with this approach. First is that, even liberal theories that go for cooperation would fail to stay tight against cheating. Additionally, liberals, who look for free trade, are supposed to resist sanctions that distort smooth

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ For Hegemonic Stability Theory see *inter alia* Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane and Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence*; Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 2 (April 1989).

¹³⁶ Sven B. Gareis, *The United Nations: An Introduction* (US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 2nd edition), 130.

flow of international transactions which cost business interests to the companies of the sender(s). Also, sanctions push prices for transactions (say, import price of a good) upwards, and economic theory dictates that if price increases, there also occurs an increase in supply.¹³⁷ “Moreover, any distortion of prices of traded goods caused by sanctions inevitably creates opportunities for non-sanctioning third parties, transshippers and smugglers to capture rents by continuing to trade with the target,”¹³⁸ the trade in this case being in the form of “purchasing the target’s exports below the world price and selling the target’s imports above the world price.”¹³⁹

While the first problem relates basically to the inability to ensure full cooperation and to prevent black market from filling the gap, the second problem tilts more towards the economics of sanctions relations. Research indicates that not only the target but also the sender state(s) is worse off in post-sanctions period in terms of trade statistics. Nonetheless, the amount of costs, or the degree of the harm inflicted on each state “depends on the number and size of other countries willing to continue trading and on the elasticity of the trade offers of those countries.”¹⁴⁰ In the end, for sanctions to be effective, the “target should not be able to absorb the costs of the disrupted relationship

¹³⁷ Note that in this hypothetical case, sanctions prevent perfect competition, hence market conditions taken as *ceteris paribus* for economic theories do not apply for a country under sanctions. In this market, there is what is called as “sanctions rent.” William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions,” in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (Netherlands: Elsevier, 2007), 883.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 875. The secondary sanctions have been introduced with the idea to prevent such circumventions. See below part on “Methods of Sanctions.”

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

more easily, or for a longer period of time.”¹⁴¹ This takes us automatically to the conclusion that in the end, “[u]nilateral sanctions create a smaller deterioration in the target’s terms of trade than do sanctions involving a large number of participant countries.”¹⁴² A new literature, however, claims that sanctions are more effective if they are implemented by lesser number of countries.

Hufbauer and colleagues argue that US unilateral sanctions proved to be more effective than multilateral sanctions. That is simply because multilateral sanctions are complex to put in action.¹⁴³ Yet, the problem with unilateral sanctions is the political allies. A good example for this can be the “pipeline sanctions” of the Reagan administration against European countries of the Western block with deep frustration over

the unwillingness of its allies to abandon a Soviet-European project to transport Siberian natural gas to Western Europe, the United States sought to coerce their compliance by extending technology sanctions to the foreign subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Joseph Lepage and Miroslav Nincic, *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 30. Sanctions are also demonstrated to be effective when costs to sender are low while to target is high. Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers, “Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics,” *American Economic Review* 89, no. 2 (May 1999).

¹⁴² Lepage and Nincic, *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance*, 30. Also see Kaya, *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi*, 57-9.

¹⁴³ Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

¹⁴⁴ Kenneth A. Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft* (N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 2. Also see Kaya, *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi*, 54-5.

However, not only target countries, but also the private actors effectively blocked the sanctions. In the end the US had to withdraw these measures. The result of this failure was the initiation of “secondary sanctions,” which we shall elaborate further below.

Hufbauer and colleagues’s study indicates that the US’s use of sanctions takes the scene “precisely because [the US is] big and can seek to influence events on a global scale.” For sake of asserting leadership, “US presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even when the likelihood of changing the target country’s behavior is remote.” The authors even allude to the “white men’s burden,”¹⁴⁵ as they argue that “sanctions often are imposed because the cost of inaction –in terms of lost confidence both at home and abroad in the ability or willingness of the United States to act- is seen greater than the cost of the sanctions.”¹⁴⁶

While the unilateral sanctions of the US have long been under discussion, there recently emerged a new discussion on how the EU is implementing sanctions. This discussion parallels the new generation of sanctions, called also as “targeted sanctions” where the EU can “single out individuals (i.e. former government officials and rebel leaders) in specific regions instead of pursuing some form of collective punishment. The price paid has been relatively small compared to the pressure and costs imposed”

¹⁴⁵ Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden, 1899,” *Part 2: The Modern World in the Twentieth Century of World History -II Course Syllabus of University of Delaware*, undated, <http://www1.udel.edu/History-old/figal/Hist104/assets/pdf/readings/11whitemanburden.pdf> (accessed on January 31, 2021).

¹⁴⁶ Above paragraph from Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 5.

on the target country,¹⁴⁷ and this has modified the traditional rationale of getting “political gain through economic pain.”¹⁴⁸ This, however, does not guarantee success in terms of accomplishment of a behavioral change through sanctions. In other words, sanctions still may end up being ineffective. One sample is Russia: Sanctions cost Russia a lot, however “Putin is not thinking like an accountant, but like a politician. ...he can live with the international diplomatic costs for now, and in any case, believes that most diplomatic sanctions will come to an end sooner than later.”¹⁴⁹

Though it implements sanctions, the EU, like the UN, does not use the word “sanctions.” Officially, they are referred as “restrictive measures,” and “sanctions” are used as a term only in connection to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As is well observed, the tools are various, nonetheless

[o]ther negative conditionality measures are not referred to as ‘sanctions’. Reductions in aid or suspension of trade preferences adopted under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement are referred to as ‘appropriate measures’. In the context of the European Neighborhood Policy, which governs the EU’s relations with Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, North Africa and the Levant, the phrase ‘less for less’ is preferred. The

¹⁴⁷ Francesco Giumelli, “Sanctioning Russia: The Right Questions,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, February 13, 2015, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sanctioning-russia-right-questions> (accessed on January 31, 2021), 2.

¹⁴⁸ Ondrej Ditrich, “Good Cop or Bad Cop? Sanctioning Belarus,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, March 4, 2013, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/good-cop-or-bad-cop-sanctioning-belarus> (accessed on January 31, 2021), 3.

¹⁴⁹ Nicu Popescu, “After Crimea: Putin’s Balance Sheet,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, April 4, 2014, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/after-crimea-putin%E2%80%99s-balance-sheet> (accessed on January 31, 2021), 2.

withdrawal of the application of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) from beneficiaries is not referred to as a sanction either.¹⁵⁰

Through the glasses of the target country, though, those measures can well be considered as sanctions too. They not only match the academic definition of sanctions, but also are “regarded and portrayed as sanctions by targeted parties.”¹⁵¹ As the regime in the target country has the ability to monopolize the discourse, it can well present the sanctions as the reason of all the daily sufferings of the population. To avoid the measures from turning into a scapegoat at the service of the regime, targeted sanctions are designed in a way to minimize humanitarian consequences and avoid criminalization of society by “putting the punitive spotlight on members of the leadership and the elites.”¹⁵²

While there is literature on US unilateral sanctions being more effective because multilateral sanctions are complex to put in action,¹⁵³ multilateral sanctions embraced by the United Nations indeed bear further credibility under international law. Established in 1945, the United Nations is an international political organization. Its founding document, the UN Charter, starts with a statement of the purposes of the Organization, which are maintaining peace and security, developing friendly relations

¹⁵⁰ Clara Portela, “The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness,” *Centre for European Policy Studies*, March 11, 2014, <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eus-use-targeted-sanctions-evaluating-effectiveness/> (accessed on January 31, 2021), 4.

¹⁵¹ Portela, “The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness,” 4. A good sample of withdrawal amounting to sanctions is decline of financement for Aswan Dam, which is elaborated below in case-study of Egypt.

¹⁵² Portela, “The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness,” 7.

¹⁵³ Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

among members, achieving international cooperation, and being a forum for harmonizing the actions of the nations. The first paragraph of Article 1 is interesting in the sense that it focuses on preservation of peace and security, and notes that the purposes of the United Nations are

to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.¹⁵⁴

Notice should be made, however, that the very concept of “peace,” which is repeated five times only in this paragraph, and 52 times throughout the Charter, has no precise definition embedded anywhere along the 111 articles of the Charter.¹⁵⁵ This means that peace is something subjective; it is determined according to the perceptions of each nation of its own surrounding environment. The same goes for security, which, especially after the September 11, 2001, became one of the favorite topics of the disciplinary studies on international politics. To put it differently, both peace and security are “constructed.”

The UN Charter makes it clear that the Resolutions of the Security Council are binding on all members,¹⁵⁶ and maintains clearly that it is the Security Council that “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression

¹⁵⁴ UN Charter, Article 1:1.

¹⁵⁵ Gareis, *The United Nations: An Introduction*, 18.

¹⁵⁶ Article 25 of the UN Charter reads as: “The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, ..., to restore international peace and security.”¹⁵⁷ This means that, *the security elite* of the international politics is the UNSC, especially the P5, where the concepts of peace, security and breach are constantly discussed, identified, evaluated and re-identified.

Having determined who decides if and when there is a breach, the next step for our discussion is what happens in case of a breach of international peace and security.

The UN Charter in Article 4.1 maintains that the membership is open to all “peace loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter.” Hence, there is a tacit assumption that all the members of the UN are by nature “peace loving” ones¹⁵⁸ and allows use of force only in cases of self and/or collective defense. Article 51 regulates how the self and collective defense measures can be taken. In line with this, a state initiating self-defense does not have an open cheque: it has to report to the Security Council about the measures taken, observe proportionality principle, and withdraw these measures when Security Council initiates collective security measures.¹⁵⁹ Still, “[w]hat was meant to emphasize the subsidiary character of self-defense within the framework of a collective security system has never, in practice,

¹⁵⁷ UN Charter, Article 39.

¹⁵⁸ A little exemption can be found in Article 53 and 107, which refer to the concept of “enemy states.” As the way they are defined in Article 53:2, enemy states are basically the enemies of one of the signatories of the UN Charter during the World War 2. They list as Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan and Romania, and by definition, following their membership to the UN, they became “peace loving” states too. Later on, a 1995 General Assembly Resolution (50/52) called for the “enemy state” clauses to be deleted from the Charter. See Gareis, *The United Nations: An Introduction*, 74-5 for further discussion.

¹⁵⁹ Gareis, *The United Nations: An Introduction*, 74.

resulted in a state's self-defense measures being suspended as a consequence of UN involvement.”¹⁶⁰

Article 42 allows the Security Council to decide on taking military measures in order to fix the breaches of peace and security. Still, the measures are not limited with military options. In reality, the main principle of the UN Charter is the peaceful settlement of disputes,¹⁶¹ and the Security Council should resort to military options after consuming non-military options enshrined in Article 41. Accordingly, the UN Charter allows utilization of sanctions, i.e. measures including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and severance of diplomatic relations.”¹⁶² This, however, is not a *carte blanche*, a prior step to be taken before resorting to Article 41 measures is getting authorization of the Security Council following its determination of the “existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.”¹⁶³

Having elaborated on the senders of the sanctions, next part will look at the methods employed in designing a sanctions measure.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ UN Charter, Article 2:3, detailed further in Chapter VI of the Charter.

¹⁶² UN Charter, Article 41.

¹⁶³ UN Charter, Article 39. Also see Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions*, 64-5.

2.3. Methods of Sanctions

By methods, what is meant here is a sanctions regime implemented towards the target or towards anyone that has a relationship with the target. Difference in between the two methods is that while the former aims only at the target country while the latter takes multiple aims and shoots any other country that continues to trade with the target. Logically, the latter is broader in scope and fiercer in impact, though is harder to implement properly and consistently.

In a globalized world, sanctions are not easy to apply against third countries. The interests in “taming” the target may backfire by costing friendly relations with other states.¹⁶⁴ Still, it is not a game only for politics; economics is also active in the discussion: Globalization induces cross-border ownership and multinational mergers by making “in many instances, ‘their’ corporations ...part of ‘our’ corporations,” making it difficult to designate who exactly wins and who loses from the sanctions.¹⁶⁵ In this respect, sanctions do not only affect the sanctioned country, but also the sanctioner as well as the third parties.

The relation between the target and the sender has multiple alternative options. In a primary sanction, for example, a sanctions measure is implemented by a sender directly onto the target. Primary sanctions can be uni-lateral, like the US sanctions towards Iran; or multi-lateral, like the UN sanctions towards North Korea.

¹⁶⁴ This is especially the case with secondary sanctions. See below this research, especially the case-study on Russia for the friendly-fire impact of the sanctions.

¹⁶⁵ Askari *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy*, 115.

Secondary sanctions, on the other hand, expand the target scope considerably. That is to say, they indirectly aim at the target country; “indirect”ness can cover the third countries that engage with trade or are likely to trade with the target, purpose being prevention of re-exports of initially denied items to the target country and to deter the allies of the target country from providing aid or any other type of support. In contrast with primary sanctions where the imposer and the target are directly in contact, the secondary sanctions do not limit the effect of the sanctions to the sender country’s territories; they rather place anyone who deals with the enemy into the same basket with the enemy.¹⁶⁶ A sample for such secondary, hence extraterritorial sanctions, is Iran Sanctions Act.¹⁶⁷

The unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions measures triggered a legislation by the EU to prevent unintended damages to legal and natural persons in the EU. Through “Regulation on Protecting against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country,”¹⁶⁸ it is possible to seek for damages in EU courts. The Regulations also seeks companies doing business with Iran to provide information about financial consequences of US sanctions, aim being better implementation of the Regulation. Last but not least, the Regulation introduces penalties and requires the parties as well as member states to observe it in full by word

¹⁶⁶ Rodman, *Sanctions beyond Borders*, 172.

¹⁶⁷ Since 2006, Iran Sanctions Act; before that Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. The sanctions were incorporated under “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act” under the name of “Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017.”

¹⁶⁸ Council Regulation 2271/96, 22 November 1996

and spirit, hence prevent EU companies from abiding by US sanctions and disregard EU legislation.¹⁶⁹ In practice, what is at hand is overcompliance, like Nike abstaining from providing shoes to Iranian national team.¹⁷⁰

The sanctions on Iran will be discussed in detail in below chapters. Hence here a different case will be touched upon: Following the establishment of Israel, the Arab League obliged companies operating in Arab states not to operate in Israel. This obligation forced companies to design their market-entrance policies accordingly. “As a result, there were a number of high-profile U.S. companies, such as Coca-Cola and Ford that for a number of years had no presence in Arab countries;” and others like General Motors and JP Morgan, abstaining from entering into Israeli market.¹⁷¹ But enforcement was discretionary – General Electric had business in Israel, but Arabs did not ban it. Similarly, Hilton ignored the embargo and built a hotel in Tel Aviv -- leave aside having adverse consequences, “Hilton hotels became as common as minarets in the Middle East.”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Kaya, *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi*, esp 62-5. See also the discussion of *Bank Mellat* case, esp 64-5.

¹⁷⁰ Farid Ashrafian, “FIFA World Cup: Nike Refuses to Provide Shoes to Iranian Team,” *Deutsche Welle*, June 13, 2018, Wednesday; <https://www.dw.com/en/fifa-world-cup-nike-refuses-to-provide-shoes-to-iranian-team/a-44206787> (accessed May 25, 2020).

¹⁷¹ Askari *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy*, 58.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 59.

Therefore, like the primary sanctions, the secondary sanctions do not automatically translate into being effective measures in introducing a change in the target country's policies in the desired way either. It is wishful-thinking to believe that

economic sanctions may influence the behavior of target country authorities in several different ways. Reduced international commerce for the target would reduce its general economic prosperity. The population would have less prosperity, shortages might occur, and their dissatisfaction would be turned toward their leaders. In addition, reduced economic performance would mean fewer resources to give to a country's military and elites, again weakening the leadership's power. Another effect would be less money for 'extracurricular activities,' such as support for terrorist groups.¹⁷³

Hence, sanctions are not easy to apply against third countries in a globalized world, where interests in "taming" the target may backfire by costing friendly relations with other states. Still, it is not a game only for politics; economics is also active in the discussion, because globalization, as noted above, blurs the lines between " 'their' corporations ...[and] 'our' corporations," complicating further the analysis of sanctions.¹⁷⁴ The question then becomes how to design sanctions in a smarter way.

While typical US pattern is primary/secondary sanctions, the EU, being composed of 27 different states, cannot implement sanctions without a decision from the European Council or the Council of Ministers. Hence, the EU's introduction of a new sanctions scheme takes longer, and maybe, this time lag allows sanctions to be designed in a tailor-made scheme, known as the smart (or targeted) sanctions.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ibid, 103.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 115.

¹⁷⁵ For a historical overview of introduction of smart sanctions into the toolbox, see Rose Gottemoeller, "The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory," *Survival* 49, no. 4 (December 2007).

A typical difference between the classical and smart sanctions is that the latter do not go for a blanket/overall measure but aim non-state actors, including individuals and companies, as well as specific sectors or products. “The objective is to design the restrictive measures in order to maximize their impact on the actors responsible for violations, and to minimize the unintended consequences for innocent civilians.”¹⁷⁶ The EU has three basic documents on how to implement smart sanctions – namely, Basic Principles,¹⁷⁷ Guidelines¹⁷⁸ and Best Practices¹⁷⁹ -- hence sanctions are pretty institutionalized type of measures under the umbrella of the European Union.

After the above elaboration on the differences between the UN as well as EU and US sanctions, it is worth noting that smart or targeted sanctions most of the time “produc[e] a number of unintended consequences... [including] ‘backfiring’ (strengthening the will of the target), ‘misfiring’ (humanitarian pain), ‘cross-firing’

¹⁷⁶ Francesco Giumelli, “How EU Sanctions Work: A New Narrative,” *EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Papers*, 2013, 17

¹⁷⁷ Council of the European Union, “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions),” 2004, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201> (accessed January 28, 2021).

¹⁷⁸ Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2012,” 2018, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed January 28, 2021).

¹⁷⁹ Council of the European Union, “Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) - Update of the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures,” 2018, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8519-2018-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed January 28, 2021).

(straining relations with allies) and ‘shooting in the foot’ (self-inflicted costs).”¹⁸⁰

Below part will look at the literature on whether the sanctions are useful or not.

2.4. Effectiveness of Sanctions

The discussion of the IR theories and sanctions brings us then whether sanctions are useful in terms of the declared aims. The literature is divided into two camps in analyzing the practice of sanctions. The “sanctions work” school can be taken to date back to the post World War 1 era, where there was a certain level of optimism on the effectiveness of sanctions.¹⁸¹ David Mitrany can be taken as being among the pioneers saying that sanctions were the only “economic weapon ... generally available for the enforcement of peace.”¹⁸² Nonetheless, a closer look to the interwar period shows that sanctions, especially those of the League of Nations, were not that effective.

One reason for their ineffectiveness was the lack of co-ordination between states in imposing sanctions and their failure to apply similar legal principles of liability and by coordinating regularly practices. Differences in law and regulation and in political will between states resulted in poor oversight by League members and inadequate implementation into national legislation and administrative law.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Mikael Eriksson, *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions* (England: Ashgate, 2011), 34

¹⁸¹ Francesco Giumelli, *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011), 21.

¹⁸² David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), 76.

¹⁸³ Kern Alexander, *Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 17.

In addition to the problems in implementation, the issue of circumvention is also discussed. Needless to say, at the age of globalization and complex interdependence,¹⁸⁴ a two-actor game between sender and target is not isolated from third parties. Supporters of the target, states willing to balance against the sender or the target,¹⁸⁵ rulers willing to use sanctions for domestic purposes,¹⁸⁶ development of domestic industry to fill the gap¹⁸⁷ and even black market¹⁸⁸ itself are important factors.

Besides the problems curbing the effectiveness of sanctions, there are at least three further points that can be mentioned under the camp of sanctions do not work school. First is the difficulty of fine tuning, which is related to softening or hardening the sanctions according to the changes of the behavior of the target. Fine-tuning not only

¹⁸⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. Also see their Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987).

¹⁸⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

¹⁸⁶ Sanctions on former Yugoslavia has been used as "a part of Serb mythology as propagated by the official media." Peter Wallenstein, "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited" (Uppsala University Peace Research Papers, 2000), 13. Sanctions are used to enrich the rulers or certain groups of interest (Kaempfer, and Lowenberg, "The Political Economy of Sanctions," 875-6), Oil-for-Food being a good sample, and can also be used to unite the nation through a rally-around-the-flag effect. See Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967).

¹⁸⁷ Indeed, sanctions serve as tools to "stimulate economic investment in areas, which earlier have been imported. In such cases the sanctions actually functions [sic] as tariffs; with the advantage of being imposed from the outside." Wallenstein, "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited," 14. Also see Margaret P. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 2nd edition), and her *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 2nd edition).

¹⁸⁸ The network of Abdul Qadeer Khan being the most notorious, as mentioned above.

necessitate constant and close monitoring of sanctions, but also harmonizing the actions and reactions of the target vis-a-vis sender. Also, theoretical assumptions dictate that rational actors operate in a world of perfect information. In such a perfect world, “sanctions would never be implemented: if a threatened sanction were sufficiently effective, the target would comply immediately, obviating the need to impose the sanction;” moreover, if the measures “were ineffective, the sender would not threaten in the first place.”¹⁸⁹ Suffice here to say that by resorting to sanctions at the first place as a routine policy tool, the sender diminishes the target’s incentives to change behavior with the hope of having sanctions lifted in the future.¹⁹⁰

Second comes the issue of democracies and allies. This is more of a philosophical discussion in the sense that it challenges both the theory and practice of sanctions. According to democratic peace theory,¹⁹¹ trade indeed results in peace, not sanctions. It can be said that perpetual peace theory assumes trading democracies, hence democracies fighting against non-democracies do not count as a deviation for the theory.¹⁹² Similarly, there is an analogous “economic peace” theory where it is found

¹⁸⁹ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions,” 891.

¹⁹⁰ Eaton and Engers, “Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics,” 413.

¹⁹¹ Kant, *Ebedi Barış Üzerine Felsefi Deneme*.

¹⁹² Kant’s perpetual peace theory has not been tested as there is not a world composed only of democracies. While democracies may resort to war less often, “a more democratic world will not necessarily be more peaceful.” Gregory D. Hess and Athanasios Orphanides, “War and Democracy,” *CESifo Working Paper*, no. 201, November 1999, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/75566/1/cesifo_wp201.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021), 26. Moreover, even among democracies there are differentiations as full and not. See, for example, Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 ‘Özal Dönemi’nde Türkiye’de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri* (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2010).

that democracies resort to sanctions against non-democracies more often than against other democracies.¹⁹³

Nonetheless, research indicates that if target expects enduring conflicts, it would not yield to sender's demands. Consequently, under the shadow of future, a democratic sender is more likely to sanction its non-democratic adversary than its democratic ally; and under the same shadow, it is less likely to collect concessions from the former because according to democratic peace theory, peace is between and among democracies whereas non-democracies by nature are prone to conflict.¹⁹⁴ This partly is founded on the assumption of unaccountability of non-democratic states where rulers would have a freer hand to resist sanctions. It goes relatively unnoticed that democratic leaders have to appeal broader constituencies than their non-democratic counterparts, hence policies indeed are less likely to change much in the former than the latter.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ See David Lektzian and Mark Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 6 (November 2003). Also see Dan G. Cox and A. Cooper Drury, "Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (November 2006).

¹⁹⁴ Drezner calls it as sanctions paradox / conflict of expectations. Daniel W. Drezner, "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (December 1998).

¹⁹⁵ Solomon Major and Anthony J. McGann, "Caught in the Crossfire," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (June 2005): 346-7.

Last but not least, literature tends to take target as well as sender as monolithic actors. Allison's famous study on Cuban missile crisis¹⁹⁶ indicates that state is far from being a monolithic actor; there are at least three different ways to approach it. Kaempfer and Lowenberg also discuss alternative interest groups within senders and targets and propose an economic model for the analysis of sanctions. Consequently,

sanctions may be considered a public good (or bad) that directly contributes to individual utility (or disutility) by allowing individuals the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of experiencing their nation engaged in a foreign policy toward a certain goal,¹⁹⁷

depending mainly on the interest group one belongs to.

If sanctions are claimed to be futile, one tends to ask why statesmen do continue to practice these measures. The basic reply mainly goes as we simply do not know how to quantify success and failure,¹⁹⁸ hence we do not know which sanctions measure was successful and why. One of the major studies to count the success rates and analyze how successful sanctions are designed belongs to Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberley Elliott. The team analyzed individual sanctions cases and introduced a model to measure success.¹⁹⁹ Some authors do not employ a model, yet look at the

¹⁹⁶ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (US: Little Brown, 1971). There the author explains rational, organizational and governmental decision making procedures.

¹⁹⁷ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," 883.

¹⁹⁸ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). Note that Baldwin takes a broader view than the academia usually adopts. Also see George Tsebelis, "Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 1 (March 1990), esp 5-6.

¹⁹⁹ Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

lecturing and symbolic aspects of the measures applied. On the one hand, sanctions are used for domestic and international purposes for the sake of satisfying the public opinion and meeting the expectations.²⁰⁰ Humanitarian interventions can be taken as examples.²⁰¹ On the other hand, there are sanctions that basically aim a third party, with purposes like declaring a position vis-à-vis allies and enemies.²⁰² Yet, it should be kept in mind that it is difficult to measure the success (if any) of these measures. “The range of ‘expressive’ purposes to which sanctions may be put is amorphous and,

Pape, by using a different methodology, analyzed the 40 sanctions classified as successful by Hufbauer and colleagues, and reached at the conclusion that only five were truly successful. In all the remaining 35 cases, Pape argued, factors other than sanctions had played a considerable role, therefore he concluded that it indeed was not the sanctions themselves that was successful, it was rather other factors like military force, or a combination, which helped the sender accomplish the desired outcome. Pape, “lists UK-USSR (1993), US/Canada-South Korea (1975), Arab League-Canda (1979), US-El Salvador (1987) and India-Nepal (1989) as samples of successful sanctions. Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work?,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (October 1997): 105.

Cortright and Lopez, by using similar methodology, reach at the conclusion that sanctions are successful if they are implemented comprehensively. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 2000).

²⁰⁰ Sanctions on Cuba, for example, have long been a part of elections in Florida. Spadoni, *Failed States: Why the U.S. Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work*, esp. chap. 2 (esp 51) on US-Cuba relations. On the use of sanctions as a tool to appease calls of domestic constituencies for a decisive action, see Brendan Taylor, “Sanctions as Grand Strategy,” *Adelphi Paper* 411 (2010): esp 20.

²⁰¹ On humanitarian interventions and all the discussions on responsibility to protect, see Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty;” Cunliffe, “Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility;” Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty;” and Arbour, “The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice.”

²⁰² These type of sanctions generally aim establishing and maintaining a reputation. Here, main aim is not to induce a behavioral change in the target, but rather to send a message worldwide. See Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions,” 870.

hence, symbolism as a sanctions objective potentially lacks analytical meaning and utility.”²⁰³

2.5. Conclusion

Sanctions are implemented in various ways for various purposes by various actors. This chapter aimed to provide a short review of literature on sanctions from different dimensions.

In terms of theory, it mainly benefited from the International Relations discipline, and took three main approaches, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. For realism, state is the central item on the agenda. Survival of the state in a world of anarchy necessitates power. Also, for realists, might makes right. From this perspective, indeed, sanctions applied by the US end up being the most successful ones. Liberals on the other hand do not promote sanctions as they are mechanisms intruding trade. Having faith in institutions, they look for international organizations to introduce, apply and supervise sanctions. Introduction of international organizations into the picture does not suffice to solve the problem of cheating – free riders and circumvention of sanctions measures still persists. While liberals claim international organizations reduce the cost of exchange of information and make up for lack of trust, constructivists go for a more fundamental point and argue that actors, be it state, nonstate or international organization, do not matter. For constructivists, what lies at the hearth of the matter is discourse. Accordingly, for a constructivist, sanctions as

²⁰³ Taylor, “Sanctions as Grand Strategy,” 20.

measures to counter threats may not be necessary measures *per se*, because these measures are extensions of threats, and threats themselves are fruits of speech acts.

Despite there is a lengthy literature on (mis)use and (dis)utility of sanctions, argument here is that sanctions indeed do not aim to change the behavior of the “maverick” country into a peaceful course, but serve mainly as tools to demonstrate power of the West over the non-West. Currently, the literature focuses on multiple dimensions, including but not limited with the economic ties in between the sender and the target casting an impact on the end result of the sanctions,²⁰⁴ third countries as joining the senders or supporting the target shape the effectiveness of sanctions,²⁰⁵ diasporas in the sender affecting the sanctions,²⁰⁶ the target’s richness in natural resources and the impact of the sanctions on citizens as well as the ruling elite,²⁰⁷ the economic structure

²⁰⁴ Argument here will rest on the assumption that the more intensive the ties between the sender and the target, the more the chance of the sanctions to change the behavior of the target. Read *contra factual*, the less the ties are there, the less the sanctions are going to be effective as the embargo of a sender would be bypassed by alternative suppliers (or by black market, as elaborated below). Alternatively, in a scenario where there is a universal embargo, then the target would be isolated, hence would have nothing to lose by continuing the course of its action. See the case of Iran, which is a country under sanctions since 1979; also see Cuba, where the US is discussing the option of lifting the sanctions.

²⁰⁵ In this sense, North Korea is a good example. Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Also see Rose Gottemoeller, “The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory,” *Survival* 49, no. 4 (December 2007).

²⁰⁶ Best sample of such kind is the Cuban diaspora living in Florida, shaping politics not only at state but also at federal level. See Spadoni, *Failed Sanctions: Why the U.S. Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work*.

²⁰⁷ Main argument here will rest on the idea that natural resources are primary products, and are indispensable for the industry. As a consequence, the sender(s) would not be able to squeeze the target too much – see the case of Iraq, where the main sanctions scheme was based on oil trade. Also see Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Free Press, 2009); and Michael T. Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependence on Oil* (US: Holt Paperbacks, 2005).

of the target (i.e. market openness, integration to global trade, existence of good governance systems, etc.) matters,²⁰⁸ the daily life being affected to the extent to amount a public opinion pressure against the ruling elite, clientalism spreading wider or shrinking smaller, i.e. whether the getting-scarce resources are exchanged with loyalty of a small group of broader society,²⁰⁹ the society suffering from a humanitarian point of the issue,²¹⁰ and the social structure getting modified vis-à-vis sanctions (i.e. whether smuggling increased social ties because of the need for networking, black market become an accepted form of economy, after lifting-up of sanctions it was/will be possible to pull the economy back into legal and registered form, etc.).

This research argues that sanctions are used as Foucauldian disciplinary tools and are employed under heavy influence of discourse of otherization. Main actors resorting to sanctions are the West, and as discourse creates a West/us, there automatically occurs non-West/other. The West portrays itself as supreme more importantly, “[t]he

²⁰⁸ Sanctions bolster a kind of solidarity in between the ruling elite, and also sharpen the civilian loyalty to the ruling class for sake of ensuring their share from yet-again-getting-smaller cake. New generation of sanctions try to target only the rulers, see for example in Resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006, where the Security Council prohibited the export of luxury goods to North Korea. Yet, sometimes the elite do not act as the way the theory predicts. Take the case of Russia, where Putin “can live with the international diplomatic costs for now, and in any case, believes that most diplomatic sanctions will come to an end sooner rather than later. His billionaire friends might make less money, but will remain billionaires nonetheless.” Popescu, “After Crimes: Putin’s Balance Sheet,” 2.

²⁰⁹ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Sanctions,” esp 883 on sanctions rent.

²¹⁰ See, for example, United Nations Human Rights Office of High Commissioner – UNHROHC, *Torn Apart: The Human Rights Dimension of the Involuntary Separation of Korean Families* (Geneva: OHCHR, 2016).

assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a silencing of the non-Western other.”²¹¹ Actor-wise, however, sanctions here are divided into unilateral, multilateral and international ones. Method-wise, though, the division is little more bifurcated as the sender may aim only at the target (primary sanctions) or include also those that continue normal relations with the target (secondary sanctions). Alternatively, sender may adopt blanket measures (classical sanctions), or tailor-make them (smart sanctions).

After this literature review, this research will start delving into case studies. In all cases, sanctions are measures that are resorted more and more often by the West against non-West. Based on this observation, this research aims to bring a new approach to the sanctions literature by introducing (or cannibalizing) Foucault into the discussion. In the end, sanctions being tools used by the West indicates “

silencing of the non-Western other... [and are] customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western ‘progress’, ‘modernization’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’ and ‘civilization’ are deployed to justify a project of enduring invasiveness.²¹²

This invasion is panoptical surveillance for Foucault,²¹³ ban-opticon for Bigo,²¹⁴ but in all cases analyzed here, sanctions senders have tacit claim to know the malign intentions of the targets to create insecurity; in other words, senders are providing

²¹¹ David Slater, *Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations* (USA, UK, Australia: Blackwell, 2004), 223.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Foucault, “ ‘Panopticalism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison.’”

²¹⁴ Bigo, “Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon.”

security proactively like precognitives in Steven Spielberg's famous movie *Minority Report*.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ Didier Bigo, "Comment Douter de la Sécurité?," *Hommes et Migrations* 141 (2003): 33 makes an interesting reference to the movie.

CHAPTER 3

EGYPT

The first country to be analyzed under case-studies part is Egypt, a country which had its first elections in January 1924 following the approval of the constitution. Wafd became the winning party, but the government could not last even for a year. The country succumbed to clashes between a set of competing foreign and national interests, with power being “rested on a delicate balance between the British, the palace, the Wafd, and rival minority parties.”²¹⁶

Constitutional power was vested on King Fu’ad, who could dissolve the parliament at his own will. With this power, King Fu’ad tied his fate to the British, and in doing so, he set the palace in opposition to the national movement. “The British, who policed Egypt and controlled the coercive arms of state power, thought nothing of bringing down any Egyptian government that proved too vociferous in challenging their presence.”²¹⁷ In these circumstances, the Wafd party managed to “marshal[l] the

²¹⁶ Joel Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution*, (Egypt: American University in Cairo, 1996), 16.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

power of mass popular support through which it made long-term rule by any rival party or coalition impossible.”²¹⁸

This chronic instability continued under King Farouk. His tenure (1936-1952) witnessed the World War 2, during and after which Egyptian economy experienced a rapid growth. The GDP increase reached at 40%.²¹⁹ However, the Wafd became more and more demanding – in a series of negotiations between 1951-52, “Wafd demanded British recognition of Egypt’s sovereign rights over the Sudan as a precondition to discussing the future of the Suez Canal base,” and the British rejected this proposal.²²⁰ In return, the Wafd government unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty.²²¹

Skirmishes quickly transformed into violence over Suez Canal area. The armed clashes between British and Egyptian forces on January 25, 1952, during which 50 Egyptian policemen died, marked a turning point. After this incidence, it became impossible to calm the masses down. The army intervened and in a period of five months, King Farouk was ousted and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was installed in his place.²²²

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Pamuk and Owen, *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 128. Note that the data is for the period of 1945-52.

²²⁰ Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement*, 26.

²²¹ The 1936 Treaty marked a change in British attitude towards demands of Egypt. Seeing the looming World War 2, Britain wanted to ensure cooperation of Egypt, and ended military occupation with 1936 Treaty. Note, however, that the Treaty did not abrogate British right to have military presence in Suez Canal. Of course, “The Egyptians regarded this as derogatory to their national pride.” Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, “New Egypt and the West.” *Pakistan Horizon* 9, no. 3 (1956): 132.

²²² Before proceeding to sanctions, it may be timely to note that “[t]he Muslim Brothers supported the Free Officers and helped them attain power in 1952. The Free Officers, having

Before starting our analysis of sanctions on Egypt, it may be useful to note that the sanctions we will elaborate in this chapter are not for countering WMD-proliferation. That is despite the fact that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser overtly looked for a nuclear capability.²²³ Even at the discourse level, he poured no effort to hide his desire for Egypt to have nuclear weapons. What is more, Egypt has not been sanctioned for Nasser's proliferation-prone ambitions. What triggered the sanctions mechanism was Nasser's ambitions to create an "Egypt for Egyptians."

Also, while the Egyptian case diverts from other case-studies in terms of the reasons for sanctions; it also exhibits diversions in terms of the tools employed as a means of settling differences between states falling short of war.²²⁴ As will be elaborated further

no popular base among the masses were very keen to use this support." However, when in 1954 a Muslim Brothers member tried to assassinate Nasser, he executed the leaders and put many members into concentration camps. Maha Abdel Rahman, "The Politics of 'UnCivil' Society in Egypt," *Review of African Political Economy* 29, no. 91 (2002): 27.

Indeed, despite Muslim Brothers was founded in Egypt in 1928, the basis for the movement was already there. In 9th century, for example, notion of solidarity and charity was well established. Frantz-Murphy quotes in length the anecdotes of a textiles merchant who could not pay taxes and had to borrow – but the lender refused interest. As the anecdote evolves, we learn a previous story where the lender had lost his merchandise in close proximity of the borrower's quarter and the borrower had offered a generous compensation. Gladys Frantz-Murphy, "A New Interpretation of the Economic History of Medieval Egypt: The Role of the Textile Industry 254-567/868-1171." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 24, no. 3 (1981): 284-5.

²²³ Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), "Egypt: Overview," *Country Profiles*, last updated September 2015; <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/egypt/> (accessed July 31, 2020). Also see Robert J. Einhorn, "Egypt: Frustrated but still on a Non-nuclear Course," in *The Nuclear Tipping Point*, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 45-6.

²²⁴ Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions*, 47-8. In this regard, an effective sanction is the one that manages to change the behavior of the target. Note, however, that sometimes the behavior is already about to change regardless the sanctions, or sometimes behavior changes not because of sanctions but of other domestic or external factors. See Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2 vols. See also Chapter 1.

below, while the sanctions in other cases mainly focus on trade in goods, the sanctions on Egypt were in the form of withholding a financial aid for the construction of Aswan Dam.²²⁵

This chapter thus will analyze the sanctions on Egypt that were initiated during Nasser's tenure from a constructivist perspective, and show that the disciplinary power exercised over Egypt casted a shadow on daily life from different dimensions including but not limited to bureaucracy and security. It will argue that the sanctions were imposed with the desire to control a "maverick" country that challenged the international order designed and desired by Western powers.

3.1. Road to Sanctions

The discovery of minerals like iron, manganese and petroleum in Egypt, as well as the plans for development of hydroelectricity power, were all promising for the future industrial growth – considering especially the agriculture reliant nature of the Egyptian economy.²²⁶ In medieval times, for example, Egypt was a considerable actor in textile

²²⁵ Unless employed otherwise explicitly, the Dam or Aswan Dam here is used to refer to the High Aswan Dam. Indeed, projects for taming Nile were already in the pipeline either by "a third raising of the existing Aswan Dam (built in 1902)" or by building a new High Dam. Despite building a new dam was more feasible, Egypt was in struggle for raising funds. "Revenue from the newly nationalized Suez Canal ... total[led] about 20 percent of foreign receipts," yet Egypt "agreed to pay a sum of 23 million Egyptian pounds compensation to British shareholders of the former Suez Canal Company." That lack of financial means and severe need for outside credits enables us to take the withdrawal of funds for construction of Nasser's pet project as sanctions. See Ragaei El Mallakh, "Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt," *Land Economics* 35, no. 1 (1959): 16, 20.

²²⁶ It is still an agricultural society, with an industry having only 34% share of the economy, and services 54% of the GDP. Central Intelligence Agency, "Egypt," *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on July 21, 2020; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed on July 31, 2020).

sector. Flax and linen, among all, were so important that “[t]he treasurization and hoarding of clothing suggests that clothing was as good as gold” and was used “in lieu of currency.”²²⁷

The World War 2 contributed to the diversification of the cotton-based Egyptian economy. In 1945, Egypt “had a larger industrial sector and relied less on the export of cotton than it had in 1914.”²²⁸ Despite the fact that this diversification did not lift Egypt up to the level of an industrialized economy,²²⁹ it still translated into a need for electricity that was higher than before, and was to increase further. Hence came into the picture the Aswan Dam, which would make about 95% of Nile’s hydropower to be utilized.²³⁰ The Dam was also “an irrigation revolution for full utilization of the

²²⁷ Frantz-Murphy, “A New Interpretation of the Economic History of Medieval Egypt: The Role of the Textile Industry 254-567/868-1171,” 290.

²²⁸ Robert L. Tignor, “Decolonization and Business: the Case of Egypt.” *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 3 (1987): 488. On dependency on cotton, see Lord Kitchener, “Egypt in 1912.” *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 61, no. 3170 (1913): 908-9.

²²⁹ According to Food and Agriculture Organization, in 1970, share of agriculture in Egyptian economy was 29.3%, in 1980 it was 18.2%, and in 2000 it was 16.6%. The latest figures available is for year 2017, estimate being 11.7% for share of agriculture in economy. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Commodity Policy and Projections Service Commodities and Trade Division, “Egypt,” *WTO Agreement on Agriculture: The Implementation Experience - Developing Country Case Studies*, 2003, <http://www.fao.org/3/Y4632E/y4632e0c.htm#fn31> (accessed February 23, 2020); Central Intelligence Agency, “Egypt.”

²³⁰ S. M. Rashad and M. A. Ismail, “Environmental Impact Assessment of Hydropower in Egypt.” *Applied Energy* 65, no. 1-4 (2000): 288. Note that there already was an Aswan Dam on Nile, which was built at the beginning of the 20th century. This is known as Aswan Low Dam, and aimed to generate power as well as to decrease seasonal fluctuations in the Nile. As a result, it did not store any water. The Aswan Dam analyzed in this research is the High Dam, which aimed “to control floods of the Nile; to store water from each annual flood; ... regulat[e] releases of water for irrigation, and to generate hydroelectric power.” Ibid, 289.

Nile's water."²³¹ In this regard, "Egyptians ... [we]re not only proud of the dam, but also strongly believe[d] that the structure has significantly contributed to the nation's prosperity as well as economic and social stability."²³² As such, the Dam was a would-be crown jewel for Egyptian society, as well as politics.

Naturally, the Dam was also Nasser's pet project. "His was an ideal-typical version, where 'expertise' was apolitical and technocracy [was] a perfect amalgam of objective technocrats and patriotic bureaucrats."²³³ Nonetheless, he lacked the financial means to complete such a grand undertaking. While domestic means would not be adequate, Nasser's sensitivity towards dominance of any outside power over Egypt prevented him from going for other foreign alternatives. This sensitivity caused him avoid the West, simultaneously it also allowed him to play the Soviet card when he deemed necessary.²³⁴

The US, in return, rushed in for purposes of not losing either Gamal Nasser or Egypt, "and promised to finance (along with Britain and World Bank) the construction of the Aswan High Dam, a project dear to Nasser and his political legitimacy by way of

²³¹ Ibid, 293.

²³² Asit K. Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada, "Impacts of the High Aswan Dam," in *Impacts of Large Dams: A Global Assessment*, ed. Cecilia Tortajada (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), 379.

²³³ Dalia E. Wahdan, "Planning Imploded: Case of Nasser's Physical Planning." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 22 (2007): 2105.

²³⁴ Dougherty notes that Nasser had too many aspirations to juggle simultaneously: "forcing the British out, seizing the leadership of Arab unity movement, building his prestige among the Bandung nations as leader of the anti-colonial struggle, increasing Egypt's foreign trade and arming his country for a showdown with Israel." James E. Dougherty, "Aswan Decision in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (1959): 34.

economic development objectives.”²³⁵ However, the US offer of financial assistance was withdrawn after Nasser’s ties with the USSR got deepened and his anti-Israeli rhetoric kept climbing. In other words, “[w]hile the project [wa]s motivated by economic considerations, these aspects have hardly received the attention they deserve and have been overshadowed by some of the political implications.”²³⁶

The Egyptian swing towards the Eastern bloc made Nasser believe he had the soviet option for technologic and economic assistance required for Aswan Dam.²³⁷ Note that he translated this belief into discourse: Following the closure of financial taps, Nasser announced (i) the nationalization of the Suez Canal to finance the Dam, as well as (ii) the acceptance of the Soviet offer to construct the dam – “although the Soviets probably did not make such an effort until after Nasser announced this.”²³⁸

Dam was important not only for Nasser, but also for controlling the flow of Nile river. In the end, “Egypt was by and large an agricultural society; its people strongly attached

²³⁵ Denis J. Sullivan and Kimberley Jones, *Global Security Watch: A Reference Handbook – Egypt* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 7. Later on, US moved back in by offering credits and Hawk missiles to discourage Nasser from being a Soviet ally. Ali Kadri, *The Unmaking of Arab Socialism* (London, New York, Melbourne, Delhi: Anthem Press, 2016), 37.

²³⁶ El Mallakh, “Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt,” 15.

²³⁷ Peter Woodward, *Nasser* (UK: England, 1992), 47. The Soviet loan of 400 million rubles was typical for bolstering “fantastic dreams about aid from the country of Sputnik.” See Karel Holbik, “A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Aid, 1961-1965.” *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 100 (1968): 329.

²³⁸ Sullivan and Jones, *Global Security Watch: A Reference Handbook – Egypt*, 7.

to the land,”²³⁹ water of the Nile determining where to settle and what to plant. In that respect, the way Egypt was ruled inspired theories known as the “Oriental Despotism.”²⁴⁰ The theory highlighted that whomever controls water controls the society; hence the Nile earned the center of attention.²⁴¹ The geopolitical importance of Egypt peaked with the realization of the Suez Canal project. Then came the British occupation under “the pretext of restoring order and safeguarding Egypt’s foreign population.”²⁴² The occupation marked the beginning of the British rule in Egypt.

In this regard, Egypt as case-study is important – the country not only holds important geopolitical and large territorial borders, but also provides an interesting sample of perception of an underdeveloped and primitive “Orient”: While Napoleon was the prince to come and kiss the Sleeping Beauty (Europe) back to life, her Oriental sister (here reference being to Egypt) had never awakened.²⁴³ This perceived gap in

²³⁹ Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood, Revised and Updated* (Great Britain: Yale University Press, 2013, 3rd edition), 9.

²⁴⁰ Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

²⁴¹ In the Nile basin, Egypt has been the country which has the widest agricultural and arable terrain. Aziz Koluman, *Dünyada Su Sorunları ve Stratejileri* (Ankara: ASAM, 2003, 2nd ed.), 52. Nile flows through 9 countries—Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Brundi and Rwanda. Its drainage zone is almost 10% of the whole African continent. Ibid, 53.

²⁴² Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution*, 15.

²⁴³ Birgit Schaebler, “Civilizing Others: Global Modernity and the Local Boundaries (French/German, Ottoman, and Arab) of Savagery,” in *Globalization and the Muslim World: Culture, Religion and Modernity*, ed. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (New York, Syracuse University Press: Syracuse, 2004), 4.

“sleeping periods” was presented as the cause of the gap in levels of development, which made the Orient “needy of European civilizing.”²⁴⁴

The perception of Egypt by the West and the West’s *mission civilizatrice* was in contrast with Nasser’s understanding of free Egypt. In this regard, the Aswan Dam was important for Nasser to assist the reforms he undertook and bolster the “[a]gricultural production [which] made important advances during the period 1955-1966.”²⁴⁵ In other words, the Dam was regarded as a panacea for all these problems.²⁴⁶ However, as mentioned, Egypt lacked its own financial means to shoulder the construction, and foreign financial assistance came with strings attached. World Bank (back then International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – IBRD), for example, wanted to ensure inflation and creditworthiness, looked for monitoring Egypt’s foreign debts.²⁴⁷ Yet, such strings fell at odds with Nasser’s philosophy of national economy. The gridlock could not be solved, and Nasser approached to the Soviet Union. Seeing the conclusion of Egypt-Czechoslovakia arms deal,²⁴⁸ in summer

²⁴⁴ Ibid, 13.

²⁴⁵ Alan Richards, “Egypt’s Agriculture in Trouble,” *MERIP*, 84 (1980): 6. Yet, the system was not flawless. Take pricing – farmers were assigned quotas of crops, some of which could be sold only to the government well below the price of international markets. The difference between domestic and international prices went mostly to the government. Ibid, 8.

²⁴⁶ The Dam could not solve Egypt’s economic and social problems simply “for all the troubles of the Nile,” High Dam was not a “one-shot cure.” El Mallakh, “Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt,” 22. There was what Wahdan calls as “fetishism of growth.” Wahdan, “Planning Imploded: Case of Nasser’s Physical Planning,” esp. 2105.

²⁴⁷ Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 146.

²⁴⁸ Nasser had been insisting on nonalignment, hence he was “rebuffed by the Americans.” The arms deal was perceived as “a breakthrough for the Soviet Union in its efforts to gain

1956 the US also “withdrew American offer to aid substantially [Dam’s] building”²⁴⁹ for not being feasible.²⁵⁰ For both the World Bank and the US, there also was the unresolved issue of the water rights between riparians.²⁵¹ Moreover, the British Foreign Office “raised the question whether Egypt had the capacity to undertake the huge river project while simultaneously financing the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia.”²⁵²

This act was followed by the nationalization of the Suez Canal; however, the nationalized revenues of the Canal was partly going to the compensation of former British shareholders. Moreover, the impact of newly founded United Arab Republic on both Egyptian and Syrian national budgets were unclear. In all cases, Egypt did not have enough domestic sources and could not generate foreign capital for the Dam, hence withdrawal of credits for Aswan Dam also amounts to restrictive measures that can well be considered as sanctions.²⁵³

some presence in a Western-dominated region.” Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 20-21.

²⁴⁹ El Mallakh, “Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt,” 15.

²⁵⁰ The project on the Dam is also noted to be insupportable in market terms by experts. Yet, it is also noted that despite all its problems, the Dam managed to transform Egypt’s economy. Louis Lefebvre, “What Remains of Development Economics?,” *Indian Economic Review* 2 (1992).

²⁵¹ Salman M. A. Salman, *The World Bank Policy for Projects on International Waterways: An Historical and Legal Analysis* (Washington: World Bank, 2009), esp 25.

²⁵² Dougherty, “Aswan Decision in Perspective,” 28.

²⁵³ For an analysis of a similar measure, i.e. withdrawal of GSP benefits amounting to sanctions, see Clara Portela, “The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating

On the other hand, despite all the disagreements and tension in between Egypt and Britain, Egypt is claimed to benefit from British control. The British have trained and organized the Egyptian army, reduced corruption and improved the condition of peasantry. Nonetheless, the British administration was focused more on balance sheets than administrative reforms, hence for example budget allocations on health and sanitary, if any, was limited. Still, it was presented not as the fault of the administration but as the primitiveness of the Egyptians: “We might be unable to educate the natives of Egypt, as those of India, to realize the danger of drinking water fouled by excretes,” goes one article in *The British Medical Journal*, and continues by noting that as the Spaniards in Toledo that “threaten[ed] to shoot any who should even wash their clothes in the river, compel[ed] the inhabitants to bring water from a distant spring,” the British could do a lot more to “civilize” the Egyptians.²⁵⁴

Such a discourse indeed is part of Foucauldian conceptualization of power. Here, Egypt as being the Oriental other is portrayed as primitive, uncivilized, backward, in

Effectiveness,” *CEPS Working Document* no. 391 (2014). <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eus-use-targeted-sanctions-evaluating-effectiveness/> (accessed July 30, 2021), 4.

²⁵⁴ Anonymous, “Sanitary Administration in Egypt.” *The British Medical Journal* 2, no. 1548 (1890): 511. In agreeing with the British being able to and should have done more, Richards points to the problems like insect attack related to the first Aswan Dam. He then questions why the British failed to make investments for purposes of improving drainage. Alan Richards, “Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture: 1890-1914.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26, no. 4 (1978), esp. 730-1.

In addition to this perception of the white men’s burden to educate Egyptians, the pejorative approach could also easily be observed in legal affairs. European consulates, for example, extended the right of extraterritoriality and made Egypt a refuge for fugitives and outlaws of Southern Europe. Wm. M. Sloane, “Egypt and England.” *Political Science Quarterly*, 19, no. 3 (1904): 477-8. The author also notes: “[I]t is the foreigners... who carry on organized smuggling, who keep brothels and gambling halls, who use the inviolability of their houses for dozens of nefarious purposes. It is they who debauch the public morals in all large towns.”

short, leper. For Egypt to be healthy, it needed to be disciplined. As the discursive violence required for branding was already there, all needed was to introduce some disciplinary measures to demonstrate the power of the West over the non-West. Below sections will analyze the impact of the measures on Egyptian daily life, local responses to them, and the Foucauldian disciplinary power embedded.

3.2. Security Aspect

While the sanctions were in play, as mentioned, Nasser's Egypt turned to the Soviets. Improving relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union would enable the latter expand its sphere of influence into the Middle East, while Egyptians were to "receive modern weapons and financial aid for the improvement of their medieval infrastructure."²⁵⁵

In this respect, the withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam, on account of classical understanding of sanctions, was a failed move. It failed stopping the construction of the Dam, improved relations between the USSR and Egypt, ended up with nationalization of the Suez Canal and eradicated the British control over it. Considering also that the literature perceives sanctions as measures that stop short of war, sanctions on Egypt clearly fall into the category of those that failed as what followed was a war.

The Suez War was waged for purposes of not losing a military base in the region. The base could not be replaced by another Middle Eastern territory, because the costs involved in opening bases elsewhere were far greater than originally anticipated. In

²⁵⁵ Pierre, "The 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations," 52.

the end, “Egypt was ‘the only country in the Middle East where the resources in labor and in industrial manpower, communications, port facilities, and airfields are adequate for the Anglo-American main base.’ ”²⁵⁶

While Britain and Egypt were drifting apart on how to handle the crisis, the US and Egypt were showing signals of amity. One such signal was the Atoms for Peace speech of President Eisenhower in 1953, another was the 1959 UN Conference in Geneva providing valuable insights to the countries like Egypt for igniting their own nuclear programs.²⁵⁷ In addition, the US and Egypt tacitly shared ideological similarities; the US believed European imperialism had been overstretched²⁵⁸ while Nasser’s conception of three overlapping circles (Arab, Muslim and African) required an independent Egypt.²⁵⁹ Despite all, the relations could not develop further because Nasser declined to sign a military treaty with the US – he did not want to allow the US take the seat of the UK in dominating Egypt.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ Tignor, “Decolonization and Business: the Case of Egypt,” 489.

²⁵⁷ Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Egypt: Nuclear,” *Country Profiles*.

²⁵⁸ Woodward, *Nasser*, 37.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ Laron, *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization 1945-1956*, 75. Similar concerns were there in refusing to join the Baghdad Pact, which according to Nasser was just “another attempt by large states to dominate smaller ones.” “Moreover, by bringing in non-Arab states and linking them with the northern Arab states the Baghdad Pact was seeking to divide the Arab world.” Woodward, *Nasser*, 42.

Egyptian security policies were a concern not only for the British but also for the French. Nasser's increasing popularity in the Arab world became a source of inspiration everywhere.²⁶¹ France saw an opportunity in the Suez Crisis to curb Egyptian support towards rebellious Algeria. Following the agreed plan between France and Israel, "the Israelis invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956 and the British and French moved into the Canal Zone on 5 November with the ostensible force of separating the two sides and guarding a strategic asset."²⁶²

The crisis was profitable for Egypt. First and foremost, as mentioned, the war proved the sanctions' failure in changing the behavior of and policies pursued by Egypt. Secondly, Egypt's "tactical defeats translated into success. Egypt gained the sympathy of the United Nations General Assembly now inundated with third world nations that voted as a [sic] anti-western block."²⁶³ Thirdly, throughout the Arab world, demonstrations and attacks on the French and British property went hand in hand with anti-French/British riots.²⁶⁴ Last but not least, the French and British "were condemned

²⁶¹ Michael Field, *Inside the Arab World* (USA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 56.

²⁶² *Ibid*, 57-8.

²⁶³ Pierre, "The 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations," 8.

²⁶⁴ Field, *Inside the Arab World*, 58. It is also observed that the US did not appreciate its NATO allies' and Israel's pressures, and the US public opinion was increasingly alarmed with the possibility to involve in a war with the USSR. Peter Mansfield, "Egypt after Nasser." *The World Today* 27, no. 7 (1971): 306. The Suez Canal crisis, starting from Western denial to fund construction of Aswan Dam and stretching towards the occupation of Egypt, provided another opportunity to squeeze the bourgeoisie. The regime capitalized on the Crisis to take over the assets of the British, French and Jewish owned firms; "representing a major extension of the state control." See Pamuk and Owen, *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 131. As a result of this extension policy, by mid1960s public sector accounted for 90% of national production. *Ibid*.

internationally, not least by the Americans who refused to help Britain when the invasion caused an unexpectedly heavy run on sterling.”²⁶⁵ While all foreign powers withdrew shortly, Nasser rose in prestige and influence, and “gave confidence to the nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which gained independence in 1956.”²⁶⁶ Two years later, Egypt formed United Arab Republic with Syria – only to dissolve in ten years.

Following the Suez War, new arms-deal negotiations were initiated with the Soviets. Within six months, Egypt received submarines and planes, and by late 1957 Egyptian military forces had already doubled. Additional agreements inflated the original amount of \$80 million up to \$400 billion.²⁶⁷ For an economy whose GDP was just above \$4 billion,²⁶⁸ an agreement of such a huge amount was a further pressure to the economy and allocation of scarce resources on social projects like health and education. “The Suez Canal revenue, which once brought in approximately \$160,000,000 per year, and the once growing earnings from tourists ... completely

²⁶⁵ Field, *Inside the Arab World*, 58. It is also observed that the US did not appreciate its NATO allies’ and Israel’s pressures, and the US public opinion was increasingly alarmed with the possibility to involve in a war with the USSR. Mansfield, “Egypt after Nasser,” 306.

²⁶⁶ Field, *Inside the Arab World*, 58. Note, however, that year before the dissolution was the Six Day War. The dire straits for the nuclear program reached at a peak with the war. As if loss of Sinai oil fields, shrinking tourism revenues, destruction caused by Israeli bombardments, and extra military expenditures were not enough, Western aid to Egypt declined considerably too.

²⁶⁷ Holbik and Drachman, “Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid: 1955-1970,” 156.

²⁶⁸ Country Economy, “Egypt GDP - Gross Domestic Product,” *GDP – Gross Domestic Product*, 2018; <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/egypt> (accessed July 31, 2020).

dried up as a result of June 1967 war.”²⁶⁹ Interestingly enough, three years later, a \$4 billion arms supply relationship was established– a relationship which “required some 17,000 Soviet military personnel (including troops) in 1971 to maintain it.”²⁷⁰

In a nutshell, the sanctions which aimed to discipline a leper non-Western country forced Egypt turn to the Soviets. Egypt avoided the US to replace the UK as a big brother; and this stubborn focus on independence gained Nasser additional popularity in the Arab world. Even when he was losing battles in the front, he was accumulating prestige in the political front. However, this time the “independent” Egypt was falling into the hands of the USSR – the security ties were building up massively as the Aswan Dam was rising. In other words, the sanctions not only failed to induce intended policy change, they also led to a war. Despite being distinctive in terms of the measures used, the sanctions on Egypt formed a solid part of *mission civilizatrice*. Foucauldian disciplinary tools were employed to tame a maverick country from Africa just for purposes of showing that the West was able and willing to flex its muscles.

3.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire gave birth to new sovereign and quasi-sovereign states. The political consequences of the dismemberment required

²⁶⁹ Holbik and Drachman, “Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid: 1955-1970,” 163.

²⁷⁰ Dan G. Cox and A. Cooper Drury, “Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions,” *Journal of Peace Research* (2006): 56.

In following years arrived the oil embargo, during which prices increased fourfold and created difficulties not only for industrialized but also for developing countries. For a relationship of energy and development, see Sarwat Razaqi, Faiz Bilquees and Saadia Sherbaz, “Dynamic Relationship between Energy and Economic Growth: Evidence from D8 Countries.” *The Pakistan Development Review* 50, no. 4 (2011).

settlement of many issues, borders being only one. It also marked the end of the Ottoman central administration which generated bureaucratic issues to be settled by these new states. In addition to politics and bureaucracy, the Ottoman Empire's demise put an end to the Imperial free-trade-area. The ramification was not only different bureaucratic systems to be faced at each time when one crossed the new borders, but also different currencies tied to sterling or franc; both of which were destined to devalue in 1930s.²⁷¹

The independent Egypt needed to tackle all these economic and administrative issues, as well as to carry the Damocles' sword of British intervention. That is to say, in recognizing Egypt's independence, Britain reserved the right to intervene when Sudan, Suez Canal, minorities and/or a foreign intervention to Egypt was concerned.²⁷² While maintaining the British control over Egypt, these four reserved points continued to cast a shadow on the full independence of the latter. From this perspective, the Aswan Dam was a symbol of Egypt's sovereignty, as well as of possession of administrative and technical capacity to undertake a giant project.

The Aswan Dam, according to then-US Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr, was a project "larger than total of all U.S. public works of this type produced since 1900."²⁷³ Total amount of materials required for the Dam's construction was estimated

²⁷¹ Pamuk and Owen, *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 6-7.

²⁷² Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 16.

²⁷³ *Ibid*, 143.

to be 43 million cubic meters; equaling to build 17 more pyramids like those in Giza.²⁷⁴ It is important to stress that financing of this kind not only “upset[] America’s domestic cotton growers, who lobbied for federal subsidies, [but] U.S. involvement in the Aswan Dam project also challenged the administration’s basic principles of foreign aid policy,”²⁷⁵ because Eisenhower’s “economic philosophy scuttled initiatives doling Western aid out to the governments of developing countries.”²⁷⁶

The problems related to the Aswan Dam sanctions were not limited with the economic aspect of the project. That problem was partially surpassed by the nationalization of the Canal, though general problems of capital formation remained still.²⁷⁷ Besides finances, Egypt was also lagging behind the technical capacity; it “was utterly dependent upon external sources for the technical equipment and skills necessary to build the dam.”²⁷⁸

This exactly was the point where the Soviets stepped in.²⁷⁹ By the tenth anniversary of USSR-Egypt (then United Arab Republic) economic and technical cooperation

²⁷⁴ Dougherty, “Aswan Decision in Perspective,” 22; Frederick J. Cox, “The Russian Presence in Egypt,” *Naval War College Review* 22, no. 6 (1970): 48.

²⁷⁵ Matthew Walker, “The Lost art of Interdependency: United Nations Leadership in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and Its Ramifications in World Affairs” (master’s thesis, University of Nebraska, 2010), 144.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ Dougherty, “Aswan Decision in Perspective,” 40.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ For a discussion of cooperation with, and perception of threat from, the West and the East, see Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, “Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad Pact as a

agreement in 1968, “the Russians [had] posted to Cairo over 2,000 technicians, with the net result that the economic and industrial planning [was] regulated by Soviet engineers.”²⁸⁰ There also was the conditionality of use of Soviet equipment, however the equipments occasionally failed due to extreme heat.²⁸¹

Moreover, Egypt lacked the skills needed to manage the nationalized Canal. Being aware of this, for purposes of pointing to Egypt’s technical incapacity to run grand projects, “European boat pilots, on instructions from their former employers, abruptly walked out in an attempt to prove to Egypt that international control [over the Canal] was necessary.”²⁸² This move was yet another demonstration of Foucauldian disciplinary power in the form of withdrawal of something granted.

Egypt was determined to derive the cash from the Suez Canal by maintaining the flow of the ships, hence it brought Egyptian pilots to assume the duty in the operations of

Source of Conflict between Turkey and the Nationalist Arab Countries,” *The Turkish Yearbook XXXVI* (2005).

²⁸⁰ Frederick J. Cox, “The Russian Presence in Egypt,” *Naval War College Review* 22, no. 6 (1970): 48.

²⁸¹ Holbik and Drachman, “Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid: 1955-1970,” 151.

²⁸² James M. Boughton, “Northwest of Suez: The 1956 Crisis and the IMF.” *IMF Working Paper*, WP/00/192 (2000), 7. A similar lack of qualified personnel was still the case in 1970s in public sector, which had expanded yet overstaffed with inexperienced and inefficient personnel. Holbik and Drachman, “Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid: 1955-1970,” 163.

There, however, is Suez Canal Maritime Training and Simulator Center designed for training the pilots in order to reduce the amount of accidents and improve accident management. Official statistics, however, are not available to allow an analysis of technical difficulties faced following withdrawal of European personnel. Accident statistics on Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety (EAMS) has long been left unupdated. EAMS, “Egyptian SOLAS ships accidents statistics,” *Accident Statistics* (undated), http://www.eams.gov.eg/Home/Statistics_en0 (accessed February 23, 2020).

the Canal.²⁸³ This, indeed, was an opportunity to boost economy through providing avenues of employment. In reality, nationalist sentiments had long been building up, and foreign businesses had been responding to these sentiments by moving their headquarters from Cairo and appointing Egyptian directors; but most of the major Egyptian enterprises were controlled by foreigners.²⁸⁴ Moreover, Nasser had already been pressing the Suez Canal Company, “which was jointly owned by British and French shareholders, to employ more Egyptian workers and to invest more of its profits in the Egyptian economy.”²⁸⁵ Hence, Egyptianization of pilots would provide positive stimulus for the administrative and technical capacity of the country as well as for the economy. It would help maintaining the income from the Canal; also creating employment opportunities and building in human capital.²⁸⁶

Yet, following the nationalization of the Canal, costs increased and revenues plummeted, indicating that Egypt’s technical capacity was not able to match a task like

²⁸³ Boughton, “Northwest of Suez: The 1956 Crisis and the IMF,” 7.

²⁸⁴ Britain, for example, imported 1/3 of its cotton from Egypt, and estimated that an embargo on imports “would virtually ruin the textile factories in the Bolton area and would significantly add to the number of the unemployed.” Robert L. Tignor, “Decolonization and Business: the Case of Egypt.” *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 3 (1987):480.

²⁸⁵ Guy Laron, *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization 1945-1956* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013), 151.

²⁸⁶ Like nationalization of the Canal, the Aswan Dam was to provide large numbers of employment opportunities. This time the employment was expected to be in agriculture by facilitating irrigation of larger areas, and in industry by providing electricity. Chaudhri, “New Egypt and the West,” 131. Almost a quarter of the population of Egypt was employed in the project to dig for the Canal, according to Admiral Osame Rabie, head of the Suez Canal Authority. Anonymous, “150 Years on, Suez Canal is ‘lifeline’ for Egypt,” *Oman Observer*, November 12, 2019, Tuesday; <https://www.omanobserver.om/150-years-on-suez-canal-is-lifeline-for-egypt/> (accessed February 23, 2020).

running the Canal. It was seen that at the end of the day, Egyptian administrative capacity was not adequate enough to generate the required budget. Hence, the country turned to the IMF for financial assistance. The idea was to fix the revenue problem arising from the modest returns from the nationalization of the Canal due to mismanagement. This, indeed, was the second application of the country to the IMF since membership in 1945; pointing to the severity of the difficulties Egypt was facing.²⁸⁷

In conclusion, from administrative and technical aspects, the Dam was a project well beyond Egypt's capacity. In absence of foreign aid, Egypt juggled different problems ranging from running the nationalized Suez Canal to managing machinery and equipment that did not meet the challenges of extreme climate; from flying foreign investments out of Egypt to creating new jobs for employment of Egyptians. The absence of foreign aid, however, was a disciplinary measure against a leper non-Western country, was a display of power by the West, and was the result of the securitization of the Dam project. After all, the *mission civilizatrice* required not (only) to foster the development of a country, but (especially) to teach it how to behave for being counted as eligible to be treated as one of "normal," if not one of "us the West."

3.4. Socioeconomic Aspect

Egypt, as mentioned above, was home of a great civilization. The Nile delta provided fertile grounds not only for agricultural production but also for a civilization to flourish. As a result, almost all civilizations

²⁸⁷ Boughton, "Northwest of Suez: The 1956 Crisis and the IMF," 7.

in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East (and later Europe) envied Egypt's pivotal place and coveted its riches. Greeks, Persians, Mesopotamians, Romans, Arab Muslims from the peninsula; the later Islamic empires of the Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamelukes and Ottomans; Napoleon's France and colonial Britain; even Hitler's Germany – all invaded and tried to subjugate the Delta valley. ... For Egypt fell to almost all of its invaders and throughout the country's long history its inhabitants have been reduced to the status of second-class citizens in their own country – and, at that times, outright slaves to foreign rulers.²⁸⁸

Egypt's status under foreign rule alternated from being an important province (as in the Greek, Roman, Arab Islamic, Ottoman and British empires) to being the base of an expanding state (as it was under the Fatimid's, Ayyubids and Mamelukes). In all cases, the country's resources (from the riches of the land to the toil of the people) were employed to serve the interests and campaigns of these foreign rulers, with little regard for the development and betterment of the Egyptians themselves.²⁸⁹

Even the Canal, as a great undertaking, was under control of the British who purchased controlling shares of the Suez Canal Company back in 1875.²⁹⁰

The 1952 coup of the Free Officers did its best to make use of all the corruption and exploitation that took place throughout the Egyptian history. To sail through the instability Egypt was stuck in, it took the wind of the “[s]tories of governments ransomed, cotton hoarded, drugs and arms trafficked through palace offices, fiancées abducted, and coffins raided for royal treasures.”²⁹¹ Prior to the coup, most of the land belonged to the wealthy,²⁹² with the farmers being “kept in a state of poverty with

²⁸⁸ Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 23.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 22.

²⁹⁰ Jean-Marc Pierre, “The 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations,” master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2004, 5.

²⁹¹ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 14-15.

²⁹² The wealth they accumulated was not only for maximizing individual gains, but also political power. With this power, “landowners were able to prevent a governmental reform in land distribution which would favor the peasant farmers.” Melvin Albaum, “Cooperative Agricultural Settlement in Egypt and Israel,” *Land Economics* 42, no. 2 (1966): 222.

malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy dominating the rural landscape.”²⁹³ The stories swelled into Colonel Nasser’s cajolement of national pride. In addition to giving the peasants their honor back,²⁹⁴ Nasser introduced new laws like guaranteed employment by state for all university or high school graduates.²⁹⁵

He also managed to emerge as a strong political figure, and his traces on the Middle Eastern history are well labeled after his name. “Nasserism provided a model for political mobilization and national development to other emerging nations.”²⁹⁶ The model has been appreciated also by the US whose ambassador to Cairo noted that Nasser “had done more for Egypt in two years than all [his] predecessors put before [him].”²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Ibid. Aziz Nesin observes that peasants, Turkish and Egyptian alike, have long been kept in poverty. However, the Turkish peasant was supposed also to fight for the Ottoman sultan; hence he should be kept healthy and well-fed. Aziz Nesin, *Irak ve Mısır: Dünya Kazan Ben Kepçe 1* (İstanbul: Nesin Yayınları, 2014, 9th edition), 210-1.

²⁹⁴ Nesin, *Irak ve Mısır: Dünya Kazan Ben Kepçe 1*, 211.

²⁹⁵ Nadine Sika, “The Arab State and Social Contestation,” in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (India: Oxford University Press, 2014), 77.

²⁹⁶ Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement*, 4.

²⁹⁷ The Ambassador was Jefferson Caffery. Ibid, 172.

Agriculture was dominating the socioeconomic structure of Egypt, with people being attached to the land,²⁹⁸ and cotton being the main cash-crop raised in large estates.²⁹⁹ By early 19th century, Egypt became an important cotton exporter to the West.³⁰⁰ On the basis of this importance, “[t]he British completed the transformation of the irrigation system and consolidated private property rights in land and labor. Perennial irrigation was extended throughout the Delta.”³⁰¹ The transformation of agriculture in Egypt continued with Nasser. During his tenure, he had pursued land reform, price policies and investment decisions that maintained the transformation. As a result, an improvement in agricultural production was observed in 1955-66.³⁰²

However, problems still persisted. One such was the difference between domestic and international prices, amounting to 20-25%. The difference went “to the government

²⁹⁸ Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 9. However, Egypt had “no department or ministry of agriculture.” Frederic Courthland Penfield, “Sidelights on the Exploitation of Egypt,” *North American Review* 159, no. 455 (1894): 479.

²⁹⁹ Alan Richards, “The Political Economy of *Gutswirtschaft*: A Comparative Analysis of East Elbian Germany, Egypt, and Chile.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, no. 4 (1979): 488.

³⁰⁰ Indeed, during the Civil War period in the United States, Britain became more and more “acutely aware of her dependence upon American cotton and determined to put an end to it.” Raymond E. Crist, “Backgrounds of Conflict in Egypt,” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 11, no. 2 (1952): 115.

³⁰¹ Richards, “Egypt’s Agriculture in Trouble,” 4. However, as noted above, same author also notes that the British rule refrained from investing in drainage infrastructure that could have prevented problems like insect attacks. Richards, “Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture: 1890-1914.”

³⁰² Richards, “Egypt’s Agriculture in Trouble,” 6.

for cotton, to urban consumers for wheat ... and to both ... for rice.”³⁰³ A related problem was corruption – richer farmers were able skip the regulations and jump over more profitable crops. “In addition to higher profits accruing to the rich peasants, the gap between rich and poor is further aggravated by the fact that supplies of subsistence foods decline and their prices increase,” ending up with deep impact on nutrition.³⁰⁴

The sanctions against Nasser’s pet project were followed by the Suez War (1956) and the June War (known also as the Six Day War, 1967), both of which exacerbated these problems further. An acute agricultural scarcity began where labor productivity stagnated and land yields declined. “In 1974 Egypt became a net importer of agricultural commodities for the first time in its history.”³⁰⁵

Egypt in 21st century still remains as a source of cheap labor, and a case of brain drain.³⁰⁶ “[D]espite significant improvements in the country’s infrastructure (especially in utilities and telecommunications),”³⁰⁷ Egypt is still in the lower tier of development, with more than 30% of its population living under poverty line.³⁰⁸ “This was a reflection of the difficulty of Egyptians’ daily lives, from the crumbling

³⁰³ Ibid, 8.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 9.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, 11.

³⁰⁸ United Nations Development Program, “The 2021 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI),” 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2021_mpi_report_en.pdf (accessed on January 4, 2022), 30.

education system and decrepit health [sic] care, to humiliating transportation.”³⁰⁹ The country was deteriorating in comparison with its international peers like Turkey and South Africa.³¹⁰ What is more important, “there was not only a sense of confusion, resentment and rejection among the Egyptians – especially the younger ones, but increasingly an overarching feeling of an irreparable damage, a national defeat.”³¹¹

To sum up, the Aswan Dam sanctions did little to change the socioeconomic structure of Egypt in positive sense. On the contrary, despite the sanctions (unlike the other case studies in this research) did not lead directly to scarcity, the policies followed to overcome the sanctions institutionalized corruption by favoring the rich over the poor. While Nasser was nurturing his popularity as the person that gave peasants back their honor and carrying his fame beyond the borders of Egypt, the country could not lift up from being an agricultural economy. Even today, Egypt is 40th biggest economy, making it a lower-middle income country.³¹² The withdrawal-type of sanctions did nothing to cure a leper Egypt, nor to prevent construction of the Dam. Hence, all the measures did was to serve as a demonstration of Western disciplinary power.

³⁰⁹ Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 11.

³¹⁰ “In 2007, 32 percent of the population were completely illiterate, ... 40 percent of the population were at or below the international poverty line and GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) was less than half of Turkey and 45 percent of South Africa’s.” Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Data from World Bank, “Data for Lower Middle Income, Egypt, Arab Rep.,” *Open Data*, undated, <https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=XN-EG> (accessed July 31, 2020). For a list of ranking in terms of national income, see World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product,” *Open Data*, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=chart (accessed July 31, 2020).

3.5. Cultural Aspect

Despite the Nile was the source of administrative theories like Oriental Despotism, the power derived from controlling Nile necessitated controlling also the flow of Nile. There had long been projects for taming the river, including a further raising of the initial Aswan Dam. Built in 1902, the Dam was heightened first in 1907-1912.

Before the second heightening that continued between 1929-1933, the World War I took place. The abovementioned *mission civilizatrice* continued with the War, which was taken as an opportunity by the British to declare a protectorate over Egyptians. Yet the Egyptians wanted to have their independence from the collapsing Ottoman Empire. With the plan to have Egypt as a protectorate, however, the British objected to the idea of Egyptian independence. The end result was a rebellion in Egypt in 1919,³¹³ which was an important movement in understanding local responses subject to this research. The rebellious movement was fed deeply by an anti-British sentiment, because already by 1800 when the British arrived to Egypt, the Egyptian “army was disbanded and the British advisers were installed in every department of government. British firms and agencies, by controlling trade and commerce, drained the economic strength of Egypt.”³¹⁴ The movement spread into workers, peasants, and imams alike. “These images of national unity inspired several generations of Egyptians, those who took part in and those bred on stories of the uprising, to continue the struggle for ‘total

³¹³ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 15.

³¹⁴ Chaudhri, “New Egypt and the West,” 132.

independence.’ ”³¹⁵ In other words, the rebellion was not only for liberation from the Ottoman Empire, but also for national pride.

The same pride element can easily be observed in the process following the decline of funds for the Dam. Just like liberation was not only for national freedom or self-determination, the Aswan Dam was not only for fulfilling economic development goals or a political agenda. Just like Mahmood Ahmadinejad who securitized the nuclear program in search for a blanket cover over the problems beneath his election as the President of Iran,³¹⁶ “Nasser had turned Aswan Dam into a popular symbol of reform.”³¹⁷

When the US announced the decline of financial assistance for the Dam on July 19, 1956, “[t]he Egyptians were totally unprepared for such a startling policy reversal.”³¹⁸ Nasser had turned the Dam into a symbol of economic reform, development and welfare. “It was to be a project of breath-taking proportions, ‘seventeen times greater than the Great Pyramid of the Pharaohs’.”³¹⁹ Moreover, upon completion, the Dam would increase the area of cultivable land by 25-30%, hence allow Egyptian economy

³¹⁵ Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement*, 16. It should be noted that Egypt indeed had never been fully independent. In ancient era it was occupied by Greeks, Romans and Ottomans; in 1798 Napoleon arrived and wanted to use Egypt as a base for his raid to India. Three years later came the British. Chaudhri, “New Egypt and the West,” 132.

³¹⁶ Kasra Najji, *Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran’s Radical* (London: IB Tauris, 2008), 132.

³¹⁷ Dougherty, “Aswan Decision in Perspective,” 21-2.

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, 22.

³¹⁹ *Ibid*.

keep up with rising population.³²⁰ The project would be the highest dam in the world.

“The water to be impounded behind the dam w[ould] be the second largest man-made lake in the world.”³²¹

The Aswan Dam was important also to prove and reinforce the efficiency of the government. In the end, already with some water, an individual peasant would be able to “raise one crop, with more another, with a perennial supply still third or even a fourth. This of course reacts on every department of life, on wages, on imports, on barter, on exchange, on security, on the welfare.”³²² Besides assisting the country’s development, the Dam was also to prove Egyptian capability to curb Nile at flood, “and the irrigation engineer w[ould] have the tropical rains under control as the locomotive engineer has his machine.”³²³

In summary, the Dam stood as a landmark for Egyptian struggle for development.

Past and the present Egyptian generations, and doubtless future generations, will recognize that the building of the HAD [i.e. the Aswan Dam as referred in this research], in spite of though opposition, and unfair and unjustified conflicts –within and beyond Egypt- to hinder the implementation of the project, to have been a great challenge to the Egyptian people. In their minds and hearts, the success in building and operating the HAD represents to the Egyptian people their dignity, insistence will and determination to their benefits and interests.³²⁴

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ahmad Abu Shumays, *Economic and Technical Aspects of Egypt’s High Aswan Dam* (California: California Institute of Technology, 1962), 7.

³²² Sloane, “Egypt and England,” 468.

³²³ Ibid, 473.

³²⁴ M. A. Abu-Zeid, F. Z. el-Shibini, “Egypt’s High Aswan Dam,” *Water Resources Development* 13, no. 2 (1997): 217.

Therefore, the withdrawal of the funds amounted to a sanctions measure also from pride perspective. As the Dam was built and as for generations it served for nurturing national pride, the West satisfied the urge to flex muscles as proof of being able to exercise disciplinary power. In the end, the power that cannot be used or demonstrated does not, according to Foucault, amount to power at all.

3.6. Conclusion

The Aswan Dam was a gigantic project. It required funds composed of \$500 million in Egyptian currency, \$300 million by private investors and an additional \$400 million equivalent of foreign currency.³²⁵ In late 1955, US, UK and IBRD offered \$270 million,³²⁶ however, political developments in following year made the US withdraw from funding the Dam.³²⁷ As the US withdrew its offer, so did the UK and the IBRD.³²⁸

Arguments for the withdrawal ranged from feasibility of the project to stability of Egypt. Indeed, upon completion, Aswan Dam was to increase agricultural output by 50%, add 1/3 more land (2 million more acres) to total cultivable land, and increase welfare by bolstering migration from over-populated areas to less-populated ones.³²⁹ However, this economic development would also enable the country buy more Soviet

³²⁵ Abu-Shumays, *Economic and Technical Aspects of Egypt's High Aswan Dam*, 11.

³²⁶ *Ibid*, 12.

³²⁷ Walker, "The Lost art of Interdependency: United Nations Leadership in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and Its Ramifications in World Affairs," 14.

³²⁸ Abu-Shumays, *Economic and Technical Aspects of Egypt's High Aswan Dam*, 12.

³²⁹ Chaudri, "New Egypt and the West," 131.

weaponry. Given the fact that Egypt already approached to Czechoslovakia for arms purchases, which already raised questions about the feasibility of the giant dam project, the Aswan Dam was securitized.

However, the constructivist approach notes that for securitization to take place, there should be a discourse. That discourse was Orientalism. It provided a fertile ground to present Egypt as a candidate for a demonstration of disciplinary power. Egypt was primitive other whose people needed to be civilized, to be educated, and hence normalized only after being subject to disciplinary processes. Egypt not only was centuries-old abnormal in need of *mission civilizatrice*, but also Nasser proved to have the nerve to challenge Western domination.

As is the case in other case-studies enveloped in this research, sanctions did not end up changing the behavior of the target. On the contrary, Nasser escalated the game by nationalizing the Suez Canal. In the same period, Soviet bloc was suffering from considerable instability. Mass protests in Poland and Hungary in 1956 kept international community busy, therefore Nasser's nationalization of Suez Canal to fund the Dam went relatively undernoticed, without facing further sanctions.³³⁰ When the Hungarian events cooled down, Suez began to heat up – in October 1956, Israel started military action.

The case of Egypt exemplifies sanctions in the form of financial assistance that is withheld. Chronologically speaking, among the cases analyzed in this thesis, sanctions

³³⁰ The decision was announced on 26 July 1956; and Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which is the authority to operate the Canal under the 1888 Constantinople Convention. Anonymous, "Arab League." *International Organizations* 10, no. 4 (1956): 646.

against Egypt is the first one. It also is the one that is not overtly named as sanctions in the literature; in this regard the literature focuses either on the impact of Aswan Dam on environmental and water management or the following Second and Third Arab-Israeli Wars (Suez and June War, respectively) as part of greater picture of regional conflict. As such, this chapter tried to provide a novel approach both to the sanctions and to the Suez crisis.

The withdrawal of funds from Aswan, on account of the classical literature on sanctions, was a failed action. It (i) failed in stopping the construction of the Dam or neutralize Nasser's ambitions, (ii) improved relations between Soviet bloc and Egypt, and (iii) ended up with nationalization of the Suez Canal and demise of the British control over it, and more important than all, (iv) sanctions failed as what followed was a war.

Still, the measures have been implemented for purposes of exercising disciplinary power over a maverick leader under the Cold War environment. The sanctions were there not to prevent the construction of the Dam, but to prevent Nasser realize its pet project. In other words, it was a punishment designed to humiliate Nasser and change his behavior by knocking the wind out of his sails.

CHAPTER 4

IRAN

This chapter³³¹ will analyze the impact of sanctions on Iran based on its nuclear program. In contrast to the contemporary animosity, the US planted the seeds of the nuclear program in 1957 as “[t]he shah emerged as an important American ally in the Persian Gulf.”³³² A year later, Iran became a party to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A decade later, it also became party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.³³³

³³¹ This chapter builds upon the unpublished preliminary research titled as “An Economic Solution to a Political Problem: Possibility of Solving Nuclear Proliferation Problem through Integration to Global Trade,” conducted in 2013.

³³² Mark Fitzpatrick, *Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment* (USA: IISS, 2011), 8. Indeed, following the coup against Prime Minister Mosaddeq, Iran received 45 million dollars of emergency aid from the US. In the ten years between 1953-1963, the US poured 535 million dollars of military aid to Iran which is observed to be highest among US aid to a non-NATO member country. Gülriş Şen, *Devrimden Günümüze İran’ın ABD Politikası: Tarihsel Sosyolojik bir Analiz* (Ankara: ODTU Publishing, 2018, 2nd edition), 90.

³³³ According to the Treaty, a nuclear weapon state is the one that successfully detonated before 1970. The rest are deemed to be non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Treaty. The text can be found at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text> (accessed February 29, 2020).

During the 1970s, the US supported Iran in developing non-oil energy bases³³⁴ even to a degree that just in the year before the Revolution, US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed. “Had the bilateral agreement put into effect it would have resulted in wide-ranging nuclear assistance from the US to Iran.”³³⁵

Iran under Shah’s rule became a quickly developing country. Gross national production (GNP) per capita almost ten-folded in between 1960s and 1970s.³³⁶ Yet, the economic development was taking place at the expense of the countryside. Illiteracy, infant mortality, and all the problems associated with rising population remained unresolved³³⁷ as inflation begun to hit harder on vital items like foodstuff and housing rent.

In this context, it is possible to argue that the Shah was not able to deal with the protests and provide effective solutions because of his ailing health condition.³³⁸ Regardless

³³⁴ Notice should be made, however, that the main if not the only aim of encouraging Iran enjoy nuclear technology was to get the large sums of oil-money back. Mohammed Sahimi, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Part I,” *Payvand News*, October 2, 2003; <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html> (accessed February 29, 2020).

³³⁵ Bobi Pirseyedi, *Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent* (UK: Routledge, 2012), 116.

³³⁶ Michael Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran: A History of Islamic Republic* (UK: Penguin, 2014), 93. Much of this increase derived from oil incomes, and the Shah got them reinvested in different sectors to diversify the economy. “The country had reoriented away from agriculture toward more developed economic activities that would yield greater benefits to the people, in industry and services.” The rush for development was so overwhelming that in most cases there was discoordination, waste and corruption (Ibid, 94).

³³⁷ Ibid, 94.

³³⁸ Ibid, 110.

the root cause of the problems, anti-Western sentiments were on rise, and they had been rising since Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq had been ousted from power by a Western-backed coup.³³⁹ Within ten years came the White Revolution, which earned the harsh criticisms from ulema for topics like female suffrage and land reform;³⁴⁰ paving the way for the Islamic Revolution. With the Revolution, the Shah left the country on January 16, 1979 for Egypt and Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini arrived from France on February 1, 1979.

The Revolution is regarded as a landmark in Iran's nuclear quest. It also is a landmark as it was when the sanctions against Iran began.³⁴¹ Needless to say, the relations of Iran with the West deteriorated after the Islamic Revolution; and the problems peaked with the disclosure of Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002.

Sanctions following the disclosure of the nuclear facilities continued and transformed themselves from uni- to multi-lateral nature. This chapter, in analyzing Iranian nuclear program, questions why Iran had such a program, what were the motivations, and how the sanctions affected the daily life. In all subsections, it will be demonstrated that the

³³⁹ About Mosaddeq, nationalization of natural resources, coup and its ties to the Islamic Revolution, see Nathan Gonzalez, *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice* (US: Praeger, 2007), esp. 43-52; Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and Roots of Middle East Terror* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003); also his *Overthrow: America's Change of Regime from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006).

³⁴⁰ Ulema had large and religiously endowed lands, hence while approach to female suffrage was religious, opposition to decentralization of land ownership was related to material concerns. Gonzalez, *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice*, 50.

³⁴¹ Note, however, that the focus of this chapter will not be sanctions on human rights breach or support for terrorism.

gist of the matter is not to prevent Iran from having a nuclear capability, but priority is given to demonstrate Western disciplinary power over a non-Western country.

4.1. Road to Sanctions

Iran had the experience of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which put an end to the “relationship between the United States and the Shah whereby the latter helped to sustain the economic and political interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region and the former helped to preserve the rule of the Shah.”³⁴²

Following the Revolution, masses had been politicized to a degree that “[t]alking, thinking and acting politically had become a reflex action, as natural ... as breathing.”³⁴³ The US Embassy became a landmark place for protests; people thought that they “could hardly criticize ‘America’ while practicing its values, which we knew were hostile to our culture.”³⁴⁴ Against this background came the Hostage Crisis, which went on for more than a year and a half. This is an important cornerstone not

³⁴² Sasan Fayazmanesh, “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran,” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 35, no. 3 (2003): 221.

³⁴³ Massoumeh Ebteker (as told to Fred A. Reed), *Takeover in Tehran: the Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture* (Talonbooks: Burnaby, B.C., 2000), 42-3. The Revolutionary constitution was designed also with an idea to ensure full independence and protection from the foreign interference, including the national economy. See Evaleila Pesaran, *Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-Reform in the Post-Revolutionary Era* (USA, Canada, UK: Routledge, 2013), esp. 39-62.

³⁴⁴ Ebteker, *Takeover in Tehran: the Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture*, 50.

only in international diplomatic history, but also for the study of sanctions here because the Hostage Crisis marked the first US sanctions against Iran.³⁴⁵

The initial US response to the Crisis was in the form of financial and commercial sanctions,³⁴⁶ with the aim of using the sanctions as a bargaining chip.³⁴⁷ However, despite the Crisis ended, the sanctions did not come to an end. A few years later, Iran was tied to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as bombings of Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. “In incremental steps, the United States imposed new restrictions on US trade with Iran, targeted primarily at limiting development of the Iranian oil industry and thus Tehran’s capability to fund terrorist groups.”³⁴⁸ And as the Hostage Crisis came to an end, Iran was in the Gulf War 2, known as Iran-Iraq War.

Interestingly enough, while Revolutionary Iran was nothing but politicized, war-time Iran witnessed “people [who] never talk[ed] about politics anymore. They [we]re simply tired. Their energy is drained by waiting in long lines all day to get the simplest

³⁴⁵ Note also that end of November 4, when the Hostage Crisis began, is also the day when the US sanctions following its withdrawal from the JCPOA fully entered into force.

³⁴⁶ For an alternative analysis to the discourse that financial sanctions severely diminished Iran’s ability to enter into commercial relations, see Fayazmanesh, “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran,” 223-4.

³⁴⁷ For this to happen, though, a delicate sanctions adjustment mechanism is required. See Eriksson’s discussion of targeted sanctions on Iraq, where he concludes that at the UN level the Sanctions Committee failed to remove Saddam Hussein from designated people list despite he had been executed in late 2006. Mikael Eriksson, *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions* (England, USA: Ashgate, 2011), esp. 74-5.

³⁴⁸ Hufbauer *et al.*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 145. See also pages 143-6 on Iran.

things.”³⁴⁹ The ten-year long war with Iraq not only dominated the first decade of a newborn regime but also cost hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives.³⁵⁰ Needless also to add that this experience “contributed to an enduring fear in Tehran that the United States desires the destruction of the Islamic Republic.”³⁵¹ In the end, some members of the Majlis claimed that it was again the US that was behind all the atrocity: “During Vietnam peace talks in Paris the U.S. was constantly bombing Vietnam as a coercive tactic. Now they presume they can use the same tactics against us” by supporting and encouraging Iraq to attack.³⁵² This constructivist perspective will be employed in this chapter to analyze the Western sanctions, how an Orientalist discourse was employed to brand Iran as leper and measures were implemented to discipline a non-Western country.

The current discourse on Iran’s leper nature revolves around its nuclear quest. Officially, Iran neither tacitly nor overtly declared to pursue a nuclear weapon program. The official rhetoric always focused on the need for energy. Looking through Iranian prism, increasing population³⁵³ meant increasing electricity demands. Because

³⁴⁹ Eric Hooglund, “Iran and the Gulf War,” *MERIP* 148 (1987): 18.

³⁵⁰ A similar “cleansing” was the case also with the army. Some members of the Shah’s army escaped abroad, some others were executed by firing squads. Recep Albayrak, *Türklerin İran’ı: Yakın Gelecek* (Berikan Yayınları: Ankara, 2013), vol.1, 128.

³⁵¹ Steven E. Miller and Matthew Bunn, “Interpreting the Implacable Foe: American Perception of Iran”, in *U.S.- Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue*, ed. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman (NY, London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 58. During the war, Iran and China developed close relations that evolved into a strategic cooperation which covered military, nuclear and energy spheres. Barış Adıbelli, *Büyük Avrasya Projesi* (İstanbul: IQ, 2006), 142-4.

³⁵² Ebtekar, *Takeover in Tehran: the Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture*, 225.

³⁵³ The population in Iran increased by 20 million in the first decade of the Revolution. See Anonymous, “A Growing Crisis: The Impact of Sanctions and Regime Policies on Iranians’

“a barrel of oil is too precious... to be used for generating electricity,”³⁵⁴ the quest for nuclear energy was justified.

The West was not convinced with Iranian claims. The Western discourse was built on Iran being the third largest natural gas producer,³⁵⁵ and natural gas being a cheaper source than nuclear power plants for generating electricity.³⁵⁶ However, one point needs to be highlighted here: for being able to produce electricity and meet energy demand, Iran should have acquired mass production capability which was absent due to inadequate research and development (R&D) due to the decades-long embargoes.

Hand-in-hand with the change of the ruling elite both in the US and Iran, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani administrations paved the way to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It provided a relief for Iran from sanctions, which “were suspended or lifted upon IAEA certification on January 16, 2016, that

Economic and Social Rights,” *the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran*, 2013; <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Growing-Crisis.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2020), 44-45.

³⁵⁴Mohammed Sahimi, *Iran’s Nuclear Program*, “Part II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary?,” <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1022.html> (accessed February 29, 2020).

³⁵⁵British Petroleum, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” 2022, <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2022), 29.

³⁵⁶Michael Eisenstadt, *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions* (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 15-6.

Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments under the agreement. (“Implementation Day”)³⁵⁷

Despite in the end the US withdrew from the JCPOA, the 159-page document contained loopholes and ambiguities, allowing a lot of space for interpretation.³⁵⁸

“Families and businesses reportedly continue to have difficulty finding financial institutions and shipping companies willing to facilitate transactions for them.”³⁵⁹ In

2016, even before its withdrawal for example, the US passed a bill titled as “the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act,”³⁶⁰ which was

interpreted to prevent Boeing from selling aircraft to Iran Air³⁶¹ and Aseman Airlines.³⁶²

³⁵⁷ Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” *CRS Report 7-5700* (2016), i.

³⁵⁸ Omer Carmi, “Iran’s Nuclear Roadmap for 2019: Pushing the JCPOA’s Boundaries,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy - Policy Watch* 3670 (2019).

³⁵⁹ Joy Gordon, “Extraterritoriality: Issues of Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect in the Cases of Cuba and Iran,” *Harvard International Law Journal Online* 57 (2016), 11.

³⁶⁰ United States Congress, “the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act,” *114th Congress (2015-2016)* H.R.5485, July 7, 2016; <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5485/actions> (accessed May 25, 2020).

³⁶¹ Iran Air’s fleet is older than twenty years of age, with 60 being grounded for technical issues. Statistically, flying with Iran Air is 100 times more risky than with others because in between 1989-2014, Iran had 200 airplane accidents, leaving more than 2000 lives lost. Ariane Tabatabai, “The Future of the Iranian Deal is Still Uncertain,” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* July 13, 2016, <http://thebulletin.org/future-iranian-nuclear-deal-still-uncertain9655> (accessed May 25, 2020).

³⁶² In total, Iran Air and Aseman Airlines made an agreement with Boeing for 110 new planes, making up to 20 billion dollars. Jason Gewirtz, “If Trump Scraps the Iran Nuclear Deal, the First Loser may be Boeing,” *CNBC*, October 2, 2017, Monday;

Speaking of airplanes, “for every aircraft sold, at least three more will be sold to the same customer in the future... Thus the loss of one sale due to export controls can bring about the loss of an entire export market.”³⁶³ While this economic dimension is medium- to long-run, there were short-run impacts of the embargo including crashing of many airplanes, and civilian airlines lacking access to spare parts,³⁶⁴ Iranian and foreign alike: a plane from Norwegian Airlines fleet was stuck in Shiraz for more than two months simply because of the fact that “[e]xport restrictions ... meant the aircraft ha[d] not yet received the spare parts needed for it to take off again.”³⁶⁵ Foreign operators like British Airways and KLM ceased operating flights to and from Iran, leaving Iran Air and Mahan Air as sole operators on the routes. While this may look like an opportunity to seize to grab in domestic market, Iran-Europe seats also fell by 30%.³⁶⁶

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/iran-nuclear-deal-what-happens-to-boeing-if-the-us-decertifies.html> (accessed May 25, 2020).

³⁶³ National Academy of Science, *Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1991), 22.

³⁶⁴ Tabatabai, “The Future of the Iranian Deal is Still Uncertain.”

³⁶⁵ Mohammed Tawfeeq and Tamara Qiblawi, “Despite US Warning, Iran Launches Satellite and Fails,” *CNN*, January 15, 2019, Tuesday; <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/15/middleeast/iran-satellite-launch-intl/index.html> (accessed May 25, 2020). The plane finally arrived Oslo in February. See Niklas Magnusson, “Norwegian Air Jet Stranded in Iran Finally Arrives Home,” *Bloomberg*, February 23, 2019, Saturday; <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-23/norwegian-air-jet-stranded-in-iran-finally-arrives-home> (accessed May 25, 2020).

³⁶⁶ Data belongs to in 2018 June-November period. It may look like a seasonal drop; yet in 2017 fall in seats in between July-November was limited with 12%. Anonymous, “Iran Aviation: Sanctions Bite as BA, Air France and KLM Withdraw,” September 19, 2018; <https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/iran-aviation-sanctions-bite-as-ba-air-france-and-klm-withdraw-437458> (accessed May 25, 2020).

In a nutshell, we can conclude that while the sanctions began as measures against the Revolutionary Iranians who caused the Hostage Crisis, they continued as embargoes during Iran-Iraq War period, followed by human rights and terrorism-related sanctions and incorporated also non-proliferation sanctions. In all cases, the target was the ruling elite; aim was to alter the policies pursued and even to change the regime. Nonetheless, while *de jure* the intention was to change the elite, *de facto* the sanctions casted deep impact on ordinary people.

Of course, Iran remembers the double standard the West pursued regarding its nuclear program, especially since the Islamic Revolution. West's tolerance for Israel to remain as a nuclear weapon country in the Middle East and cooperation with India and Pakistan in their nuclear programs were well observed moves and discretions.³⁶⁷ While the three mentioned countries enjoyed positive relations with the US despite their nuclear quests, Iran continued to suffer from sanctions. As a result of the economic hardship, Iran recorded 12.4% unemployment and 10.5% inflation rate in 2020;³⁶⁸ the figures are 9.6 and 44% respectively for 2021,³⁶⁹ and the currency keeps devaluing.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Washington: Carnegie, 2007), 245. Note that Israel pursues a neither deny nor confirm policy on its nuclear capacity.

³⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "Iran," *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on July 21, 2020; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html> (accessed July 31, 2020).

³⁶⁹ Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Iran," *Country Report* (November 10, 2021), 2.

³⁷⁰ See Hadi Salehi Esfahani, "The Experience of Iran's Manufacturing Sector under International Economic Sanctions," *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2018, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/hadi-salehi-esfahani> (accessed November 29, 2021). The policy of "maximum pressure" resulted in rial depreciating vis-à-vis dollar. This is the depressing effect of sanctions – it "can 'depress' the overall economic

The positive momentum gained by the JCPOA could have provided incentives for foreigners to consider Iran for future investments. Yet, the unilateral US sanctions together with all their extraterritorial characteristics created concerns not only for foreign businesses but also for foreign governments. While European Union leaders were getting together to figure out a way to bypass US sanctions,³⁷¹ Iran carried the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Court as provisional measures unanimously ordered the US to remove

any impediments arising from the measures announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation to the territory of Islamic Republic of Iran of (i) medicines and medical devices; (ii) foodstuffs and agricultural commodities; and (iii) spare parts, equipment and associated services (including warranty, maintenance, repair services and inspections) necessary for the safety of civil aviation;³⁷²

as well as related licenses, authorizations and restrictions on payment transfers.³⁷³ The US, in return, not only objected to the decision but also withdraw from the 1955 US-

activities of the target countries, so that their trade with other countries is also negatively affected – as a result of diminished demand.” Jiawen Yang, Hossein Askari, John Forrer and Lili Zhu, “How do US Economic Sanctions Affect EU’s Trade with Target Countries?,” *The World Economics* 32, no. 8 (2009): 1225.

³⁷¹ Daniel Boffet, Sabrina Siddiqui and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “EU Acts to Protect Firms from Donald Trump’s Sanctions against Iran,” *the Guardian*, August 6, 2018, Sunday; <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/06/eu-acts-to-protect-firms-from-donald-trumps-sanctions-against-iran> (accessed August 1, 2020); Gabriela Baczyńska, “UPDATE-EU Leaders Struggle to save Iran Economic ties from U.S. Sanctions,” *Reuters*, May 17, 2018, Thursday; <https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N1SN7MN> (accessed August 1, 2020).

³⁷² International Court of Justice, “Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Provisional Decision,” *Reposits of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders* General List No. 175 (October 3, 2018); <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2020), para. 102.

³⁷³ *Ibid*, para. 103. The final decision will be awarded after proceedings to the merits of the case.

Iran Treaty of Friendship based on which the ICJ gave its decision.³⁷⁴ This move by itself was a mere sample of sanctions being employed to demonstrate power – anything that prevents the demonstration itself would suffer from another power demonstration.

Below sections will concentrate on sanctions on Iran’s nuclear quest as the measures are relatively recent. It does not mean that this chapter managed to single out the non-proliferation sanctions. On the contrary, it looks at the recent debate on imposition, execution and impact sanctions with respect to national security, pride, economy and administrative capacity of Iran, in other words, how the sanctions were implemented, how they were hanging as Damocles’ sword, and how they actually are manifest measures to display disciplinary power against an Oriental country.

4.2. Security Aspect

The Shah’s “Great Civilization” project went hand in hand with Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Middle East talks. In mid1970s, Iran established its national atomic energy institution, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which concluded nuclear contracts with the US, Germany and France. During those “good old days,” the Western assistance was guaranteed since the program was still infant and since Iran was one of the so-called “three pillars” of the US in the region; the other two being Israel and Egypt. Following the Revolution, the program was put on a pause because

³⁷⁴ Remarks of Secretary of State Pompeo was widely reflected in newspapers. See, for example, Anonymous, “U.S. Terminates 1955 'Friendship' Treaty with Iran After UN Court Ruling,” *RFERL*, October 3, 2018, Wednesday; <https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-terminates-1955-friendship-treaty-with-iran-after-un-court-ruling/29523774.html> (accessed August 1, 2020).

the revolutionary Iran experienced an eight-year war with Iraq, leaving heavy economic destruction behind.

Neither Iraq nor Iran could win the war. The difficulty for Iran was that, in addition to many Arab countries siding with Iraq, it had to wage the war under an arms embargo. The Iranian armed forces were equipped with US ammunition during the Shah era, and the alternatives from China and North Korea were not compatible with the existing ammunition.³⁷⁵ At one point, Iran turned to Sweden and bought missile systems which had not even been on test-fire. Many of the missiles exploded on the battlefield; Iran then started its own missile system for sake of not being reliant on foreigners in the future.³⁷⁶

Following the Iran-Iraq War, in 1989, Iran started a modernization project with regards to its armed forces. However, the small-size of Iran's land forces, and its inability in replacing combat losses, combined with the ongoing embargo, made it impossible for Iran to afford a conventional war. In addition to these factors, there was also the national target of undermining the US dominance in the Gulf.³⁷⁷ Thus, for Iran, acquiring non-conventional weapons could have climbed at the top of the agenda. In

³⁷⁵ Iran could get US weapons both through US and Israel under the secret arms-for-hostages deal. Israel also supplied spare parts through third parties. Nonetheless, Iran could not secure steady supply of spare parts, hence had to turn to black market. Prices were higher, quality was lower, and equipment was not all the time compatible with the US arsenal. Iraq, on the contrary, was "able to buy higher quality, more sophisticated weapons from a wide variety of sellers on the legal market." Martha Wenger and Dick Anderson, "The Gulf War," *MERIP Middle East Report*, 148 (1987): 26.

³⁷⁶ Albayrak, *Türklerin İran'ı: Yakın Gelecek*, 139. Many thanks to M. Erdeviren for bringing this book to my attention.

³⁷⁷ Eisenstadt, *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions*, 3, 35.

other words, Iran was believed to continue its nuclear program because (i) it had already invested a lot and does not want to let that investment turn into sunk cost, and (ii) by being a nuclear power, it could build up its own arsenal and will not need to revive and sustain costly conventional power.³⁷⁸

The same economic concerns seem to be valid even today for the security agenda. Today, in some Iranian cities unemployment hits 60%.³⁷⁹ Following November 2018, with the new wave of unilateral US sanctions, figures worsened even further; which means less budget would be available for army and ammunition. Here, nuclear option enters into the scene once more as a magic wand: An average submarine of the US costs \$ 2.8 billion; a cutting-edge one is \$8 billion (without the R&D costs); whereas a full-scale nuclear program is reported to cost only \$1-3 billion.³⁸⁰

In simple security terms, Iran feels encircled by its arch enemy, the US.³⁸¹ The nuclear gap between the haves and have-nots adds spice to the imbalance and insecurity in the region; and “[p]art of the problem in ... nuclear disarmament is that international community has, as yet, developed no alternative to a reliance on nuclear deterrence.”³⁸²

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Bilal Hatemi, “İran’da Eşitsizlik, Yoksulluk ve Sosyal Refah Siyaseti,” *Maduniyet* 1 (2019): 27.

³⁸⁰ Associated Press, “Less than One Aircraft Carrier? The Cost of North Korea’s Nukes,” *CNBC News*, July 20, 2017, Thursday; <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/less-than-one-aircraft-carrier-the-cost-of-north-koreas-nukes.html> (accessed February 29, 2020). Note that the figures belong to North Korea, another country that has long been under sanctions.

³⁸¹ Note that the US enjoys a presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and holds military bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Oman.

³⁸² Mohamed el-Baradei, statement titled as “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region,” *IAEA*, April 26, 2005,

Having six of the existing –at least- eight nuclear powers around itself,³⁸³ the Iranian sense of insecurity is understandable;³⁸⁴ however its acts and actions to reduce this insecurity is helping to add fuel to the discursive violence by labelling Iran as a “leper” other which is subject to securitization.

The former head of IAEA, Hans Blix, notes in full agreement that the “concerns over Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions may -as before the invasion of Iraq in 2003- be more of marketing ploy than real worry.” He also notes that “assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists as well as introducing the highly sophisticated ‘Stuxnet’ computer virus into Iranian centrifuges” amount to terrorism and intervention.³⁸⁵ The overt discourse of threat, accompanied by the behavior, serves as an action. By rules of physics, each action creates a reaction: Despite the regime kept repeating that its main doctrine is defensive, “the threats issued by senior Iranian leaders and officials indicate that Iran’s actual strategy for responding to a Western attack is taking an increasingly offensive and deterrent characteristics.”³⁸⁶ In addition to the state security which drains limited

<https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-pursuing-security-region-region> (accessed February 29, 2020).

³⁸³ These countries are China, India, Israel, Russia and Pakistan bordering Iran, and the USA; being in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other two states of the nuclear club are France and the UK.

³⁸⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, “After Iraq, Iran?” *Binghamton Commentary*, No. 146 (2004).

³⁸⁵ Hans Blix, “From an Isolated Iran to Isolated US,” *European Leadership Network*, November (2017), <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/from-an-isolated-iran-to-an-isolated-us/> (accessed October 13, 2020).

³⁸⁶ A. Savgon and Yossi Mansharaf, “Iran’s Response to Western Warnings: ‘First Strike,’ ‘Preemptive Attack,’ Long-Range Ballistic Missiles, ‘Asymmetric [Guerilla – original] Warfare,” *MEMRI Inquiry&Analysis Series*, No. 407 (2007). See Anonymous, “US Must Talk to Revolutionary Guards if it Wants to Enter Hurmuz Strait – Zarif,” *Sputnik International*, April 24, 2019, Wednesday; <https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201904241074419574-iran->

resources in all countries, the sanctions create a budget constraint that makes nuclear a feasible option, and any move to further the nuclear quest feeds in future sanctions.³⁸⁷

This process of securitization creates a downward spiral; feeding into otherization. The very spiral itself is an input for and output of Western disciplinary measures.

4.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect

Following the US sanctions, Iran retaliated by initiating its own import embargo. The items revolutionary Iran imported were machineries and electronics. Exports, on the other hand, were basically oil and handicrafts like jewelry or rugs. Whereas “US consumers had no difficulty substituting these high luxury goods from other countries, or they could go without them,”³⁸⁸ for Iran, items subject to imports from US were essential, substitutes were not readily available, and price was quite inelastic. There is no clear figure on the black market, but in terms of legal trade, welfare loss is estimated to be a quarter of trade before its 1994 level in addition to the trade volume reduced to zero. As such, in ten years, estimations indicated that “Iran suffered \$82.23 million

[hormuz-strait-us-revolutionary-guards/](#) (accessed February 29, 2020) for one of the resent samples of the escalatory discourse.

³⁸⁷ Iran launched a satellite regardless of the US warnings in April 2020. Contrary to previous failures, this time the launch was successful. Maysam Bizaer, “Iran Satellite Launch 'Sends a Message' on Failed US Pressure,” *Al Jazeera* April 28, 2020, Tuesday; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/iran-satellite-launch-sends-message-failed-pressure-200428102657189.html> (accessed May 25, 2020). One recent attempt came in cooperation with Russia. See Matt Murphy, “US Officials Concerned as Russia Launches Iranian Satellite,” *BBC News*, August 9, 2022, Tuesday; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62482687> (accessed October 14, 2022).

³⁸⁸ Akbar E. Torbat, “Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran,” *The World Economy* 28, no. 3 (2005): 416.

lost annually for not being able to import the needed goods from the US” and \$58 million in exports.³⁸⁹

As sanctions began to hurt, war-torn country needed to find alternative sources of income to ignite its national development projects. One source was the World Bank, where the US was pressuring to prevent Iran’s access to funds. One other was diaspora, but sanctions prevented transfer of the funds raised by immigrants back to Iran.³⁹⁰

While financial sanctions drained foreign investment, Iran had long adopted legislative measures like becoming a member to United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in order to provide a secure investment climate for foreign investors. However, in addition to the difficulties directly imposed on financial transactions,³⁹¹ there was the “chilling effect” visible “when banks and corporations decline to engage in legally permissible transactions simply because the regulations are unclear, as in the event of a misstep, the consequences could be catastrophic.”³⁹²

In other words, despite all the UN Resolutions and volumes of sanctions texts, from a legal perspective all were consciously designed vaguely -- they always called for

³⁸⁹ Ibid, 415 and 417.

³⁹⁰ Gordon, “Extraterritoriality: Issues of Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect in the Cases of Cuba and Iran.”

³⁹¹ SWIFT, for example, imposed sanctions on Iranian banks following EU Regulation No 267/2012. See European Council, “Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010,” *Council of the European Union*, March 23, 2012; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0267&from=EN> (accessed August 1, 2020). See also SWIFT, “SWIFT and Sanctions,” *Compliance*, undated; <https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance/swift-and-sanctions> (accessed August 1, 2020).

³⁹² Gordon, “Extraterritoriality: Issues of Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect in the Cases of Cuba and Iran,” 6.

“exercising vigilance,” which meant the grey zones in legal text should be interpreted not with a facilitating but restricting perspective.³⁹³

While the vague wording was there intentionally to enable further discursive violence, oil emerged as another area where disciplinary power could be exercised. These sanctions on Iranian oil exports were initiated first by the US and barred US companies. Soon before Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was enacted, “Germany exported four times more to Iran than [to] the US, Japan ... [and] Italy twice as much, and France slightly more.”³⁹⁴ Their companies ignored the US call to avoid trading with Iran, and did not hesitate to fill the vacuum the US left in Iran. Total, for example, took over a \$600 million project on Sirri oil field, which had been agreed with Conoco before the US sanctions.³⁹⁵

Seeing that its Western allies continued to engage with Iran, the US expanded the scope and shifted to secondary sanctions. From this perspective, ILSA “was the first major ‘extra-territorial sanction’ on Iran – a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties

³⁹³ It should be noted “that the sanctions are often intentionally vague, since they are intended to discourage economic activity in the sanctioned country.” Alezey Eremenko, “The ‘Who, What, When’ of Russia Sanctions: A Cheat-Sheet for Laymen,” *Russia Matters*, September 26, 2018; <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/who-what-when-russia-sanctions-cheat-sheet-laymen> (accessed May 25, 2020).

³⁹⁴ Torbat, “Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran,” 409.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, 412. Indeed, the competitors of US benefited a lot from US’s export control mechanism in high-tech sectors. “In the nuclear power industry alone, US competitors have generated revenues of about 15 billion US dollars in exports to China over the past few years.” Jiawen Jang, Hossein Askari, John Forrer and Hildy Teegen, “US Economic Sanctions against China: Who Gets Hurt?.” *The World Economy* 27, no.7 (2004): 1078.

against third country firms.”³⁹⁶ Nonetheless, the act was born lame because of practical unenforceability -- Iran was a lucrative market for foreign companies.³⁹⁷ Moreover, “[h]istory has shown that since the Iranian nationalization of 1951 and the events leading to the overthrow of Dr [Mohammed] Mossaddegh in 1953, oil embargoes simply do not work.”³⁹⁸

Yet again, it was back then. In especially post-2018 period, “[t]he secondary sanctions have in effect converted U.S. bilateral [sic] sanctions into ‘quasi-multilateral’ ones.”³⁹⁹ As the measures are consciously vaguely designed, many companies are not willing to risk trade relations with the US for a transaction with Iran. This behavior results in a “pre-emptive alignment and overcompliance with US secondary sanctions.”⁴⁰⁰ As such, “[t]he sanctions constituted a form of economic warfare,”⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁶ Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” *CRS Report* RS20871 (updated April 14, 2020): 12.

³⁹⁷ “On 28 September 1997, the French firm Total defied U.S. laws and signed a multibillion deal with Iran to develop the South Pars gas field. The United States now found itself in an embarrassing position of having to waive the sanctions for some ‘technical issues.’ ” Fayazmanesh, “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran,” 231.

³⁹⁸ Paul Stevens, “An Embargo on Iranian Crude Oil Exports: How Likely and with What Impact?,” *EEDP Programme Paper* no.01 (2012): 7.

³⁹⁹ Shahrokh Fardoust, “Macroeconomic Impacts of Us Sanctions (2017-2019) on Iran,” *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/fardoust> (accessed November 29, 2021), 8.

⁴⁰⁰ Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, “Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions,” *European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief*, June 29, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/publication/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions/ (accessed November 29, 2021), 2.

⁴⁰¹ Richard N. Haass, “[From Sanctions to the Soleimani Strike to Escalation: Evaluating the Administration’s Iran Policy](#),” *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 14, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29951?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed November 29, 2021), 2. Haass notes that “Iran was not in a position to respond in kind, and instead initiated a series of actions – attacking shipping in the Persian Gulf, downing American

indiscriminately targeting everyone. The donor money raised for Afghan refugees, for example, could not be transmitted to Iran; similarly, the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Agreement, despite pilot transaction being run in January 2020, faces considerable delays “as Iranian assets abroad remain frozen in escrow accounts because of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s central bank.”⁴⁰² Roche also claimed that “the opening of letters of credit or even cash payments have become exceedingly difficult, resulting in long delays in transporting medicine to Iran.”⁴⁰³

Similar administrative problems persisted following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. One of the major choke points in unilateral US sanctions was once more the international financial transactions.

To bypass it, the EU introduced INSTEX as a new payment system.⁴⁰⁴ Yet again, INSTEX was not a panacea by itself. For purposes of putting this system into action, the EU demanded Iran sign international treaties regulating financial transactions and money-laundering. For Iranian administrative scheme, this demand amounted to

drone, ... This was the context in which the targeted killing of Qassim Suleimani took place.” Ibid.

⁴⁰² International Crisis Group, “Flattening the Curve of U.S.- Iran Tension,” *Middle East Brief* 76 (2020), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/b76-flattening-curve-us-iran-tensions> (accessed November 29, 2021), 7.

⁴⁰³ Anonymous, *A Growing Crisis: The Impact of Sanctions and Regime Policies on Iranians’ Economic and Social Rights*, 147.

⁴⁰⁴ European External Action Service, “Chair's Statement Following the 28 June 2019 Meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” *Statements*, June 28, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/64796/chairs-statement-following-28-june-2019-meeting-joint-commission-joint-comprehensive-plan_en (accessed February 29, 2020).

bowing to sanctions one way or another, as it was manifestation of Orientalism and imposition of a new measure as show of disciplinary power.⁴⁰⁵

In sum, from administrative and technical point, the sanctions on Iran proved to be more-or-less waterproof, not allowing Iran engage with outer world. The tools resorted to ease the sanctions, like being part of the UNCITRAL, however, could not bolster investors' confidence and encourage them to invest in Iran. Following the secondary sanctions of the US, big petroleum companies also withdrew from Iranian markets, leaving Iran with diminishing returns from oil wells. Diminishing production meant diminishing exports and diminishing inputs to the administrative budget. Adding on the top of it came limitations on international financial transactions, to which Iran was not able to produce a solution. The sanctions schemes, in short, were hanging as Damocles' sword over leper Iran.

4.4. Socioeconomic Aspect

Sanctions undoubtedly cost Iran in economic terms. Following the intensification of international sanctions in 2011, the economy shrunk by 9% till 2014.⁴⁰⁶ The figures changed sharply when the JCPOA entered into the stage. The agreement reached on July 2015 was to cast immediate positive effect on oil exports and financial services

⁴⁰⁵ It should be noted also that Iran was expecting more from the EU; it has declared that if the EU does not invest more into the JCPOA, it will follow a harder policy line, including enriching uranium to weapons grade. Iran gave two-months period for non-US parties of the JCPOA to save the agreement, calling it as a "strategic patience." Anonymous, "EU Chief Diplomat: Iran has not Violated JCPOA," *Tehran Times*, December 16, 2019, Monday; <http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/443098/EU-chief-diplomat-Iran-has-not-violated-JCPOA> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴⁰⁶ IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia* (Washington: IMF, 2007), 81.

first, and their spillover effects would be observed on non-oil economy in medium term.⁴⁰⁷

However, total factor productivity in Iran declined sharply with the sanctions, and it surely would take time to recover it. Being aware of this, IMF focuses on the external demand shocks, i.e. the demand on Iranian oil that will generate income for the national budget, a terms-of-trade shock that derives from lowering price of imports as a result of eased financial transaction restrictions, and the wealth effect which should follow the eased exports and cheaper imports thanks to the JCPOA. Yet again, the Fund ignores what we can name as the domestic demand shock: this was (and with the post-JCPOA schemes, still is) a country that is under sanctions since 1980s. Unlike North Korea (elaborated below) where people do not know any life other than the current one under sanctions, Iranians are well aware of what they have been deprived off during the past decades. It means, removal of sanctions can create a surge for imported goods; and such a surge may well offset the positive terms-of-trade predictions of IMF.

In all cases, JCPOA is put on the shelves by the US in 2018. While Iran had begun to face difficulties in oil exports and oil prices in international markets kept declining, domestic prices increased –a reduction in subsidies caused almost 50% price increase in Iranian oil markets. The amount saved from oil subsidies was declared to be used

⁴⁰⁷ IMF has concluded multiple analyses on implications of the removal of sanctions on Iranian economy. Bruno Versailles, “The Economic Implications of Iran’s Economic Sanction Relief,” *IMF direct*, February 1, 2016. A similar analysis is also available in IMF’s Country Report on Iran. See IMF, “2015 Article IV Consultation,” *IMF Country Report* 15, no. 349 (2015). Also see IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia*.

for low-income citizens,⁴⁰⁸ however protests climbed and even reached to a point that Iranian government began using it as a securitization tool saying “ ‘whole centers of evil in the world’ have mobilized efforts in recent days to encourage unrest in Iran.”⁴⁰⁹ It should also be noted that during the protests Iran blocked access to internet for almost a week – that was possible because all that was left was government run network as “tech companies with platforms and services that Iranians relied on, including Google App Engine, Digital Ocean and GitLab, started banning Iranian users” following US withdrawal from the JCPOA.⁴¹⁰ “Similarly, Zoom’s website states that for regulatory reasons, Iranians cannot access its services.”⁴¹¹

The sanctions imposed on Iran are “smart sanctions.” Therefore, for example, with the aim of avoiding indiscriminate harm to population, medication is not under sanctions schemes. However, this remains on paper because Iran lacks access to life saving

⁴⁰⁸ Anonymous, “Iran Petrol Price Hike: Protesters Warned that Security Forces may Intervene,” *BBC*, November 17, 2019, Sunday; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50444429> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴⁰⁹ Anonymous, “Ayatollah Khamenei Urges Iranian Officials to Address Economic Woes,” *Tasnim News*, November 17, 2019, Sunday; <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/11/17/2141909/ayatollah-khamenei-urges-iranian-officials-to-address-economic-woes> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴¹⁰ Melisa Method, Ramin Mostaghim, “When Iran Blocked the Internet, Tech Experts in the U.S. tried to Hack a Solution. Here’s Why They Couldn’t,” *LA Times*, December 17, 2019, Tuesday; <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-12-17/iran-blocked-internet-tech-experts-hack-solution> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴¹¹ Orkideh Behrouzan and Tara Sepehri Far, “The Impact of Sanctions on Medical Education in Iran,” *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/orkideh-behrouzan-tara-sepehri-far> (accessed November 29, 2021), 12.

medicines just because sanctions extended also to banking transactions.⁴¹² With the idea of “mak[ing] the financial sanctions even more effective, in January 2012 the EU instructed ...SWIFT, which is the inter-bank financial transactions clearinghouse based in Belgium ... to stop services to Iranian banks.”⁴¹³ The Trump administration also introduced “travel bans and ... curtailed a number of fruitful exchange programs,”⁴¹⁴ causing “[t]he young doctors express frustration that every day they feel they are falling behind in their academic and career development, and behind classmates who choose to leave the country.”⁴¹⁵ Undoubtedly, this situation affects Iranian medical and pharmaceutical industry, as well as health tourism, too.

Despite currently almost all of the annual medication is produced domestically, Iranian pharmaceuticals sector is still crawling. Firstly, it is heavily dependent on imports as 80% of ingredients are from abroad.⁴¹⁶ Moreover, the sector cannot produce most of

⁴¹² Gordon, “Crippling Iran: The U.N. Security Council and the Tactic of Deliberate Ambiguity,” 1002.

⁴¹³ Nader Habibi, “The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Economic Sanctions,” in *Iran and the Global Economy: Petro Populism, Islam and Economic Sanctions* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 175. On how Iran maneuvered to circumvent sanctions, see esp. 184-8

⁴¹⁴ Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin and Sahil Shah, “Renewing Transatlantic Strategy on Iran,” *ELN- Atlantic Council Issue Brief*, November 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Transatlantic-Strategy-Iran-IB.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2021), 7.

⁴¹⁵ Behrouzan and Far, “The Impact of Sanctions on Medical Education in Iran,” 16. It should be noted that Iranian doctors in New York were more than those outside Tehran also back in 1970s. Abrahamian says brain drain was first associated with Iran. Ervand Abrahamian, *Modern Iran Tarihi*, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2020, 7th edition), 186.

⁴¹⁶ Anonymous, *A Growing Crisis: The Impact of Sanctions and Regime Policies on Iranians’ Economic and Social Rights*, 145, esp. fn.203.

the advanced drugs of past 10-15 years because their generic versions are not available. Secondly, the pressure on the prices emanating from inflation in the sector climbed up to 350%. Last but not least, the sector cannot find loans from Iranian banks. The banks were pressured by the government to engage in loose lending to shady enterprises; therefore they experienced a ten-fold increase in non-performing loans only in the tenure of Ahmadinejad. In addition to domestic constraints, it was getting difficult for Iran also to borrow from abroad: “depending upon the year, Iran was forged to endure additional borrowing costs of between \$29 and \$164 million per annum.”⁴¹⁷

It goes undisputed that the JCPOA was very promising to revive Iranian economy. With its demise, measures like INSTEX are introduced to ease the impact of unilateral American sanctions,⁴¹⁸ yet in the end, what matters is the markets – newspapers had been reporting about the organ markets in Iran.⁴¹⁹ The news report provided photographs of kidney-for-sale advertisements on walls or trunks. One Iranian man interviewed in the report notes that he would sell his liver too to get out of debt, “as a

⁴¹⁷ Above paragraph mainly from *ibid*, 55, 111-2, 145, 148.

⁴¹⁸ Recently, with the rise of new type of corona virus as a global problem, INSTEX emerged and started to be used in exchanges between Iran and Europe. The mechanism aims to facilitate transactions and to provide an avenue for trade without being subject to unilateral US sanctions. First transaction as such was concluded in March 2020, INSTEX introduced barter as a method of continued commercial ties. Anonymous, “Europe and Iran Complete First INSTEX Deal Dodging US Sanctions,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 31, 2020, Tuesday; <https://www.dw.com/en/europe-and-iran-complete-first-instex-deal-dodging-us-sanctions/a-52966842> (accessed November 10, 2020).

⁴¹⁹ These news were followed by December 2017 protests. Indeed, the uprisings were expected as early as 2010 when the government decided to remove energy subsidies. Literally overnight, price of gasoline, natural gas and diesel increased by 300, 50 and 900% respectively. Laura el-Katiri and Bassam Fattouh, “A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa,” in *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Boston: Brill, 2017), 77.

marker of Iran's social and economic dysfunction after years of endemic corruption, mismanagement and stifling international sanctions."⁴²⁰

To conclude, sanctions against Iran proved to be measures affecting socioeconomic life deeply. The steps taken to lighten the impact of them on local people did not accomplish the aim. Sanctions proved to be measures designed to display Western disciplinary power, employed to exercise discursive violence, and aimed to continue branding Iran as an abnormal other at all cost to the local people.

4.5. Cultural Aspect

While there is a bunch of literature on the advanced technology required to achieve a development in the nuclear sector, and this requirement is visible by the fact that so far only four states (India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel) managed to build nuclear weapons following the entry into force of the NPT,⁴²¹ it also remains a fact that nuclear proliferation is not welcomed by the international community. In addition to the image of "international outlier," the symbolic value of the weapons for the level of national development is also formulated to be a negative factor that deduces the pride attributed to the nuclears. Take the case of Japan, for example. A realist approach would require the country not to rely on the US security guarantees and seek its own nuclear weapons capability – in the end, it was the US that used nuclear weapons twice on Japan and

⁴²⁰ Shashank Bengali and Ramin Mostaghim, " 'Kidney for sale': Iran has a Legal Market for the Organs, but the System Doesn't Always Work," *LA Times*, October 15, 2017, <https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-kidney-20171015-story.html> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴²¹ The projections in 1960s were as high as 25 new states. Moeed Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons," *Brookings Foreign Policy Paper* 11 (2009): 15.

walked away with full immunity.⁴²² However, instead of building a national nuclear deterrent, Japan not only adopted pacifism, but also made a cost-benefit analysis and invested more time and labor into the economy. In the end, military capability does not bring prestige, but SONY does; and “[i]f India and Pakistan can do it, how would it [i.e. nuclear weapons] increase Japan’s prestige to join their ranks?”⁴²³

Nonetheless, this perspective does not work for Iranians. According to Brzezinski and Gates, the fact that Pakistan to have superior military technology is simply unacceptable for Iranians. That is because Pakistan is a neighbor country which is less developed economically, socially and politically than Iran. In this respect, the prestige of having nuclear weapons is closely connected with national pride.⁴²⁴

In addition to this appreciation of nuclear brick onto the national wall of pride, “U.S. sanctions have created a siege mentality; the regime’s remaining supporters have

⁴²² With the peace agreement, Japan waived all claims against the US. This meant the Japanese people lost their claims for damages against the US. The case of Ryuichi Shimodo et al vs The State is in this sense very interesting Japanese court decision on 7 December 1963, where residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki claimed for damages against the Japanese state. Full decision is available in *Japanese Annual of International Law* 10 (1964).

⁴²³ Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” *International Studies Review* 10 (2008): 444; for her interview with an anonymous Japanese Ministry of Defense official. One should note, however, that Japan had a nuclear weapon program during the World War 2 – see Joseph M. Siracusa, *Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), esp. chap. 4. Current Japanese pacifism reflects the cultural, hence relative, weight of having nuclear capability. It indicates that security, prestige and development are all socially constructed terms whose meanings depend on the context within which they are used.

⁴²⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert M. Gates, *İran’ın Zamani Geldi*, trans. Sermin Karakale (İstanbul: Profil, 2008, 2nd edition).

become determined to rely on their own resources and ingenuity.”⁴²⁵ This mentality and the developed ability of self-help made Iran “deliberately cultivate and play up [an idealized self-] image of Iran as a dangerous foe whose soldiers seek martyrdom, and whose society is willing to pay any price.”⁴²⁶ In the end, “Iran has been at war with its neighbors and the West since the early days of the Islamic Revolution.”⁴²⁷ Adding more salt to the wounds of sustained wars was “the apathetic international response to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons” during the Iran-Iraq War.⁴²⁸ As a result, a dedication to develop national capabilities arose not only to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers but also to create a modern army.⁴²⁹

The determination to become self-sufficient spread onto non-military spheres, too. “The kinds of sophisticated goods and services now designed and produced in Iran – increasingly for export abroad - did not exist ten or five years ago.”⁴³⁰ Despite Iran is still dependent on imports on many items like aircraft spare parts, “Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei has publicly welcomed the U.S. ban as a boon to

⁴²⁵ Jahangir Amuzegar, “Adjusting to Sanctions,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (1997): 34.

⁴²⁶ Michael Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change,” *MES Monographs*, no.7 (2015), 4.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid*, 8.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid*, 11. There also is an organization based in Sardasht, Iran, dedicated to draw attention to the effects of use of chemical weapons and to build solidarity among the victims of 1987 attacks. See Organization for Defending the Victims of Chemical Weapons, www.odvcw.org. Special thanks to Mr Soltanieh for bringing this organization to my attention.

⁴²⁹ Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 11.

⁴³⁰ Amuzegar, “Adjusting to Sanctions,” 34.

popular mobilization and self-reliance.”⁴³¹ He also has long promoted the Silk Road project even before China’s One Belt One Road initiative was born, with the argument that Iran’s geography is central in this “next iteration of human globalization.”⁴³²

As the US withdrawal and unilateral sanctions were at sight,⁴³³ in February 2018, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif visited Germany for Munich Security Conference. Airport companies hesitated to face US sanctions, hence declined to provide fuel for Zarif’s plane. The crisis was over with the intervention of German military – air forces provided the required fuel for the plane to take off and head to Moscow.⁴³⁴

Under the shadow of unilateral US sanctions, the hesitations to enter into transactions with Iranian entities are spreading, ranging from Nike not selling shoes to girls’

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Mohammadbagher Forough, “Geographic Agency: Iran as a ‘Civilizational Crossroads’ in the Belt and Road Geography,” in *Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity*, ed. Florian Schneider (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021), 299.

⁴³³ Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was indeed expected in Iran. As much as 92% of Iranians claimed to have no confidence in the US to live up to the nuclear deal. Anonymous, “Poll: Iran Attitudes on Nuclear Deal,” *Iran Primer*, May 10, 2018, <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/may/10/poll-iranian-attitudes-nuclear-deal> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁴³⁴ Benjamin Weinthal, “Fear of U.S. Sanctions Ends German Companies Fueling Iranian FM’s Plane,” *Jerusalem Post*, February 28, 2018, Wednesday; <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Fear-of-US-sanctions-ends-German-companies-fueling-Iranian-FMs-plane-543937> (accessed February 29, 2020). Iranian authorities denied such a development even to take place.

football team⁴³⁵ to keeping Norwegian Airlines plane in Shiraz on hold.⁴³⁶ None of these measures are directly related with Iranian nuclear quest; indicating role of discourse in securitization. In the end, the British nuclear forces is not a concern but non-existing Iranian nuclear capability is,⁴³⁷ meaning Britain is one of healthy us, but Iran is a member of non-Western leper other.

4.6. Conclusion

Iran met the nuclears back in 1950s. It had cooperation agreements and joint projects with the West up till the Islamic Revolution in 1979. After that, the relations lost amicable vibes. Also, the Revolutionaries were against the nuclear agenda. Not only the costs involved were high to meet while waging an 8-year war with Iraq,⁴³⁸ but also of human capital (both Iranian and foreigner) made it quite impossible for Iran to continue with the nuclear option.⁴³⁹ In reality, it was face saving for Iran to prioritize Revolutionary agenda and criticize Shah for choosing nuclear technology from abroad

⁴³⁵ Farid Ashrafian, "FIFA World Cup: Nike Refuses to Provide Shoes to Iranian Team," *Deutsche Welle*, June 13, 2018, Wednesday; <https://www.dw.com/en/fifa-world-cup-nike-refuses-to-provide-shoes-to-iranian-team/a-44206787> (accessed May 25, 2020).

⁴³⁶ Magnusson, "Norwegian Air Jet Stranded in Iran Finally Arrives Home."

⁴³⁷ D'Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 103.

⁴³⁸ The costs have been subject to considerable reduction with technical developments and widespread availability of information on various channels, including internet. There even a truck driver, John Coster-Mullen (a.k.a. Atomic Joe), who taught himself how to build replica of an atomic bomb by visiting museums and combining public information. He even wrote a book: *Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man* (US: Spiral bound, 2002). See also Naim's *Illicit* is on smuggling routes and methods. Moises Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy* (London: Arrow, 2007).

⁴³⁹ Ercan Çitlioğlu, *İran'ı Anlamak* (Ankara: Başkent University, 2015), 100.

over domestic petroleum sources.⁴⁴⁰ In time, these reserves have long been among the reasons that fed the suspicions on purely civilian intentions behind the search for nuclear capacity.

The Western disciplinary measures entered into stage after the Hostage Crisis; and in time evolved from unilateral to UN-wide in format; only to come to unilateral form back again after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.⁴⁴¹

The Program was heavily linked with what Foucault calls as a production of truth – despite “it is the United States and Europe claiming that it is the greatest danger to the world peace,”⁴⁴² non-aligned countries support Iran’s nuclear rights; and Arab population (not Arab states, as Chomsky rightfully differentiates), despite not liking Iran, “don’t regard it as a serious threat. They regard the U.S. and Israel as threats.”⁴⁴³ Therefore, the sanctions as well as the JCPOA were products of a discursive approach of securitization according to which Iran was desiring to have a nuclear military capability. For Iran to be integrated into Western designed political game, from a Foucauldian perspective, there is “one condition: that this individuality [of Iran] would

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Çitlioğlu quotes Western sources which maintain that even with all the inspections drafted in the JCPOA are fully implemented, and even all the nuclear facilities of Iran are fully demolished, the know-how gained by Iranian scientists in the past 25 years could not be erased. Ibid, 110.

⁴⁴² Noam Chomsky and Andre Vltychek, *On Western Terrorism* (New York: Pluto Press, 2013), 123.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns.”⁴⁴⁴ These patterns were enveloped in JCPOA, which was a demonstration of disciplinary power of the West.

Nonetheless, the JCPOA ended up being a short pause. The extraterritorial nature of the unilateral sanctions of the US created extra tension at the international sphere;⁴⁴⁵ while Boeing already stopped commercial relations,⁴⁴⁶ another US company, Nike, declared that it “will not provide cleats to the Iranian soccer team ... [for] World Cup because of economic sanctions.”⁴⁴⁷ Whereas Iran took the case to the ICJ, the US withdrew from the Treaty of Friendship to deny the Court from legal basis that favors Iranian claims.⁴⁴⁸ This withdrawal indeed exemplified once more that being a part of non-West/Orient, Iran was not welcome as an equal party to play the Western game.

⁴⁴⁴ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 783.

⁴⁴⁵ The EU leaders held meetings to find a way out of US secondary sanctions. See Gabriela Baczynska, “EU Leaders Struggle to Save Iran Economic Ties from U.S. Sanctions,” *Reuters*, May 16, 2018, Wednesday; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-europe/eu-leaders-explore-ways-to-save-iran-economic-ties-from-u-s-sanctions-idUSKCN1IH1DX> (accessed May 25, 2020). Yet the US seems to be determined to implement the sanctions in an extraterritorial manner. See Hacaloğlu, “ABD Heyetinden Türk Özel Sektörüne İran Uyarısı.”

⁴⁴⁶ Anonymous, “Boeing İranlı Havayolu Şirketleriyle Anlaşmalarını İptal Etti,” *Hürriyet*, June 7, 2018, Thursday; <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/boeing-iranli-havayolu-sirketleriyle-anlasmalari-iptal-etti-40860188> (accessed May 25, 2020)

⁴⁴⁷ Ashrafian, “FIFA World Cup: Nike Refuses to Provide Shoes to Iranian Team.”

⁴⁴⁸ A similar commerce-related case was opened by Iran against UK in which the ICC in 2009 ruled in favor of the former and ordered the latter to pay Iran for the amount it paid back in 1980s for tanks and other vehicles which were not delivered after the sanctions following the 1979 Revolution. Now, however, the UK cannot pay the amount due to the sanctions. Sheetal Sukhija, “Britain to Repay 400 million Pound Debt to Iran?,” *Middle East Star*, November 18, 2017; <https://www.middleeaststar.com/news/255424741/britain-to-repay-400-million-pound-debt-to-iran> (accessed May 25, 2020).

The Orientalist game is not between equals but between different; it is “*the system of differentiations* which permits one to act upon the action of others.”⁴⁴⁹

Sanctions, though, were tools not only for flexing but also relaxing the muscles from time to time. Recently, the country began fighting against corona virus pandemic—statistically, it followed China for a long while in terms of infected and deceased people. While sanctions relieves were there in the past (after 2003 and 2012 earthquakes, for example) to facilitate humanitarian aid, in post JCPOA period in order “[t]o sell some protective items to Iran, including full face mask respirators and some decontamination systems used to sterilize them, companies need a special licence from the U.S. Treasury Department.”⁴⁵⁰ “Corruption and mismanagement no doubt played a role” too, however “sanctions are inhumane because they hurt ordinary Iranians during a pandemic.”⁴⁵¹ A commentary following death of an Iranian nurse due to the COVID19 noted that “the likely result [of US sanctions] is many more Iranian nurses and health care workers being made into martyrs,”⁴⁵² indicating once more that sanctions are designed with Foucauldian glasses to nurture a discourse which “result[s]

⁴⁴⁹ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 792. *Emphasis* original.

⁴⁵⁰ Negar Mortazavi, “Iran’s Nurses are Martyrs to Trump’s Maximum Pressure,” *Bourse and Bazaar*, April 17, 2020; <https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2020/4/17/irans-nurses-are-martyrs-to-trumps-maximum-pressure> (accessed May 10, 2020).

⁴⁵¹ Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Impact of Sanctions on Household Welfare and Employment,” *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/salehiisfahani> (accessed November 29, 2021), 12.

⁴⁵² Mortazavi, “Iran’s Nurses are Martyrs to Trump’s Maximum Pressure,”.

in a sense of reinforced, deepened, hardened identity that has not been particularly edifying.”⁴⁵³

⁴⁵³ Said, *Orientalism*, 335.

CHAPTER 5

RUSSIA

Russia is a great power with vested interests in all the areas covered in this research.⁴⁵⁴

The Russian case is unique also because contrary to the previous case-studies in this research where we see “ ‘rogue’ states which had sanctions inflicted on them tended to be poor and underdeveloped, with very limited economic ties with the US and the EU ... and almost no export markets to speak of.”⁴⁵⁵ Trade with Russia has been one of the aspects that has been debated at length among the senders. The long debates took consideration of the fact that especially the EU, which “does more business with

⁴⁵⁴ See, inter alia, Mark N. Katz, “When the Friend of My Friend is not My Friend: The United States, US Allies, and Russia in the Middle East,” *Atlantic Council Issue Brief* (2019); https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/When_the_Friend_of_My_Friends_is_Not_My_Friend.pdf (accessed August 2, 2020). A similar interest can also be seen for Far Asia. Russia is involved with North Korea’s nuclear quest – several years ago, Russia was concerned with possibility of a technical failure causing a catastrophe in close proximity to Russia. Now, as North Korea proved its level of technical development, Russia is concerned that if sanctions choke North Korea economically, it may consider selling of the weapons, which is a move with unpredictable security consequences. See Alexander Gabuev, “Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula,” *Carnegie Russia*, April 24, 2019; <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976> (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁴⁵⁵ Max Marioni, “The Cost of Russian Sanctions in Western Economies: The UK, US and EU,” in *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta (UK: Bow Group, 2015), 16, <http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).

Russia than the US does,”⁴⁵⁶ has to think twice in introducing and implementing sanctions following the 2014 Crimea crisis.

Like the case of Egypt, the Russian sanctions do not have authorization by a UN Resolution. Yet, different from the Egyptian case, the target, Russia, is a member of the UNSC; and as being the one among five permanent members, it holds a veto power. Yet again, there are several General Assembly resolutions⁴⁵⁷ on the crisis which called for respect for the Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as several measures which were adopted by Western actors⁴⁵⁸ designed to sanction Russia.

This chapter, like the others, will first look at the road heading to the sanctions against Russia and measures adopted for purposes of restoring territorial sovereignty of

⁴⁵⁶ BBC News, “How far do EU-US Sanctions on Russia Go?,” September 15, 2014, Monday; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218> (accessed January 31, 2020).

⁴⁵⁷ The last one was adopted on December 16, 2021; titled as “Problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov,” A/RES/76/70, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3952032/files/A_RES_76_70-EN.pdf (accessed October 14, 2022).

⁴⁵⁸ For an overall summary and update of the measures, see European Council, “EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine (since 2014),” undated, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/> (accessed May 5, 2022). The current measures will expire on 31 July 2021; however the EU is likely to renew sanctions. See joint motion for a resolution by European Parliament, “Resolution on Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and Russian attacks in the Czech Republic,” 2021/2642(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0236_EN.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021). See also the interactive map at <https://sanctionsmap.eu/#/main> (accessed June 7, 2021) for a brief summary of EU sanctions schemes on various countries.

For those of the US, see Department of State, “Ukraine and Russia Sanctions” (undated), <https://www.state.gov/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions/> (accessed December 4, 2020).

Ukraine. It then will try to analyze them from different dimensions through Foucauldian lenses.

One point that should be raised is that Russia, too, uses disciplinary measures to correct what it sees as leper – yet, the methods differ considerably. While Western methods of disciplinary measures are revolving around sanctions that cast considerable shadow over daily life of civilians, Russian method simply is waging wars. It may sound more brutal; however wars have their code of conduct. Law of war defines the civilians' and warriors' spheres clearly, even the rights of the war prisoners are regulated.⁴⁵⁹

It should be noted that in early 2000s, Russia also resorted to embargoes. Nonetheless this embargo followed a specific course of events beginning with Russian revision of the priced of natural gas. The dispute escalated and Russia cut the gas supply dedicated to Ukraine. Given harsh winter conditions, Ukraine, being a transit country for Russian gas to Europe, began to siphon the gas and use it for domestic needs. Reaching at no agreement, Russia cut all the gas on the New Years of 2006. Within days, a preliminary agreement was reached and gas supply resumed. However, in 2008 and 2009, culminating Ukrainian debt sparked new disputes. In 2010 Kharkiv Accords, it was agreed that Russia's lease of the Sevastopol naval base would be extended till 2042. The base is important as it lies on the edge of the Crimean peninsula and hosts Russia's

⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, for purposes of circumventing those rights, post 9-11 operations were defined as war on terror and other / leper fighters were no more than terrorists. Mary Kaldor well elaborates on this topic in her book *New and Old Wars* (US: Stanford University Press, 2007). Also see Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command* (England: Penguin, 2005).

Black Sea fleet. “In return, Russian government would cancel the export duty on gas exported to Ukraine, thus giving Ukraine a 30 percent discount.”⁴⁶⁰

At the time of writing, the crisis between Russia and Ukraine evolved into a hot conflict, confirming the argument put forward in this research. As a response to Western sanctions, Russia also introduced sanctions measures, but the measures have been reactionary in nature. In other words, it is still the West that resorts to sanctions as a favorite tool to exercise Foucauldian disciplinary measures. Russia’s use of sanctions is not of choice but of reaction; to discipline, Russia uses direct conflict and prefers to stay in the domain of war that is regulated under international law.⁴⁶¹

5.1. Road to Sanctions

The dismemberment of the USSR was a major turning point in history. The process of disintegration was pretty quick as the Russian Federation did basically not want to carry the burden of other republics. Nonetheless, Russia’s political hand has always been felt over the new republics, including Ukraine, a country which was labelled as a cleft one. The name father of this label was Samuel Huntington, who, in his well-

⁴⁶⁰ Sharples and Judge, “Russian Gas Supplies to Europe: The Likelihood and Potential Impact of an Interruption in Gas Transit via Ukraine,” 116.

⁴⁶¹ It should be noted that this research does not put forward any preference in between the measures. In other words, by emphasizing that war is a domain that is legally regulated does not automatically translate into wars being measures preferable over sanctions. All this research aims to argue is that sanctions are disciplinary measures used by West against the non-Western, leper others.

known *Clash of Civilizations*, also maintained that Crimea carried the status of a particular contention.⁴⁶²

There had long been tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Still, “[m]ost North Americans and Western Europeans [we]re, at best, only dimly aware that Ukraine even exist[ed]”⁴⁶³ – at least up until 2006 when the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia surfaced and began to interrupt the supplies reaching at Europe. While Russia was claiming un-discounted, international market-level price for the natural gas it supplied to Ukraine, it was clear that the prices were subject not only to economic interests but to political negotiations.⁴⁶⁴

The tensions in Ukraine surfaced when the then-Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the EU. Taken in November 2013,

⁴⁶² Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 136-7. It should also be noted that according to Russia, “ ‘color revolutions’ [w]ere not organic domestic movements led by democratic activists but rather coup d’états supported and funded by the West.” Gabuev also provides Russian perceptions of “U.S. ... pursuing a regime change in Russia itself.” James N. Miller Jr and Richard Fontaine, “A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability: How Changing Geopolitics and Emerging Technologies are Reshaping Pathways to Crisis and Conflict,” *CNAS Report* (2017); <https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-ProjectPathways-Finalb.pdf?mtime=20170918101505> (accessed August 2, 2020); and Alexander Gabuev, “Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula,” *Carnegie Russia*, April 24, 2019; <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976> (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁴⁶³ James Dean, “Ukraine: Europe’s Forgotten Economy,” *Challenge* 43, no. 6 (2000): 93.

⁴⁶⁴ For a good chronological analysis of the gas dispute, see Jack Sharples and Andrew Judge, “Russian Gas Supplies to Europe: The Likelihood and Potential Impact of an Interruption in Gas Transit via Ukraine,” in *Future Energy Trends: Innovation, Markets & Geopolitics*, ed. Emirates Center for Strategic Research (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 2016).

this decision sparked a mass protest movement;⁴⁶⁵ the protests continued for more than a year and Russia capitalized on the ongoing instability by annexing Crimea.⁴⁶⁶

The Russian annexation of Crimea took place on February 27, 2014, just four days after the end of the Sochi Winter Olympics.⁴⁶⁷ Putin interpreted the annexation as a correction of a historic mistake made in 1954 by Khrushchev,⁴⁶⁸ as Crimea had been

⁴⁶⁵ Ian Bond, Christian Odendahl and Jennifer Rankin, “Frozen: The Politics and Economics of Sanctions against Russia,” *Centre for European Reform* (March 2015). See pages 2-3 for a summary of the crisis.

⁴⁶⁶ It is off-the-topic to discuss Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Movement in Ukraine. They, however, contributed to the bitterment of relations with Russia but not to the development of closer ties with the West. Beremeres here observes two reasons for this situation: One is “Ukraine fatigue” – the economic and political transformation of Ukraine could not get completed and lack of stability costed patience of outside supporters. Other is “enlargement fatigue.” “More broadly, much of Western Europe feels that the reasonable limits of EU and NATO expansion now been reached,” hence it is time to digest and refrain from further commitments.” John Beserames, *Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II* (Australia: ANU Press, 2016), 143-8.

⁴⁶⁷ The Economist, “Russia and the EU: Friends or Foes?,” *Intelligence Unit Report* (2017): 2, https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=RussiaEU2017 (accessed August 2, 2020). Note that there is a “material” side of this “feeling”: India, for example, declared it will not impose sanctions on Russia [Ankit Panda, “India will not support Western Sanctions against Russia,” *The Diplomat*, March 20, 2014, Thursday; <https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-will-not-support-western-sanctions-against-russia/> (accessed January 31, 2020)]. In this respect, a possible alternative market for Russia can be Asia; however Asian countries make up one third of Russia’s exports while the figure for the EU is 50%. EIU, *Russia and the EU: Friends or Foes?*, 6. It is also observed that by 2015 major Russian economic actors knew already that “Asian financial centers ... [are] basically no alternative to Western capital markets.” Oleg Buklemishev, “Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia,” *Carnegie Moscow Center*, August 13, 2015, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/61005> (accessed January 31, 2020).

⁴⁶⁸ Rose Gottemoeller, “What’s Eating Putin?,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 3, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/whats-eating-putin/> (accessed April 1, 2022). It should be noted also that “[w]hen Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine, Ukraine was an integral part of the Soviet Empire in which its armed forces could freely operate. And it was crucial to Russian security.” Gordon L. Anderson, “Beyond Realism: Values, Interests, Levels, and Spheres in International Relations Theory.” *International Journal on World Peace* 31, no. 2 (2014):7.

“handed over like a sack of potatoes” back in 1991.⁴⁶⁹ He also noted that “Ukraine is not and has never been an independent state; ... its very name is derived from Russian word ‘periphery’.”⁴⁷⁰

The sanctions measures related to Ukraine targeted individuals and basically focused on “a wide array of Russian civil servants, members of parliament, military or intelligence officers, journalists, and private individuals, including those who accumulated wealth thanks to their close relationship with Putin.”⁴⁷¹ The measures included a travel ban, with exceptions of diplomatic immunity and humanitarian grounds like need for medical treatment.⁴⁷² Moreover, it covered Russia’s exclusion of G8 meetings⁴⁷³ and NATO’s suspension of “all practical cooperation between

⁴⁶⁹ Vladimir V. Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” *Kremlin*, March 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> (accessed September 5, 2020). Also see Stephanie Pezard and Ashley L. Rhodes, “What Provokes Putin’s Russia? Deterring without Unintended Escalation,” *RAND Corporation Perspective* January (2020) <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE338.html> (accessed November 29, 2021), and especially John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014), for Russian perspective on the course of events.

⁴⁷⁰ Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, “Ukraine: Putin’s Unfinished Business,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 12, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/12/ukraine-putin-s-unfinished-business-pub-85771> (accessed April 1, 2022). It worths noting here also that despite all the foreign dominations dating back even to Mongols, Russia and Russians became the other to be hated by Ukrainian nationalists while for Russia, Ukrainans have not been foreigners but siblings. Mikhail Pogrebinskiy, “Russians in Ukraine: Before and after Euromaidan,” in *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, ed. Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa (Bristol: E-IR, 2016), 198.

⁴⁷¹ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion*, 20.

⁴⁷² BBC News, “How far do EU-US Sanctions on Russia Go?.”

⁴⁷³ G8 mainly is the group of industrial countries; Russia’s inclusion aimed to facilitate its post-Soviet transition. Yuliia Popyk, “Trump’s G7 Invite for Putin will Encourage More War,”

NATO and Russia including that which took place in the framework of NRC [NATO-Russia Council].”⁴⁷⁴ The measures embraced also asset freezes. Considering the fact that the Russian elite prefers “to keep money, own real estate, or send their children to study in the West,”⁴⁷⁵ such sanctions indeed would deprive them from the opportunity to move to the West or utilize the assets they have there.

The measures imposed therefore were smart sanctions and avoided targeting “the” top level individuals.⁴⁷⁶ “Western leaders do not want to treat Russia as an international pariah – they still want to be able to meet Mr Putin face-to-face.”⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, it is not only for purposes of solving the Crimean crisis; “[t]he West still needs Russian co-operation on a huge range of issues, including Iran and North Korea.”⁴⁷⁸ It is because

Atlantic Council, June 2, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/trumps-g7-invite-for-putin-will-encourage-more-war/> (accessed January 28, 2021).

⁴⁷⁴ NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” *NATO Topics*, March 23, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm (accessed January 28, 2021). Similarly, channels of dialogue is open in OECD while “[a]ctivities related to Russia’s accession to the Organization were ‘postponed for the time being’.” OECD, “OECD and the Russian Federation,” *Russian Federation*, undated, <https://www.oecd.org/russia/oecd-and-the-russian-federation/> (accessed January 28, 2021).

⁴⁷⁵ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 20-21. Original source omitted because of linguistic barriers.

⁴⁷⁶ Oligarchs are close parts of Russian state as they temporarily manage, but not own, the companies. Still, impact of sanctions on oligarchs is debatable. Jarrett Blanc and Andrew S. Weiss, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Congress Should Go Back to Fundamentals,” *Carnegie Endowment Paper*, April 3, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/03/u.s.-sanctions-on-russia-congress-should-go-back-to-fundamentals-pub-78755> (accessed November 29, 2021).

⁴⁷⁷ BBC News, “How far do EU-US Sanctions on Russia Go?.”

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

of this, the feeling is mutual – “Russia’s elite and its people ... see Russia as primarily a European power whose interests lie in Europe more than anywhere else in the world.”⁴⁷⁹

While the initial round of sanctions was designed with the hope of a de-escalation, following the shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian flight (MH17) on July 17, 2014, the sanctions gained a broader scope.⁴⁸⁰ The second round of sanctions enveloped economic measures, and according to some authors, with these new sanctions “[m]ore than two decades of work to integrate post-Soviet Russia into the world economy came to a sudden juddering halt.”⁴⁸¹

Very simply put, the sanctions covered three fields: finance, defense and energy. Because the Russian private sector as well as state companies were dependent on loans

⁴⁷⁹ EIU, “Russia and the EU: Friends or Foes?,” 6. An interesting discussion on Russia’s own Orientalism is enveloped in Nathaniel Knight, “Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?,” *Slavic Review* 59, no. 1 (2000). Knight notes that even following Peter the Great’s reforms, “Russia’s acceptance into the community of civilized western nations was conditional at best and applied only to the extent that Russian elites were able to shed their native traditions and assimilate into a pan-European culture of aristocracy.” He continues as “[w]hen Russian scholars turned to the east it was often with a sharp awareness of their own supposed backwardness and inferiority in the face of the grand civilization of Britain, France, and Germany.” *Ibid*, 77.

⁴⁸⁰ As a note for chronology, sanctions on the USSR introduced by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment were lifted only in 2012 despite the fact that the sanctions targeted Soviet’s emigration restrictions which were abolished in 1987. Marina Klinova and Elena Sidorova, “Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on Russian Economic Relations with the European Union,” *Problems of Economic Transition* 58, no. 3 (2016): 219. Only in two years time Russia faced sanctions again, and again with a little effect on changing Russian foreign policy. Mehmet Onder, “Economic Sanctions Outcomes: An Information-Driven Explanation,” *Journal of International Studies* 14, no. 2 (2021): 39.

⁴⁸¹ Bond, Odendahl and Rankin, “Frozen: The Politics and Economics of Sanctions against Russia,” 3. Here only the sanctions related to Crimea will be analyzed; any additional measure related to other topics will not be covered in detail.

from Western banks, financial sanctions put Russia in a crunch immediately,⁴⁸² creating hardship on “new deep water, arctic or shale oil projects that would affect oil production levels in the future.”⁴⁸³ However, idea was not to prevent Russian oil and gas circulation in global markets – on the contrary, there was “no intention to provide Putin with a bonus by introducing an oil embargo and driving the oil price up.”⁴⁸⁴

Initially, with the introduction of the post-JCPOA oil of Iran to the global markets and the existence of Saudi Arabia as a swing producer, there was no shortage of oil, hence oil prices did not seem to climb.⁴⁸⁵ Yet, political concerns have also been taken into account by the market. For example, several projects in which foreign capital or know-how was necessary were either delayed or deleted. By factoring in the sanctions, Royal Dutch Shell suspended cooperation with Gazprom on a project for extracting shale oil in Siberia. A year later, in 2015, Total quitted its joint venture with Lukoil in

⁴⁸² Stanislav Secieru, *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion* (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 22.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴⁸⁴ Secieru, *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion*, 23. Some authors interpret the fact that sanctions could have hurt further by a conscious choice. They claim that “the West, to some extent, agreed not to challenge Russia’s annexation of Crimea in exchange for Vladimir Putin’s promise that he will recognize the territorial integrity of the rest of Ukraine and not expand his campaign against Kyiv.” See Elina Kyselchuk, “Examining the Policy of Sanctions: What Effect have the Sanctions had so far?,” in *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta (UK: Bow Group, 2015), 11.

⁴⁸⁵ Indeed, price of oil has been in decline for a long while. Oil production increased between 2010-2015, and the level of increase was the highest since 1970s. The increase followed a prolonged period of above \$90/bbl level of price, and IEA predicted the prices to recover only by 2020. International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook* (Paris: IEA, 2016), 130. Nonetheless, 2020 began with conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Russia, which pushed prices even further down; not counting the impact of demand collapse due to COVID19 pandemic.

Bazhenov. While Lukoil and Gazprom continued their projects, Rosneft had to postpone the second phase of Kara Sea drilling project when Exxon Mobile interrupted further works and Rosneft could not find another partner.⁴⁸⁶ French Renault suspended its cooperation on infantry vehicle; Italian Fincontieri too on developing small non-nuclear submarines.⁴⁸⁷ As of 2020, exports are not allowed “for military, dual-use, or energy-related goods to designated users,” i.e. the ones included in sanctions lists.⁴⁸⁸

In 2022, Russia intervened again in Ukraine; as Russian military advanced, so did the Western sanctions. This time, though, as Western companies like MacDonald’s and Starbucks were also leaving the country,⁴⁸⁹ and as the West began to introduce measures targeting private wealth of Russian oligarchs, Russia stepped up by confiscating assets of foreign companies that left Russia as a retaliation.⁴⁹⁰ Taken out

⁴⁸⁶ Kara Sea is in arctic region. Following the interruption, Rosneft also had to freeze its logistic base in Murmansk designed for arctic projects. Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 35.

⁴⁸⁷ Klinova and Sidarova, “Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on Russian Economic Relations with the European Union,” 230.

⁴⁸⁸ Cory Welt, Kristin Archick, Rebecca M. Nelson and Dianne E. Rennack. “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” *CRS Report* R45415 (January 17, 2020), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf> (accessed on January 31, 2020): 9

⁴⁸⁹ Minami Funakoshi, Hugh Lawson and Kannaki Deka, “Tracking sanctions against Russia,” *Reuters*, March 9, 2022 (updated March 22, 2022), Wednesday, <https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/byvrjenzmve/> (accessed on March 23, 2022).

⁴⁹⁰Richard Partington, “Russia Plans to Seize Assets of Western Companies that Pull Out,” *Guardian*, March 10, 2022, Thursday; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/10/russia-plans-to-seize-assets-of-western-companies-exiting-country> (accessed March 28, 2022).

of the SWIFT system, Russia began insisting on use of ruble for its exports,⁴⁹¹ and this move made the IMF voice concerns on “gradual decrease of the dominance of the US dollar in the world financial systems.”⁴⁹² Russia at the same time preserved its position at the negotiations on Iranian nuclear issue related to the restoration of the JCPOA. It offered to have Iran’s international trade flow on Russia, but having an understanding of possible Western moves in the game, it wanted “a written guarantee from the United States that trade with Iran will not be affected by new US sanctions imposed on Russia.”⁴⁹³

Russia’s political importance is highly linked with economics. Russia is the 11th biggest economy, with exports amounting to \$379 billion and imports to \$304 billion.⁴⁹⁴ Economics make Russia a special case, not only because “it is a powerful

⁴⁹¹ Maria Shagina, “The Sanctions and Moscow’s Adaptation Strategy,” in *Russian Energy Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Australia*, ed. Elisabeth Buchanan (Australia: ANU Press, 2021), 194.

⁴⁹² Anonymous, “The IMF Warns of the US Dollar Losing Dominance after Sanctions,” *TRT World*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/the-imf-warns-of-the-us-dollar-losing-dominance-after-sanctions-55970> (accessed on April 1, 2022).

⁴⁹³ Javad Heiran-Nia, “Iran Won’t Break with Russia over Ukraine. Here’s Why,” *Atlantic Council – Iran Source* (blog), March 30, 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-wont-break-with-russia-over-ukraine-heres-why/> (accessed on April 1, 2022). Interestingly enough, Iran disagreed to be part of Russian plan for sanctions weaver, perceiving it as an attempt to link Ukraine issue to the JCPOA. Russia’s role is critical, yet might not necessarily be indispensable, for completin the nuclear fuel cycle in full. See Ray Takeyh, “Iran Loses Its Imperial Strategist.” *Politico*, January 3, 2020, Friday; <https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-loses-imperial-strategist-us-tensions-qassem-soleimani/> (accessed October 14,2022).

⁴⁹⁴ World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product,” *World Development Indicators*; Central Intelligence Agency, “Russia,” *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on January 19, 2022; <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#economy> (accessed on January 20, 2022).

state, able to withstand economic pressures,... [but also] it is an oligarchy, in which the interests of big business cannot easily be separated from those of the state.”⁴⁹⁵ Despite all its strengths, like many other states, Russia does not prefer to be, and is not, in isolation. To put it in different words, Russian economy is well integrated at global level and has an important role in the global value chains.⁴⁹⁶ Nonetheless, Russian participation to the global economy is from the downstream, meaning “other countries intensively use Russian intermediates in their exports.”⁴⁹⁷

For sake of simplification, it is possible to say that Russian contribution to the global value chains is through supply of primary commodities. In conformity with this argument, data indicates that the Russian integration with the global economy is highest in mining sector (for the rest of the traded items, Russia sells and buys approximately similar items, depending on quality and quantity needed, or price available at international markets).⁴⁹⁸ Indeed, while the EU was designing and implementing a sanctions scheme, the reluctance of “Germany, Italy, and other EU

⁴⁹⁵ Stephen Osborne, “Sanctions on Russia: Are They Working, Workable, and Worth It?,” *Strategic Trade Review* (2019): 25.

⁴⁹⁶ Among the countries surveyed by the OECD, Luxemburg is the most successful country in terms of GVC participation. To compare, Russia ranks 20th, India 32, US 34, followed by China and Turkey. OECD, “Global Value Chains (GVCs): Russian Federation,” (May 2013), <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/GVCs%20-%20RUSSIAN%20FEDERATION.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020). Data belongs to year 2009– as enveloped in figure 1 in Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid, figure 2.

Member States to maintain the EU's sanctions on Russia suggests that it is the EU, rather than Russia, that has suffered the more."⁴⁹⁹

While the US sanctions were aiming for an economic impact and clearly avoided targeting Putin personally, EU measures focused on asset freezes and travel bans on listed persons, and "were not intended to cause any adverse humanitarian consequence to any of the population of Russia or Crimea."⁵⁰⁰ While the US sanctions are there until lifted, those of the EU should periodically be renewed in unanimity.⁵⁰¹ Also, the US exports to and investments in Russia are negligible but only Germany⁵⁰² or Netherlands⁵⁰³ alone stands out in terms of economic and commercial relations with Russia. These differences might underlie the reason why "while they [i.e. the US and European countries] succeeded in imposing costs on Russia, they failed to prevent

⁴⁹⁹ Osborne, "Sanctions on Russia: Are they Working, Workable, and Worth It?," 24. Also see Konstantins Benkovskis, Julia Pastusenko and Julia Wörz, "Assessing the Full Extent of EU-Russia Trade Integration in the Presence of Global Value Chains," *Focus on European Economic Integration - Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank)* 3 (2014); and Dennis Avorine and Judith Levy, "Unintended Consequences of Sanctions on Russia," *Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives Paper* 770, March 16, 2018; <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/sanctions-russia/> (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁵⁰⁰ Osborne, "Sanctions on Russia: Are They Working, Workable, and Worth It?," 26, 31, 34.

⁵⁰¹ Peter E. Harrell, Tom Keatinge, Sarah Lain and Elisabeth Rosenberg, "The Future of Transatlantic Sanctions on Russia," *Center for a New American Security – CNAS*, June 15, 2017, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-future-of-transatlantic-sanctions-on-russia> (accessed November 29, 2021), 3.

⁵⁰² Ben Aris, "Impact of Sanctions on Russia: An Assesment," *European Leadership Network Policy Brief*, July 2014, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Impact-of-Sanctions_Ben-Aris.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021), 1.

⁵⁰³ Klinova and Sidarova. "Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on Russian Economic Relations with the European Union," 221.

Putin from consolidating control in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”⁵⁰⁴ Moreover, while sanctions created economic slowdown, there were not only losers but also winners as import substitution created new rents and revenues. “Former agriculture minister Aleksandr Tkachev, for example, has said that he hopes [the West’s sanctions and Russia’s] counter-sanctions would go on for another ten years.”⁵⁰⁵

While the course of the events is still unpredictable at the time of writing this chapter, it is safe to maintain that when it comes to correcting its own lepers, Russia does not belong to the Western sanctions school. To put it differently, in case of a dispute where classical diplomacy fails to solve, Russia resorts to war as a disciplinary measure. In the end, war is, as Clausewitz notes, continuation of policy by other means.⁵⁰⁶

Below parts will look at how the sanctions measures implemented demonstrate a sample of Foucauldian disciplinary power exercised by West over a non-Western country. It will show also how constructivism is in play: despite the target country claims to be a great power which is part of the West,⁵⁰⁷ the following sections will

⁵⁰⁴ Peter E. Harrell, “Lessons from Russia for the Future of Sanctions,” *Center for a New American Security*, September 2015, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06193?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed November 29, 2021), 6.

⁵⁰⁵ Blanc and Weiss, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Congress Should Go Back to Fundamentals,” 11. Also see Oleg Inshakov and Elena Inshakova, “Russian Nanotechnology Industry Development: The Impact of External Political and Economic Sanctions,” *European Research Studies* XIX, no. 2 (2016).

⁵⁰⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret), 584.

⁵⁰⁷ Biscop notes that nobody has been and is in doubt of Russia being a great power. “But perhaps, like Machiavelli, Putin judges it is better to be feared than be loved.” Sven Biscop, “Is Putin Winning, or Is He Trying not to Lose?,” *Security Policy Brief* 154 (2022): 1.

maintain that Russian identity of an Eastern country is better constructed and accepted than its own construction of itself as part of the West.

5.2. Security Aspect

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, national security forces were in dire conditions, and defense budget kept draining till 2000. As a consequence of this situation, “weapons and equipment were in short supply, the strategic missile system was becoming obsolete and ill-repaired, and most of the navy’s ships were in need of modernization and often simple maintenance.”⁵⁰⁸ For example, in Hlebalkin shipyard, 15-16 submarines were used to be docked for maintenance; in 2006 the number was zero. Anna Politkovskaya quotes the captain of a nuclear defense submarine saying “one cannot expect miracles all the time. Submarines are not like shrewd elderly that survive for ages without visiting doctors.”⁵⁰⁹ The situation was even more dramatized with *Kursk* and its entire crew lost in 2000.⁵¹⁰

Putin acknowledged these problems, and increased the defense and military budget.⁵¹¹ In time, Russia became a giant actor by gaining its leading status in defense sector. Back in 2013, it was the second largest arms exporter, dominating more than a quarter

⁵⁰⁸ Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 670.

⁵⁰⁹ Anna Politkovskaya, *Putin’s Russia* (London: Harvill Press, 2004), 179.

⁵¹⁰ Anonymous, “What Really Happened to Russia’s ‘Unsinkable’ Sub,” *the Guardian*, August 5, 2001, Sunday; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/05/kursk.russia> (accessed October 14, 2022).

⁵¹¹ Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 670.

of the global market.⁵¹² Just like the other sectors of the economy, defense sector is highly integrated into the global markets too –Russia is a big exporter of major weapons.⁵¹³ Though being mostly self-sufficient, top level Russian officials claim that in mainly optics and radio-electronic components, defense industry relied on Western technology and equipments.⁵¹⁴ German companies solely by themselves amounted close to a one-fifth of the decline in engineering products sold to Russia following the introduction of sanctions.⁵¹⁵ This is an imminent impact that is reflected in the figures we have at hand; but “prohibitions on arms exports, dual-use technologies for defense and equipment or services for certain oil exploration and production activities are designed to have a strong cumulative effect in the mid and long terms.”⁵¹⁶

Above summarized is the conventional arms industry in which Russia is having problems. The country is also in trouble at the unconventional sphere. That is to say, its nuclear power is under the shadow of the sanctions, too. Russia believes that its

⁵¹² Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 23.

⁵¹³ Russia still is the second biggest arms exporter, only after the USA. Alexandra Kuimova, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Pieter D. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2021,” *SIPRI*, March 2022, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf (accessed April 20, 2022).

⁵¹⁴ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 23. Marioni, “The Cost of Russian Sanctions in Western Economies: The UK, US and EU,” 23. Also see Burkhard Schwenker and Tobias Raffel, “The Impact of Economic Sanctions,” *Think Act Economic Scenario Update - Roland Berger Strategy Consultants* (September 2014), https://www.rolandberger.com/publications/publication_pdf/roland_berger_tab_impact_of_economic_sanctions_20141009.pdf (accessed February 8, 2020).

⁵¹⁵ Marioni, “The Cost of Russian Sanctions in Western Economies: The UK, US and EU,” 23.

⁵¹⁶ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 23.

national security and great-power image necessitates nuclear capability, hence it is modernizing its “strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces.”⁵¹⁷ Yet, “[t]he ambitious nuclear modernization program is likely to be challenged by Russia’s financial crisis.”⁵¹⁸ The already existing pressures on the national economy has been exacerbated by the financial sanctions, “and the budget crunch is already forcing trade-offs between nuclear and conventional programs.”⁵¹⁹ Among those cancelled or delayed are plans to build a rail-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), some key projects by Russian Defense Ministry, and engine deliveries for some warships and submarines.⁵²⁰

One might question whether there is a threat towards Russia that requires building up so immense conventional⁵²¹ and unconventional power.⁵²² A classic realist would

⁵¹⁷ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 125.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. Also see Edward Hunter Christie, “Does Russia Have the Fiscal Capacity to Achieve its Military Modernisation Goals?,” *The RUSI Journal* 162, no. 5 (2017).

⁵¹⁹ Kristensen and Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” 126.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Some commentators argue that Russia is aware it cannot match US military power in conventional terms. As Russia “cannot just lash out against the United States in a physically destructive way, which can be extremely frustrating for a militarily powerful nation,” it started looking for alternatives. One such was cyber domain, which may be “allowing Russia to attack the United States without facing dire consequences.” Shuya, “Russian Cyber Aggression and the New Cold War,” 12-13.

⁵²² A discussion that goes beyond the scope of this research would be withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty. See Kingston Reif, “Trump to Withdraw U.S. From INF Treaty,” *Arms Control Today* (November 2018), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-11/news/trump-withdraw-us-inf-treaty> (accessed February 8, 2020).

definitely say yes, as he sees the world from a zero-sum perspective. A neorealist, however, would point to completely different concepts like relative power and security dilemma. Then, maybe, a more relevant question would be what Putin wants.

The answer is surprisingly straightforward: he wants security. He wants the rest of the world -but most particularly, the leader of that rest of the world, the United States- to acknowledge Russia as a sovereign country that defines and defends its own vital interests as it sees fit, and is not 'pushed around' by others.⁵²³

Fair enough. But, how does he define security? That is to say, how is the Russian understanding of security that casts its deep shadow in Russia's foreign policy making and Russians' reactions towards the sanctions?

The Russian equivalent for security is '*bezopasnost*,' which literally means absence of threats. This word complicates the issue deeply as it embeds its own constructivist approach.⁵²⁴ This word defines the way Russia reacts to the developments at the national, regional and international level including prevention of future Eastward expansion of NATO.⁵²⁵ This, indeed, is a speech act by itself -- "[y]ou can be more or

⁵²³ Fiona Hill, "Putin: The One-Man Show the West Doesn't Understand," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 142-3.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. This corresponds with the current state of "other" for Russia, which means any one whose values are different from self. Laine notes also the changes in the constitution in early 2020 to make the country more conservative. Veera Laine, "Evolution of Russia's 'Others' in Presidential Discourse in 2000-2020," in *Nexus of Patriotism and Militarism in Russia: Nexus of Patriotism and Militarism in Russia* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2021). In this context, for a discussion of use and understanding of Orthodoxy by Russia, see Heather A. Conley and Donatienne Ruy, *The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

⁵²⁵ Bill Chappell, "Russia digs in on Ukraine never joining NATO, on a day of talks with the U.S.," *NPR*, 10 January 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/10/1071880010/russia-us-ukraine-nato-join> (accessed 20 January 2022). It should be noted that with the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, there are signals of further Eastward expansion of NATO. See NATO, *The Secretary General's Annual Report 2021* (Brussels: NATO, April 1, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193590.htm (accessed April 20, 2022), esp. 92-

less secure, but never fully secure.”⁵²⁶ As a result, there constantly is a struggle, an ongoing one but never progressing enough; and also a distrust towards every actor, and “a deeply rooted mutual incomprehension between Russia and the West.”⁵²⁷

In this respect, the defense doctrine is shaped in a “reciprocal counterstrike” format where Russians will not commit to first strike, but deliver the hell – this is a new wording for MAD, where in a mutual destruction the enemy will go to hell while Russians, as being victims of the aggression, go to the paradise.⁵²⁸ Because a country of such vast territory with a defense system and a population of unmatched patriotism, Russia has the advantage of the strong willpower of the Russians.⁵²⁹ However, as this section emphasized, Russian security apparatus needs Western high-tech inputs, and arms and dual-use technologies are covered by sanctions. This is the point where sanctioning Russia gets more complicated – the friendly-fire impact⁵³⁰ indicates that the measures applied are casting harm to the senders as well. In other words, the

5. For NATO-Russia relations, see NATO, “Relations with Russia,” *NATO Topics*, March 15, 20 22, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm (accessed April 4, 2022).

⁵²⁶ Hill, “Putin: The One-Man Show the West Doesn’t Understand,” 142-3.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁵²⁸ Isabelle Facon and Bruno Tertrais, “La Russie et l’Emploi des Armes Nucléaires: le Sens des Propos de Vladimir Poutine lors de Valdai-2018,” *FRS Papers* 21 (November 5, 2018): 2-3; also see footnote 4 of the article. MAD stands for the Cold War terminology, “mutually assured destruction.”

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁰ Matthieu Crozet and Julian Hinz, “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions,” *Kiel Institute Report* 2059 (updated July 2017); also see Avorin and Levy, “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions on Russia.”

disciplinary measures not only fail to change the behavior of Russia and restore Crimea back under Ukraine, but also hinder export of high-tech, high-value added items to Russia – depriving the West from a lucrative market. It is safe to argue that despite the measures are not blanket but smart, sanctions still reflect a blind quest for discipline, a mere exercise of Foucauldian conceptualization of power, and a labelling of a non-Western country as the leper other regardless what this labelling costs to the West.

5.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was a financial as well as a political and administrative story.⁵³¹ Ukraine was under Russian rule “for more than three hundred years. It was the empire’s industrial heartland, home to its defense industry and bread basket, and a bridge to the outside world.”⁵³² Disintegration was such a huge leap in history because it marked the end of the decades long Cold War and the bipolar structure; opening up a new chapter in international relations.

“In March 1991 there was a referendum on whether the USSR should continue to exist as a single state. [Despite t]he population voted for the continuation,” following the August attempt for a coup, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became first to declare their

⁵³¹ See Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, *Türkiye-Orta Asya İşbirliği Stratejileri ve Gelecek Senaryoları* (İstanbul: IQ Yayınları, 2003, 2nd edition), 74-82 for a broad overview of administrative and economic policies pursued during the disintegration process.

⁵³² Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, *Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle be Broken?* (Washington: Carnegie, 2019), 16. Speaking of bread, one sample from late Ottoman era is worthy to note here to illustrate difficulties of managing imperial territories – it was 75% more expensive to transport grain from Anatolia to İstanbul than importing from New York. Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908 – 2009* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003, 21st edition), 28.

independence.⁵³³ Initial reaction was to issue publications whose aim was to prove the pro-secession republics “that leaving the Soviet Union would make them impoverished orphans.”⁵³⁴ However, the figures proved otherwise: “Russia was the origin of a disproportionately large share of Soviet hard currency exports, and these, resting heavily on oil, gas, and raw materials, were especially underpriced in the domestic economy.”⁵³⁵

The Soviet republics had different levels of development. They were “locked” into each other via “vertically integrated industries whose supply chains spanned republican boundaries.”⁵³⁶ Moreover, there was “bureaucracy enforced production and delivery of goods to industrial activities that were widely dispersed and specialized regionally across different republics.”⁵³⁷ Towards the end of the Cold War, traditional coordination channels broke down; “resulting in diversion of labor and inputs” which

⁵³³ Philip Hanson, *Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 224.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid*, 230.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid*, 231. Such an asymmetric relation was there also with Cuba, where the Soviets had subsidized sugar exports by paying more than world price. See Kosmas Tsokhas, “The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union.” *Theory and Society* 9, no. 2 (1980): 326.

⁵³⁶ Marvin Suesse, “Breaking the Unbreakable Union: Nationalism, Trade Disintegration and the Soviet Economic Collapse,” *European Historical Economics Society Working Papers in Economic History* 57 (2014): 3.

⁵³⁷ Eteri Kvintradze, “Russia’s Output Collapse and Recovery: Evidence from the Post-Soviet Transition,” *IMF Working Paper* WP/10/89 (April 1, 2010): 4.

influenced output⁵³⁸ and growth rates.⁵³⁹ In this sense, a monolithic economy with a single currency area became unsustainable in terms of pursuit of the financial stability. “With uncoordinated fiscal policies and a single currency, the attraction for each republic of free riding would prevent macro-stabilization.”⁵⁴⁰ In these circumstances, “[i]f any one republic – given available resources and technologies and the inherited pattern of production capacities- was being exploited by the rest, it could be argued that it was Russia.”⁵⁴¹

Under these circumstances, disintegration became a good policy option because it was a cost-effective move for Russia.⁵⁴² Reintegration, on the other hand, reversed the equation and imposed costs on Russia. Back in 2013, for example, up to 60% of Crimea’s budget was covered by Ukraine. After March 2014, however, “it has been Russia’s financial burden.”⁵⁴³ It looks like an easy project for a huge country like Russia to maintain a small territory like Crimea. Nonetheless, just like it was difficult

⁵³⁸ Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Reversing the Soviet Economic Collapse,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2 (1991): 354.

⁵³⁹ GNP fell by 2% year-on-year in 1990, and 8% in 1991. *Ibid*, 341.

⁵⁴⁰ Hanson, *Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy*, 235.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid*, 231. Such an asymmetric relation was there also with Cuba, where the Soviets had subsidized sugar exports by paying more than world price. See Tsokhas, “The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union,” 326.

⁵⁴² See Daniel Gros, “Regional Disintegration in the Soviet Union: Economic Costs and Benefits,” *Intereconomics* 26, no. 5 (1991), for a discussion of impossibility of applying alternative models like customs union to keep the Soviet Union together economically.

⁵⁴³ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion*, 24.

to maintain Soviet republics, maintaining Crimea has not been an easy project. It is because just like Soviet republics were tied to Moscow, Crimea had been tied to Ukraine.⁵⁴⁴ The entire infrastructure for water, electricity and transportation links Crimea with Ukraine, and “substantial investments [would] be needed to connect peninsula with Russia.”⁵⁴⁵

This was indeed where the sanctions stepped in. Bearing in mind that Crimea would require substantial amount of investments in infrastructure for integrating fully with Russia, “the Western sanctions banish trade, investment and provision of services (e.g., brokering, engineering, construction, tourism) and technologies to the peninsula, in particular in the telecommunication, transportation and energy sectors.”⁵⁴⁶ Restriction of transportation and logistics services has also been important for continuation of the international political stance for not recognizing Crimea as being separate from Ukraine.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ Crimea was given as a gift to Ukraine in 1954 by Khrushchev.

⁵⁴⁵ Secieru, *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion*, 24.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. Still, there were companies that were ready to do business with Crimea. See Anton Zverev, Gleb Stolyarov, Olga Sichkar, “Exclusive: How EU Firms Skirt Sanctions to do Business in Crimea,” *Reuters*, September 21, 2016, Wednesday; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-sanctions-insig/exclusive-how-eu-firms-skirt-sanctions-to-do-business-in-crimea-idUSKCN11R1AN> (accessed January 31, 2020).

⁵⁴⁷ See also United Nations, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014,” *General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/68/262*, April 1, 2014, <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/68/262> (accessed August 2, 2020).

At that stage, Russia claimed that “it should no longer be under sanctions since Kyiv is to blame for the lack of progress.”⁵⁴⁸ Despite this narrative, a new set of sanctions were introduced by the US, citing cyber intrusions and elections-meddling among the atrocities of Russia. These unilateral sanctions were introduced in August 2017⁵⁴⁹ while some European countries were planning further engagement with Russia, and “end[ed] the transatlantic ruptures.”⁵⁵⁰ In addition to this discoordination, another factor that reduced the impact of sanctions was the steps taken by the administration: Russia not only reacted by imposing retaliatory sanctions,⁵⁵¹ but also protected

⁵⁴⁸ Fredrik Wesslau, “Will the EU Prolong Economic Sanctions against Russia?”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, May 16, 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_will_the_eu_prolong_economic_sanctions_against_russia_this_7026 (accessed January 31, 2020).

⁵⁴⁹ United States Congress, “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” *115th Congress (2017-2018)* H.R.3364 Public Law 115-44, August 2, 2017; <https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ44/PLAW-115publ44.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2020).

⁵⁵⁰ Aurelie Bros, Tatiana Mitrova and Kirsten Westphal, “German Russian Gas Relations: A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters,” *SWP Research Paper* 13 (2017), 35, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP13_wep_EtAl.pdf (accessed January 31, 2020). Despite sanctions, the Russians continued with gas pipeline construction project. The US then introduced “Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 – PEESA” on December 20, 2019, which requires sanctioning foreign persons that contribute to existing or future pipeline constructions, moreover, while on the one hand Russia agreed with Ukraine for transiting Russian gas to Europe, on the other hand it rolled up sleeves to build vessels able to lay subsea pipelines. Welt *et al.*, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” 33-4.

⁵⁵¹ Russian sanctions were originally enveloped in the Executive Order on Special Economic Measures to Protect Russia’s Security, 7 August 2014. An interesting study on the impact of Russian retaliatory sanctions has been conducted by Kjetil J. Bjørkman. See his “The Impact from the Russian import-ban (2014-) on the Norwegian Seafood Industry: When an Export-Dependent Industry Face Spill-over Effects from Geopolitical Conflicts” (master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2016). Also see Tatia Dolidze, “EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones,” *CEPS Working Paper* 402 (January 2015), <https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=8848&pdf=WD%20402%20TD%20Sanctions.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).

individuals that were subject to sanctions. The Rotenberg Law, for example, was designed to compensate the Russians that suffer from asset freeze measures under Western sanctions.⁵⁵² It should be noted that despite the Law was not adopted, Rotenberg's construction company kept being awarded in Russia with lucrative contracts.⁵⁵³

The name-father, Arkady Rotenberg, is known as being Putin's judo sparring partner and a wealthy industrialist, indicating that one way to react and respond to the sanctions was keeping ties with the ruling elite warm.⁵⁵⁴ These ties, while being necessary to stay afloat, also were pointing to "rally-around-the-flag" affect theorized by Galtung.⁵⁵⁵ That is to say, the sanctions, instead of inducing a change in policy behavior, caused a unity behind the leader. And this unity is there not only among the businessmen but also at the public level as "many Russians judge the country's relative

⁵⁵² Bianca Becca and Dmitriy Miryan, "Russia Undeterred: The Failure of Smart Sanctions," *the Policy Corner* (August 15, 2017), <https://www.policycorner.org/en/2017/08/15/russia-undeterred-the-failure-of-smart-sanctions/> (accessed February 2, 2020).

⁵⁵³ One recent sample was construction of a bridge to link Khabarovsk with Sakhalin – a project of £3.9 billion. Tom Parfit, "Building Bridges Pays off for Vladimir Putin's Friend Arkady Rotenberg," *The Times*, October 17, 2017, Tuesday; <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/building-bridges-pays-off-for-vladimir-putin-s-friend-arkady-rotenberg-lqwnbz5sm> (accessed February 2, 2020). On public discontent with government's attempts to protect cronies at the expense of public interests, see Celestine Bohan, "The Sanctions against Russia: What did West and Media Expect," *Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center Discussion Paper* D90 (2015): 6.

⁵⁵⁴ Becca and Miryan, "Russia Undeterred: The Failure of Smart Sanctions." For an interesting analysis of Putin and judo, as well as the cronies, see Kimberly Marten, "Putin's Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (April 2015).

⁵⁵⁵ Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia." *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967).

stable economic performance against the memories of the disastrous crisis in the 1990s, before Vladimir Putin took power.”⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, the sanctions facilitated painting a picture of Western hostility, and help to create "this feeling, after the Crimean annexation, that Russia once again become a great power and can lead any foreign policy it likes, regardless of criticism or Western sanctions.”⁵⁵⁷

In a nutshell, the adventure in Crimea created extra administrative and technical burdens for Russia to bear. “[T]he Russian state [already] was generating insufficient income to fund many of its most basic tasks.”⁵⁵⁸ Moreover, “[s]ince the 2008 crash, Russian economy has struggled to regain the equilibrium of 2000-8 period, and the crisis over Ukraine and Western sanctions” created an environment with “unknown consequences for ... Putin’s ... regime.”⁵⁵⁹ First of all, it reversed the decades-old disintegration and put additional costs on Russia. Second, the fragility of the process of integration was well observed by the West and sanctions targeted infrastructure

⁵⁵⁶ Darko Janjevic, “Western Sanctions on Russia: Lots of Noise and Little Impact,” *Deutsche Welle*, April 5, 2018, Thursday; <https://www.dw.com/en/western-sanctions-on-russia-lots-of-noise-and-little-impact/a-43271200> (accessed August 2, 2020). This approach is rather “bad is better than worse” type. The sanctions coincided with dealing oil revenues and created difficulties for example for Russian companies to refinance their debts. Nonetheless, it was observed by some that “Russian society has settled into a new ‘post Crimea’ social contract, in which the people accept economic hardship in return for Russia’s restoration to the ranks of the great powers.” Peter Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” in *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism (2000-2015)*, ed. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2016), 358.

⁵⁵⁷ Janjevic, “Western Sanctions on Russia: Lots of Noise and Little Impact.”

⁵⁵⁸ Leslie Holmes, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Putin’s Russia.” *Europe-I Studies* 60, no. 6 (2008): 1022.

⁵⁵⁹ Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 338.

investments, condemning Crimea into a permanent demolished zone. Also, even for touristic purposes, flights and shipments from and to Crimea were not allowed. Last but not least, the oligarchs went untouched by the sanctions: even the asset freezes designed to inflict direct harm to the ruling elite were compensated by Russian state budget from which there could have been allocations for projects designed to further the welfare of the ordinary Russians.

From administrative aspect, the case-study demonstrates the differences among West and non-West in reacting to international developments. That is to say, Russia had always made it clear

that incorporation of Ukraine into Europe would be unacceptable to Russia because it would be inconsistent with Russian security requirements. Putin tried an alternative economic relationship with Ukraine that was not acceptable for the latter. This produced a crisis and the Russian solution that led to Russian incorporation of Crimea.⁵⁶⁰

In other words, Russian reaction was open declaration of war. Western reaction, however, is a tacit war – namely sanctions that impose measures to discipline a non-Western leper country by using Foucauldian measures of punishment.

5.4. Socioeconomic Aspect

With the dismemberment of the USSR, “Europe and the United States transformed their Soviet policy of isolation and containment to one of political and economic

⁵⁶⁰ Gordon L. Anderson, “Beyond Realism: Values, Interests, Levels, and Spheres in International Relations Theory,” *International Journal on World Peace* 31, no. 2 (2014): 7. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Tannrisever for giving me this perspective to employ in analyzing the Russian case.

integration with the Russian Federation.”⁵⁶¹ According to some analysts, “Russia’s integration with Europe was successful. In ... 10 years alone, the value of Russia’s global trade nearly quadrupled from \$210 billion in 2003 to \$730 billion in 2014.”⁵⁶² In the meantime, Russia increased investments in Europe. “The full extent of Russia’s reach ... remains unknown as Russia has sought to conceal its economic activity behind a web of foreign shell companies and offshore accounts.” As a result, for example, the Netherlands on paper is the largest foreign investor in Bulgaria, because LukOil is registered there. “In this way, Russia’s true presence is masked.”⁵⁶³

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ailing economy gave birth to “protection rackets,” which are “involved extorting regularly paid dues in return for a ‘roof’ (*krysha*) of protection against other gangs, street bandits, police, and politicians (all of whom competed in offering ‘roofs’).”⁵⁶⁴ The revenue generated by these criminal activities were invested in economic activities like banks and other businesses, creating a solid bonding between illegal and legal spheres. “[I]llegal privatizations left uncontested by law, criminals involved in entirely legal legal [sic]

⁵⁶¹ Heather A. Conley *et al.*, *The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe: A Report of the CSIS Europe Program and the CSD Economics Program* (Lanham, Washington, D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), iv.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, 10. “In the Netherlands, Russian companies’ assets [including the letterbox ones] have jumped from €13.2 billion in 2007 to around €96 billion in 2017.” Heather A. Conley *et al.*, *The Kremlin Playbook 2: The Enablers* (Washington, D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 4.

⁵⁶⁴ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 690.

activities, and ordinary citizens engaged in illegal activities without connection to the mobs.”⁵⁶⁵

Simply put, Russia suffers from a set of three curses. One is the Dutch Disease, or the oil curse, typical experience for a natural resource rich country. Second is Russian curse – “a centuries-old tradition of a strong, centralized state, deemed necessary to preserve internal stability and external security of what became the largest country in the world.”⁵⁶⁶ Last but not least is the “Soviet curse:”

seventy years of socialist central planning that reinforced the statist tradition of Tsarist Russia and adding new distortions such as bloated military industry complex, disdain for entrepreneurship, dependency on state handouts and networks of trust inhibit competition.⁵⁶⁷

The sanctions added more spice to the situation. Foreign investment as well as domestic capital began departing Russia.⁵⁶⁸ This departure effected the stock

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 341.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁸ As Russia was not able to generate foreign tools for financing itself, its external debt declined “spectacularly in one year from \$732 billion to \$556 billion.” Nonetheless, it does not automatically mean good news for the rest of the economy – declining foreign financing options meant Russia was withdrawing from its own reserves, which translated into a decline in value of national currency, which, in return, has an impact on real income. Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 31.

Figures at a quick glance confirm this trend: Following the sanctions, rouble lost its value by 50%, inflation surged and recession loomed. Russian GDP growth was 1.5% in 2017 (below 2013 level), and growth since 2014 averaged -0.1%. Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 358; EIU, *Country Report: Russia*, 12.

exchange, which lost half of its value in 2014 following Crimean annexation. The loss in RTS index marked the worst stock exchange globally,

even worse than Greece's or Nigeria's. By the end of 2014, Russian stock exchange capitalization (\$517 billion) was below that of Apple Inc alone (\$647 billion). Russian companies followed the negative trend. In the FT 500 global ranking for 2015 there were five Russian companies, down from eight in 2013. But none made it into the world's top 100, unlike in 2013 when three companies reached it.⁵⁶⁹

The sanctions managed to inflict a damage. Within months following the sanctions, Prime Minister Medvedev noted that Russian economy lost tens of billions of dollars because of sanctions.⁵⁷⁰ In the end, "Russia is an emerging economy heavily reliant on oil and gas with an urgent need of modernization to lift more than 15 million people out of poverty."⁵⁷¹ Nonetheless, for being able to sell hydrocarbons, Russia needs to be able to extract them. This was exactly where the financial sanctions step in: the suspension of project funding hit oil and gas sector deeply. Rosneft had to quit its project in Kara Sea, indicating that Russia's capacity to conduct such projects by itself was limited. Moreover, close to 70% of the equipment imported for oil and gas sector became inaccessible due to the sanctions. "At the same time, for hard-to-recover oil projects Russian companies need to import 50% of the equipment and 80% of the

⁵⁶⁹ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 33. Nonetheless, Russian companies continued to grow and prosper. As Osborne observes, all 12 Russian companies that appeared on Forbes Global 2000 list proved to maintain healthy level of financial status in 2018. Osborne, "Sanctions on Russia: Are they Working, Workable, and Worth It?," 40-1.

⁵⁷⁰ Osborne, "Sanctions on Russia: Are they Working, Workable, and Worth It?," 37. Also see Katya Golubkova, Gabriela Baczynska, "Rouble Fall, Sanctions Hurt Russia's Economy: Medvedev," *Reuters*, December 10, 2014, Wednesday; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-medvedev-sanctions/rouble-fall-sanctions-hurt-russias-economy-medvedev-idUSKBN0JO0SR20141210> (accessed February 8, 2020).

⁵⁷¹ Bond, Odendahl and Rankin, *Frozen*, 6.

software.”⁵⁷² The dependency was even more visible for “offshore projects, where Russia relies on 80% of imported equipment and 90% of software.”⁵⁷³

The sanctions focusing on upstream sector resulted in a considerable decline in Russian oil recovery rate.⁵⁷⁴ Despite the fact that soon after 2014 sanctions Russia launched an import substitution program, “Russian analogues often did not fully match [end-user] companies’ technological requirements or could not compete with market prices.”⁵⁷⁵ “[D]ecade-long negligence of research and development departments, poor inter-sectoral coordination and cooperation as well as rent-seeking”⁵⁷⁶ were among the factors adding further spice and contributing to the considerable level of inefficiency. Additionally, “[t]he Russian energy majors also showed no willingness to cooperate and exchange their in-house know-how. Rosneft ... [for example] refused to join a single engineering centre for LNG projects initiated by Gazprom.”⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷² Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 35. It should be noted that Russian software had time to progress under sanctions in many areas. One sample is from dairy sector, where farmers began to use virtual reality googles on cows to make them happy and able to produce more milk. Leah Asmelash, “Russian Dairy Farmers Gave Cows VR Goggles With Hopes They Would be Happier and Make Better Milk,” *CNN*, November 27, 2019, Wednesday; <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/27/us/virtual-reality-russian-dairy-farm-cows-trnd/index.html> (accessed February 29, 2020).

⁵⁷³ Secrieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 35.

⁵⁷⁴ Shagina, “The Sanctions and Moscow’s Adaptation Strategy,” 186.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 191.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 192.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 193.

Nonetheless, like Rosneft the oil giant, Gazprom the gas giant was hit hard by the sanctions. It recorded a serious “slump in market capitalization, from \$101 billion in 2013 to \$51 billion in August 2015, making top management’s ambitions to reach \$1 trillion in market value by 2017 unattainable.”⁵⁷⁸ For purposes of providing alternative to Russian gas and undercutting Nord Stream 2 project, the US began supplying gas to Europe.⁵⁷⁹ The moves taken by the US to undermine Russia irritated also the Europeans, because attempting to enter into European markets at the expense of Russia with the (tacit) assistance of sanctions is perceived “as an unacceptable intervention in Europe’s energy sector – using political sanctions as instruments of economic interests.”⁵⁸⁰

Here, let us open a bracket and discuss the issue of impact of sanctions on third parties. With an initial attempt to pursue other Western countries to bandwagon in sanctioning Russia, the US criticized its allies for buying oil and gas from Russia. “But even if these countries wanted to reduce their petroleum imports from Russia, they would need

⁵⁷⁸ Secieru, *Russia under Sanctions*, 33.

⁵⁷⁹About Nord Stream, see Gazprom, “Nord Stream 2,” *Projects*, undated; <https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/> (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁵⁸⁰ Morena Skalamera, “Transformed Gas Markets Fuel US-Russian Rivalry, but Europe Plays Key Role too,” *Russia Matters* (May 30, 2018), <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/transformed-gas-markets-fuel-us-russian-rivalry-europe-plays-key-role-too> (accessed February 8, 2020). One sample move came a few days prior to the end of Trump’s tenure as the President of the US: A Russia-based entity is sanctioned “for knowingly selling, leasing, or providing to the Russian Federation goods, services, technology, information, or support for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines.” The move is justified under CAATSA as well as the Protecting European Energy Security Act (PEESA). US Embassy in Georgia, “Sanctions on Russian Entity and a Vessel Engaging in the Construction of Nord Stream 2,” *News & Events*, January 19, 2021, <https://ge.usembassy.gov/sanctions-on-russian-entity-and-a-vessel-engaging-in-the-construction-of-nord-stream-2/> (accessed January 28, 2021).

to replace them with supplies from other sources” like Iran.⁵⁸¹ Researchers indicate that “the European Union bears 90% of all lost trade of sanctioning countries and 93% of lost trade in non-embargoed products.” To give some statistics, “Germany is bearing almost 40% of monthly lost trade, while ... the United States (0.6%) are much less affected.”⁵⁸² “This indicates strong ‘friendly fire’ effects of the economic sanctions on Russia.”⁵⁸³

While the friendly fire impact was there, Russia also was suffering from a contracting GDP by up to 5% in post-sanctions era.⁵⁸⁴

The resource-laden structure of the Russian economy indeed faces difficulties in isolating and determining the impact of the sanctions shock.⁵⁸⁵ “The bottom line is that Russians are becoming poorer and are suffering because of Putin’s decision to interfere

⁵⁸¹ Mark N. Katz, “When the Friend of My Friend is not My Friend: The United States, US Allies, and Russia in the Middle East,” *Atlantic Council Issue Brief* (2019); https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/When_the_Friend_of_My_Friends_is_Not_My_Friend.pdf (accessed August 2, 2020): 8. Also see Benkovskis, Pastusenko and Wörz, “Assessing the Full Extent of EU-Russia Trade Integration in the Presence of Global Value Chains,” for an interesting dependency analysis based on GVC.

⁵⁸² Crozet and Hinz, “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions,” 13-4.

⁵⁸³ Avorin and Levy, “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions on Russia,” 2.

⁵⁸⁴ “To respond that, Russia has had to launch a campaign promoting a renewal of domestic production, similar to the United States’ *Made in America* movement, as well as work new agreements with Iran and North Korea.” Mason Shuya, “Russian Cyber Aggression and the New Cold War,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 11, no. 1 (2018): 9.

⁵⁸⁵ UNHCR Council Report, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, on his Mission to the Russian Federation,” A/HRC/36/44/Add.1 (July 27, 2017), <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/36/44/Add.1> (accessed January 31, 2020), 9.

in neighboring Ukraine.”⁵⁸⁶ Nonetheless, as the sanctions on Russia are not UN-imposed but rather unilateral,⁵⁸⁷ not all countries have to apply coercive measures on Russia. The measures applied also are not blanket but carefully designed sanctions. Therefore, there is a maneuvering room for Russia.⁵⁸⁸ This room enables Russia deepen its ties with Asian and South American countries.⁵⁸⁹ With or without the stimulus of the sanctions, some authors believe, rapidly expanding Asia would make a better partner than debt-ridden Europe. In the end, “[i]n the East, Putin can find eager consumers for Russian raw materials, like China – without the hectoring on human rights he receives from the West.”⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁶ Shuya, “Russian Cyber Aggression and the New Cold War,” 9.

⁵⁸⁷ International sanctions rather are in the form of suspension of Russian membership. One recent example came from the UN, see United Nations, “UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” UN News - Affairs, April 7, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782> (accessed April 20, 2022).

⁵⁸⁸ There also is the option of circumvention. Data indicates that food exports from EU to Belarus and from Belarus to Russia increased correlatively, suggesting sanctions evasion. It is possible that the evasion that occurs in food sector also is the case in dual-use items. Osborne, “Sanctions on Russia: Are they Working, Workable, and Worth It?,” 44.

⁵⁸⁹ The weakening ties between EU and Russia in energy sector created a gap for China to capitalize on – in 2014, China inked \$400 billion gas deal with Russia. Ibid, 5. To combat with sanctions, Rosneft, too, expanded its international business by reselling 13% of Venezuelan oil, and assuming the remaining 55% stake in Amazon oil and gas basins (it already had 45% stake following acquisition of TNK-BP in 2013). Edward C. Chow and Andrew Stanley, “Russia’s National Oil Champion Goes Global,” *CSIS Briefs* (2018); https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180627_Chow_RussiasNationalOilChamp.pdf?A34fyMoqtnspqdf6gl2HF9rayuPiCPx (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁵⁹⁰ Michael Schuman, “Sanctions? Russia is Just Going to Shrug them off,” *Time* (March 25, 2014), <https://time.com/36614/russia-will-shrug-off-crimea-sanctions/> (accessed February 8, 2020).

The turn to East is an interesting issue to be elaborated on as it is important for purposes of constructivism. Still, constructivism is not a single-player game. As Hopf aptly observes, construction is a social process; ideas and identities should have discursive resonance. He continues by an analysis of Russia's economic data and reaches at the conclusion that Russia is part of semiperiphery – not of developed Western world of core countries. Hopf also notes that “institutionally speaking, Russia is less connected to Western hegemony, and so less reproductive of its ideology, than one would expect from a typical semi-peripheral state.”⁵⁹¹ In other words, Russia is less part of West than it wants to portray itself; therefore its position is constructed not by Russian but by Orientalist discourse. As a result, Russia could be labelled as leper that is eligible to be a subject for sanctions, and is in need of disciplinary measures to join back to global political arena as a healthy actor.

5.5. Cultural Aspect

“How Russians have understood and interpreted the realities around them has been as important as the facts themselves. Perceptions, desires, and ideals have shaped responses to social and economic conditions,”⁵⁹² and are shaped by culture. Above we have seen financial and technical difficulties the defense sector faces. We have also seen how the Russian language defines security, and how it creates a security culture based on a conception of insecurity. Under this section, we shall be looking at how the

⁵⁹¹ Ted Hopf, “Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics.” *International Organizations* 67 (2013): 329.

⁵⁹² Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 691.

national pride interacts with the sanctions, and whether or not it adds more fuel to the fire set by the sanctions like the security perceptions do.

Some argue that the landmark for divergence in between the West and Russia have not been the Cold War's bipolar environment, but the end of the Cold War itself. In the final years of the Cold War, the argument goes,

the post-World War II settlement was rejected in favor of a new Europe. The wildly successful decision to make the newly reunited Germany a full member of NATO and the European Community created a precedent for the rest of post-communist Europe: enlarge, with only slight modification, the existing Euro-Atlantic institutions in order to facilitate the democratic and economic transformations ongoing there.⁵⁹³

A reading of history from a Russian perspective confirms this understanding, and sets a pattern indeed. "In April 2008, NATO's Bucharest Summit Declaration proclaimed that Ukraine and Georgia 'will become' members of the Atlantic Alliance."⁵⁹⁴ Within four months of time, Russia not only invaded Georgia, but also reorganized Abkhazia and Ossetia, its two breakaway regions, as separate independent states. In 2009, the EU initiated its Eastern Partnership Program to enhance economic and political ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. As a reaction, "Russia championed its own regional security and economic integration projects, in the form of Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union."⁵⁹⁵ Similarly, regime change in Ukraine in early 2014 was not regarded as a

⁵⁹³ Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, "US-Russian Relations: The Middle Cannot Hold," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 153.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid. Also see North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Bucharest Summit Declaration," *Official Texts* (April 4, 2008), https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed February 8, 2020).

⁵⁹⁵ Charap and Shapiro, "US-Russian Relations: The Middle Cannot Hold," 153. A contrary opinion belongs to Seiffert. He argues that Russia wanted to compensate loss of 14 Republics by establishing CIS where a loose group of states instead of a qualified group with a legal

grassroots movement; next step was thought to be a similar attempt for a regime change in Russia.⁵⁹⁶

It might be useful to remember the history of Crimea here. The peninsula joined the Russian Empire back in 1783, following its conquest by Catherine the Great. Crimea continued to be a part of Russia during the Soviet era up “until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the USSR’s Communist Party, symbolically transferred it to Ukraine’s jurisdiction as a gift” for the three centuries-old union.⁵⁹⁷ “With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimea was part of newly independent Ukraine and remained so until March 2014 when it was reunified with Russia.”⁵⁹⁸

Following the “reunification,” Russia began to be treated as an occupier, not as a sovereign equal. There were many opportunities to reflect this treatment; one of which was the G8 that convened in Brussels as G7, i.e. excluding Russia.⁵⁹⁹ This, of course,

identity and organizational ability to enter into international contracts. Wolfgang Seiffert, *Putin*, transl. Zerrin Yılmaz (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2004), 22.

⁵⁹⁶ Sabine Fischer, “European Union Sanctions against Russia: Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps,” *SWP Comments* 17 (March 2015): 3.

⁵⁹⁷ Adriel Kasonta, “Introduction,” in *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta (UK: Bow Group, 2015), 6, <http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ In the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, the G8/7 is not listed among the partnerships to which “Russia attaches great importance” (para.25). Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” December 1, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE

was by no means a declaration of intent to “deal with world affairs and international crises in Iran, Syria, or anywhere ... without taking Russia’s position into consideration;” yet it still had a symbolic meaning.⁶⁰⁰ “EU countries supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia’s membership of the OECD and International Energy Agency.” The summits of Russia with the EU as well as individual members of the EU were cancelled; “talks with Russia on visa matters and the new EU-Russia Agreement were both suspended.”⁶⁰¹

Then sanctions were intensified gradually with the introduction of new sectoral sanctions, asset freezes and visa bans.⁶⁰² However, as was observed in other case-studies of sanctions subject to this thesis research, in Russian experience “there was a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ reaction, which led the population accept the inconveniences caused by the unilateral coercive measures.”⁶⁰³ What is more, Russians “declare[d]

[02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB](#) (accessed February 8, 2020).

⁶⁰⁰ Simond de Galbert, “A Year of Sanctions Against Russia – Now What?,” *CSIS Report*, (October 2015): 5.

⁶⁰¹ Kasonta, “Introduction,” 5. Such exclusionary policies send strong political signals to Russia. It is simply because inclusion “was considered as a major step when Russia joined the G-8 in the first place, in recognition of the role it plays on the world economic and political scene.” Maarten Smeets, “Can Economic Sanctions be Effective?,” *WTO Staff Working Paper* ERSD-2018-03 (March 15, 2018).

⁶⁰² It should be noted that while mutual visa/entry bans look minor relative to the other available tools of sanctions box, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept notes the visa regime itself, not even the visa bans, as “one of the main barriers to expanding contacts between Russia and the EU.” (para.65). For the bans, see Mario Damen, “Russia,” *Fact Sheets on the EU - EU Parliament*, November 2020, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.6.3.pdf (accessed on January 31, 2020).

⁶⁰³ UNHCR, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, on his Mission to the Russian Federation,” 10.

their appearance on Western sanctions lists as patriotic solidarity with the fatherland and its political leadership,” underlining also that any existing asset is already in Russia.⁶⁰⁴ “Given that Kremlin has long been calling for repatriation of foreign assets, sanctions offered those targeted an opportunity to prove their loyalty.”⁶⁰⁵

In other words, the Western reactions towards Ukraine crisis was interpreted in Russia as the manifestation “of decades of Western striving for global hegemony, during which the United States and NATO, and increasingly also the European Union, had steadily encroached into the post-Soviet space.”⁶⁰⁶ Additionally, not only the Western reaction to Russia’s action, but also even the road paving the way to the initial action of Russia (i.e., the very change of regime in Ukraine in 2014) was also perceived to be the outcome of anti-Russia policies. “The sanctions, too, are interpreted as one instrument of a broad-based Western strategy seeking to weaken Russia... [as well as to] exert pressure and ultimately bring about regime change in Moscow.”⁶⁰⁷ Four years after the initiation of the sanctions, in 2018, Putin ended his speech in Federal Assembly following the showdown of new weapons systems as “Nobody listened to

⁶⁰⁴ Fischer, “European Union Sanctions against Russia: Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps,” 4.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid, 3. In “Foreign Policy Concept,” Russia still calls for “equitable partnership” with NATO. (para. 70)

⁶⁰⁷ Fischer, “European Union Sanctions against Russia: Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps,” 3.

us. Listen now.”⁶⁰⁸ The policy seems to have paid off as Russia now is not a bystander but a leading power in many international security questions, like the one in Syria.⁶⁰⁹

As a result, the sanctions are not regarded as an insult to the greatness of the nation, but as an opportunity to achieve “rally-around-the-flag,” or as a chance to install further control over people through controlling scarce items that are sanctioned. From pride point of view, sanctions were regarded as an opportunity to show nationalist sentiments. In the end, one of the main characteristic features of Russians is patriotism, which goes well beyond all material values.⁶¹⁰ It may sound oxymoronic, yet Russians are proud of being resilient and able to survive in dire conditions –

Really and truly, Russia had ultimately overcome Napoleon. Really and truly, Russian soldiers had displayed wonders of valor even though they were, most of them, ex-serfs. What was unprecedented and strange was something else: the fact that class contradictions and consciousness had yielded place to national sentiment. The Russian people, regardless of serfdom, landlords, and the Tsarist oppression – that is, regardless of the entire Marxist-Leninist understanding of history – had nonetheless emerged as the greatest and most powerful nationality. Which meant that what acted and ruled in history was not class, but national factors. Which meant that the Russian folk somewhere from its inception was stronger and better than other peoples.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁸ Bond and Yurgens, “Putin’s Last Term: Taking the Long View,” 14.

⁶⁰⁹ Dimitar Bechev, “Resurgent Russia: Myth and Reality,” *Al Jazeera*, February 17, 2019, Sunday; <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/resurgent-russia-myth-reality-190217060009723.html> (accessed February 8, 2020).

⁶¹⁰ Yaşar Onay, *Rusya ve Değişim* (Ankara: Nobel, 2002), 33. In Russian, foreigner is “nimetz,” which means mute, cannot speak Russian or is not human.

⁶¹¹ Andrey Sinyavsky, “Russian Nationalism,” *The Massachusetts Review* 31, no. 4 (1990): 484; Onay, *Rusya ve Değişim*, 34. One other sample is from World War 2, during which St Petersburg resisted to the blockade of German and Finnish armies for 872 days. Around 1 million people died out of hunger, diseases and bombardment; but the city did not fall. Kamil Tüğen, *Rusya, Makedonya, Cezayir ve Tunus’tan Notlar* (İzmir: Başsaray, 2009), 5.

Being “better” than the rest is also the case with the West. In the end, Orientalism itself is there not to study and understand, but to construct and reconstruct the non-West/Orient as the other. The very perception of self as healthy normal and other as leper is there both in Russian and Western understanding of global politics. Both also want to correct the leper other – difference here being that while Russia prefers to declare and wage war openly, the West prefers to employ sanctions as disciplinary measures.

5.6. Conclusion

Like the sanctions against Iran, sanctions against Russia are still rolling. Unlike Iran, however, Russia has not faced a UNSCR. Rather, there were country groups that challenged Russia with sanctions against its annexation of Crimea.

Russia is not in the same basket with Iran or Egypt as being previous case-studies elaborated in this research. It is multiple times of them in terms of economic size, political power, demography or geography. It also is of a different social and historical background. These characteristic features, together with Putin’s desire of re-Sovietization, enabled Russia to act as a revisionist actor.⁶¹²

⁶¹² Indeed, “Russia was incensed by the Western recognition of the independence of Kosovo in February 2008, and responded by granting recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008.” Still, overall assumption was that Crimea would not fall under Russian irredentism as territorial integrity of Ukraine was agreed in return for denuclearization. Still, overall assumption was that Crimea would not fall under Russian irredentism as territorial integrity of Ukraine was agreed in return for denuclearization. Ibid, 2. Bruce G. Blair, “Ukraine’s Nuclear Backlash,” *Brookings Review* 11, no. 3 (1993): 46.

Some authors claim that sanctions against Russia has a symbolic value to indicate that sanctions are not tools designed for “the bullying of the weak by the strong.”⁶¹³ Some other circles claim Russia itself uses its own version of sanctions, i.e. natural gas embargoes, as a weapon. In 2022, Russia still is able to use gas as a weapon; in late April it “decid[ed] to cut off gas exports to Poland and Bulgaria” in response to “the action by ‘unfriendly steps’ of Western nations.”⁶¹⁴ Interestingly enough, years ago Russian use of gas has been labelled as “economic warfare.”⁶¹⁵ This label fits into the argument of this research in the sense that (i) it is not a sanction as per discourse, (ii) it does not disguise the damage occurring to the civilians, (iii) it has clear beginning, clearcut conditionalities, and clear ending as soon as the conditionalities are met, (iv) therefore, Russian “war” yields the result quickly in comparison to Western sanctions that continue for decades.

Since annexation of Crimea, more than 800 natural and legal persons have been subjected to sanctions.⁶¹⁶ As it would be expected from the design of smart sanctions, the listed people are wealthy, *crème-de-la-crème* ones. In this respect, these measures

⁶¹³ Osborne, “Sanctions on Russia: Are they Working, Workable, and Worth It?,” 32.

⁶¹⁴ Matt Murphy, “Ukraine War: Russia Gas Supply Cuts ‘Blackmail’, Says EU,” *BBC News*, April 27, 2022, sec. Europe, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61240499> (accessed May 5, 2022).

⁶¹⁵ See “An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe,” *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty* (originally published in Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*), July 16, 2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/An_Open_Letter_To_The_Obama_Administration_From_Central_And_Eastern_Europe/1778449.html (accessed May 5, 2022).

⁶¹⁶ Anonymous, “Russia Sanctions List,” *Risk Advisory*, September 27, 2019, <https://www.riskadvisory.com/sanctions/russia-sanctions-list/> (accessed February 8, 2020).

exemplify smart sanctions. Still, just like it is observed in other case-studies subject to this thesis research, in Russian experience “there [, too,] was a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ reaction, which led the population accept the inconveniences caused by the unilateral coercive measures.”⁶¹⁷ Even if the sanctions crucially harmed the civilians, Russians would still be content for having the opportunity to show their resilience. That is to say, Russians are proud of their strength in resisting to and surviving from dire conditions. In the end, they are the descendants of a nation that resisted a blockade nearly for three years during the World War 2.

In addition to feeding into national pride, the sanctions also played into the hands of the administration by repatriating Russian capital abroad. The Russians on the sanctions lists took it as an opportunity to prove their patriotic solidarity.⁶¹⁸ The government was also doing its best in order to minimize the impact of the measures taken by Western countries. The Rotenberg Law (drafted but not enforced), for example, was designed to compensate the Russians who suffer from asset freezes.

Therefore, as Tanrısever observes, “the sanctions are not capable of putting Russian economy into a structural crisis.”⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁷ UNHCR, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, on his Mission to the Russian Federation,” 10.

⁶¹⁸ Fischer, “European Union Sanctions against Russia: Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps,” 4.

⁶¹⁹ Anonymous, “Batının Yaptırımlarının Rusya’ya Etkisi.” Prof. Tanrısever also observes that Russia did not impose harsh counter-sanctions for purposes of avoiding from deepening the drift with the West.

There is a high degree of national pride and self image dimension enveloped in this case-study -- in the end, in Russian population there is a feeling that “after the Crimea annexation, ... Russia once again became a great power and can lead any foreign policy it likes, regardless of criticism or Western sanctions.”⁶²⁰ Despite they created economic problems and tilted the distribution of resources for purposes of encouraging domestic production and/or supporting oligarchs, sanctions did not pose intolerable economic hardship on the country, it catalyzed import-substitution programs that aimed to create an independent Russian technological advancement especially in security sector.

Sanctions aimed “to signal the West’s shock at Russia’s use of force to change international borders, in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that Russia had signed recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁶²¹ Therefore, it aimed simply to discipline Russia to act back as a part of the system set by the West. Still, the literature and research indicate that despite a few projects that experienced financial difficulties, sanctions were not harmful economically. It was the case not only because oil prices declined simultaneously back after 2014 (hence, impact of sanctions ended up being incalculable) and recovered after 2022 intervention. It is also because Russia neither is a small economy that is dependent on external trade, nor has asymmetrical trade relations with the West that creates dependency and allows sanctioning countries exercise muscles easily. On the contrary, reports analyzing the

⁶²⁰ Janjevic, “Western Sanctions on Russia: Lots of Noise and Little Impact.”

⁶²¹ Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 357.

impact of sanctions on Russia pointed to the “friendly fire”⁶²² impact as well as the tradeoff between not buying Russian gas and finding alternative suppliers – one available replacement being Iran.⁶²³

It is time to pause and analyze the situation from a Foucauldian perspective.

As noted above, Russia constructs its own identity and accordingly places itself apart from the East. However, construction is not a unilateral game; it is a social process. Construction and reconstruction processes requires a receiving side which is supposed to accept and adopt to the process. In this regard, Russia’s construction of self does not resonate; socioeconomically Russia stands as part of semiperiphery.⁶²⁴

Indeed, contrary to how it sees and wants to locate itself, Russia does not belong to the Western camp. It is evident not only in Western discourse which presents Russia as other, but also in cases where Russia needs to exercise disciplinary power, it does so not through unregulated ways and means of sanctions, but through clearly regulated sphere of war. While in war the law determines what can and cannot be done, in sanctions as demonstrated above even friendly-fire impact goes unregulated. Moreover, in Russia as in the previous case-studies, sanctions do not trigger behavioral

⁶²² Crozet and Hinz, “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions.”

⁶²³ Katz, “When the Friend of My Friend is not My Friend: The United States, US Allies, and Russia in the Middle East.”

⁶²⁴ Hopf, “Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” 328. EIU also defines Russia as “an upper-middle-income emerging economy.” Economist Intelligence Unit, “Russia,” 2.

change – therefore, they are employed as show of disciplinary power, unemployment of which would eradicate West’s normalcy over the non-West’s otherness.

CHAPTER 6

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan lies in a geostrategically important location where great powers over centuries tried to gain a foothold. While its modern history began in mid-18th century with the foundation of the Durrani Empire, “Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength.”⁶²⁵ The country fell into a virtual state of statelessness following the fall of the Soviet-backed Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai in 1992.⁶²⁶ Together with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center and following Operation Enduring Freedom, “the Bush administration announced that U.S.-led forces had liberated Kabul, Afghanistan. Both the administration and the American media represented this military action as a human rights mission for the benefit of Afghan women.”⁶²⁷ Nonetheless, there was no *baguette magic* to improve the situation of the Afghan

⁶²⁵ Katzman and Clayton Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 1.

⁶²⁶ Oktay F. Tanrisever, “Introduction: NATO, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Security in the Aftermath of 9/11,” in *Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2013).

⁶²⁷ Gwen Bergner, “Veiled Motives: Women’s Liberation and the War in Afghanistan,” in *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 95.

women. Rape became a daily feature, so did assassins and suicide attacks. “Though the USSR had dissolved and the United States disengaged, virtually every faction found a regional foreign backer that kept the weapons and money coming.”⁶²⁸

Largely because foreign actors keep supplying munitions to all the parties of the war, in Afghanistan “Taliban and their opponents continue to seek a military solution to the questions of who should control Afghanistan and what manner of government control the country should have.”⁶²⁹ The near-anarchy situation feeds into violence as violence became a mean of settling everyday disputes. Widespread violence was fed also by proliferation of high-tech weapons, a process known as “Kalashnikovization.”⁶³⁰ The weapons were funded by opium trade.⁶³¹ And continues the vicious cycle – the power struggle creates violence, which sets the ground for Kalashnikovization, which contributes to and emanates from opium trade, which serves as the main element of the power struggle.

⁶²⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror* (UK, US: Oxford University Press, 2013), 135.

⁶²⁹ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 87.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid*, 97.

⁶³¹ *Ibid*, 102.

The post 9-11⁶³² situation still gives the signs of a failed nation.⁶³³ The country is under multilateral sanctions concerning the activities of Taliban and their leaders,⁶³⁴ unable to generate its own budget without foreign aid and illicit revenues from opium, and fails to set control over the territory under the authority of the central government. All these casts an impact on Afghan people, which will be analyzed in detail below.

In analyzing those points, this chapter will also try to show that Afghanistan as a failed state⁶³⁵ does not have the capacity neither to react nor to adapt to the sanctions. Therefore, sanctions obviously do not have any impact to change the behavior of the country. In other words, sanctions are applied as a sign of disciplinary power which, as Foucault puts, will mean nothing if not used.

6.1. Road to Sanctions

Afghanistan had entered the 20th century in the form of a buffer between the British and Russian empires. Lying on a critical geopolitical crossroads,⁶³⁶ Afghanistan owed

⁶³² For an alternative interpretation of the attacks towards the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, see Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction* (UK: Routledge, 2010, 3rd edition), esp chap.8.

⁶³³ OECD, *States of Fragility* (Paris: OECD, 2018).

⁶³⁴ UNSCR 2255 (December 21, 2015), clarifies how the sanctions regime designed previously in Resolution 1988 (June 17, 2011) were to be implemented. See Security Council Report, "Afghanistan," *UN Documents* (no date), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/afghanistan/> (accessed December 5, 2020) for all the Resolutions and other documents adopted on Afghanistan.

⁶³⁵ It should be noted that the very term failed state is something Western, therefore unavoidably embeds the notion of an other.

⁶³⁶ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 4.

its territorial integrity to the rigidity of the bipolar system of the Cold War.⁶³⁷ Yet, towards the last decade of the bipolar structure, the country had a bloody coup which brought Nur Mohammed Taraki to power. Taraki signed a 20-year cooperation agreement with the USSR in 1978. Next year, another coup took place, bringing Hafizullah Amin to the presidency. His tenure only lasted till the end of 1979; he could not control the uprising, and the Soviets decided to invade Afghanistan on December 24.⁶³⁸ The invasion was complete by the New Year, followed also by sanctions measures. However, the grain embargo, boycott of the Moscow Olympics and UN condemnations did little to reverse the situation.⁶³⁹

By 1985, when Gorbachev became the new Soviet general secretary, Afghan resistance was still divided and ineffective, “unable to agree on anything, despite the creation of a unified front by the seven major Sunni parties in Peshawar on May 16, 1985.”⁶⁴⁰ Nonetheless, it should be noted that the operations of resistant mujahedeen got more complex and they began to enjoy US military aid, including advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Only in 1991, after the coup against Gorbachev, “the two superpowers agreed to cutoff military assistance to their respective clients in Afghanistan by the beginning of 1992.”⁶⁴¹ In the following period, control of Kabul,

⁶³⁷ Ibid, 11.

⁶³⁸ Ibid, 55-8.

⁶³⁹ Note that these sanctions were against the USSR.

⁶⁴⁰ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 67.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid, 73.

like the control of various parts of the country, fell into the hands of different competing groups.⁶⁴²

Within this picture, the Taliban rose first in 1994 when they “rescued” a trade convoy from Pakistan to Central Asia. “Presenting themselves simply as religious students who were fed up with the postcommunist struggle for Kabul and the lawlessness elsewhere in the country, the Taliban quickly found support.”⁶⁴³ Their structure has been resilient: “centralized enough to be efficient but flexible and diverse enough to adapt to local contexts. (In addition, the Taliban have been pragmatic in their use of criminal gang and opium resources).”⁶⁴⁴ Yet, as they installed their control, human rights breaches began to surface. Discrimination against women was particularly attracting attention⁶⁴⁵ and civil society movements began to pressure for preventing Taliban from obtaining a seat in the United Nations.⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴² Following the capture of Qandahar in 1994 by Taliban, the US engaged with the group. However, the Clinton administration “was unable to moderate the Taliban’s policies, and the United States withheld recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government.” Katzman and Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” 5.

⁶⁴³ Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 77.

⁶⁴⁴ Gilles Dorronsoro, *The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington, Moscow, Brussels, Beijing, Beirut: Carnegie, 2009), 9.

⁶⁴⁵ The situation of women, especially the widows, got worse and worse under Taliban as “no women should leave her house unless she was escorted by a male relative, but thousands of war widows had no male relatives left.” Ann Jones, *Kabul in Winter: Life without Peace in Afghanistan* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 15.

⁶⁴⁶ Katzman and Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” 5; Christopher L. Gadoury, “Should the United States Officially Recognize the Taliban? The International Legal and Political Considerations,” *Houston Journal of International Law* 23, no. 2 (2001): 418. Note that when the constitution was adopted in 2004, Afghanistan had

Oppression, unfortunately, was not limited to women. Only in September 1998, in Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan, “[m]ore than eight thousand noncombatants had been reported killed . . . and thousands more were reported to have been relocated as ethnic cleansing returned to Afghanistan.”⁶⁴⁷

Adding to these events was the reappearance of Usama bin Laden. In 1999, standing against the risk of facing UN sanctions,⁶⁴⁸ the Taliban refused to hand bin Laden in. Not only he was a Muslim who “had fought alongside them against the Russians” and whose “followers, experienced, motivated and well trained, were providing useful aid in the fight against the Taliban’s opponents,” but also “to have surrendered him would have violated the Pushtoon code of hospitality.” There would also be mundane issues like the physical capacity. In other words, “[i]t is also entirely possible that the Taliban simply may not have possessed the muscle to enforce bin Laden’s departure, even if they wished to do so.”⁶⁴⁹

established quotas in the upper and lower houses of the parliament to ensure representation of women. Zachary Warren *et al.*, editors, *A Survey of Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2016* (San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2016), 154.

⁶⁴⁷ Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 79. Also see Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (NY, London: IB Tauris, 2004), 228-9.

⁶⁴⁸ Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 83. Also see UNSCR 1267 (October 15, 1999), para. 2.

⁶⁴⁹ Above quotes mainly from Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics* (NY: Perennial, 2002), 283.

What followed was a period of sanctions, combined with severe drought and “donor fatigue”⁶⁵⁰ of the international community. At the turn of the new millennium, “[m]ore than one million Afghans were at grave risk of starvation.”⁶⁵¹ Despite Taliban made a few steps like introducing a ban on poppy farming and relaxing the ban on girls’ schooling, the bombing of USS Cole in Aden in October opened the avenues of new UN sanctions in December 2000.⁶⁵² “Prior to the fall of Taliban, Afghanistan was one of the world’s worst humanitarian emergencies: a quarter-century of civil war had left an estimated one million people dead; over six million people were displaced,”⁶⁵³ majority of them were refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.⁶⁵⁴

The war following the Soviet invasion “totally destroyed the progress toward nation building of more than two centuries.”⁶⁵⁵ It “had claimed an estimated one to two

⁶⁵⁰ Afghanistan has always attracted attention of the international community. Most of the attention, however, “has come in the form of military aid, consumption-oriented economic aid, and refugee relief.” Donor fatigue is still the case; the UN is not able to raise the funds to meet its relief targets. Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 95.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid, 84.

⁶⁵² Ibid, 85. See UNSCR 1333 (December 19, 2000).

⁶⁵³ Eva Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s Contribution,” *ISS Occasional Paper*, 78 (2009): 17.

⁶⁵⁴ By 2000, there were 2.6 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. Majority of them were well-educated people including professors, doctors and engineers that left Afghanistan in 1980s. Saif R. Samady, *Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century* (France: UNESCO, 2001), 18.

⁶⁵⁵ Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 92.

million Afghan lives, or up to 10 percent of the prewar population.”⁶⁵⁶ Without even finding time to recover, Afghanistan became the theatre of war once more in post 9-11 era.

While the US “instantly turned from strident unilateralism to urgent multilateralism,”⁶⁵⁷ cooperation was limited in effect because as Waltz observes, the coalition was a mile wide yet only an inch deep – the 9-11 demonstrated a terrorist act to threat stability, however “because terror is a weapon wielded by the weak, terrorists do not seriously threaten the security of states.”⁶⁵⁸ However, 9-11 became part of discourse on “democratization of risk” in the sense that each and every individual can commit to a terrorist act, hence we live in a ticking bomb scenario in which everyone and everything is elevated to a subject of national security.⁶⁵⁹ This elevation made traditional understanding of borders also change “to become widespread not only across territories, but ... further extend[] the sphere of a spatial border.”⁶⁶⁰ Therefore,

⁶⁵⁶ Steve Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)* (US, UK: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2018), 1.

⁶⁵⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Continuity of International Politics,” in *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), 348.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 353.

⁶⁵⁹ For an interesting discussion of a set of terms including Foucauldian power, terror, knowledge, democratization of risk, ticking bomb, see Matthew Hannah, “Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 96, no. 3 (2006).

⁶⁶⁰ Giulia Sinatti and Renske Vas, “Representations of Border Deaths and the Making and Unmaking of Borders,” in *Border Deaths: Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of Migration-Related Mortality*, ed. Paola Cuttitta and Tamara Last (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 72.

the end result of the 9-11 was not ending international terrorism but “to enhance American power and extend its military presence in the world.”⁶⁶¹ The display of disciplinary power was there visibly; a power to be demonstrated so that it is able to intervene to normalize the leper. This lust for power indeed is natural ramification of great power status – in order to be able to define normal and differentiate it from abnormal, a state should be powerful enough to continuously produce and reproduce truth. In the end, “‘[o]ut of sight, out of mind’ in common parlance: it is hard to evoke a felt sense of responsibility for something that happens far away;”⁶⁶² threat should be kept alive nearby via discourse and labelling. Following the labelling process attached to production of truth, comes correction. Like truth-production, correction stage also requires power to build and maintain a “structure, in which individuals [read: states] can be integrated, under one condition: that his individuality would be shaped in a new form submitted to a set of very specific patterns.”⁶⁶³

Below sections will look at how the disciplinary power has been exercised on Afghanistan, and how people have suffered as part of the demonstration of power,

⁶⁶¹ Waltz, “The Continuity of International Politics,” 350-1.

⁶⁶² Sinatti and Vas, “Representations of Border Deaths and the Making and Unmaking of Borders,” 75.

⁶⁶³ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 783.

power which “exists only when it is put into action, ... [i.e.] power is not a function of consent.”⁶⁶⁴

6.2. Security Aspect

Afghanistan became not only a country, but also an exporter, of instability. Last war the country experienced was the “war on terror.”⁶⁶⁵ The country occupies a key place in the war on terror and is still “a major challenge for international actors concerned with post-conflict reconstruction but also with economic development.”⁶⁶⁶ In this regard, the differences in terms of approaches to this challenge “puts the coherence of international efforts to the test – and has so far prevented the formulation and eventual implementation of a coherent overall strategy towards Afghanistan.”⁶⁶⁷

Afghanistan’s internationally supported then-government was led by Hamid Karzai, himself a former mujahedeen.⁶⁶⁸ Despite the support he had, national unity and

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid, 788. Even realist theories accept “that some ideas succumb because some actors have the material capacity to defeat them.” Sten Rynning, Stefano Guizzi, “Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis,” *COPRI Working Paper* 42 (2001): 12.

⁶⁶⁵ For an interesting discussion of war on terror, see Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*; also see Mattia Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East* (London, NY: Routledge, 2013).

⁶⁶⁶ Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s Contribution,” 13. Also see Nurşin A. Güney, *Batı’nın Yeni Güvenlik Stratejileri: AB-NATO-ABD* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2006). Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Road to Kabul,” *NATO Newsroom- Speeches&Transcripts* (April 1, 2003; last updated November 3, 2008), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_20500.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 20, 2020).

⁶⁶⁷ Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s Contribution,” 13.

⁶⁶⁸ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 230. The last elections for presidency (the fourth since 2001) was held on September 28, 2019 and Ashraf Gani won. Anonymous, “Afghanistan President Ghani on Track to Win Second Term,” *Guardian*,

government formation was quite problematic to accomplish. To start with, for a state to exist, there should be a monopoly on the right to exercise violence. Such a monopoly requires different groups give up their claim in violence, which could not work in Afghanistan, because “since there was little or no state structure, giving up commanding an armed group in order to become a minister amounted to abandoning power rather than sharing it.”⁶⁶⁹

The lawlessness and absence of a legal order in the country distorted the social fabric and fed into violence. Before the Soviet invasion, rural Afghan men mostly possessed weapons, however the most advanced were even by then ancient Lee Enfield .303 rifles.⁶⁷⁰ With the war, Afghanistan was introduced with a set of modern weaponry – “Over the course of the Soviet phase of the war, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China supplied \$6 billion to \$12 billion worth of weapons and military supplies to the mujahedeen.”⁶⁷¹ Only the Soviet Union, up till its dissolution in 1990, supplied military equipment worthy of \$36-48 billion to the Kabul regime for purposes of supporting its communist features.⁶⁷² The result of this modernization was not only

December 22, 2019, Sunday; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/22/afghanistan-president-ashraf-ghani-on-track-to-win-second-term> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁶⁶⁹ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 46.

⁶⁷⁰ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 99. This type of rifles are now found in museums, and employed only for luxurious hunting expeditions.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

rubbleization, “but also the dissemination of modern weapons to people living in a segmentary social system with a cultural tradition of violence.”⁶⁷³

In addition to the routine violence, “Afghanistan presents a case where large-scale military operations take place alongside state- and institution-building efforts on the part of the international community.”⁶⁷⁴ These simultaneous efforts carried an “inherent contradiction between military operations in the context of the war against terror and institution-building efforts”⁶⁷⁵ – a contradiction which enveloped barriers to effective reforms in security sector.

It should also be noted that the continuous war created an economy of itself. This is where Afghanistan deviates from other cases where standard plans for ending civil wars work.

Standard international plans for ending civil wars involve negotiating a cease-fire with international monitors; establishing interim power-sharing leading to elections; integrating the economy and society under international auspices; and instituting accountability for abuses of human rights. But belligerents negotiate when they are exhausted or reach a stalemate,⁶⁷⁶

whereas in Afghanistan, exhaustion has never been the case.⁶⁷⁷ As Rubin analyses throughout his book, in Afghanistan war continues due mainly to foreign aid from

⁶⁷³ Ibid. For a small comparison, the author notes that more than fifteen hundred SCUD missiles were used in Afghanistan, while fewer than one hundred in the Gulf War.

⁶⁷⁴ Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s Contribution,” 11.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁶ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War*, 67.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid. This non-exhaustion reflects itself also in US policies. That is to say, seeing the worsening situation in Afghanistan, US began talking of privatization of the war. See C. Raja Mohan, “Privatizing the Afghan War,” *Carnegie India*, August 28, 2018,

interested parties like Pakistan and Iran. Power sharing is a clear problem that fuels the insurgency. Legal economy is a real dwarf compared to its illegal counterpart, and the temptation for misgovernment is high – “Only the drug, transit, and gem trades are worth taxing. The rest of the economy is hardly productive enough to recover the cost of governing it.”⁶⁷⁸ This observation is confirmed indirectly by the World Bank in its study on Afghan agriculture, where it maintains that “intermittent conflict and periodic drought have provoked the flight of capital, displaced farming communities, caused the neglect of irrigation channels, diminished technical and market support,” all of which caused the loss of agriculturally productive land and decline of productive capacity.⁶⁷⁹

In a nutshell, the unending instability in Afghanistan breeds further instability. Theory suggests that in long enduring conflicts, parties eventually sit on the table and negotiate peace. However, the key point is that peace negotiations follow exhaustion of the parties, which has never been the case in Afghanistan. The disciplinary measures introduced have nurtured instead of ending the violence. Moreover, ongoing conflict environment created and strengthened its own economy.

<https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/28/raja-mandala-privatising-afghan-war-pub-77118>
(accessed February 15, 2020).

⁶⁷⁸ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War*, 68.

⁶⁷⁹ World Bank, “Understanding Gender in Agricultural Value Chains: The Cases of Grapes/Raisins, Almonds and Saffron in Afghanistan,” *Agriculture and Rural Development Unit Sustainable Development Department South Asia Region Report* no. 62323-AF (May 2011): 1.

To put it differently, before 1980, Afghanistan was a dominant actor in global raisin, pistachio and dried fruit sectors and was producing livestock as well as woolen items for regional markets.⁶⁸⁰ Today, it relies on war economy; proving once more that sanctions measures are tools for Foucauldian display, sole aim being the maintenance of the show of power.

6.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect

The Cold War ended the rivalry between two superpowers by ending the strict bipolar system, yet it did not end conflicts. “In Afghanistan as in some other places, ... the new situation transformed rather than ended the conflict.”⁶⁸¹ The Taliban gained more control in the country by controlling main roads, cities, airports and customs posts; moreover, “they implemented a transition from localized predatory warlordism to weak rentier state power based on a criminalized open economy.”⁶⁸² Rubin mentions that the Taliban was proud to claim safety in roads by maintaining that “[y]ou can drive from one end of the country to the other even at night with a car full of gold, and no one will disturb you.” He continues by noting that “[t]he greater security provided by Taliban also improved the conditions for the trade in opium.”⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁸¹ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 28.

⁶⁸² Ibid, 58.

⁶⁸³ Ibid, 60. Indeed, according to Coll, the years following Taliban’s fall from power witnessed 25% increase in opium cultivation in Afghanistan; 2006 being the peak year. “Afghan farmers planted just over four hundred acres in poppy, the most ever measured, enough to manufacture just over 90 percent of the world’s annual heroin supply.” Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 266.

The opium trade indeed provided much of the administrative scheme of the then-Afghanistan.⁶⁸⁴ Taliban drove revenues from this illegal trade, and the revenues paradoxically titled with religious terms like *ushr* and *zakat*. “The taxes hit farmers, truckers, morphine makers, and smugglers.”⁶⁸⁵ Farmers paid Islamic tithe, which is *ushr*, for their products at the farm gate. In mosques, *zakat* was collected as a tax on traders with a rate of 20%. There of course is no certain data on how much this quasi-budget added up.

A very rough estimate would be that *ushr* ... might amount to up to \$15 million in 1999, while *zakat* of 20 percent on remaining opium in the south (60 percent of the total) marked up by 50 percent (the border price) would total about \$30 million. ... How much they might derive from taxing trade in morphine base and heroin remains an open question.⁶⁸⁶

The Taliban rule brought international crime networks deep into the country. There emerged a natural cooperation, because, for example, opium grown in Taliban-controlled territory needed Russian mafia to be smuggled northward. Opium was traded with arms, trade being conducted by land through Tajikistan, by sea through Kyrgyzstan, or by air – in addition to the Russian mafia that flew heroine out of Kunduz, “Arabs who for years have flown private planes to southwest Afghanistan for hunting expeditions are now also reported to be flying out opium products to the

⁶⁸⁴ The country became the “opium capital of the world.” Nigel C. Gibson, “It’s the Opium, Stupid: Afghanistan, Globalization, and Drugs,” in *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 32. Afghanistan was still the leading opium producer before the 2001 intervention; yet the figures were 75% of global production back in 1999. Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 52.

⁶⁸⁵ Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 267.

⁶⁸⁶ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 62-3.

Persian Gulf.” The money involved in this trade, no doubt, undermined and corrupted state institutions.⁶⁸⁷

This weakness of state institutions enables the country benefit a lot from various capacity building activities.⁶⁸⁸ Only for purposes of building human rights, for example, solely under the World Bank umbrella \$123 billion have been dedicated to Afghanistan with the objective “to assist the government in improving the capacity and performance of select line ministries in carrying out their mandates and delivering services to the Afghan people.”⁶⁸⁹ Still, the process needs to be tailor-made –

For example, both the Afghan and Iraqi constitutions assert gender equality (a provision not specified in the U.S. constitution) but defer to Sharia law. Since there can be no law directly contradicting Sharia law, codified gender inequality may take precedence, as for example when the testimony of two female witnesses equals that of one male, as specified by Islamic law. Negotiating these sometimes contradictory legal codes and emphasizing local over global interests has put the Afghan government in a particular bind.⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid, 65-6. Back in 2006, even the President Karzai’s half-brother was alleged to be a narcotics trafficker, and Karzai to “be protecting [his half-brother] Ahmed Wali and other political allies profiting from opium.” Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 278.

⁶⁸⁸ See Directorate General [of] Budget, “Citizens Budget: A Simplified Version of the National Budget 1398,” *Ministry of Finance* (2019), 5, [https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal_Year_1398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20\(English%20Version\).pdf](https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal_Year_1398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20(English%20Version).pdf) (accessed February 20, 2020).

⁶⁸⁹ World Bank, “Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant in the Amount of US\$150 million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility,” *Governance Global Practice South Asia Region*, ICR00004761 (July 25, 2019), 7, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/438491565036747457/pdf/Afghanistan-Capacity-Building-for-Results-Facility-CBR-Project.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁶⁹⁰ Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess, “Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan,” in *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 18.

Similarly, “although the [US] administration could sell such theories to *educated Americans*, they could not convince *illiterate Afghans* ... that soldiers had flown ten thousand miles to their village and arrived in tanks to build girls’ schools.”⁶⁹¹ This *mission civilizatrice* failed not only to convince the Afghans, but also to facilitate a solid state system to flourish. In other words, the discursive violence towards the underdeveloped other automatically enveloped an exclusion and a foreclosure; the label “Third World as a species of the Orient” also indicates “that, for allegedly structural reasons, resists ‘modernization’.”⁶⁹² Individual Afghans are dependent on poppy cultivation – instead of decreasing, poppy cultivation rose about 25% after Taliban’s fall from power simply because “Afghan farmers might earn just over \$30 planting an acre of wheat, but more than \$500 for poppy.”⁶⁹³

As it is the case for individuals to run their family, Afghan economy fails to generate income also to run the administrative wheels of the state; national budget is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The safety and security that should be provided by state is largely at the hands of Taliban, which uses opium as a means of generating revenue. Opium not only provides cash, but also sustains a quasi-taxation scheme and creates employment. That is to say, the disciplinary measures disguised as sanctions against

⁶⁹¹ Rory Stewart, “Foreword,” in *The Impact of 9/11 on the Media, Arts and Entertainment*, ed. Matthew J. Morgan (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xi. *Emphasis mine*.

⁶⁹² Pranab Kanti Basu, “World of the Third,” *Economic and Political Weekly* L, no. 31 (2015): 76. For a discussion of security and development, also see Arda Bilgen, “Güvenliksiz Kalkınma, Kalkınmasız Güvenlik Mümkün mü? Güvenlik-Kalkınma İlişkisinin Dönüşüm Süreci ve Farklı Yaklaşımlarla Kavramsallaştırılması,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 14 (2017).

⁶⁹³ Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 266.

Taliban not only failed to take al-Qaeda group down, but also locked the society into a malfunctioning administrative system which prevents a strong welfare system to take roots, uplifting the country from failed (leper) state status.

6.4. Socioeconomic Aspect

Even a quick glance at the history of Afghanistan is enough to reveal social wounds. In his book *My Life with the Taliban*,⁶⁹⁴ Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former senior member of Taliban and a principal actor in its domestic and foreign affairs, indicate that the society has long been forced to struggle with foreign invasions, loss of relatives and beloved ones, instability, and poverty. His personal story encapsulates how the region turned into a fertile ground for terror and violence.⁶⁹⁵ As an orphan, he first joined jihad against the Soviets, then became part of the mujahidin for purposes of bringing order and stability to the country; and his life story stands as a sample of the lives and motivations of Afghan society, whose people had suffered for a “succession of crimes

⁶⁹⁴ Abdul Salam Zaeef, *My Life with the Taliban*, ed. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). On Guantanamo, also see Hersh, *Chain of Command*.

⁶⁹⁵ Such a type of childhood traumas indeed cast an important impact on future decisions of people. One anecdote is from Lieutenant General Hasan Kundakçı, interrogating a PKK militant on an incidence of murder of nine people – three mother and six children. He quotes the militant telling the importance of pre-emption by saying “when the child turns 20, he will come after the murderer.” Fikret Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi* (İstanbul: Detay, 2007, 2nd edition), 128. A similar story with a longer timespan is from Russia: Upon unsuccessful assassin attempt to Tsar Alexandr III, people from Narodnaya Volya were executed. Among them was brother of 17-year-old Vladimir Lenin, who swore for a revenge which he took 30 years later. İlker Başbuğ, *Terör Örgütlerinin Sonu* (İstanbul: Remzi, 2011, 2nd edition).

that constitute a virtual catalogue of all that is supposedly forbidden but remains prevalent in human affairs.”⁶⁹⁶

All this violence continues vividly even today, under sanctions.⁶⁹⁷ That is partially because the sanctions require asset freeze, prevention of entry or transit of certain people, as well as “of sale and transfer of arms and military equipment with regard to any individual or entity associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Ladin and/or the Taliban,”⁶⁹⁸ but are not concerned with effective disarmament, which can put an end to the extreme violence.⁶⁹⁹

Arms sector was fed by and feeding into the opium cultivation. Before World War 2, the area spared for poppy cultivation was less than 2% of that of today’s, and Afghanistan had prohibited opium production in 1945. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, cultivation began to demonstrate a rising trend. There were two main reasons – one was the enforcement of bans or strict controls over poppy cultivation in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (the then three main sources of opium), which made Afghanistan a

⁶⁹⁶ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 133.

⁶⁹⁷ Sanctions are still ongoing; the UN’s ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee is still active thanks to the renewed mandate in UNSCR 2368 (July 20, 2017) valid up till end of 2021.

⁶⁹⁸ UK Treasury, “Financial Sanctions: Afghanistan,” *Guidance* (May 17, 2013; updated on November 27, 2020), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-afghanistan> (accessed December 5, 2020).

⁶⁹⁹ An observation back in 2006 notes that often the suicide bombers themselves died due to incompetence – “One had strapped on his vest, traveled to say goodbye to his parents, and accidentally detonated his device during the visit, taking his own life and theirs.” Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 256.

possible alternative source of supply.⁷⁰⁰ The other reason was the Soviet invasion of 1979 – the invasion “destroyed thousands of acres of farmland and sent millions of refugees over the border to Iran and Pakistan,” remaining farmers turned to opium as it left more income than traditional crops.⁷⁰¹

This non-traditional crop initially filled the pockets of Pakistan’s military which was working to support Afghan resistance against the Soviets. Up until the Soviet withdrawal in the following decade, the US turned a blind eye to Pakistani ISI’s drug smuggling. After Soviet military withdrawal, the US also withdrew economic support from Afghanistan, leaving resistant mujahedeen leaders in fierce competition over power. It was on this background that the Taliban emerged and gained support by “protecting villagers from excesses of violent and greedy mujahedeen.”⁷⁰² Taliban’s legend in providing security quickly spread, and in time they began capturing towns without a single shot.⁷⁰³

The Taliban indeed had projects to revive the economy. These projects were based on creating a rentier state through exports of natural resources. One of them was run by the CENTGAS consortium led by Unocal. If it was realized, the project would build a

⁷⁰⁰ Doris Buddenberg, “On the Cultural History of Opium – How Poppy came to Afghanistan,” *Afghanistan Analysts Network* (January 11, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/on-the-cultural-history-of-opium-and-how-poppy-came-to-afghanistan/> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷⁰¹ Gretchen Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban,” *United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks* 62 (2009): 7.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*, 9-11.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*

natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan, and induce billions of dollars of revenue for the country. “The imposition of UN sanctions on Afghanistan in November 1999 and December 2000, as well as the continuing war there, have delayed the project indefinitely.”⁷⁰⁴

Similarly, development of copper mines in Logar and cellular phone systems for Afghanistan remained as projects that could not be translated into action because of the sanctions.⁷⁰⁵ That is to say, in addition to the vicious cycle of security, sanctions also created a vicious cycle of economy. When tangible development projects could not have been realized, economy as a living organism turned to (illicit) alternatives just for purposes of avoiding total collapse.

Like the arms sector, the (out-of-the-books or illicit) economy, too, functioned through opium. The security provided by Taliban facilitated opium cultivation and trade. The Taliban taxed 10% ushr from farmers, 20% zakat on truckloads of opium as they leave

⁷⁰⁴ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 138. The project was among the reasons for Pakistan's promotion of the Taliban. Islamabad “exalted [Taliban] as the only force capable of bringing stability to Afghanistan,” as only through stable Afghanistan, Pakistan could enjoy a valuable transit route to Central Asia's Muslim states. Pakistan's support can also be tied to geopolitical skirmishes, “because Pakistan needs a peaceful Afghanistan in order to compete with Iran and Turkey for a share of riches of Central Asia.” See Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 225; and Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 165.

Note also that not only UNSCRs but also 9-11 attacks and following military intervention as well as chronic instability in the country delayed the pipeline project. The project was there back in 1990s, yet construction began only recently, with inclusion of India to the route in 2008, and the pipeline being branded as TAPI- Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. See Ministry of Mines and Petroleum of Afghanistan, “TAPI Project,” (undated), <https://momp.gov.af/index.php/tapi-project> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷⁰⁵ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 123.

the farm, and \$50-70 per kilo for the final product.⁷⁰⁶ In return for these economic benefits, “Taliban provide security for poppy farmers, building defensive positions around their fields or planting mines and IEDs [improvised explosive devices] ahead of visits by eradication police.”⁷⁰⁷ In addition to generating income, such actions provided a social ground of support for Taliban – for example, in rural areas, most trade is done in kind, opium being favorite means of exchange.⁷⁰⁸

Opium is a labor-intensive crop, in a hectare it requires 360 person-days while a staple food like wheat can be raised on household scale.⁷⁰⁹ Besides providing employment and serving as a medium of exchange, opium also leaves cash to farmers⁷¹⁰ -- UN-

⁷⁰⁶ Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban,” 12.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid, 20. For a detailed information on IEDs, see United Nations, “Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices,” *General Assembly Report of the Secretary General A/71/187*, July 25, 2016, <https://undocs.org/A/71/187> (accessed February 15, 2020). Also see Dorransoro, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, 10 on how good Taliban is at use of IEDs, and Ercan Seyhan, and Gökhan Sarı, “Terör Maksatlı Biyolojik-Kimyasal Saldırlara Ait Terör Değerlendirmesinde Risk Analizi ve Yönetimi,” *Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2012) for an analysis of risks and risk management.

It should also be noted that UNSCRs cover IEDs under arms embargos. See the background information notes approved by UN al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, “Arms Embargo: Explanation of Terms,” February 24, 2015, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_arms_embargo_english.pdf (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷⁰⁸ Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban,” 19. Katzman and Thomas note that estimations amount up to 25% of insurgent budget in Afghanistan. Katzman and Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 23.

⁷⁰⁹ LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, “After the Drug Wars,” *LSE Ideas* (February 2016), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-After-Drug-Wars.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷¹⁰ Reports on opium prices indicate that on 9-11, opium peaked to \$746/kg. In following weeks, it nosedived to \$95, “possibly indicating that owners were dumping stockpiles in anticipation of the U.S.-led invasion.” Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban,” 14.

induced poppy cultivation ban in 2000 left the farmers swamped in debt for their farm loans.⁷¹¹

Of course, international community was concerned with socioeconomic situation in Afghanistan. Following September 11, 2001, for example, there were more or less 800 NGOs in Kabul. A quarter of them were international organizations like Doctors without Borders. Remaining “were Afghan organizations that relied on the UN and the aid programs of foreign governments for the money and technical support to carry on their work.” There even was one organization, ACBAR, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief, that was keeping track of the other NGOs operating in the country, providing alphabetical lists and contact information.⁷¹²

The problem created by all these mushrooming NGOs was not limited with coordination. The international staff was well-paid, able to “pay unheard of rents for the privilege of occupying the finest houses in Kabul,” hence landlords prefer international over local tenants. As a result, locals have to move out every year when next rental increase period arrives – ending up with

[c]ivil servants and teachers, [for example, being] at the low end of the salary scale, [to be] pushed farther and farther from their offices and schools. They ride the unreliable busses to work – men in the back, burqa-clad women piled like laundry bags in a few seats reserved for them at the front.⁷¹³

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² Above paragraph mainly from Jones, *Kabul in Winter: Life without Peace in Afghanistan*, 32.

⁷¹³ Ibid, 33.

The deep divides in incomes were also there with regards to local people working for international organizations. Accordingly, an uneducated driver of an international staff “can make more money than a professor at Kabul University or the head of a hospital, the chief of police, or a cabinet minister.”⁷¹⁴

It means that socioeconomically, the income gap expands, squeezing some groups in poverty more and more. Also, the ways and means of building and sustaining a structure which generates legal income is very difficult. People are locked into cascades of violence which also adds fuel to the problem of setting schemes and systems for sustainable production. In the end, from a socioeconomic perspective, opium cultivation rises up as a panacea for reducing unemployment, earning daily life, paying for weapons for security concerns as well as getting and remaining under Taliban’s protective umbrella.

In other words, sanctions have not reduced the power and influence of Taliban, leave aside removing them as a center of power in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the measures solidified Taliban as well as their acceptance in Afghanistan. The disciplinary tools, therefore, have been there as a display of power, for a Foucauldian self-satisfaction of the West, and at the expense of socioeconomic development of a Third World country.

6.5. Cultural Aspect

Afghanistan is geographically located in southwest Asia, between Iran and Pakistan. The region is known as the roof of the world, thanks mainly to the Hindu Kush and

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

Hazarajat mountains. Afghanistan was part of Greek, Persian, Mongol and Moghul Empires; and “was wedged between the Russian Empire and the British Imperial Colony of India throughout the 19th century, when it became a key prize between Moscow and London.”⁷¹⁵ The war in 1919 resulted with the withdrawal of British forces, an event which is celebrated as Afghan Independence Day annually on August 19.⁷¹⁶

While the British withdrew, many Afghans maintained to believe that foreign intervention continued. “Since the fall of the royal system in 1973, Afghanistan has faced repeated failure – or at least crisis—of political leadership” and Afghans nurtured the idea that this failure derives from “other powerful countries [which] use their economic and military power to install leaders of their own choice in Afghanistan.”⁷¹⁷ As a result, Afghan people feel deep alienation from the government. One Afghan woman is reported to regret “that the present parliamentarians are former Mujahideen involved in a variety of criminal activities.”⁷¹⁸ She believes that “the secret ties between US-backed Afghan government and the Afghan opium cultivators

⁷¹⁵ Anonymous, *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide*, undated, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/MCIA-CultureGuide.pdf> (accessed December 5, 2020), 1.

⁷¹⁶ Anonymous, *Background Brief: Afghanistan – A Cultural Appreciation Booklet*, January 2007, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/16870/afghanistan_cultural_appreciation_booklet.pdf (accessed December 5, 2020), 3.

⁷¹⁷ Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, “Political Leadership in Afghanistan: Identifying and Assessing Determining Factors” (master’s thesis, Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2016), 14.

⁷¹⁸ Deepshika Shahi, *Understanding post-9/11 Afghanistan: A Critical Insight into Huntington’s Civilizational Approach* (Bristol, England: E-IR, 2017), 90.

... constitute the basis of the criminalized war economy.”⁷¹⁹ As a result, “Afghans continue to express low confidence in governmental and nongovernmental institutions, the year 2016 marks nationwide lowest confidence rates recorded in a decade.”⁷²⁰

The last presidential elections held in September 2019 also could not provide results for unifying country along the path of socioeconomic and national development. Results were set in five months, and margin of extra votes for Ashraf Ghani was very small in comparison to his competitor, Abdullah Abdullah. Both gentlemen had

sworn in, in competing inauguration ceremonies held just meters apart in the capital, Kabul.

Afghans watched split-screen news coverage of the events and wearily shook their heads. The two could each rule for eight hours a day, with a third shift going to the leader of the Taliban insurgency, suggested Afghan Onion, a parody site.⁷²¹

Lack of good governance, combined with declining security situation and worsening economy makes people say “they would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else if given opportunity.”⁷²² There are push-factors like economic, political, and social or security problems that make people leave their homeland. There also are pull-factors

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ Warren *et al.*, *A Survey of Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2016*, 105. It deserves being noted that this situation is not unique to Afghanistan. For an analysis on Russia, for example, see Politkovskaya, *Putin's Russia*. It should also be noted that Politkovskaya was found dead in her apartment on October 7, 2006.

⁷²¹ Anonymous, “Politics in Afghanistan: Twin Peaks,” *The Economist* 434, no. 9185 (March 14-20, 2020): 41.

⁷²² Warren *et al.*, *A Survey of Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2016*, 13.

like the destination's reputation on reception and resettlement policies, or presence of family or friends there.⁷²³

Despite people express worsening domestic circumstances and people with higher levels of education tend to express more willingness to leave (which is called as brain-drain), there is a drop in outward migration. This drop might be linked to rally-around-the-flag impact. However, Afghanistan is called as “graveyard of empires.” This is a source of pride for Afghans as the country has never been colonized. But, as Rahim rightly puts, “[w]ho wants to live in a graveyard?”⁷²⁴

Not only inside but also outside of Afghanistan became a graveyard for Afghans. The wars and instability, as mentioned above, nurtured conditions for inhumane treatment. As such, Afghan prisoners experienced torture not only in past times nor in Afghanistan, but also in 21st century abroad – Guantanamo being a notorious example.⁷²⁵ This approach was legitimized with the idea that al Qaeda fighters were not aligned with a particular nation (or, as Jalalzai and Jefferess note, a successful nation), they were rather part of a global terrorist network, they did not fall under the laws designed for traditional relationships at international level; moreover, they were

⁷²³ Ibid, 13-14.

⁷²⁴ Rahim, “The Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Responsibility,” 996.

⁷²⁵ The architect of the USA PATRIOT Act, John C. Yoo, is quoted to claim that “since Afghanistan was a ‘failed state, ... its fighters should not be considered a real army but a ‘militant-like group’.” Such an approach pulls the prisoners of war on terror out of the protective umbrella of the Geneva Convention. Jalalzai and Jefferess, “Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan,” 12. On this discussion, also see Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

“participants in the murkier words of a new warfare to which the Geneva Convention seemingly did not apply.”⁷²⁶

What is more, while the wounds of war is a source of pride in many countries as an indication of bravery to join the war and capacity to return home alive,⁷²⁷ studies indicate that men in Afghanistan are vested with the head of family role; hence are “compelled to marry and ensure the livelihood and security of the family. As a result, disabled men, who cannot work because of their impairment ... are often marginalized.”⁷²⁸ Considering that disablement occurs not only in front-to-front wars, but also through attacks at local bazaars or mosques, or from unexploded remnants of

⁷²⁶ Jalalzai and Jefferess, “Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan,” 12-3. The UN Office of Counter Terrorism published a report on 4 August which maintains that a number of “disillusioned and disappointed” foreign terrorist fighters left Syria and returned to their countries of origin when they found these groups hardly make good on their promises, except promise of death and destruction. Most of those interviewed in this survey are neither well educated nor well off economically. This finding is noted to contradict with the literature which often conclude that foreign terrorist fighters are both better educated and better off economically than their peers. See Hamed el-Said and Richard Barrett, “Enhancing the Understanding of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon in Syria,” *United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism* (July 2017), https://www.rcc.int/p-cve/download/docs/Report_Final_20170727.pdf/fe2e72478b396372d410d55d2880750d.pdf (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷²⁷ See, for example, Rachel Roberts, “Ibrahim Abu Thuraya: Disabled Palestinian Activist Shot Dead by Israeli Troops in Jerusalem Protest,” *the Independent*, December 16, 2017, Saturday; <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ibrahim-abu-thuraya-dead-shot-killed-israel-jerusalem-protest-disabled-no-legs-wheelchair-a8114766.html> (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷²⁸ Jean-Francois Trani, and Parul Bakhshi, “Vulnerability and Mental Health in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond War Exposure,” *Brown School Faculty Publications* 40 (2013): 6. Another group that is kicked out of society are women and children, as they fell victim of human trafficking. Katzman and Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” 17.

munitions,⁷²⁹ it is safe to conclude that individual pride which is broken deeply (combined with lack of a visible and effective government to rally-behind) prevented Afghan people develop a solid and unified reaction towards the sanctions which can be understood through the national pride prism. It does not necessarily mean the sanctions did not affect or went ignored; it means sanctions did not inflict a considerable change in the behavior of Afghans or Afghanistan. Having seen that, sanctions were kept implemented against a non-Western/Oriental country that has been subject to a discursive violence by being known and labelled as base land of international terror.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter, like the others of this research, analyzed the sanctions from multiple facets. From administrative and technical aspects, the sanctions changed the situation very minimally, if any. Yet, from a socioeconomic aspect barely any difference is observable between pre-sanctions period and sanctions era. Foreign aid had already amounted to 40% of the natural budget back in 1960s. When aid declined, exports of natural gas to the Soviet Union financed half of the budget. There was (i) a state dependent of foreign support one way or another, (ii) an urban group dependent on state redistribution, and (iii) a rural sector earning their living on agriculture. Rubin observes that “[t]he Communist coup of April 1978, the Soviet invasion of December

⁷²⁹ UNICEF notes the case of Abdul, who lost his right leg at age of 7 in landmine explosion. The mine took life of “his brother who brought it home thinking it was a toy.” United Nations Children’s Fund, *Rebuilding Hope in Afghanistan* (NY: UNICEF, 2003), 11.

1979, and the reaction to these by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, China and others destroyed this system.”⁷³⁰

The situation did not change following the Soviet withdrawal, which itself proved to be a challenge to the established system by draining external aid. Still, “commanders pursued economic strategies to increase their power, wealth, and autonomy, establishing bazaars and providing local security to traders in return for tribute.”⁷³¹ They were also collecting aid from humanitarian organizations; such activities “provided services and employment that increased resources under their control.”⁷³²

Indeed, *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*: Afghanistan is still dependent on foreign support, national budget is still funded mainly by foreign aid and rural people still engage with agriculture.⁷³³ Today, with the withdrawal of foreign forces and Taliban (re)gaining the control in the country (proving that none of the external powers could gain a strong foothold in Afghanistan), the country proved to earn its label as the graveyard of empires. Still, this point does not create a strong national sentiment around which one can observe rally-around-the-flag impact. It is because unending wars and conflict coined new terms like Kalashnikovization, rubbleization and

⁷³⁰ Katzman and Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” 53-4.

⁷³¹ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 56.

⁷³² Ibid, 56. In addition to the inherent weaknesses of the economy, the presence of international staff also distorts the restructuring process. The presence of people with high salaries and big houses pushes the prices upwards, as a result “Afghan NGOs can no longer afford office space in the center of the capital.” Ibid, 107.

⁷³³ Only difference here can be that before 1970s, main crop was grape and almond while now it is opium.

Beirutization for Afghanistan, and continuous demolition created a push factor for people leave the country. In the end, as Rahim notes, “[w]ho wants to live in a graveyard?”⁷³⁴

In a nutshell, it is possible to wrap up by saying that sanctions did not cast a tangible impact on Afghanistan. Socioeconomically, it was and is still in the least-developed countries list,⁷³⁵ politically it still counts as a fragile state,⁷³⁶ security-wise the continuous wars created their own economy and fed into further destabilization. It is safe to conclude that sanctions did neither weaken Taliban nor strengthened Afghan government in its long quest of establishing a solid state.⁷³⁷ People, on the other hand, have continued to suffer from fragile state, ailing economy, absent security and vanishing national pride.

The case of Afghanistan indicates once more that sanctions do not intend to change policies and improve the conditions of the target country. The measures are designed to give priority to disciplining the target. The discursive violence and branding continued especially under the so-called war on terror, where the clear-cut separation

⁷³⁴ Rahim, “The Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Responsibility,” 996.

⁷³⁵ Afghanistan is in the list since 1971. Committee for Development Policy, “List of Least Developed Countries,” *United Nations* (December 2018), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf (accessed February 15, 2020).

⁷³⁶ OECD, *States of Fragility*.

⁷³⁷ Indeed, as seen with the withdrawal of foreign forces, Taliban gained the control in a short period while Ashraf Ghani fled to Qatar with the declared aim of preventing further instability.

of “underdeveloped other” that poses a security threat to “us”⁷³⁸ enveloped an exclusion and foreclosure. The label “Third World as a species of the Orient” serves like a sign of underdevelopment characteristics is here in the discourse to indicate “that, for allegedly structural reasons, resists ‘modernization’.”⁷³⁹ In other words, the Afghan case is a mere yet prolonged display of disciplinary power; it is there not to cure the leper but to raise awareness about West’s capacity and intention to act in Foucauldian way.

⁷³⁸ Bilgen, “Güvenliksiz Kalkınma, Kalkınmasız Güvenlik Mümkün mü? Güvenlik-Kalkınma İlişkisinin Dönüşüm Süreci ve Farklı Yaklaşımlarla Kavramsallaştırılması,” 31.

⁷³⁹ Basu, “World of the Third,” 76.

CHAPTER 7

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is a very interesting case to analyze. Of all the case studies covered in this research, North Korea is the only one that has been facing sanctions since it was born. It faced total embargo of exports from the US when the Korean War broke out. The embargo was followed by several arms-export restrictions. In 1975, transactions involving agricultural products with North Korean inputs were prohibited while in 1988 the country was added to the list of state sponsors of terrorism. By the end of the Cold War arrived the sanctions related to its nuclear program.⁷⁴⁰

In 2018, the then-US President Donald Trump and Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un met in Singapore;⁷⁴¹ yet the roses also had thorns. There was the sample of Libya that gave up all its WMD projects in 2003 yet Colonel Kaddafi's regime fell

⁷⁴⁰ For a summary table of sanctions, see Anonymous, "Timeline: U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK," *National Committee on North Korea* (January 2008), https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/publications/US-DPRK_Sanctions_Timeline.pdf (accessed February 22, 2020). Also see the annexed chronological tables of in Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, "Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis," *FAS Issue Brief* (June 2012): 18-21.

⁷⁴¹ A follow-up meeting was due on February 28, 2019; but this meeting in Vietnam did not produce any tangible result. Everett Rosenfeld, "Trump-Kim summit was cut short after North Korea demanded an end to sanctions," February 28, 2019, Thursday; <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/white-house-trump-kim-meetings-change-of-schedule.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).

off and he was killed in 2011 after 42 years of rule. Even before the Western-backed uprising against Kaddafi,⁷⁴² Iran was pointing to the need to play the game not by its rules. In other words, Iran was aware of and ready for the possible alternative scenarios in which its negotiation partners may not deliver what was agreed on the table. In the end, it was Ayatollah Humeyni himself that said the negotiations were only for purposes of buying time, not for de-nuclearization of Iran.⁷⁴³

It could be maintained that a similar tactic was employed by Pyongyang as “North Korea appears to be building new ballistic missiles despite ... [while] warming ties with the Trump administration and pledges to denuclearize.”⁷⁴⁴ Yet, it should also be noted that just like the case with Iran,⁷⁴⁵ the US triggered the nuclear quest of North Korea. As aptly observed by Alagöz, the use of nuclear weapons by the US against

⁷⁴² Anna Jones, “Trump and Kim: The Meeting the World's been Waiting for,” *BBC*, June 7, 2018, Thursday; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idx-sh/trumpkim_summit (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁴³ See Fitzpatrick, *Iran's Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities* for a short history of nuclear negotiations between West and Iran.

⁷⁴⁴ Anonymous, “North Korea Working on New Missiles, US Officials Say, Despite Thaw,” *BBC*, July 31, 2018, Tuesday; <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-45015343> (accessed February 22, 2020). Some authors like Rose Gottemoeller claimed that this was the result of severe financial sanctions. She gives also the sample of Banco di Macao, which has been used for laundering supernote dollars printed by North Korea. Er-Win Tan, in contrast, maintains that several factors like the end of the Cold War set the stage for the US-North Korea dialogue between 1992-2008; however the main track for Pyongyang remained to seek nuclear weapons as strategic equalizers. Rose Gottemoeller, “The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory,” *Survival* 49, no. 4 (December 2007); Er-Win Tan, *The US versus the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Mitigating the Nuclear Security Dilemma* (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), esp. 9-12.

⁷⁴⁵ Anton Khlopkov, “How the United States Helped Iran Build a Lazer Enrichment Laboratory,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no. 1 (2013).

Japan and defeat the hegemon of the peninsula quickly turned the eyes of North Korea to nuclear weapons.⁷⁴⁶

This last case study of this research will first provide a short historical overview of North Korea's nuclear program, then analyze at the sanctions from different aspects. It will come to the conclusion that by securitizing North Korea, the West creates a vicious cycle where North Korea securitizes the West in return. This vicious cycle feeds into a security dilemma and creates a downward spiral. In this gridlock, despite the nuclear weapons are considered to be unusable by the West (and sometimes even useless⁷⁴⁷), they are seen as "equalizers"⁷⁴⁸ by North Korea.

This chapter will argue that sanctions on North Korea are not solely for non-proliferation purposes; if nonproliferation was the aim then senders would take the lead to be part of the Ban Treaty.⁷⁴⁹ Rather, as a mere sample of constructivist theory in action, North Korean case shows that "[a]ll the mechanisms of power ... are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him."⁷⁵⁰ In the end,

⁷⁴⁶ Emine Akçadağ Alagöz, "Stratejik Kültür Perspektifinden Kuzey Kore'nin Nükleer Programı," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no. 61 (2019): 123.

⁷⁴⁷ "The ongoing inability for other nuclear powers to push North Korea into an agreement – or keep it to an agreement – illustrates the limitations for nuclear states to use their weapons for general strength against other nuclear states." Kyle Beardsley, Victor Asal, "Winning with the Bomb," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009): 298.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 297.

⁷⁴⁹ See International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) official webpage, <https://www.icanw.org/>, for a set of detailed discussions and chronology of the agreement.

⁷⁵⁰ Foucault, " 'Panopticalism' from 'Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,'" 5.

North Korea is leper while its Western counterparts holding nuclear weapons capabilities are considered to be part of healthy West/us.⁷⁵¹ North Korea has been a non-Western other branded as posing security challenge and served as a stage for display of disciplinary power -- a power which is not accumulable, but “is conceived as an effect (also as relational – in the practical sense of being immanent, mobilized and effectuated in relations).”⁷⁵²

7.1. Road to Sanctions

Father Kim has been appreciated a lot for his “ ‘shining ability to look toward the future’ and ... ‘ sense of mission that enables him to be thoroughly responsible for the fatherland and the revolution’.”⁷⁵³ One anecdote from 2000 confirms his image as a knowledgeable man with an intellectual capacity: According to news reports, when Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang, father Kim was presented a set of questions related to the technical details of the missile program. Instead of handing the list to his advisers to be responded later, Kim answered most of the questions himself one after another, “reinforcing his image as a micro-manager.”⁷⁵⁴

⁷⁵¹ As observed by Paul d’Anieri, “(North Korea may have as many as ten; Iran currently has zero), yet most countries consider North Korea’s tiny arsenal and Iran’s potential arsenal to be more threatening than the much larger British arsenal.” D’Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, 103.

⁷⁵² Diaz-Bone, “Economics of Convention Meets Foucault,” 309.

⁷⁵³ Sonia Ryang, *Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 33.

⁷⁵⁴ Paul French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia* (New York, London: Zed Books, 2014), 95.

When Kim Jong Il passed away in December 2011, his son, Kim Jong Un succeeded him as the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “There had been expectations that the Swiss-educated new leader might want to distinguish himself as a more modern ruler than his father and grandfather.”⁷⁵⁵ Contrary to the expectations, Kim junior proved to be even more ambitious than his predecessors – especially with regards to the country’s nuclear agenda.

Still, from a historical perspective, North Korea has never been a country that solely dedicated itself to having nuclear weapons capability. Instead, Pyongyang prioritized the ideology of self-reliance, known as *juche*. Introduced by Kim Il Sung (the grandfather) in the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in 1970, the policy of *juche* “insists that the destiny of the nation lies in the hands of its own people, and hence places the utmost emphasis on political independence, economic self-reliance, and military self-defense.”⁷⁵⁶

The policy survived even after the death of Kim Il Sung, and evolved to a national ideology from a leader’s ambition. His son, Kim Jong Il (the father) contributed to the *juche* in 1980s, too. One sample of the ideology put into action was the nuclear program. Despite in the beginning it was with the assistance received from Soviets and China, Pyongyang mostly developed its own capabilities by using domestic sources. This, as will be elaborated below, contributed a lot to the inefficiency of sanctions in denuclearizing North Korea. Moreover, the country also devised policies to ensure

⁷⁵⁵ Jina Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?* (US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1.

⁷⁵⁶ Ryang, *Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry*, 25.

equal development of civilian and military sectors of the economy. Therefore, “Simultaneous Development of Economy and Nuclear Weapons” program was initiated, and promoted *juche* (self-defense) rather than *sangun* (military first).⁷⁵⁷

In addition to its missile program,⁷⁵⁸ North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program and conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice), and lastly on September 3, 2017. The 2017 test generated the most powerful blast so far, making it likely to be a hydrogen bomb, with a yield of 17 times of the one dropped by the US on Hiroshima.⁷⁵⁹ This test triggered another meeting of the UN Security Council, and the meeting ended with the adoption of Resolution 2397 (December 22, 2017), sanctioning Pyongyang further. North Korea keeps conducting missile tests too, including submarine-launched versions.⁷⁶⁰ With a successful re-entry vehicle, North

⁷⁵⁷ North Korea’s *songun* policy, which basically is a military-first priority system, does not necessarily dictate a nuclear weapons capability, nor prioritization of the army at the expense of other classes. Yet, based on *juche*, developing nuclear weapons arises as a necessary capability for self-defense. Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 1, 121-3.

⁷⁵⁸ The country frequently test-launches missiles, the last of which was a long-range, intercontinental ballistic missile. See Anonymous, “N Korea Claims Successful Launch of 'Monster Missile' Hwasong-17,1 *BBC*, March 25, 2022, Friday; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60860441#:~:text=The%20Hwasong%2D17%20is%20North,size%20surprised%20even%20seasoned%20analysts>. (accessed March 28, 2022).

⁷⁵⁹ Anna Fifield, “For North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, 2017 has been a very Good Year,” *Washington Post*, December 24, 2017, Sunday; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un-2017-has-been-a-very-good-year/2017/12/23/4f5b9068-e10a-11e7-b2e9-8c636f076c76_story.html (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁶⁰ Anonymous, “North Korea: What Missiles Does It Have?,” *BBC News*, October 6, 2022, Thursday; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41174689> (accessed October 14, 2022); Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Tests a Submarine-Launched Missile,” *The New York Times*,

Korea can conduct nuclear attacks, hence “it is possibly just one technical step away from being able to credibly threaten the U.S. with a nuclear weapon.”⁷⁶¹

Despite North Korea ignited its nuclear program back in 1950s, significant progress arrived only in 1980s when it was able to construct uranium milling facilities and R&D institutions, as well as conduct tests on triggering mechanisms of a nuclear weapon. In 1992, Pyongyang was ready to threaten IAEA with withdrawal from the NPT. Facing the threat, the US negotiated the Agreed Framework, which was broken down in 2002. The following year North Korea withdrew from the NPT,⁷⁶² this time leading to Six Party Talks only to break in 2009. The frequency as well as the range of the missiles tested increased rapidly in recent years⁷⁶³ while diplomatic talks seem to have been failed to make equaling progress.

May 7, 2022, Saturday; <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/07/world/asia/north-korea-missile-submarine.html> (accessed October 14, 2022).

⁷⁶¹ Sue Mi Terry, a Korean-American researcher quoted in Fifield, “For North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, 2017 has been a very Good Year.”

⁷⁶² The withdrawal is not recognized by all countries. France, for example, considers the withdrawal process “initiated,” but not complete. Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Our Dossier,” *French Foreign Policy* (April 2019), <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/nuclear-weapon/article/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-npt-our-dossier> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁶³ Relevant data and statistics can be found at Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” *Learn Countries: North Korea* (October 16, 2020), [https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/#:~:text=The%20James%20Martin%20Center%20for,300%20kilometers%20\(186.4%20miles\)](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/#:~:text=The%20James%20Martin%20Center%20for,300%20kilometers%20(186.4%20miles)) (accessed November 23, 2020).

Still, hand-in-hand with sanctions, North Korea was also benefiting from foreign aid. According to official records, “North Korea had been receiving a relatively larger amount of US economic aid than Iran, India and Pakistan until 2002 (US\$5.92 per capita).” The aid declined starting from 2003,⁷⁶⁴ but the North’s economy did not experience the hardships forecasted by Western analysts.⁷⁶⁵

One point to make here is that the case-study at hand has reached to the point of no return. It is not possible to de-nuclearize North Korea. This helps us once more to reach at the conclusion that the sanctions were imposed in order to demonstrate the disciplinary muscles of the West.

Following parts will elaborate how the decades-long sanctions affected North Korean society, administration, economics, security as well as perceptions. Moving from the assumption that the sanctions target the ruling elite of North Korea for purposes of accomplishing denuclearization, North Korean case allows us to understand how society reacts when the country virtually is outcasted from global trade, international politics and world society⁷⁶⁶ -- this, for Foucault, is a necessary step after naming and

⁷⁶⁴ Prashant Hasur, “Politics of UNSC Sanctions: The Issue of Nuclear Weapons Development,” *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper 25* (2010): 6.

⁷⁶⁵ The collapse of the Soviets was set to be the economic doomsday for Pyongyang. The trade volume shrank from \$4.6 billion in 1990 to \$2.4 billion in 1991; and analysts could not think of alternative scenarios in which North Korean economy could resurge. Paul French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia* (New York, London: Zed Books, 2014), 299. “While Tokyo and Washington played politics in 1997, Seoul found itself racked by the Asia financial crisis and backed out of its promised payments to KEDO [The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization].” Ibid.

⁷⁶⁶ The term belongs to Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

judging; this isolation is followed by controlling.⁷⁶⁷ It also exemplifies how the sanctions affect society, regardless the fact that they aim at the leaders solely.

7.2. Security Aspect

Pyongyang began its nuclear program under the tense environment of the Cold War. However, while for other countries extension or decline of support from nuclear weapon states determined the success or failure of the nuclear program, the experience of North Korea was unique. Not only Pyongyang started its nuclear adventure under embargo,⁷⁶⁸ but also despite both Moscow and Beijing were cooperating, “North Korea’s nuclear program developed largely without significant foreign assistance.”⁷⁶⁹ Especially the 1980s marked “significant indigenous expansion, when North Korea constructed uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, as well as research and development institutions.”⁷⁷⁰

In the 1980s, Pyongyang on the one hand “experiment[ed] with the high explosive tests required for building the triggering mechanism of a nuclear bomb,”⁷⁷¹ on the other decided to become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North

⁷⁶⁷ Downing, *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault*, 77.

⁷⁶⁸ The US already imposed a comprehensive embargo for its exports to North Korea following the outbreak of the Korean War.

⁷⁶⁹ Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear,” *Learn Countries: North Korea*. This limited dependency enabled Pyongyang to proceed under the radar for a long while; making each test yet another unexpected progress in the eyes of the international community, and proving each new sanction measures ineffective to stop the country’s nuclear quest.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

Korea became 89th party of the NPT⁷⁷² on December 12, 1985, with the non-nuclear weapon state status. In 1992, following the cancellation of US and South Korea joint military training exercise called as Team Spirit, “the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that it would sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.”⁷⁷³ Cancellation of Team Spirit was an important gesture not only for hard security, but also for perceptions-based dimension of security. In the end, in the eyes of the US the Team Spirit was “Our Super Bowl,” but in those of the North Korea, it was a rehearsal for invasion⁷⁷⁴ -- reflecting a securitization by North Korea.

Soon before the conclusion of the safeguards agreement, and also with the end of the Cold War, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea. This move paved the way for the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, where the North and South agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” nor possess “nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”⁷⁷⁵ Two years later came the 1994 Agreed Framework where

⁷⁷² Researcher’s own calculation from the chronology provided by the UN Status of Treaty. United Nations Office for Disarmament, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” *Treaties Database Home* (undated), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁷³ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 22.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid, 22. Footnotes omitted. Team Spirit included 50000 US, 70000 South Korean troops. French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 294.

⁷⁷⁵ NTI, “Nuclear.” North Korea and South Korea signed a non-aggression agreement on December 13, 1991; together with the agreement, the Joint Denuclearization Declaration of 19 February 1992 marks North and South recognizing each other as interlocutors. Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 21.

Pyongyang froze its nuclear program in return for two light-water reactors to be used in electricity generation.⁷⁷⁶

Coincidentally, grandfather Kim died on the day set for the discussions on implementation of the Framework.⁷⁷⁷ His son, father Kim also believed that denuclearization of the peninsula was grandfather Kim's instruction,⁷⁷⁸ therefore in the early 1990s there was a positive momentum for the realization of the historic goal of nuclear disarmament. In addition to father Kim being newly introduced to the scene, and President Clinton was willing to focus on domestic, economics-related agenda instead of engaging with foreign policy; there were further historically important changes to contribute to the positive trend in the peninsula. One was the famine the North faced, creating an existential threat from another dimension of the security prism. The other was election of Kim Dae-jung in South, whose Sunshine Policy "opened new opportunities for engagement, which culminated in Albright's October 2000 visit to Pyongyang."⁷⁷⁹

Nonetheless, following the change of administration in the US, a more hawkish policy has been adopted. "The [George] Bush team believed that Pyongyang was in breach

⁷⁷⁶ French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 296. The US-made, proliferation-resistant light water reactors' costs would be mostly shared by Japan (70%) and South Korea (20%). Ibid, 298.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid, 300.

⁷⁷⁸ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 2.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid, 303.

of the Agreed Framework.”⁷⁸⁰ The unprecedented terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 as well as Bush’s 2002 State of the Union which listed North Korea as part of axis of evil determined the nature of the future of US-North Korea relations,⁷⁸¹ and paved the way for continuous securitization process.

Later in 2002, North Korea “admitted the existence of a covert nuclear weapons programme, while asserting a sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons.”⁷⁸² In 2003, the country decided to withdraw from the NPT; and in three years’ time arrived the first test of nuclear weapons. While the policies pursued by the administration were reactive, i.e. responding to the steps taken by the US; the implication of the policies for North Koreans were not only imposition of further sanctions, but also a sense of security provided under the *juche*. In the end, steps taken by the US and North Korea fell under security dilemma, reflecting the difficulties faced *en route* to developing nuclear capabilities.

Test after test, North Korea gradually managed to increase the range and yield of nuclear weapons, which necessitated a spill-over of security to other domains of life, but the pursuit of self-reliance ending up in obsession of independent technology for national security reflects itself even in jurisdictional domain: Pyongyang continued nuclear tests in 2009, unveiled enrichment program in 2010, carved its “status as a

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid, 304. For the mentioned State of the Union address, see Office of the Press Secretary, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” *the White House* (January 29, 2002), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁸² Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 309.

nuclear state in the socialist constitution in 2012, and established legal and institutional mechanisms for the pursuit of nuclear capability after its third nuclear test in 2013.”⁷⁸³ It even conducted a successful thermonuclear test in 2017. Currently, not because of its economic, cultural or demographic, but solely for its nuclear weapons capability,⁷⁸⁴ North Korea is one of the actors in the international sphere whose voice always finds ears to listen. Nonetheless, it still is not an equal actor; being a leper, North Korea is still perceived to be in need of Foucauldian discipline.

7.3. Administrative and Technical Aspect

North Korea’s Kim Jong Un succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, in 2012. Being the youngest head of the state so far, he lacked “the opportunity to consolidate his position in the North’s hierarchical political system.”⁷⁸⁵ However, he succeeded in establishing

⁷⁸³ Ibid, 4. The tests continued well into 2020 – in March a series of short-range missiles were launched, “signalling Pyongyang’s intent to follow through with leader Kim Jong Un’s promise to possess a ‘new strategic weapon’ in the near future.” Julia Masterson, “North Korea Tests First Missiles of 2020,” *Arms Control Today* (April 2020), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/news/north-korea-tests-first-missiles-2020> (accessed August 2, 2020).

⁷⁸⁴ Though it goes beyond the scope of this research, North Korea is also alleged to have a biological weapons program. See Hyun-Kyung Kim, Elizabeth Phillipp and Hattie Chung, “North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown,” *Project on Managing the Microbe Belfer Center Report* (October 2017), <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/NK%20Bioweapons%20final.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁸⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Country Report: North Korea* (April 2, 2018), 7.

his power through fear,⁷⁸⁶ and consolidating the image of his country “as a self-contained and self-reliant nuclear state.”⁷⁸⁷

Under Kim’s rule, Korean People’s Army grew in influence, shadowing other two powerful organs of administration, namely the Workers’ Party of Korea and State Administration Council (i.e. the cabinet).⁷⁸⁸ Yet, despite all, the country managed to pursue market reforms to ease the impact of sanctions on daily life, as will be elaborated further in the part on socioeconomic aspect.

It is argued that the more the states are open to international economy, the more responsive they are to flows of international trade and investment, hence less likely they are to seek nuclear weapons. This argument is followed by the idea that the quest for nuclear weapons triggers sanctions, threatens inflow of investment, and distorts international trade.⁷⁸⁹

This argument indeed assumes the existence of a government that absolutely prioritizes about welfare of its people and/or of people that can rise up against the government. Alternatively, public may be enthusiastic and pressure the government to

⁷⁸⁶ In 2013, Kim publicly executed his uncle for allegations of corruption and of plotting a coup. In 2017, he was suspected to be involved in assassination of his half-brother in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In between, reports indicate that more than 600 senior officials had been eliminated for being involved in the coup plots. Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid. Note that North Korea is founded on the ideology of *juche*, in 2012 through a change in the Constitution, declared itself as a nuclear country; and had already withdrawn from the NPT a decade ago in 2003.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

undertake the nuclear option. In either case, for the domestic processes to influence decision-makers, decision-makers should be open to the influence of the public opinion. “However, some domestic variables behind a state’s nuclear decision making, including competition among political parties, private groups, and bureaucrats, are not very useful for the study of North Korea,” as the country is a monolithic structure that forms a “synthetic organism.”⁷⁹⁰

That means, the obsession with going nuclear as well as the decision to move out of the NPT was taken by one-man as a way of showing his reaction to the sanctions. That is a very important and indeed a historical step, because so far Pyongyang remains to be the only capital to take the decision to withdraw from the NPT.

However, steps taken and decisions made have been consistent. Despite the fact that “the development of nuclear weapons at the risk of provoking its regional neighbors and alienating further the international community in times of urgent need of international aid may seem like a very irrational approach,”⁷⁹¹ North Korea has always been clear in what it wanted – namely, recognition at international level as an equal sovereign player.

In this regard, sanctions did not reverse the progress achieved in Pyongyang’s nuclear quest. On the contrary, “continuous development of North Korean nuclear, missile, and WMD capabilities has taken place.”⁷⁹² The progressive pattern fed into the

⁷⁹⁰ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 7.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid, 6.

⁷⁹² Ibid, 133.

development and improvement of Pyongyang's domestic capabilities that allows the country not to be bound by sanctions at least at technical level.⁷⁹³ The pattern also was nurtured by the administrative dedication – “The international community demands that North Korea show its commitment to join the denuclearization effort first, but North Korea prioritizes developing nuclear forces for self-defense purposes.”⁷⁹⁴ Considering that it is a capability with immense destructive power, it may sound irrational that Kim prefers to deploy its nuclear warheads in an attempt to pre-empt a possible US action, or to look serious to be taken serious. Kim is far from being irrational – Even the simple observation of North Korea's “participat[ion] in many international forums and protest[s] against vertical nuclear proliferation,” it is possible to maintain “that it is aware of the normative international culture on nuclear weapons.”⁷⁹⁵ In this respect, it is also possible to maintain that Pyongyang has a nuclear no-first-use policy.

If North Korea is a rational actor with no first use policy, then why to sanction it for its nuclear program but not, say, the UK? The answer lies in Orientalist theories which help us understand how and why the branding process takes place. North Korea has long been posing a threat because it was in the group of leper others, hence for West it is in need of a corrective treatment. Accordingly, being labelled as an “other,” for

⁷⁹³ It should be noted that consecutive tests created problems in the geographical structure and the mountainous zone dedicated for underground tests was closed Soyoung Kim and Cynthia Kim, “North Korea says will Stop Nuclear Tests, Scrap Test Site,” *Reuters*, April 21, 2018, Saturday; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/north-korea-says-will-stop-nuclear-tests-scrap-test-site-idUSKBN1HR37J> (accessed November 23, 2020).

⁷⁹⁴ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 142.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 6.

North Korea to join the cadres of “us,” it should go through a disciplinary process – a process which is hardly more than the West’s display of power.

7.4. Socioeconomic Aspect

It is safe to conclude that sanctions did not affect much the texture of the administration in North Korea, nor the technical capabilities the country had, despite causing socioeconomic hardships which will be elaborated below.

While North Korea’s nuclear program was there since 1950s, the first UNSC Resolution targeting Pyongyang’s nuclear program arrived only in early 2000s.⁷⁹⁶ It is difficult to observe the way people reacted, and to determine how the sanctions affected people’s daily lives. To many analysts, North Korea is still “a timeless misery, ... enigma ... or terra incognita, ... indicat[ing] a genuine void of knowledge.”⁷⁹⁷

Despite this, it is not difficult to observe that North Korea’s ontological foundations are rooted in national emergency. The roots go so deep that

it has become difficult for North Koreans to imagine life without emergency, without national enemy. When the electricity occasionally goes off in North Korea’s towns and villages, ... when there is not enough rainfall, causing drought, ... when people starve to death, it is because of U.S. imperialism.⁷⁹⁸

Therefore, decades-long sanctions became part of North Korean identity, which was shaped in 1950s by the war with the US, in 60s by postwar reconstruction, in 70-80s

⁷⁹⁶ United Nations Security Council’s first resolution was S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006), [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1718%20\(2006\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1718%20(2006)) (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁷⁹⁷ David Shim, *Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is Believing* (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 1.

⁷⁹⁸ French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 137.

ideological struggle that ended up in *juche*, and from 90s onwards by the reappearance of the US as the enemy.⁷⁹⁹

The reasons behind North Korean resilience to sanctions has at least three explanations. Firstly, the growth rate has partly been facilitated if not financed by Banco Delta Asia – a small bank in Macao that North Korea used for money laundering. Since then, “North Korea has diversified its money laundering of illicit funds (a key part of its economy).”⁸⁰⁰ In between 2009-2017, international banks including Deutsche Bank and some major US banks have been reported to conduct business totaling 700 million Dollars with companies which are connected to North Korea.⁸⁰¹ This, of course, reflects legal economy. Despite the sanctions and tightened screening of transactions, in 2020 reports also revealed that during that same period transactions approached 180 million Dollars.⁸⁰² There a lot is going on in the illegal side.⁸⁰³

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid, 131-5.

⁸⁰⁰ Bruce E. Bechtol, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weaponization Program,” in *Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobel, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, (UK:Routledge, 2018).

⁸⁰¹ Michael Paul and Elisabeth Suh, “North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Missiles,” *SWP Comments* 32 (August 2017): 5.

⁸⁰² Andrew W. Lehren and Dan De Luce, “Secret Documents Show How North Korea Launders Money Through U.S. Banks,” *CNBC News*, September 20, 2020, Sunday; <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/20/secret-documents-show-how-north-korea-launders-money-through-us-banks.html> (accessed on November 23, 2020).

⁸⁰³ In addition to under cover money laundering and illicit trade schemes, there also is the cyber space that is used to steal funds from abroad. See Jason Bartlett, “Exposing the Financial Footprints of North Korea’s Hackers,” *CNAS Report* (November 18, 2020),

Secondly, there are well organized smuggling nets. A smuggler can make more than \$1500 in one trip to China, and smuggled items include even refrigerators. Though it sounds illegal, “[s]muggling became a respected profession,” not only for offering poor villagers an income, but also for various accomplishments including “knit[ting] the isolated country to the outside world, bringing in food during a brutal famine and, later on as a small consumer class began to grow, everything from Chinese car parts to DVDs of South Korean TV shows.”⁸⁰⁴ Though new measures make it harder to smuggle goods in and out, especially “after the famine, every child began dreaming of becoming a smuggler” instead of being a doctor, teacher or soldier.⁸⁰⁵ Human trafficking also is a routine for smugglers, with majority of escapees being women, “and many are forced into marriages and prostitution,”⁸⁰⁶ and all “risk[ing] their lives

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/exposing-the-financial-footprints-of-north-koreas-hackers> (accessed on November 23, 2020).

⁸⁰⁴ Tim Sullivan and Hyung Jin Kim, “Rough Times for Smugglers who Knitted North Korea to the World,” *Fox News*, December 24, 2017, Wednesday; <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/12/24/rough-times-for-smugglers-who-knitted-n-korea-to-world.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸⁰⁵ Anonymous, “Smugglers who Worked North Korea-China Border Seeing Tough Times under Kim, Sanctions,” *The Japan Times*, December 25, 2017, Tuesday; <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/25/asia-pacific/social-issues-asia-pacific/smugglers-worked-north-korea-china-border-seeing-tough-times-kim-sanctions/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸⁰⁶ The figure of ratio of women escapees is 80% (2015); data from South Korea. UNHROHC, *Torn Apart: The Human Rights Dimension of the Involuntary Separation of Korean Families*, 22 and 25. Nearly all these women initially are trafficked to China, where one-child policy ended up scarcity of females and North Korean women are used to “help meet the shortage of brides in China’s male-dominant society. . . . [S]tarving North Korean peasants are often happy to sell a teenaged daughter . . . to agents who claim that they are recruiting workers for Chinese companies.” Steven W. Mosher, “North Korea Exports Women to China,” *Fox News*, December 12, 2017, Tuesday; <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/north-korea-exports-women-to-china> (accessed February 22, 2020).

and expose themselves to harsh treatment, including hard labor sentences, if they are caught escaping.”⁸⁰⁷

Thirdly, not only the North Korean people but also the economy managed to adjust to a life under sanctions. For example, despite the fact that sanctions seem to be hurting “civilian economy more than in the past, ...[f]ood production in North Korea has grown remarkably. ... Moreover, estimates by UN agencies ... tend to overstate how much food distribution by the state really matters.”⁸⁰⁸ Data indicates only about 20% of North Koreans depend on regime-distributed food while 60% relies on private markets.⁸⁰⁹ What is more, President Kim has tendency to liberalize the economy and facilitate continuation of this development.⁸¹⁰ Private markets are gradually getting more effective as a result not only of mandatory adjustments to sanctions but also of radical changes introduced by the regime in management of State Owned Enterprises

⁸⁰⁷ UNHROHC, *Torn Apart: The Human Rights Dimension of the Involuntary Separation of Korean Families*, 23.

⁸⁰⁸ Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, “Between Sanctions, Drought and Tensions: How Bad is North Korea’s Food Situation?,” 38 *North* (November 18, 2017), <https://www.38north.org/2017/11/bksilberstein111417/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸⁰⁹ The private market prices, indeed, help understanding the availability of food. The pandemic create tension in the market. Some countries like China can keep covering up for scarcity of food, but then the food aid will be distributed by government. Considering that North Korean “public [already] consumes far fewer than their daily need even in a good [harvest] year,” the government distribution may not necessarily prioritize needs but political choices. *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁰ EIU, *Country Report: North Korea*, 9.

– an adjustment which “seems to have created the legal basis for private investments in state enterprises.”⁸¹¹

To conclude, from socioeconomic point of view, the sanctions created not only a common enemy -the US- as a scapegoat for everything that goes wrong. They also created considerable scarcity and poverty in the country. The sanctions proved to have limited, if any, impact on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, but left people at starvation level. Regardless the reforms introduced to liberalize the economy and foster development, illegal economy kept growing, both at international and national level. Internationally, sanctions were bypassed through banks that engage in money laundering. Nationally, smuggling items and people came forward, placing further burden especially on women.⁸¹² People suffered also from the COVID19 pandemic and accompanying scarcity arising from problems in supply chains; however the leadership continued to enjoy armored luxury cars shipped from Rotterdam to North Korea.⁸¹³ As the Mercedeses found their way to North Korea while

⁸¹¹ Peter Ward, “Market Reforms with North Korean Characteristics: Loosening the Grip on State Owned Enterprises,” 38 *North* (December 21, 2017), <https://www.38north.org/2017/12/pward122117/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸¹² An overwhelming majority of the escapees are women, “and many are forced into marriages and prostitution.” The ratio of women escapees is 80% (2015); data from South Korea. UNHROHC, *Torn Apart: The Human Rights Dimension of the Involuntary Separation of Korean Families*, 22 and 25.

⁸¹³ Each of these Mercedes Maybach S600 vehicles were reported to worth half a million dollars. Joshua Berlinger, “How did Kim Jong Un get his Mercedes Benzes? New Report Traces Origin of North Korea's Luxury Rides,” *CNN*, July 16, 2019, Tuesday; <https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/north-korea-luxury-vehicles-intl-hnk/index.html> (accessed August 2, 2020).

ordinary people fighting to weather the challenges of daily life, sanctions once more proved to be Foucauldian measures designed with purpose of display of power.

7.5. Cultural Aspect

Zulfikar A. Bhutto, one of Pakistan's previous presidents, is quoted often by his words highlighting his choice of people eat grass if need be for the country to gain nuclear weapon capability.⁸¹⁴ Accordingly, despite exact figures are not public, nuclear project is assumed to be a costly one.⁸¹⁵ Given the fact that national budget is a limited source, there is a trade-off between civilian and military projects.

The trade-off is valid also for North Korea. When asked for purposes of understanding “why Pyongyang was spending its scarce resources on ballistic missiles instead of education or in other civilian areas that would directly benefit the DPRK's population,” father Kim gave a reply which resonated pretty much that of Bhutto: “[t]he missiles cannot reach the US and if I launch them, the US would fire back thousands of missiles and we would not survive. But I have to let them know I have missiles. I am making them because only then will the US talk to me.”⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁴ Khushwant Singh, “Pakistan, India, and the Bomb,” *New York Times*, July 1, 1979, Sunday; <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/foreign-affairs-pakistan-india-and-the-bomb.html> (accessed April 4, 2020).

⁸¹⁵ Still, it should be noted that depending on the perspective, nuclear project can indeed be more budget-friendly to pursue. Eric Talmadge, “Less than one Aircraft Carrier? The Cost of North Korea's Nukes,” *Bloomberg*, July 20, 2017, Thursday; <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-20/less-than-1-aircraft-carrier-the-cost-of-n-korea-s-nukes> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸¹⁶ French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 307.

This is a very important rhetoric. It is possible to conclude from this remark that regardless the Western approach, North Korea does not want to “securitize” the issue, at least not in a way the US is doing. This difference in approaches is very striking when we consider the fact that

North Korea had experienced an actual nuclear threat from the US that included plans for the use of a nuclear weapon during the Korean War. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and [South] Korea in 1954, the New Look Strategy announced by Dulles in January 1954, the announcement of President Eisenhower about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against China in March 1955, and Secretary of Defence James R. Schelesinger’s remarks about the deployment of nuclear weapons in [South] Korea along with US forces in June 1975⁸¹⁷

are all count as factors to feed into further securitization. On the contrary, Pyongyang’s rhetoric is based less on constructivist but more on rational approaches. Therefore, this research will argue that there is a continuous calculation of actions and reactions in the process of developing nuclear weapons. The pattern of leaking information on the nuclear weapons program directly “to the public rather than keeping it secret indicates that North Korea’s nuclear weapons were a ‘means’ to press the US into taking action rather than an ‘end’ in and of themselves.”⁸¹⁸ It is also easy to observe that North Korea’s “self-confidence has grown in recent years, mainly due to ... advancements toward nuclear-armed status which it regards as essential to national prestige and its legitimacy.”⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁷ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 55; footnotes omitted.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid, 134.

⁸¹⁹ Paul and Suh, “North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Missiles,” 1.

North Korea has long been protesting against the double standards as its nuclear project has been objected but other countries have been “tolerated” in their missile and nuclear programs.⁸²⁰ A similar discussion is there on North Korean efforts to develop its space technology further: while Pyongyang claims Kwongmyongsong-5 (Bright Star) is part of its four-year-plan on “economic development and improvement of the people’s living,” the West is concerned that the satellite launch is not only a cover for testing ICBMs, but also Kwongmyongsong-5 is “equipped with cameras and telecommunication devices,” hence is likely to be used as a spying tool.⁸²¹

In addition to the Western double standards that contribute to fueling national pride, there also is aspect of national development. Like all countries, secure supply of power has been critical for North Korea “not only to meet growing domestic demands but also to reduce dependence on imported oil from its patron – Russia- who began to ask for hard currency.”⁸²² Against this background, to accomplish the economic revitalization plan, investment in atomic energy turned out to be increasingly important. Such an investment would not only provide energy but also open up avenues of scientific development,⁸²³ which further contributes to pride.

⁸²⁰ Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 139.

⁸²¹ Gareth Davis, “Kim Jong-un Blasts UN Oil Sanctions Against North Korea As 'An Act Of War' As Pressure Mounts On His Evil Regime Over Missile Tests,” *Daily Mail*, December 26, 2017, Tuesday; <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5209881/Kim-Jong-blasts-oil-sanctions-against-North-Korea.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸²² Kim, *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?*, 17.

⁸²³ Ibid.

To conclude, through the nuclear project indeed North Korea managed to develop a sense of national pride. Despite the project by itself is costly and North Koreans suffer from poverty deeply, nuclear weapons and the missiles as delivery vehicles indeed deliver a message to the world that when North Korea has something to say, it is to be heard. Through reactionary moves, North Korea not only advanced in its nuclear power status, but also developed a self-confidence to feed “national prestige”⁸²⁴ despite the nuclear project drained public resources away from socioeconomic development and forced people to adapt to the situation through all types of smuggling.

In this regard, from an Orientalist perspective, North Korea stands as an incorrigible other. Its nuclear program is advanced and the country does not give the image that it is ready or willing to put the program on the negotiation table in return for gradual sanction removals. The dedication of the administration to the program, and adaptation of the people to the life under sanctions already gives signals that sanctions measures will fail to denuclearize North Korea. Therefore, once more it is observed that sanctions are disciplinary measures, used primarily to demonstrate that the West can flex its muscles. As they say, under all circumstances show must go on.

7.6. Conclusion

Among all the case studies covered in this research, North Korea stands out for being under sanctions since its foundation. Nonetheless, like some other cases analyzed here, North Korea has been subject to sanctions for its nuclear weapons program. From time to time, the issue gained a personal dimension between the US and North Korean

⁸²⁴ Paul and Suh, “North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Missiles.”

leaders -- Thanks to modern communication facilities and raising global awareness of world politics, “international society”⁸²⁵ witnessed a set of exchange of insults over the social media.⁸²⁶ Despite all the escalation in the wording, at practical level we witnessed a *détente* following Trump- Kim meeting for the second time in February 28, 2019 in Vietnam⁸²⁷ and Kim delivering the remainings of soldiers lost in the peninsula during the Korean War.⁸²⁸

Of course, the closure of Punggye-ri test area as well as the COVID19 pandemic put both the meetings as well as test shootings on hold. Yet, by seeing the fate of Kaddafi who agreed to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction, North Korea, like Iran, seems to have been paying attention to play the game with due diligence. In the end, the deal reached with Iran is now partially on the shelves and Iran continues to suffer from US sanctions which affects also the third countries that are doing business with Iran. A similar tactic can be observed in Pyongyang, as the satellite images at hand are

⁸²⁵ The term is introduced by Hedley Bull, though with a different connotation in mind. See his *The Anarchical Society*.

⁸²⁶ A short summary is provided by Kate Samuelson, “Here Are All the Times Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump Insulted Each Other,” *Time* (September 22, 2017), <http://time.com/4953283/kim-jong-un-donald-trump-insults/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

⁸²⁷ Donald Kirk, “Second Trump-Kim Summit is a Possibility,” *Inside Sources* (July 23, 2018), <http://www.insidesources.com/second-trump-kim-summit-possibility/> (accessed February 22, 2020). This meeting, nonetheless, did not deliver the expectations. See Rosenberg, “Trump-Kim Summit was Cut Short after North Korea Demanded an end to Sanctions.”

⁸²⁸ Anonymous, “Trump Thanks North Korea's Kim for Sending War Remains, Hopes to See Him 'Soon',” *CNBC*, August 2, 2018, Thursday; <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/02/trump-thanks-north-koreas-kim-for-sending-war-remains-hopes-to-see-h.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).

interpreted by the experts as deceptive moves indicating that North Korea is not up to denuclearization.⁸²⁹

Looking at the impact of sanctions, it is possible to argue that North Korea managed to survive. This survival, however, has few if any to do with the severity of the sanctions. The North Koreans mastered the ways to circumvent and ease the impact of sanctions, as life under sanctions is the only thing that they know.

With an administration that sees a WMD capability as a sine quo non for equal treatment in international sphere, a society that is well organized under smuggling nets, a nation that is thought to be proud of being able to make a nuclear investment, and people forced into subordination, North Koreans seem not to be affected by sanctions in a way to change the political dedication of the ruling elite. Therefore, once more the sanctions measures prove to be unable to yield the literatural result of attaining a behavioral change without resorting to war. They, on the contrary, display a practical show of power. Irrespective of the unintended consequences like fostering Kim's power inside the country, pushing people more into deep poverty, or setting ground for development of indigenous capacity, sanctions are there as Foucauldian measures applied by the West towards a non-Western country under an orientalist umbrella.

⁸²⁹ Uri Friedman, "Two Ways to Read the Newest Intelligence on North Korea," *The Atlantic* (August 1, 2018), <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/north-korea-missile/566429/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Shakespeare is present in the human and family drama of it all: think of the Macbeth's ambitious drive for power, and of Lear's vanity and lack of imagination, making elaborate arrangements for the future rule of his kingdom only to disrupt them in his petulant old age.⁸³⁰

This research aimed to bring a new perspective to the study of sanctions. Main argument proposed here is that sanctions are designed mainly as disciplinary tools to be employed by the West against non-Western leper countries. For those tools to be effective, they need to be composed of measures that are displayed, for Michel Foucault argues that power is not accumulable, it has to be exercised. This exercise requires branding and otherization, hence enters into stage the securitization discourse of constructivist theories.

Despite the research was designed to be interdisciplinary, “some animals are more equal.”⁸³¹ Among the social science disciplines, therefore the influence of International Relations is heavily felt throughout the research. While history, economics, international law and geography for example were inherently there, due to the fact that sanctions are part of more of a current debate, the International Relations

⁸³⁰ Roger Owen, *The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 11.

⁸³¹ George Orwell, *Animal Farm: A Fairy Story* (London: Penguin, 2000), 97.

theories helped us to understand the literature on sanctions mechanisms as well as how and why they are designed at first stage.

The literature on sanctions seem to focus more on what is a successful sanctions mechanism, and how the measures are to be implemented as well as designed. In this respect, “[c]onventional wisdom examines the problems of one player only: the target country. It ignores the fact that sanctions as well as violations are the outcome of the interaction of two players.” Therefore, it “leads to wrong conclusions, such as the expectation that modification of the incentives of one player will modify his behavior, while in reality it modifies the behavior of the opponent.”⁸³² Sanctions analysis shows that the measures are not automatically lifted following immediate compliance, or compliance automatically follows sanctions. There is also the problem of the degree of the severity of the measures. It requires fine tuning in implementing sanctions as sanctioning may end up with being too costly to the sender,⁸³³ the sender may look, or actually be, “ ‘soft,’ (that is, never sanctions) or ‘tough’ (that is, prefers to sanction if its interests are violated).”⁸³⁴

⁸³² Tsebelis, “Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” 12-13. Also see Kaempfer and Lowenberg, “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions,” 875.

⁸³³ Hufbauer *at al*, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, esp 4. A similar logic was observed in Vietnam War. Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam predicted that “[i]n the end, the Americans will have killed ten of us for every American soldier who died, but it is they who will tire first.” Quoted in Jason W. Davidson, *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-Quo States* (NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006), 39.

⁸³⁴ Tsebelis, “Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” 14. Note that currently popular smart sanctions have long been seen as soft tools. Wallenstein, “A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited,” 12.

Some authors argue that a sanction that has not been implemented is a successful sanction. The argument is based on the attainment of the desired policy outcome without imposition of sanctions. Two such examples can be 1921 League of Nations “consideration” of punitive economic measures against Yugoslav military incursions into Albania, and Southern Common Market - MERCOSUR’s threat to dispel Paraguay from the customs union in 1996 in case a coup took place in the country. Philosophically speaking, “[t]hese sanctions were not ‘effective,’ as the economic sanctions did not go beyond the threat stage.”⁸³⁵ Politically speaking, though, they “were highly successful and efficient as the targets changed their behavior very quickly and the sender countries did not have to forego the welfare gains of international trade and investment.”⁸³⁶

Some others take it one step ahead, and claim that if a sanction is about to work, they work at the threat stage. To put it in different words, if a sender is implementing sanctions, that is basically because threat of sanctions failed in initiating a policy change in the target. Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz⁸³⁷ claim that target, being a rational actor, may have perfect information⁸³⁸ but ignore the consequences of sanctions, or underestimate their potency as it calculates sanctions be more costly for the sender than for itself, or it “erroneously believes they will be imposed and sustained

⁸³⁵ Van Bergeijk, *Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade*, 147.

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz, “When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?,” 485-9

⁸³⁸ Copeland, “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of Cold War 1985-91,” 23.

regardless of whether it yields.”⁸³⁹ This research disregarded non-implemented sanctions, and focused on the sanctions experiences deriving from implementation.

This research, by agreeing that that sanctions are newly-added tools to the toolbox, argues they indeed are favorite items to resort to as Foucauldian disciplinary measures. The idea(1) behind employing sanctions is to change the behavior of the target, however the argument here revolved around the fact that this idea(1) is the overt set of reasons for resorting sanctions. This research hence focuses rather to unveil the unexposed idea of the sender through constructivist approaches. Accordingly, argument continues, step by step, the senders’ overall policy of “naming, judging, isolating and controlling”⁸⁴⁰ evolves into sanctions measures. These mechanisms then become natural extensions of this “binary brandings” which is based on a fictive separation of the non-West from the West, i.e. a constant division of deviant from normal.

Foucault discusses in length the disciplinary power employed in order to correct the wrong. However, for the wrong to be corrected, it first has to be identified. It means, for the disciplinary power to be exercised, a discourse is required to take place. Building on Foucault’s notion of discourse, Said argues that Orientalism is a discourse over which the Western (initially under European then American dominance) culture was built. The discourse enabled the West “to manage – and even to produce – the

⁸³⁹ Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz, “When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?,” 485-9.

⁸⁴⁰ Downing, *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault*, 77.

Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.”⁸⁴¹

It should be noted briefly that while the creation and maintenance of the West necessitated a study of Orient, the East was also studying its other, namely, the Occident.⁸⁴² Both were like two sides of the same apple, and each has been an output of the discourse: the East, in diplomatic history, was initially used to refer to Poland, following the cessation of whose existence, the East as the problematic other, or with the notorious heading the Eastern Question, translated into the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴³ In return, “[t]he ‘Western Question’ also is known as the problem of modernization/Westernization, a problem for the non-European or non-Western states”⁸⁴⁴ (note how the ‘modern’ is automatically equated with the West, despite the author aims to reevaluate these Questions).

While the Orient and Occident simultaneously (re)produced each other, as Said notes, Orientalism was used to be a British and French enterprise, only with World War 2 the US gained dominance. He also notes that the US approach is as French and British once was. This research agrees; in the end, back then it was colonialization, now it is

⁸⁴¹ Said, *Orientalism*, 3.

⁸⁴² See, for example, Fokkema, *Perfect Worlds: Utopian Fiction in China and the West*.

⁸⁴³ Yurdusev, “From the Eastern Question to the Western Question: Rethinking the Contribution of Toynbee.”

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 325.

sanctions. Back then the approach required waging direct war, now it is rather “invisible wars.”⁸⁴⁵

As part of the discourse, sanctions are painted in a rosy manner with the claim that they stop short of war. This research argues that they do not; indeed, in terms of the damages inflicted the sanctions measures most often go beyond war. War itself has regulatory rules and laws which, as per discourse, does not cover sanctions.⁸⁴⁶ That is why the US, simply by claiming that they could be used by military, “unilaterally blocked goods including child vaccines, water tankers during a period of drought, cloth, the generator needed to run a sewage treatment plant, radios for ambulances”⁸⁴⁷ as part of sanctions.

Building upon the literature available, the cases elaborated in this research are picked from different non-Western regions to analyze the unifying factors in the way the sanctions are designed and implemented. The case studies also demonstrate how target states and their people react to the measures implemented against them.

Amongst the case studies, the first was Egypt. In the Egyptian case the sanctions were declared to aim to change the behavior of a maverick country and prevent it from

⁸⁴⁵ Term belongs to Gordon, *Invisible War: the United States and the Iraq Sanctions*.

⁸⁴⁶ A similar discourse to provide immunity to the policy choices was there on war against terrorism – argument was that terrorists were not soldiers, hence even if it was a war, they were not covered by laws of war. For an overall analysis, see Jean-Marc Piret, “The ‘War Against Terrorism,’ International Law and the Growth of Unchecked Executive Power in the U.S.,” *Revue Interdisciplinaire D'études Juridiques* 60, no. 1 (2008).

⁸⁴⁷ Example belongs to sanctions regime in Iraq. See Gordon, *Invisible War: the United States and the Iraq Sanctions*, 4.

slipping towards the Soviet camp. The sanctions represent the form of measures that amount to Western withdrawal of financial opportunities to support the Aswan Dam. Withdrawal of support as well as credits was a very strong sanction to indicate the limits of the policy room for Nasser; nonetheless the sanctions failed in introducing a change of behavior.

The failure has two related but also separate dimensions. Practically, the Aswan Dam was built with the support of the Soviets, hence the sanctions measures *de facto* failed to prevent the spearhead of non-alignment movement flirt with Eastern bloc. Theoretically, as the literature defines the sanctions being measures falling short of war, the sanctions against Egypt also failed by leading to the Suez War.

Irrespective of success or failure, sanctions were tools for exerting disciplinary power against an Oriental country whose people needed to be civilized, educated, hence normalized only after being subject to Foucauldian measures. A similar Foucauldian process is ongoing with Iran with regards to its nuclear program. It was the US that triggered the sanctions against Iran, which, in time evolved into a UN one,⁸⁴⁸ and in time rolled back to unilateral sanctions once more with the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. The sanctions against Iran were referred as “economic terrorism”⁸⁴⁹ - the sanctions keep biting more and more, especially given the COVID19 pandemic where

⁸⁴⁸ Drezner, in his “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion,” calls this sparking country as primary sender and those that join afterwards as secondary. However, this research will take the distinction between primary and secondary not of senders but of sanctions. In this regard, primary sanctions as sanctions directly implemented on the target. Daniel W. Drezner, “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998).

⁸⁴⁹ Soltanieh, “TRT World Forum 2018 – Closing Ranks.”

the economy suffered even further. Even before the pandemic, people were selling their kidneys;⁸⁵⁰ and the assassin of the Qods Force Major General Qassem Soleimani as well as “the accidental downing of Ukrainian International Flight 752 by Iranian air defense have further contributed the political and social instability in Iran.”⁸⁵¹ With the pandemic, hospitals were labelled as “virus factories,” and the country suffered the second-biggest outbreak outside China.⁸⁵² Still, sanctions kept preventing Iran from concluding transactions to purchase medical items⁸⁵³ or to pay for UN membership.⁸⁵⁴ It should be noted also that in Iranian case sanctions are of secondary nature, i.e. the disciplinary measures are designed in a way to sanction not only Iran, but also those that continue trading with Iran. In this respect, it can be argued that disciplinary power of the West is exercised not only against the target, but covered also those that preferred to stay on the border line between “us” and “them.”

⁸⁵⁰ Bengali and Mostaghim, “ ‘Kidney for sale’: Iran has a Legal Market for the Organs, but the System Doesn’t Always Work.”

⁸⁵¹ Esfandiyar Bathmangelidj (coordinator), “Iran’s Year under Maximum Pressure: The Political Limits of Economic Resilience,” *Bourse&Bazaar Special Report* (2020): 2.

⁸⁵² Anonymous, “Iran and Covid-19: Sickly State,” *The Economist* 434, no. 9185 (March 14-20, 2020): 27. Iran still is the third-biggest country worldwide with regards to new cases. See Anonymous, “Coronavirus Live Update - Reported Cases and Deaths by Country, Territory, or Conveyance,” *Wordometer* (June 15, 2021), <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries> (accessed June 15, 2021).

⁸⁵³ Gordon, “Crippling Iran: The U.N. Security Council and the Tactic of Deliberate Ambiguity,” 1002.

⁸⁵⁴ Michelle Nichols, “Iran regains U.N. Vote after U.S. Enables U.N. Payment,” *Reuters*, June 11, 2021, Friday; <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-regains-un-vote-after-us-enables-un-payment-2021-06-11/> (accessed June 15, 2021).

Together with Iran, this research picked North Korea as a case study containing a nuclear dimension. Both cases, therefore, resemble each other from a securitization point of view. Constructivist approaches aptly discuss the theory of securitization which helps understanding how some countries' conventional and unconventional military stocks are perceived dangerous whereas those of others are welcomed as stabilizers. Here, Iran and North Korea share the same status as being labelled as “the other” via securitization.

In North Korean case, despite the measures are designed to be “smart” and targeted only the designated entities, they cast a considerable harm to people. Despite (i) people have adopted to a life under constant national emergency and got used to blame the US “when there is not enough rainfall, causing drought, ... when people starve to death,”⁸⁵⁵ (ii) some countries like China are backing North Korea for different reasons like prevention of mass migration from the country into China, and (iii) all types of smuggling (be it human, goods or finance) is widely prevalent, people still keep risking their lives to leave the country. In other words, despite the regime managed to have nuclear weapons and successfully conducted tests for delivery vehicles, it failed to combat with scarcity and poverty. The situation now is worse given the COVID19 pandemic⁸⁵⁶ – the country still had no official coronavirus cases up until mid-May 2022, but with widespread food insecurity, combined with increasing homelessness

⁸⁵⁵ French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 137.

⁸⁵⁶ See Göktuğ Sönmez, “COVID-19, International Security and the Possible Impacts of COVID-19 on the International System,” ORSAM Policy Brief 117 (April 2020).

and overpriced medicine, a new humanitarian crisis is looming⁸⁵⁷ as a ramification of the Foucauldian disciplinary measures exercised by the West over an Eastern country disguised as sanctions to combat nuclear proliferation.

The situation is similar in Afghanistan. Different from North Korea, Afghan government during inter-Taliban period was well recognized at the international level and did not have any sanctions measures against it (sanctions rather aim at Taliban), and the government was, as still is dependent on foreign aid and could not lift its people up out of sanctions-period socioeconomic problems. While Afghanistan is labelled as underdeveloped country which poses security threat to the West,⁸⁵⁸ the discourse helped building up a separation of us and other. This separation, as this research argues, helped exclusion and foreclosure which are the two elements indispensable for Foucauldian process of normalizing the leper through disciplinary measures. The Afghan case reflects the West's capacity and willing to act in a Foucauldian way against non-Western countries which, "for allegedly structural reasons, resist[] 'modernization'."⁸⁵⁹

One last case study in this research was Russia. Despite Russia is not in the same basket with the other cases in terms of size, population or political weight, it still is a

⁸⁵⁷ Anonymous, "Some Starving' in North Korea as COVID Constrains China Trade, say UN Experts," *Deutsche Welle*, June 9, 2020, Tuesday; <https://www.dw.com/en/some-starving-in-north-korea-as-covid-constrains-china-trade-say-un-experts/a-53754390> (accessed November 23, 2020).

⁸⁵⁸ Bilgen, "Güvenliksiz Kalkınma, Kalkınmasız Güvenlik Mümkün mü? Güvenlik-Kalkınma İlişkisinin Dönüşüm Süreci ve Farklı Yaklaşımlarla Kavramsallaştırılması," 31.

⁸⁵⁹ Basu, "World of the Third," 76.

good example of sanctions being disciplinary tools, and of international political structure as well as global distribution of power.

While Russia is a giant actor, since its annexation of Crimea, it is subject to sanctions. However, the core components of Russian economy, namely energy, mining and defense sectors still seem solid. Moreover, despite Russia is able to retaliate, it has not imposed harsh counter-sanctions for purposes of avoiding from deepening the drift with the West. In all cases, sanctions do play to the favor of Russia -- in the end, in Russian population there is a feeling that “after the Crimea annexation, ... Russia once again became a great power.”⁸⁶⁰ As a result of sanctions, import-substitution programs aimed to create an independent domestic technological advancement especially in defense sector. In addition, the strong rally-around-the-flag impact is easily observable as Putin’s personal approval rating hit 88% following the annexation, allowing some observers argue that there is a new social contract in Russia where “the people accept economic hardship in return for Russia’s restoration to the ranks of the great powers.”⁸⁶¹

Despite Russia constructs its own identity and accordingly places itself apart from the East, this construction does not resonate in the West. The tools used to initiate policy changes also indicates that Russia indeed does not belong to the West. While the West prefers to use sanctions as show of disciplinary power, Russia wages direct wars to

⁸⁶⁰ Darko Janjevic, “Western Sanctions on Russia: Lots of Noise and Little Impact,” *Deutsche Welle*, April 5, 2018, Thursday; <https://www.dw.com/en/western-sanctions-on-russia-lots-of-noise-and-little-impact/a-43271200> (accessed November 24, 2020).

⁸⁶¹ Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 357-8.

correct its own “leper others.” While the West stays in unregulated zone of sanctions as being measures that stop short of war, Russia stays in international sphere which is regulated by law of war. Moreover, “Russia is less connected to Western hegemony, and also less reproductive of its ideology.”⁸⁶² Therefore, in line with the argument of this research, Russia is less part of the West than it portrays itself to be; therefore, its identity is constructed by Orientalism; and therefore Russia can be labelled as (i) leper eligible to be sanctioned, and (ii) in need of Foucauldian disciplinary measures of the West.

The five case studies enveloped in this research tried to answer the main question of whether areas do matter or not. The reply was yes, because this research indicates that sanctions targeted non-Western countries. This research indicates also that the measures fail to attain declared aim of policy change in the target, and cause considerable harm to the daily life of the civilians. It should be noted, however, that the research does not aim to provide alternatives for better designed sanctions, nor to defend or support the targets while criticizing the measures employed. It is rather questioned why to have sanctions at all if they do not deliver the intentions and cause civilian distress in target countries. The conclusion we reached was that the construction of “them” actually helps building up a strong identity of “us.” Therefore, the more “they” are painted as dangerous, the more “us” is unified against the leper, and the more disciplinary power can be exercised. “They” are the East altogether; the West has the duty of civilizing the “other.” This *mission civilizatrice* ranges from

⁸⁶² Hopf, “Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” 329.

education about the sewage system⁸⁶³ to re-installation of borders. It is a solicitation of colonialism, because it is a mere reflection of the *White Man's Burden*⁸⁶⁴ to civilize the other and “to bring light to the dark-skinned peoples of the world.”⁸⁶⁵

This exactly is what Foucault means – disciplinary mechanisms are there *a priori*, they lie on “[t]he constant division between the normal and abnormal.”⁸⁶⁶ The division requires not only a branding to sustain a “*system of differentiations* which permits one to act upon the acts of others;”⁸⁶⁷ it also needs action. Disciplinary “power is not a function of consent,” it “exists only when it is put into action.”⁸⁶⁸ George Orwell agrees, saying that each teacher that thinks his students like him is actually mocked; as any adult that is not considered dangerous is deemed to be.⁸⁶⁹ Translated into international sphere, a state as the individual is considered to be a full man and allowed to be part of “us” as a sovereign equal if and only if it abides by “our” normal. If not, “our” norms of equality are put aside, system of differentiations enters into stage, and

⁸⁶³ Anonymous, “Sanitary Administration in Egypt.”

⁸⁶⁴ Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden, 1899,” *Part 2: The Modern World in the Twentieth Century of World History -II Course Syllabus of University of Delaware*, undated, <http://www1.udel.edu/History-old/figal/Hist104/assets/pdf/readings/11whitemanburden.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2021).

⁸⁶⁵ Andrew Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 68, no. 1 (2009): 85.

⁸⁶⁶ Foucault, “‘Panopticalism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,’” 5.

⁸⁶⁷ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 792. *Emphasis* original.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 788.

⁸⁶⁹ Orwell, *Kitaplar ve Sigaralar*, 117.

disciplinary measures are introduced. As sanctions ignore *jus in bello*, they also ignore sovereign equality and nonintervention, which “only applies in *European* [i.e. Western] affairs, that is, among the civilized.”⁸⁷⁰ As the sanctioned party is the “other” that needs to be disciplined, “we” the Western world, “succumb[ing] to the temptation of paternalism,”⁸⁷¹ need to intervene and “tame”⁸⁷² the Oriental other. The discourse of us and them automatically creates inequality between parties, allows “one to act upon acts of others,”⁸⁷³ and obliges disciplinary power to be exercised “upon their

⁸⁷⁰ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 86. *Emphasis* mine. Still, it should be noted that the civilized West is not a monolithic unit. As Bobo Lo aptly observes:

Despite talk of shared values, it is unclear what those values are and to what extent they are shared. Are the commonalities between the Trump Administration and, say, the coalition government of German Chancellor Angela Merkel greater than the differences between them? ... What is one to make of Hungary and Poland, where the separation of powers barely survives? Meanwhile, leaders such as Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán appear to have more in common with authoritarian rulers than with their counterparts in NATO.

Bobo Lo, “Global Order in the Shadow of the Coronavirus: China, Russia and the West,” *Lowy Institute Analyses*, July 29, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Bobo%20Lo%2C%20Global%20Order%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20the%20Coronavirus%20-%20China%2C%20Russia%2C%20and%20the%20West_web.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021), 21-22.

⁸⁷¹ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 86.

⁸⁷² The wording is used for North Korea. Tina J. Park, “Time for a NATO Strategy on North Korea?,” *NATO Defense College Policy Brief*, no 7, April 2020, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1431> (accessed November 29, 2021), 1. Similar embedded Orientalism is there about Iran, where “[c]ritics of the JCPOA were concerned with Iran’s ability to cause trouble if granted economic prosperity.” Brian O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran Nuclear Deal: Not So Easy,” *Atlantic Council Issue Brief*, January 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/rejoining-the-iran-nuclear-deal-not-so-easy/> (accessed November 29, 2021), 2. *Emphasis* mine. Russia also takes its share from Oriental prejudices being an expansionist occupier nation. Kula, *Bati Felsefesinde Oryantalizm ve Türk İmgesi*, 162.

⁸⁷³ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 792.

actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.”⁸⁷⁴

This inequality is inherent also in Kant’s⁸⁷⁵ understanding of absence of war among democracies – “we” as supreme developed countries do not wage wars among and against each other; yet when it comes to the “others,” war is an option especially to help the other to develop. However, “[i]dealistic appropriations of democratic peace theory can be used to rationalize immoral means.”⁸⁷⁶ In other words, the theory risks to be an extension of colonialism, “it can be employed in political discourse as an ideological prop for unjust wars – as a myth or ideal that insulates war from criticism.”⁸⁷⁷

This research, in taking five case studies, tried to question how the sanctions are designed and implemented and whether the sanctions as measures short of war manage to attain their aim. It is concluded that in all these five cases, sanctions indeed do not stop short of war; on the contrary, operating out of *jus in bello*, sanctions go well beyond wars and inflict harm on innocent civilians. This, of course, does not mean that wars are better than sanctions; argument here points not to the betterness but to the unregulated nature of sanctions measures. Yet still, the sanctions also fail to change the behavior of the target country in the way desired by the sender. Moreover, they

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid, 789.

⁸⁷⁵ Kant, *Ebedi Barış Üzerine Felsefi Deneme*.

⁸⁷⁶ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 78.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid, 82-3.

became tools of choice among the policy alternatives and once initiated, they are very hardly removed. Therefore, we conclude that, in all the cases from different regions of the world, there is one common point: Sanctions are sent by Western countries, target non-Western ones, reflect a paternalistic attitude employed among unequal parties of the game of international diplomacy; in a nutshell, sanctions exhibit Foucauldian disciplinary tools which carry considerable amount of Orientalist notions.

REFERENCES

“An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe.” *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty* (originally published in Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*), July 16, 2009. https://www.rferl.org/a/An_Open_Letter_To_The_Obama_Administration_From_Central_And_Eastern_Europe/1778449.html (accessed May 5, 2022).

Abrahamian, Ervand *Modern Iran Tarihi*. Translated by Dilek Şendil. İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2020, 7th edition.

Abu Shumays, Ahmad. *Economic and Technical Aspects of Egypt's High Aswan Dam*. California: California Institute of Technology, 1962.

Abu-Zeid, M. A. and F. Z. el-Shibini. “Egypt's High Aswan Dam.” *Water Resources Development* 13, no. 2 (1997): 209-217.

Adıbelli, Barış. *Büyük Avrasya Projesi*. İstanbul: IQ, 2006.

Alagöz, Emine Akçadağ. “Stratejik Kültür Perspektifinden Kuzey Kore'nin Nükleer Programı.” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no. 61 (2019): 111-26.

Albaum, Melvin. “Cooperative Agricultural Settlement in Egypt and Israel.” *Land Economics* 42, no. 2 (1966): 221-5.

Albayrak, Recep. *Türklerin İran'ı: Yakın Gelecek*. Ankara: Berikan Yayınları, 2013. 2 volumes.

Alexander, Kern. *Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Alexandra Kuimova, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Pieter D. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2021,” *SIPRI*, March 2022, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf. (accessed April 20, 2022).

- Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. US: Little Brown, 1971.
- Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Adjusting to Sanctions." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (1997): 31-41.
- Anderson, Gordon L. "Beyond Realism: Values, Interests, Levels, and Spheres in International Relations Theory." *International Journal on World Peace* 31, no. 2 (2014): 3-9.
- Anonymous. "A Growing Crisis: The Impact of Sanctions and Regime Policies on Iranians' Economic and Social Rights," *the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran*, 2013, <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Growing-Crisis.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2020).
- Anonymous. "Arab League." *International Organizations* 10, no. 4 (1956): 646-7.
- Anonymous. "Coronavirus Live Update - Reported Cases and Deaths by Country, Territory, or Conveyance." *Wordometer* (June 15, 2021), <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries> (accessed June 15, 2021).
- Anonymous. "Poll: Iran Attitudes on Nuclear Deal." *Iran Primer*, May 10, 2018, <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/may/10/poll-iranian-attitudes-nuclear-deal> (accessed February 29, 2020).
- Anonymous. "Russia Sanctions List." *Risk Advisory*, September 27, 2019, <https://www.riskadvisory.com/sanctions/russia-sanctions-list/> (accessed February 8, 2020).
- Anonymous. "Sanitary Administration in Egypt," *The British Medical Journal* 2, no. 1548 (1890): 510-11.
- Anonymous. "Savaşın Kitabı." *Atlas* special issue (2003).
- Anonymous. "SWIFT and Sanctions," *Compliance*, undated, <https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance/swift-and-sanctions> (accessed August 1, 2020).

- Anonymous. *Background Brief: Afghanistan – A Cultural Appreciation Booklet*, January 2007, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/16870/afghanistan_cultural_appreciation_booklet.pdf (accessed December 5, 2020).
- Anonymous. *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide*. Undated, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/MCIA-CultureGuide.pdf> (accessed December 5, 2020).
- Arbour, Louise. “The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice.” *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 445–58.
- Aris, Ben. “Impact of Sanctions on Russia: An Assessment,” *European Leadership Network Policy Brief*, July 2014, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Impact-of-Sanctions_Ben-Aris.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Ashley, Richard. “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problématique.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17, no. 2 (1988).
- Askari, Hossein, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang. *Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003.
- Askari, Hussein and John Forrer, Hildy Teegan and Jianwen Yang. *Economic Sanctions - Examining their Philosophy and Efficacy*. Westport, CO: Praeger, 2003.
- Avorin, Dennis and Judith Levy. “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions on Russia.” *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies* 770 (March 16, 2018).
- Axworthy, Michael. *Revolutionary Iran: A History of Islamic Republic*. UK: Penguin, 2014.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty.” *International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002): 81–102.
- Baldwin, David A. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.

- Bartlett, Jason. "Exposing the Financial Footprints of North Korea's Hackers," *CNAS Report* (November 18, 2020), <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/exposing-the-financial-footprints-of-north-koreas-hackers> (accessed on November 23, 2020).
- Basaran, Tugba, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and R. B .J. Walker. "Transversal Lines: An Introduction." In *International Political Sociology: Transversal Lies*, ed. Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and R. B .J. Walker, 1-9. London, New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Başbuğ, İlker. *Terör Örgütlerinin Sonu*. İstanbul: Remzi, 2011, 2nd edition.
- Basu, Pranab Kanti. "World of the Third." *Economic and Political Weekly* L, no. 31 (2015): 75-80.
- Bates, Robert H. "Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible Synthesis," *Africa Today* 44, no. 2 (1997): 123-32.
- Bathmangelidj, Esfandyar (coordinator). "Iran's Year under Maximum Pressure: The Political Limits of Economic Resilience," *Bourse&Bazaar Special Report* (2020).
- Beardsley, Kyle and Victor Asal. "Winning with the Bomb." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009): 278-301.
- Becca, Bianca and Dmitriy Miryan. "Russia Undeterred: The Failure of Smart Sanctions." *The Policy Corner*, August 15, 2017, <https://www.policycorner.org/en/2017/08/15/russia-undeterred-the-failure-of-smart-sanctions/> (accessed February 2, 2020).
- Bechtol, Bruce E. "North Korea's Nuclear Weaponization Program." In *Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobel, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, 38-49. UK: Routledge, 2018.
- Behrouzan, Orkideh and Tara Sepehri Far. "The Impact of Sanctions on Medical Education in Iran," *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/orkideh-behrouzan-tara-sepehri-far> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Benkovskis, Konstantins, Julia Pastusenko and Julia Wörz. "Assessing the Full Extent of EU-Russia Trade Integration in the Presence of Global Value Chains."

Focus on European Economic Integration - Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank) 3 (2014): 31-47.

Bergner, Gwen. "Veiled Motives: Women's Liberation and the War in Afghanistan." In *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess, 95- 116. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.

Beserames, John. *Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II*. Australia: ANU Press, 2016.

Bickerton, Christopher, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch, eds. *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*. London: UCL Press, 2007.

Bigo, Didier. "Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon." *Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (in)Security Games*, 5-49.

Bigo, Didier. "Comment Douter de l Sécurité ?." *Hommes et Migrations* 141 (2003) : 32-42.

Bigo, Didier. "Delivering Liberty and Security? The Reforming of Freedom when Associated with Security," in *Europe's 21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty*, ed. Didier Bigo, Sergio Camera, Elspeth Guild, R. B. J. Walker, 263-87. England, USA: Ashgate, 2010.

Bigo, Didier. "Michel Foucault and International Relations: Cannibal Relations." In *Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies of World Politics*, ed. Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo, Frederic Gros, 33-59. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Bila, Fikret. *Komutanlar Cephesi*. İstanbul: Detay, 2007, 2nd edition.

Bilgen, Arda. "Güvenliksiz Kalkınma, Kalkınmasız Güvenlik Mümkün mü? Güvenlik-Kalkınma İlişkisinin Dönüşüm Süreci ve Farklı Yaklaşımlarla Kavramsallaştırılması." *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 14 (2017): 19-40.

Biscop, Sven. "Is Putin Winning, or Is He Trying not to Lose?," *Security Policy Brief* 154 (2022).

- Biswas, Asit K. and Cecilia Tortajada. "Impacts of the High Aswan Dam." In *Impacts of Large Dams: A Global Assessment*, ed. Cecilia Tortajada, 379-95. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012.
- Bjørkmann, Kjetil J. "The Impact from the Russian import-ban (2014-) on the Norwegian Seafood Industry: When an Export-Dependent Industry Face Spillover Effects from Geopolitical Conflicts." Master's thesis, University of Oslo, 2016.
- Blair, Bruce G. "Ukraine's Nuclear Backlash." *Brookings Review* 11, no. 3 (1993): 46.
- Blanc, Jarrett and Andrew S. Weiss. "U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Congress Should Go Back to Fundamentals," *Carnegie Endowment Paper*, April 3, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/03/u.s.-sanctions-on-russia-congress-should-go-back-to-fundamentals-pub-78755> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Blank, Stephan. "The Greater Middle East and its Strategic Profile." *Alternatives* 3, no.1 (Spring 2004): 1-35.
- Blix, Hans. "From an Isolated Iran to Isolated US," *European Leadership Network*, November 2017, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/from-an-isolated-iran-to-an-isolated-us/> (accessed October 13, 2020).
- Bohan, Celestine. "The Sanctions against Russia: What did West and Media Expect." *Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center Discussion Paper* D90 (2015)
- Bond, Ian, Christian Odendahl and Jennifer Rankin. "Frozen: The Politics and Economics of Sanctions against Russia." *Centre for European Reform* (March 2015).
- Bonditti, Philippe. "Introduction: the International as an Object for Thought." In *Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies of World Politics*, ed. Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo, Frederic Gros, 1-12. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908 – 2009*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003, 21st edition.

- British Petroleum, *Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2020, <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2020).
- British Petroleum. “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” 2022. <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2022),
- Bros, Aurelie. Tatiana Mitrova and Kirsten Westphal. “German Russian Gas Relations: A Special Relationship in Troubled Waters.” *SWP Research Paper* 13 (2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP13_wep_EtAl.pdf (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Brown, Chris, and Kirsten Ainley. *Understanding International Relations*. 4th ed. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Robert M. Gates. *Iran'in Zamani Geldi*. Translated by Sermin Karakale. İstanbul: Profil, 2008, 2nd edition.
- Buddenberg, Doris. “On the Cultural History of Opium – How Poppy came to Afghanistan.” *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, January 11, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/on-the-cultural-history-of-opium-and-how-poppy-came-to-afghanistan/> (accessed February 15, 2020).
- Buklemishev, Oleg. “Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia,” *Carnegie Moscow Center*, August 13, 2015, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/61005> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Palgrave, 2002, 3rd edition.
- Buzan, Barry and Charles Jones, and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- Buzan, Barry, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of Columbia Press, 1993.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- Buzan, Barry. "Culture and International Society." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 1 (2010): 1–25.
- Buzan, Barry. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School." *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 327–52.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York, London: Hemel Hempstead, Harvester, 1991, 2nd edition.
- Çam, Mehmet Mert. *İran'da İstihbarat Savaşı: Birinci Dünya Davası'nda İran Cephesi'ndeki Psikolojik Harp Faaliyetleri*. İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat, 2016.
- Carl Von Clausewitz. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Carmi, Omer. "Iran's Nuclear Roadmap for 2019: Pushing the JCPOA's Boundaries." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy - Policy Watch* 3670 (2019).
- Çaşın, Mesut Hakkı. "NATO Stratejisindeki Değişim ve Rusya-NATO Rekabetinin Geleceği." In *Putin'in Ülkesi: Yeni Yüzyıl Eşiğinde Rusya Federasyonu Analizi*, ed. İrfan Kaya Ülger. Ankara: Seçkin, 2015.
- Central Intelligence Agency, "Iran," *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on July 21, 2020; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html> (accessed on July 31, 2020).
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on July 21, 2020; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed on July 31, 2020).

- Central Intelligence Agency. "Russia." *World Factbook: Country Reports*, updated on January 19, 2022; <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#economy> (accessed on January 20, 2022).
- Charap, Samuel and Jeremy Shapiro. "US-Russian Relations: The Middle Cannot Hold." *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 150-5.
- Chaudhri, Mohammed Ahsen. "New Egypt and the West." *Pakistan Horizon* 9, no. 3 (1956): 130-42.
- Chomsky, Noam and Andre Vltychek. *On Western Terrorism*. New York: Pluto Press, 2013,
- Chow, Edward C. and Andrew Stanley. "Russia's National Oil Champion Goes Global." *CSIS Briefs* (2018); https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180627_Chow_RussiasNationalOilChamp.pdf?A34fyMoqttnspqdf6gl2HF9rayuPiCPx (accessed August 2, 2020).
- Christie, Edward Hunter. "Does Russia Have the Fiscal Capacity to Achieve its Military Modernisation Goals?." *The RUSI Journal* 162, no. 5 (2017): 4-15.
- Christopherson, Susan, Jonathan Michie and Peter Tyler. "Regional Resilience: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives," *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 3, no. 10 (2010): 3-10.
- Chubin, Sharam, and Charles Tripp. *Iran and Iraq at War*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1988.
- Çitlioğlu, Ercan. *İran'ı Anlamak*. Ankara: Başkent University, 2015.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Coll, Steve. *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*. US, UK: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2018.
- Committee for Development Policy. "List of Least Developed Countries." *United Nations*, December 2018, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp->

[content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf](#) (accessed February 15, 2020).

Conley, Heather A., and Donatienne Ruy. *The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022.

Conley, Heather A., James Mina, Ruslan Stefanov, and Martin Vladimirov. *The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe : A Report of the CSIS Europe Program and the CSD Economics Program*. Lanham, Washington, Dc: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

Conley, Heather A., Ruslan Stefanov, Donatienne Ruy, and Martin Vladimirov. *The Kremlin Playbook 2: The Enablers*. Washington, D.C: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Copeland, Dale. "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of Cold War 1985-91." In *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence and National Security*, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, Norrin M. Ripsman. 14-58. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez. *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*. Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 2000.

Coster-Mullen, John. *Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man*. US: Spiral bound, 2002.

Council of the European Union. "Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)," 2004. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201> (accessed January 28, 2021).

Council of the European Union. "Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2012," 2018. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed January 28, 2021).

Council of the European Union. "Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) - Update of the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures," 2018. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8519-2018-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed January 28, 2021).

Council Regulation 2271/96, 22 November 1996

Country Economy. "Egypt GDP - Gross Domestic Product." *GDP – Gross Domestic Product*, 2018; <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/egypt> (accessed July 31, 2020).

Cox, Dan G., and A. Cooper Drury. "Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions." *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (November 2006): 709–22.

Cox, Frederick J. "The Russian Presence in Egypt." *Naval War College Review* 22, no. 6 (1970): 44-53.

Crist, Raymond E. "Backgrounds of Conflict in Egypt," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 11, no. 2 (1952): 113-117.

Crozet, Matthieu and Julian Hinz. "Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions." *Kiel Institute Report 2059* (updated July 2017).

Cummings, Bruce. "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29, no.1 (1997): 6-26.

Cunliffe, Philip. "Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility." In *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*, edited by Christopher Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch, 39–57. London: UCL Press, 2007.

d’Anieri, Paul. *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*. USA: Wadsworth, 2010, 3rd edition.

David, Steven R. "Third World Alignment." *World Politics* 43: 2 (1991): 233-56.

Davidson, Christopher M. *The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence*. London: Hurst, 2010.

Davidson, Jason W. *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-Quo States*. NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006.

- de Galbert, Simond. "A Year of Sanctions Against Russia – Now What?," *CSIS Report*, (October 2015).
- Department of State, "Ukraine and Russia Sanctions" (January 29, 2020), <https://www.state.gov/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions/> (accessed on January 31, 2020).
- Devlen, Balkan, and Özgür Özdamar. "Uluslararası İlişkilerde İngiliz Okulu Kuramı: Kökenleri, Kavramları ve Tartışmaları." *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 7, no. 25 (2010): 43–67. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43926319>.
- Diaz-Bone, Rainer. "Economics of Convention Meets Foucault." *Historical Social Research* 44, no. 1 (2019): 308-34.
- Directorate General [of] Budget. "Citizens Budget: A Simplified Version of the National Budget 1398." *Ministry of Finance* (2019), [https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal Year 1398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20\(English%20Version\).pdf](https://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/Fiscal%20Year%201398/1398%20Citizen%20Budget%20(English%20Version).pdf) (accessed February 20, 2020).
- Ditrich, Ondrej. "Good Cop or Bad Cop? Sanctioning Belarus | European Union Institute for Security Studies." *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, March 4, 2013. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/good-cop-or-bad-cop-sanctioning-belarus> (accessed on January 31, 2021).
- Dolidze, Tatia. "EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: Sanctioner-Sanctionee's Game of Thrones," *CEPS Working Paper* 402 (January 2015), <https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=8848&pdf=WD%20402%20TD%20Sanctions.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Dorransoro, Gilles. *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*. Washington, Moscow, Brussels, Beijing, Beirut: Carnegie, 2009.
- Dougherty, James E. "Aswan Decision in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, 74, no. 1 (1959): 21-45.
- Downing, Lisa. *The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Doxey, Margaret P. *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

- Doxey, Margaret P. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion." *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (December 1998): 709–31.
- Eaton, Jonathan, and Maxim Engers. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics." *American Economic Review* 89, no. 2 (May 1999): 409–14.
- Ebtekar, Massoumeh. *Takeover in Tehran: the Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture*. As told to Fred A. Reed. Burnaby, B.C.: Talonbooks, 2000.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. "Iran," *Country Report* (2021), November 10.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. "North Korea," *Country Report* (2018), April 2.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. "Russia," *Country Report* (2021), November 10.
- Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety (EAMS). "Egyptian SOLAS ships accidents statistics." *Accident Statistics* (undated), http://www.eams.gov.eg/Home/Statistics_en0 (accessed February 23, 2020).
- Eickelman, Dale. *The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach*. USA: Prentice Hall, 1998, 3rd edition.
- Eisenstadt, Michael. "The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change." *MES Monographs* 7 (2015).
- Eisenstadt, Michael. *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions*. Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996.
- El Mallakh, Ragaei. "Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt," *Land Economics* 35, no. 1 (1959): 15-23.
- el-Baradei, Mohamed. "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region." *IAEA*, April 26, 2005, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-pursuing-security-region-region>.

- el-Katiri, Laura and Bassam Fattouh. "A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA*, ed. Giacomo Luciani, 58-87. Boston: Brill, 2017.
- El-Malik, Sheira S. "Why Orientalism Still Matters: Reading 'Casual Forgetting' and 'Active Remembering' as Neoliberal Forms of Contestation in International Politics." *Review of International Politics* 41 (2015): 503-25.
- el-Said, Hamed and Richard Barrett. "Enhancing the Understanding of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon in Syria." *United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism* (July 2017), https://www.rcc.int/p-cve/download/docs/Report_Final_20170727.pdf/fe2e72478b396372d410d55d2880750d.pdf (accessed February 15, 2020).
- Eremenko, Alezey. "The 'Who, What, When' of Russia Sanctions: A Cheat-Sheet for Laymen," *Russia Matters*, September 26, 2018; <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/who-what-when-russia-sanctions-cheat-sheet-laymen> (accessed May 25, 2020).
- Eriksson, Mikael. *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions*. England: Ashgate, 2011.
- Esfahani, Hadi Salehi. "The Experience of Iran's Manufacturing Sector under International Economic Sanctions," *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2018, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/hadi-salehi-esfahani> (accessed November 29, 2021). European Council. "EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine (since 2014)," undated, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/> (accessed May 5, 2022).
- European Council. "Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010," *Council of the European Union*, March 23, 2012; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0267&from=EN> (accessed August 1, 2020).
- European External Action Service. "Chair's Statement Following the 28 June 2019 Meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," *Statements*, June 28, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/64796/chairs-statement-following-28-june-2019-meeting-joint-commission-joint-comprehensive-plan_en (accessed February 29, 2020).

- European Parliament, “Resolution on Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and Russian attacks in the Czech Republic,” 2021/2642(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0236_EN.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
- Ewans, Martin. *Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics*. NY: Perennial, 2002.
- Facon, Isabelle and Bruno Tertrais. “La Russie et l’emploi des armes nucléaires: le sens des propos de Vladimir Poutine lors de Valdaï-2018,” *FRS Papers* 21 (November 5, 2018)
- Fardoust, Shahrokh. “Macroeconomic Impacts of Us Sanctions (2017-2019) on Iran,” *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/fardoust> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Farrall, Jeremy Matam. *United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Fawcett, Louise. “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective.” In *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luck van Langenhove, 21-37. London, Ann Harbor: Pluto Press, 2005.
- Fayazmanesh, Sasan. “The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran,” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 35, no. 3 (2003): 221-40.
- Feste, Karen A. *Intervention: Shaping the Global Order*. USA: Praeger, 2003.
- Fiala, Andrew. “The Democratic Peace Myth,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 68, no. 1 (2009): 77-89.
- Field, Michael. *Inside the Arab World*, USA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Fischer, Sabine. “European Union Sanctions against Russia: Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps.” *SWP Comments* 17 (March 2015).
- Fitzpatrick, Mark. *Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment*. USA: IISS, 2011.

- Fokkema, Douwe. *Perfect Worlds: Utopian Fiction in China and the West*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011.
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Commodity Policy and Projections Service Commodities and Trade Division. "Egypt." *WTO Agreement on Agriculture: The Implementation Experience - Developing Country Case Studies* (2003), <http://www.fao.org/3/Y4632E/y4632e0c.htm#fn31> (accessed February 23, 2020).
- Forough, Mohammadbagher. "Geographic Agency: Iran as a 'Civilizational Crossroads' in the Belt and Road Geography." In *Global Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity*, ed. Florian Schneider, 291-313. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021.
- Foucault, Michel. "'Panopticalism' from 'Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison.'" *Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts* 2, no. 1 (2008): 1-12.
- Foucault, Michel. "The Subject and Power." *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95.
- Frantz-Murphy, Gladys. "A New Interpretation of the Economic History of Medieval Egypt: The Role of the Textile Industry 254-567/868-1171," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 24, no. 3 (1981): 274-97.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
- French, Paul. *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*. New York, London: Zed Books, 2014.
- Friedman, Uri. "Two Ways to Read the Newest Intelligence on North Korea." *The Atlantic* (August 1, 2018), <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/north-korea-missile/566429/> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- Gabuev, Alexander. "Good Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia's Role on the Korean Peninsula." *Carnegie Russia*, April 24, 2019; <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976> (accessed August 2, 2020).

- Gadoury, Christopher L. "Should the United States Officially Recognize the Taliban? The International Legal and Political Considerations," *Houston Journal of International Law* 23, no. 2 (2001): 385-428.
- Galtung, Johan. "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia." *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967): 378-416.
- Gareis, Sven B. *The United Nations: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Gazprom. "Nord Stream 2." *Projects*, undated; <https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/> (accessed August 2, 2020).
- Gelvin, James L. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Geranmayeh, Ellie and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil. "Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions," *European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief*, June 29, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/publication/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions/ (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Geranmayeh, Ellie, Barbara Slavin and Sahil Shah. "Renewing Transatlantic Strategy on Iran," *ELN- Atlantic Council Issue Brief*, November 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Transatlantic-Strategy-Iran-IB.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Gerges, Fawaz A. *The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Gibbs, Hamilton A. R. *Area Studies Reconsidered*. UK: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1963.
- Gibson, Nigel C. "It's the Opium, Stupid: Afghanistan, Globalization, and Drugs." In *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess, 31-49. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Giumelli, Francesco. "How EU Sanctions Work: A New Narrative." *EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Papers*, 2013.

- Giumelli, Francesco. "Sanctioning Russia: The Right Questions." *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, February 13, 2015. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sanctioning-russia-right-questions> (accessed on January 31, 2021).
- Giumelli, Francesco. *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011.
- Gonzalez, Nathan. *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice*. US: Praeger, 2007.
- Goodson, Larry P. *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001.
- Gordon, Joel. *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution*. Egypt: American University in Cairo, 1996.
- Gordon, Joy. "Extraterritoriality: Issues of Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect in the Cases of Cuba and Iran." *Harvard International Law Journal Online* 57 (2016): 1-12.
- Gottemoeller, Rose. "The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory." *Survival* 49, no. 4 (December 2007): 99–110.
- Gottemoeller, Rose. "What's Eating Putin?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 3, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/whats-eating-putin/> (accessed April 1, 2022)
- Gros, Daniel. "Regional Disintegration in the Soviet Union: Economic Costs and Benefits," *Intereconomics* 26, no. 5 (1991).
- Gross, Eva. "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's Contribution." *ISS Occasional Paper*, 78 (2009).
- Güney, Nurşin A. *Batı'nın Yeni Güvenlik Stratejileri: AB-NATO-ABD*. İstanbul: Bağlam, 2006.
- Güngörmüş Kona, Gamze. *Türkiye-Orta Asya İşbirliği Stratejileri ve Gelecek Senaryoları*. İstanbul: IQ Yayınları, 2003, 2nd edition.

- Gürbey, Gülistan. *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 'Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2010.
- Haass, Richard N. "From Sanctions to the Soleimani Strike to Escalation: Evaluating the Administration's Iran Policy," *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 14, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29951?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Hakimdavar, Golnoosh. *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law and Development*. New York, London: Routledge, 2014.
- Halliday, Fred. *Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror and Jihad have Changed the English Language*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- Hamid, Shadi. *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Hannah, Matthew. "Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 96, no. 3 (2006): 622-40.
- Hanson, Philip. *Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945*. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Harrell, Peter E. "Lessons from Russia for the Future of Sanctions," *Center for a New American Security*, September 2015, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06193?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Harrell, Peter E., Tom Keatinge, Sarah Lain and Elisabeth Rosenberg. "The Future of Transatlantic Sanctions on Russia," *Center for a New American Security – CNAS*, June 15, 2017, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-future-of-transatlantic-sanctions-on-russia> (accessed November 29, 2021), 3.
- Hasur, Prashant. "Politics of UNSC Sanctions: The Issue of Nuclear Weapons Development," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper 25* (2010).

- Hatemi, Bilal. "İran'da Eşitsizlik, Yoksulluk ve Sosyal Refah Siyaseti." *Maduniyet* 1 (2019): 19-36.
- Heine, Jorge. "From Club to Network Diplomacy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, PAGES. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Heiran-Nia, Javad. "Iran Won't Break with Russia over Ukraine. Here's Why," *Atlantic Council - IranSource* (blog), March 30, 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-wont-break-with-russia-over-ukraine-heres-why/> (accessed on April 1, 2022).
- Heisbourg, François. "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad." *Survival* 41, no. 4 (January 1999): 5–19.
- Held, Colbert C. *Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, 2nd edition.
- Henry, Clement Moore and Robert Springborg. *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*. UK: Cambridge University Press: 2005, 5th printing.
- Herz, John H. *International Politics in the Atomic Age*. New York: Columbia University, 1959.
- Herz, John H. *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Hess, Gregory D. and Athanasios Orphanides. "War and Democracy," CESifo Working Paper, no. 201, November 1999, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/75566/1/cesifo_wp201.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021), 26.
- Hill, Fiona. "Putin: The One-Man Show the West Doesn't Understand." *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 140-4.
- Hobsbawn, Eric. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. Great Britain: Abacus, 1995.

- Hofmann, Murad. "Muslims Torn between Occident and Orient." *Islamic Studies* 37, no. 3 (1998): 381–393.
- Holbik, Karel and Edward Drachman. "Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid: 1955-1970," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 127, no. 1 (1971): 137-65.
- Holmes, Leslie. "Corruption and Organized Crime in Putin's Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 6 (2008): 1011-31.
- Hooglund, Eric. "Iran and the Gulf War." *MERIP* 148 (1987): 12-8.
- Hopf, Ted. "Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics." *International Organizations* 67 (2013): 317-54.
- Hovi, Jon, Robert Huseby and Detlef F. Sprinz. "When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?," *World Politics* 57 (2005): 479 – 99
- Howard, Rhoda E. "Occidentalism, Human Rights, and the Obligations of Western Scholars." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 29, no. 1 (1995): 110-126.
- Hufbauer, Gary C., Kimberley A. Elliott, and Jeffrey J. Schott. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: IIE, 1990, 2nd edition. 2 vols.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London, N.Y.: Simon&Schuster, 1996.
- IMF. "2015 Article IV Consultation," IMF Country Report No. 15/349, December 2015.
- IMF. *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia*, Washington: IMF, 2007.
- Inshakov, Oleg and Elena Inshakova. "Russian Nanotechnology Industry Development: The Impact of External Political and Economic Sanctions," *European Research Studies* XIX, no. 2 (2016): 189-204.
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) webpage, <https://www.icanw.org/>

- International Court of Justice, “Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Provisional Decision,” *Reposits of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders* General List No. 175 (October 3, 2018); <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2020).
- International Crisis Group, “Flattening the Curve of U.S.- Iran Tension,” *Middle East Brief* 76 (2020), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/b76-flattening-curve-us-iran-tensions> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- International Energy Agency. *World Energy Outlook*. Paris: IEA, 2016.
- Jackson, Robert H., and Georg Sørensen. *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Jalalzai, Zubeda and David Jefferess. “Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan.” In *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation Building*, ed. Zubeda Jalalzai and David Jefferess, 1-30. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Jang, Jiawen, Hossein Askari, John Forrer and Hildy Teegen. “US Economic Sanctions against China: Who Gets Hurt?.” *The World Economy* 27, no.7 (2004): 1047-1081
- Jones, Ann. *Kabul in Winter: Life without Peace in Afghanistan*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
- Kadri, Ali. *The Unmaking of Arab Socialism*. London, New York, Melbourne, Delhi: Anthem Press, 2016.
- Kaempfer, William H., and Anton D. Lowenberg. “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions.” In *Handbook of Defense Economics*, edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 867–911. Netherlands: Elsevier, 2007.
- Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. London: Atlantic Books, 2003.
- Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars*. Stanford University Press: US, 2007.

- Kant, Immanuel. *Ebedî Barış Üzerine Felsefî Deneme*. Translated by Yavuz Abadan and Seha L. Meray. Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaası, 1960.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Political Writings*. Translated by H. S. Reiss and H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Kasonta, Adriel. "Introduction," in *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta (UK: Bow Group, 2015), 5-6, <http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Katz, Mark N. "When the Friend of My Enemy is not My Friend: The United States, US Allies, and Russia in the Middle East." *Atlantic Council Issue Brief* (2019); https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/When_the_Friend_of_My_Friends_is_Not_My_Friend.pdf (accessed August 2, 2020).
- Katzenstein, Peter J. *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Cornell University Press: London, Ithaca, 2005.
- Katzman, Kenneth and Clayton Thomas. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." *CRS Report*, 7-5700 (2017).
- Katzman, Kenneth. "Iran Sanctions." *CRS Report* RS20871, updated September 11, 2019.
- Kaya, Talat. *Ekonomik Yaptırımların Uluslararası Ticari Sözleşmelerden Kaynaklanan Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümüne Etkisi*. Ankara: Adalet, 2022.
- Kennedy, David. *The Rights of Spring: A Memoir of Innocence Abroad*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown, 1977.
- Keohane, Robert O. "Power and Interdependence Revisited." *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 725–53.

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

Khlopkov, Anton. "How the United States Helped Iran Build a Lazer Enrichment Laboratory." *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no. 1 (2013): 39-62.

Kim, Hyun-Kyung, Elizabeth Phillip and Hattie Chung. "North Korea's Biological Weapons Program: The Known and Unknown." *Project on Managing the Microbe Belfer Center Report* (October 2017), <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/NK%20Bioweapons%20final.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2020).

Kim, Jina. *The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Crisis: The Nuclear Taboo Revisited?* US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and Roots of Middle East Terror*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003.

Kinzer, Stephen. *Overthrow: America's Change of Regime from Hawaii to Iraq*. New York: Times Books, 2006.

Kipling, Rudyard. "The White Man's Burden, 1899," *Part 2: The Modern World in the Twentieth Century of World History -II Course Syllabus of University of Delaware*, undated, <http://www1.udel.edu/History-old/figal/Hist104/assets/pdf/readings/11whitemanburden.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2021).

Kirk, Donald. "Second Trump-Kim Summit is a Possibility." *Inside Sources* (July 23, 2018), <http://www.insidesources.com/second-trump-kim-summit-possibility/> (accessed February 22, 2020).

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. US: Simon&Schuster, 1994.

Kitchener, Lord. "Egypt in 1912," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 61, no. 3170 (1913): 908-9.

Klare, Michael T. *Blood and Oil : The Dangers and Consequences of America's*

- Growing Dependence on Oil*. US: Holt Paperbacks, 2005.
- Klinova, Marina and Elena Sidarova. "Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on Russian Economic Relations with the European Union." *Problems of Economic Transition* 58, no. 3 (2016): 218-34.
- Knight, Nathaniel. "Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?." *Slavic Review* 59, no. 1 (2000): 74-100.
- Koluman, Aziz. *Dünyada Su Sorunları ve Stratejileri*. 2nd ed. Ankara: ASAM, 2003.
- Krasner, Stephan. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Krasner, Stephen D. "Rethinking the Sovereign State Model." *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001).
- Krasner, Stephen D., ed. *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris. "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016): 125-134.
- Kula, Onur Bilge. *Batı Felsefesinde Oryantalizm ve Türk İmgesi*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018, 3rd edition.
- Kuranga, David Oladipupo. *The Power of Interdependence: Lessons from Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Kvintradze, Eteri. "Russia's Output Collapse and Recovery: Evidence from the Post-Soviet Transition." *IMF Working Paper* WP/10/89 (April 1, 2010).
- Kyselchuk, Elina. "Examining the Policy of Sanctions: What Effect have the Sanctions had so far?." In *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta, 7-15. UK: Bow Group, 2015, <http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).

- Laine, Veera. "Evolution of Russia's 'Others' in Presidential Discourse in 2000-2020." In *Nexus of Patriotism and Militarism in Russia: Nexus of Patriotism and Militarism in Russia*, 49–79. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2021.
- Langewiesche, William. "The Wrath of Khan." *The Atlantic*, 2005.
- Laron, Guy. *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization 1945-1956*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013.
- Lefebvre, Louis. "What Remains of Development Economics?." *Indian Economic Review* 2 (1992): 215-29.
- Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. "The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions." *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 6 (November 2003): 641–60. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433030406002>.
- Lepgold, Joseph and Miroslava Nincic. *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Leservot, Typhaine. "Occidentalism: Rewriting the West in Marjane Satrapi's *Persépolis*." *French Forum* 36, no. 1 (2011): 115–130.
- Lo, Bobo. "Global Order in the Shadow of the Coronavirus: China, Russia and the West," *Lowy Institute Analyses*, July 29, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Bobo%20Lo%2C%20Global%20Order%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20the%20Coronavirus%20-%20China%2C%20Russia%2C%20and%20the%20West_web.pdf (accessed November 29, 2021), 21-22
- LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy. "After the Drug Wars." *LSE Ideas* (February 2016), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-After-Drug-Wars.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2020).
- Lynch, Marc. *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2013.

- Magnusson, P. Magnus. "Life Eternal: I Orient and Occident." *Social Science* 5, no. 2 (1930): 216–228.
- Major, Solomon, and Anthony J. McGann. "Caught in the Crossfire." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (June 2005): 337–59.
- Mansfield, Peter. "Egypt after Nasser." *The World Today* 27, no. 7 (1971): 302-9.
- Marioni, Max. "The Cost of Russian Sanctions in Western Economies: The UK, US and EU." In *The Sanctions on Russia*, ed. Adriel Kasonta, 16-31. UK: Bow Group, 2015, <http://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/files/Bow%20Group%20-%20Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20-%20Adriel%20Kasonta.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Marten, Kimberly. "Putin's Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (April 2015).
- Massad, Joseph. "Orientalism as Occidentalism." *History of the Present* 5, no. 1 (2015): 83-94.
- Masterson, Julia. "North Korea Tests First Missiles of 2020." *Arms Control Today* (April 2020), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/news/north-korea-tests-first-missiles-2020> (accessed August 2, 2020).
- Mayer, Jörg. *The Growing Interdependence between Financial and Commodity Markets*. Geneva: United Nations, 2009.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89.
- Miller Jr, James N. and Richard Fontaine. "A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability: How Changing Geopolitics and Emerging Technologies are Reshaping Pathways to Crisis and Conflict." *CNAS Report* (2017); <https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-ProjectPathways-Finalb.pdf?mtime=20170918101505> (accessed August 2, 2020).
- Miller, Steven E. and Matthew Bunn. "Interpreting the Implacable Foe: American Perception of Iran." In *U.S.- Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue*, ed. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman, 57-88. NY, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.

- Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Our Dossier.” *French Foreign Policy* (April 2019), <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/nuclear-weapon/article/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-npt-our-dossier> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- Ministry of Mines and Petroleum of Afghanistan. “TAPI Project.” (undated), <https://momp.gov.af/index.php/tapi-project> (accessed February 15, 2020).
- Mitchell, Timothy. “The Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science.” *UCIAS Edited Volume 3* (2003): 1-34.
- Mitchell, Timothy. “The Stage of Modernity.” In *Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell, 1-34. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Mitrany, David. *The Problem of International Sanctions*. London: Oxford University Press, 1925.
- Mohan, Raja. “Privatizing the Afghan War.” *Carnegie India*, August 28, 2018. <https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/28/raja-mandala-privatising-afghan-war-pub-77118> (accessed February 15, 2020).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.
- Mortazavi, Negar. “Iran’s Nurses are Martyrs to Trump’s Maximum Pressure.” *Bourse and Bazaar*, April 17, 2020, <https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2020/4/17/irans-nurses-are-martyrs-to-trumps-maximum-pressure> (accessed May 10, 2020).
- Mueller, John, and Karl Mueller. “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (1999): 43–53. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049279>.
- Myerson, Roger B. *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Naim, Moises. *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy*. London: Arrow, 2007.

- Naji, Kasra. *Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical*. London: IB Tauris, 2008.
- National Academy of Science. *Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment*. Washington: National Academy Press, 1991.
- NATO. "Bucharest Summit Declaration," *Official Texts* (April 4, 2008), https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed February 8, 2020).
- NATO. "NATO-Russia Council," *NATO Topics*, March 23, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm (accessed January 28, 2021).
- NATO. "Relations with Russia," *NATO Topics*, March 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm (accessed April 4, 2022).
- NATO. *The Secretary General's Annual Report 2021* (Brussels: NATO, April 1, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193590.htm (accessed April 20, 2022).
- Nesin, Aziz. *Irak ve Mısır: Dünya Kazan Ben Kepçe 1*. İstanbul: Nesin Yayınları, 2014, 9th edition.
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 1970, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.
- Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). "Egypt: Overview." *Country Profiles*, last updated September 2015; <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/egypt/> (accessed July 31, 2020)
- Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Nuclear." *Learn Countries: North Korea* (October 2018), <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- O'Toole, Brian. "Rejoining the Iran Nuclear Deal: Not So Easy," *Atlantic Council Issue Brief*, January 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/rejoining-the-iran-nuclear-deal-not-so-easy/> (accessed November 29, 2021).

- OECD. "Global Value Chains (GVCs): Russian Federation," (May 2013), <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/GVCs%20-%20RUSSIAN%20FEDERATION.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- OECD. "OECD and the Russian Federation," *Russian Federation*, undated, <https://www.oecd.org/russia/oecd-and-the-russian-federation/> (accessed January 28, 2021).
- OECD. *States of Fragility*, Paris: OECD, 2018.
- Office of the Press Secretary. "President Delivers State of the Union Address." *The White House* (January 29, 2002), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard Economic Studies, 2002, 20th printing.
- Onay, Yaşar. *Rusya ve Değişim*. Ankara: Nobel, 2002.
- Onder, Mehmet. "Economic Sanctions Outcomes: An Information-Driven Explanation," *Journal of International Studies* 14, no. 2 (2021): 38-57.
- O'Neil, Maureen. "Area Studies is Dead: Long Live Area Studies." *International Development Research Center CCASLS* (1998), <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/15796/108348.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed July 31, 2020).
- Orwell, George. *Animal Farm: A Fairy Story*. London: Penguin, 2000.
- Orwell, George. *Kitaplar ve Sigaralar*. Translated by Levent Konca. İstanbul: Sel, 2017, 7th edition.
- Osborne, Stephen. "Sanctions on Russia: Are They Working, Workable, and Worth It?." *Strategic Trade Review* 5, no. 8 (2019): 23- 53.
- Osman, Tarek. *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood, Revised and Updated*. Great Britain: Yale University Press, 2013. 3rd edition.

- Ottoway, Marina and Thomas Carothers. "The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start." *Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief*, March 29, 2004, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief29.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2020).
- Owen, Roger. *The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life*. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Oxford English Dictionary, "Area," <http://dictionary.oed.com> (accessed May 29, 2019).
- Özbudun, Ergun. "Regional Studies and Comparative Politics: the Example of the Middle East and North Africa." *International Social Science Journal*, 37:1 (1985): 75-84.
- Paasi, Anssi. "Bounded Spaces in the Mobile World," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 93:2 (2002).
- Paasi, Anssi. "Place and Region: Looking through the Prism of Scale," *Progress in Human Geography*, 28 (2004): 536-46.
- Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz. "The Road to Kabul," *NATO Newsroom-Speeches&Transcripts* (April 1, 2003; last updated November 3, 2008), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_20500.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 20, 2020).
- Pamuk, Şevket and Roger Owen, *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth Century*. London: IB Tauris, 1998.
- Panda, Ankit. "India will not support Western Sanctions against Russia." *The Diplomat* March 20, 2014, Thursday; <https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-will-not-support-western-sanctions-against-russia/> (accessed January 31, 2020).
- Pape, Robert A. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work?" *International Security* 22, no. 2 (October 1997): 90–136. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90>.
- Park, Tina J. "Time for a NATO Strategy on North Korea?," *NATO Defense College Policy Brief*, no. 7, April 2020, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1431> (accessed November 29, 2021).

- Paul, Michael, and Elisabeth Suh. "North Korea's Nuclear-Armed Missiles." *SWP Comments* 32 (August 2017).
- Penfield, Frederic Courthland. "Sidelights on the Exploitation of Egypt." *North American Review* 159, no. 455 (1894): 479-89.
- Perkovich, George, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, eds. *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*. Washington: Carnegie, 2007.
- Pesaran, Evaleila. *Iran's Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-Reform in the Post-Revolutionary Era*. USA, Canada, UK: Routledge, 2013.
- Peters, Gretchen. "How Opium Profits the Taliban." *United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks*, 62 (2009).
- Pezard, Stephanie and Ashley L. Rhodes. "What Provokes Putin's Russia? Deterring without Unintended Escalation," *RAND Corporation Perspective* January (2020) <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE338.html> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Pierre, Jean-Marc. "The 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations." Master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2004.
- Piret, Jean-Marc. "The 'War Against Terrorism,' International Law and the Growth of Unchecked Executive Power in the U.S." *Revue Interdisciplinaire D'études Juridiques* 60, no. 1 (2008): 59 -111.
- Pirseyyedi, Bobi. *Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent*. UK: Routledge, 2012.
- Pogrebinskiy, Mikhail. "Russians in Ukraine: Before and after Euromaidan." In *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, edited by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa, 195–210. Bristol: E-IR, 2016.
- Politkovskaya, Anna. *Putin's Russia*. London: Harvill Press, 2004.
- Popescu, Nicu. "After Crimea: Putin's Balance Sheet." *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, April 4, 2014. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/after->

[crimea-putin%E2%80%99s-balance-sheet](#) (accessed on January 31, 2021).

Popyk, Yuliia. "Trump's G7 Invite for Putin will Encourage More War," *Atlantic Council*, June 2, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/trumps-g7-invite-for-putin-will-encourage-more-war/> (accessed January 28, 2021).

Portela, Clara. "The EU's Use of 'Targeted' Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness." *Centre for European Policy Studies*, March 11, 2014. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eus-use-targeted-sanctions-evaluating-effectiveness/> (accessed January 31, 2021).

Portela, Clara. "The EU's Use of 'Targeted' Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness." *CEPS Working Document* no. 391 (2014). <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eus-use-targeted-sanctions-evaluating-effectiveness/> (accessed July 30, 2021).

Powell, Robert. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Putin, Vladimir V. "Address by President of the Russian Federation," *Kremlin*, March 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> (accessed September 5, 2020).

Rahim, Taiba. "The Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Responsibility," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 880 (2010): 993-1002.

Rahman, Maha Abdel. "The Politics of 'UnCivil' Society in Egypt," *Review of African Political Economy* 29, no. 91 (2002): 21-35.

Rahmani, Ahmad Idrees. "Political Leadership in Afghanistan: Identifying and Assessing Determining Factors." Master's thesis, Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2016.

Rashad, S. M. and M. A. Ismail. "Environmental Impact Assessment of Hydropower in Egypt." *Applied Energy* 65, no. 1-4 (2000): 285-302.

Razzaqi, Sarwat and Faiz Bilquees, Saadia Sherbaz. "Dynamic Relationship between Energy and Economic Growth: Evidence from D8 Countries," *The Pakistan Development Review* 50, no. 4 (2011): 437-58.

- Reif, Kingston. "Trump to Withdraw U.S. From INF Treaty." *Arms Control Today* (November 2018), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-11/news/trump-withdraw-us-inf-treaty> (accessed February 8, 2020).
- Reus-Smit, Christian. "Constructivism." In *Theories of International Relations*. US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Reus-Smit, Christian. "Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty." *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 519–38.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D. Steinberg. *A History of Russia*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Richards, Alan "Egypt's Agriculture in Trouble," *MERIP* 84 (1980): 3-13.
- Richards, Alan. "Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture: 1890-1914." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26, no. 4 (1978): 725-45.
- Richards, Alan. "The Political Economy of *Gutswirtschaft*: A Comparative Analysis of East Elbian Germany, Egypt, and Chile." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, no. 4 (1979): 483-518.
- Robert Duncan Luce, and Howard Raiffa. *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*. New York: John Wiley&Sons, 1957.
- Rodman, Kenneth A. *Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publication, 2001.
- Rostow, Walt Whitman. *The Stages Of Economic Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Rubin, Barnett R. *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*. UK, US: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Rublee, Maria Rost. "Taking Stock of Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness." *International Studies Review* 10 (2008): 420-50.

- Rumer, Eugene and Andrew S. Weiss. "Ukraine: Putin's Unfinished Business," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 12, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/12/ukraine-putin-s-unfinished-business-pub-85771> (accessed April 1, 2022).
- Rumer, Eugene and Richard Sokolsky. *Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle be Broken?*. Washington: Carnegie, 2019.
- Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)," December 1, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB (accessed February 8, 2020).
- Ruthland, Peter. "The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates." In *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism (2000-2015)*, ed. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud, 336-61. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2016.
- Ryang, Sonia. *Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry*. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Rynning, Sten and Stefano Guizzi. "Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis." *COPRI Working Paper* 42 (2001).
- Ryuichi Shimodo et al vs The State, *Japanese Annual of International Law* 10 (1964): 626-42.
- Sahimi, Mohammed. Iran's Nuclear Program, "Part II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary?," <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1022.html> (accessed February 29, 2020). All parts available online at www.payvand.com.
- Sahimi, Mohammed. Iran's Nuclear Program: Part I," *Payvand News*, October 2, 2003; <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html> (accessed February 29, 2020). All parts available online at www.payvand.com.
- Said, Edward. "An Ethics of Language: Review of The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language by Michel Foucault." *Diacritics* 4, no. 2 (1974): 28-37.

- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin, 2003.
- Saikal, Amin. *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*. NY, London: IB Tauris, 2004.
- Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. "Impact of Sanctions on Household Welfare and Employment," *Iran Under Sanctions*, 2020, <https://www.rethinkingiran.com/iranundersanctions/salehiisfahani> (accessed November 29, 2021).
- Salman, Salman M. A. *The World Bank Policy for Projects on International Waterways: An Historical and Legal Analysis*. Washington: World Bank, 2009.
- Samady, Saif R. *Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century*. France: UNESCO, 2001.
- Savgon, A. and Yossi Mansharaf, "Iran's Response to Western Warnings: 'First Strike,' 'Preemptive Attack,' Long-Range Ballistic Missiles, 'Asymmetric [Guerilla – original] Warfare,'" *MEMRI, Inquiry&Analysis Series* 407 (2007).
- Schelling, Thomas C. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Schneider, Ann Imlah (2010), "Internationalization vs. Area Studies? (presentation to Association of International Education Administrations)," *International Education Advice*, <http://www.internationaledadvice.org/pdfs/AIEApaper.2010.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2020).
- Schulz, Helena Lindholm and Michael Schulz, "The Middle East: Regional Instability and Fragmentation." In *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luck van Langenhove, 187-201. London, Ann Harbor: Pluto Press, 2005.
- Schwenker, Burkhard and Tobias Raffel. "The Impact of Economic Sanctions," *Think Act Economic Scenario Update - Roland Berger Strategy Consultants* (September 2014), https://www.rolandberger.com/publications/publication_pdf/roland_berger_tab_impact_of_economic_sanctions_20141009.pdf (accessed February 8, 2020).

Secieru, Stanislav. *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinizing Adaptation and Evasion*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2015.

Security Council Report, "Afghanistan," *UN Documents* (no date), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/afghanistan/> (accessed December 5, 2020)

Seiffert, Wolfgang. *Putin*. Translated by Zerrin Yılmaz. İstanbul: Gendaş, 2004.

Şen, Gülriz. *Devrimden Günümüze İran'ın ABD Politikası: Tarihsel Sosyolojik bir Analiz*. Ankara: ODTU Publishing, 2018, 2nd edition.

Seyhan, Ercan and Gökhan Sarı. "Terör Maksudlu Biyolojik-Kimyasal Saldırlara Ait Terör Değerlendirmesinde Risk Analizi ve Yönetimi." *Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2012).

Shagina, Maria. "The Sanctions and Moscow's Adaptation Strategy," in *Russian Energy Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Australia*, ed. Elisabeth Buchanan. Australia: ANU Press, 2021. 183-99.

Shahi, Deepshika. *Understanding post-9/11 Afghanistan: A Critical Insight into Huntington's Civilizational Approach*. Bristol, England: E-IR, 2017.

Sharples, Jack and Andrew Judge. "Russian Gas Supplies to Europe: The Likelihood and Potential Impact of an Interruption in Gas Transit via Ukraine." In *Future Energy Trends: Innovation, Markets & Geopolitics*, ed. Emirates Center for Strategic Research, 113-54. Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 2016.

Shim, David. *Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is Believing*. London, New York: Routledge, 2014.

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. "Reversing the Soviet Economic Collapse," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2 (1991).

Shuya, Mason. "Russian Cyber Aggression and the New Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Security* 11, no. 1 (2018): 1-18.

- Sika, Nadine. "The Arab State and Social Contestation." In *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava, 73-97. India: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Silberstein, Benjamin Katzeff. "Between Sanctions, Drought and Tensions: How Bad is North Korea's Food Situation?" *38 North* (November 18, 2017), <https://www.38north.org/2017/11/bksilberstein111417/> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- Sinatti, Giulia and Renske Vas. "Representations of Border Deaths and the Making and Unmaking of Borders." In *Border Deaths: Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of Migration-Related Mortality*, ed. Paola Cuttitta and Tamara Last, 71-84. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020.
- Sinyavsky, Andrey. "Russian Nationalism." *The Massachusetts Review* 31, no. 4 (1990): 475-94.
- Siracusa, Joseph M. *Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Skalamera, Morena. "Transformed Gas Markets Fuel US-Russian Rivalry, but Europe Plays Key Role too." *Russia Matters* (May 30, 2018), <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/transformed-gas-markets-fuel-us-russian-rivalry-europe-plays-key-role-too> (accessed February 8, 2020).
- Slater, David. *Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations*. USA, UK, Australia: Blackwell, 2004.
- Sloane, Wm. M. "Egypt and England." *Political Science Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1904): 459-84.
- Smeets, Maarten. "Can Economic Sanctions be Effective?." *WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2018-03* (March 15, 2018).
- Smith, Alastair. "The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions," *International Interactions* 21, no. 3 (1996): 229-45.
- Solingen, Etel. *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.

- Soltanieh, Ali Asghar. "TRT World Forum 2018 – Closing Ranks," October 5, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_cN4HEJY98 (accessed May 29, 2019).
- Sönmez, Göktuğ. "COVID-19, International Security and the Possible Impacts of COVID-19 on the International System," *ORSAM Policy Brief* 117 (April 2020).
- Spadoni, Paolo. *Failed Sanctions : Why the U.S. Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work*. US: University Press of Florida, 2010.
- Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Realism." In *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, edited by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 13–17. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
- Stevens, Paul. "An Embargo on Iranian Crude Oil Exports: How Likely and with What Impact?." *EEDP Programme Paper* no. 01 (2012).
- Stewart, Rory. "Foreword." In *The Impact of 9/11 on the Media, Arts and Entertainment*, ed. Matthew J. Morgan, ix-xiv. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Suesse, Marvin. "Breaking the Unbreakable Union: Nationalism, Trade Disintegration and the Soviet Economic Collapse." *European Historical Economics Society Working Papers in Economic History* 57 (2014).
- Sukhija, Sheetal. "Britain to Repay 400 million Pound Debt to Iran?," November 18, 2017; <https://www.middleeaststar.com/news/255424741/britain-to-repay-400-million-pound-debt-to-iran> (accessed May 25, 2020).
- Sullivan, Denis J. and Kimberley Jones. *Global Security Watch: A Reference Handbook – Egypt*. London: Praeger Security International, 2008.
- Tabatabai, Ariane. "The Future of the Iranian Deal is Still Uncertain," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* July 13, 2016, <http://thebulletin.org/future-iranian-nuclear-deal-still-uncertain9655> (accessed May 25, 2020).
- Tan, Er-Win. *The US versus the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Mitigating the Nuclear Security Dilemma*. London, New York: Routledge, 2013.

- Tanrisever, Oktay F. "Introduction: NATO, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Security in the Aftermath of 9/11." In *Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO's Role in Regional Security since 9/11*, edited by Oktay F. Tanrisever, 1–16. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2013.
- Taylor, Brendan. "Sanctions as Grand Strategy." *Adelphi Paper* 411 (2010).
- Telhami, Shilbey and Michael Barnett. *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. London: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Thakur, Ramesh. "Managing the Nuclear Threat after Iraq: Is It Time to Replace the NPT Paradigm: Is It Time to Replace the NPT Paradigm?" In *Arms Control after Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges*, edited by Wagehuru Pah Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur, 1–19. Tokyo, N.Y., Paris: UNU, 2006.
- Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Richard Chaw. Auckland, N.Z.: Floating Pres, 2008.
- Tian, Nan. Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman. "Trends in World Military Expenditures." *SIPRI Factsheet* (April 2020), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0.pdf (accessed January 28, 2021).
- Tignor, Robert L. "Decolonization and Business: the Case of Egypt." *The Journal of Modern History* 59, no. 3 (1987): 479-505.
- Toaldo, Mattia (2013), *The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East*, Routledge: London, NY.
- Torbat, Akbar E. "Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran." *The World Economy* 28, no. 3 (2005): 407- 34.
- Trani, Jean-Francois and Parul Bakhshi. "Vulnerability and Mental Health in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond War Exposure." *Brown School Faculty Publications* 40 (2013): 108-139.
- Tsebelis, George. "Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 1 (March 1990): 3–28.

Tsokhas, Kosmas. “The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union.” *Theory and Society* 9, no. 2 (1980): 319-62.

Tüğen, Kamil. *Rusya, Makedonya, Cezayir ve Tunus’dan [sic] Notlar*. İzmir: Başsaray, 2009.

UK Treasury. “Financial Sanctions: Afghanistan.” *Guidance* (May 17, 2013; updated on February 20, 2020), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-afghanistan> (accessed February 15, 2020).

UN al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, “Arms Embargo: Explanation of Terms,” February 24, 2015, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_arms_embargo_english.pdf (accessed February 15, 2020).

UN Status of Treaty. <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> (accessed February 29, 2020)

UNHCR Council Report. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, on his Mission to the Russian Federation.” A/HRC/36/44/Add.1 (July 27, 2017), <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/36/44/Add.1> (accessed January 31, 2020).

United Nations Charter, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text> (accessed May 5, 2022).

United Nations Children’s Fund. *Rebuilding Hope in Afghanistan*. NY: UNICEF, 2003.

United Nations Development Program. “The 2021 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI),” 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2021_mpi_report_en.pdf (accessed on January 4, 2022).

United Nations General Assembly, “Problem of Militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov,” A/RES/76/70, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3952032/files/A_RES_76_70-EN.pdf (accessed October 14, 2022).

- United Nations Human Rights Office of High Commissioner – UNHROHC. *Torn Apart: The Human Rights Dimension of the Involuntary Separation of Korean Families*. Geneva: OHCHR, 2016.
- United Nations Office for Disarmament. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” *Treaties Database Home* (undated), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt> (accessed February 22, 2020).
- United Nations, “Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices,” *General Assembly Report of the Secretary General A/71/187*, July 25, 2016, <https://undocs.org/A/71/187> (accessed February 15, 2020).
- United Nations, “UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” UN News - Affairs, April 7, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782> (accessed April 20, 2022).
- United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014,” *General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/68/262*, April 1, 2014; <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/68/262> (accessed August 2, 2020).
- United States Congress. “Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” *115th Congress (2017-2018)* H.R.3364 Public Law 115-44, August 2, 2017; <https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ44/PLAW-115publ44.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2020).
- United States Congress. “the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act,” *114th Congress (2015-2016)* H.R.5485, July 7, 2016; <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5485/actions> (accessed May 25, 2020).
- US Embassy in Georgia. “Sanctions on Russian Entity and a Vessel Engaging in the Construction of Nord Stream 2,” *News & Events*, January 19, 2021; <https://ge.usembassy.gov/sanctions-on-russian-entity-and-a-vessel-engaging-in-the-construction-of-nord-stream-2/> (accessed January 28, 2021).
- Uzer, Umut and Ayşe Uzer. “Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad Pact as a Source of Conflict between Turkey and the Nationalist Arab Countries.” *The Turkish Yearbook* XXXVI (2005): 101-18.
- Van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. *Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade*. US, UK: Edward Elgar Publications, 2009.

- Versailles, Bruno. "The Economic Implications of Iran's Economic Sanction Relief," *IMF direct*, February 1, 2016; <https://www.imf.org/external/np/blog/nafida/020116.pdf> (accessed July 30, 2021).
- Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics*. 5th ed. Boston, Mass. ; Columbus, Ohio ; Indianapolis, Ind.: Longman Pearson, 2012.
- Volkman, Toby Alice. *Crossing Borders: Revitalizing Area Studies*. New York: Ford Foundation, 1999.
- Volkman, Toby Alice. *Crossing Borders: The Case for Area Studies, Ford Foundation Report*. Publication place information unavailable, 1998.
- Wahdan, Dalia E. "Planning Imploded: Case of Nasser's Physical Planning." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 22 (2007): 2099-2107.
- Walker, Matthew. "The Lost Art of Interdependency: United Nations Leadership in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and Its Ramifications in World Affairs." Master's thesis, University of Nebraska, 2010.
- Wallace, Hellen, Mark Pollack, and Alasdair Young. *Policy-Making in the European Union*. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Wallensteen, Peter. "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited." Uppsala University Peace Research Papers, 2000.
- Wallensteen, Peter. "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited," *Uppsala Peace Research Papers*, 1 (2000).
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "After Iraq, Iran?" *Binghamton Commentary* 146 (2004).
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Amerikan Gücünün Gerileyişi: Kaotik Bir Dünyada ABD*. Translated by Tuncay Birkan. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004.
- Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

- Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Continuity of International Politics." In *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, 348-54. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979.
- Ward, Peter. "Market Reforms with North Korean Characteristics: Loosening the Grip on State Owned Enterprises," *38 North*, December 21, 2017, <https://www.38north.org/2017/12/pward122117/> (accessed July 30, 2021).
- Warren, Zachary, John Rieger, Charlotte E. Maxwell-Jones, and Nancy Kelly. Editors. *A Survey of Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2016*. San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2016.
- Webb, Michael C. and Stephan D. Krasner. "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment." *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 2 (1989): 183-198.
- Weber, Cynthia. *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, Routledge: UK, 2010, 3rd edition.
- Welt, Cory, Kristin Archick, Rebecca M. Nelson and Dianne E. Rennack. "U.S. Sanctions on Russia." *CRS Report*, R45415 (January 17, 2020), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf> (accessed on January 31, 2020).
- Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.
- Wenger, Martha and Dick Anderson. "The Gulf War." *MERIP Middle East Report* 148 (1987): 23-26.
- Wertz, Daniel and Ali Vaez. "Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis." *FAS Issue Brief* (June 2012).
- Wesslau, Fredrik. "Will the EU Prolong Economic Sanctions against Russia?" *European Council on Foreign Relations*, May 16, 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_will_the_eu_prolong_economic_sanctions_against_russia_this_7026 (accessed January 31, 2020).

Wittfogel, Karl August. *Oriental Despotism; A Comparative Study of Total Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.

Woodward, Peter. *Nasser*. UK: England, 1992.

World Bank. "Data for Lower Middle Income: Egypt, Arab Rep.," *Open Data*, undated, <https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=XN-EG> (accessed July 31, 2020).

World Bank. "Gross Domestic Product." *World Development Indicators*, undated; <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&period=#> (accessed August 2, 2020).

World Bank. "Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant in the Amount of US\$150 million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility." *Governance Global Practice South Asia Region*, ICR00004761 (July 25, 2019), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/438491565036747457/pdf/Afghanistan-Capacity-Building-for-Results-Facility-CBR-Project.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2020).

World Bank. "Understanding Gender in Agricultural Value Chains: The Cases of Grapes/Raisins, Almonds and Saffron in Afghanistan." *Agriculture and Rural Development Unit Sustainable Development Department South Asia Region Report* no. 62323-AF (May 2011).

Yang, Jiawen, Hossein Askari, John Forrer and Lili Zhu. "How do US Economic Sanctions Affect EU's Trade with Target Countries?." *The World Economics* 32, no. 8 (2009): 1223-44.

Yergin, Daniel. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*. New York: Free Press, 2009.

Yurdusev, Ahmet Nuri. "From the Eastern Question to the Western Question: Rethinking the Contribution of Toynbee." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 3 (October 2005): 323-332.

Yurdusev, Ahmet Nuri. "Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: From Realism to Rationalism." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (2006): 305-321.

Yusuf, Moeed. "Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons," *Brookings Foreign Policy Paper* 11 (2009).

Zaeef, Abdul Salam. *My Life with the Taliban*, ed. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Aksop, Ece

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 17 may 1983, Ankara

Phone: +90 312 2049043

email: ece.aksop@metu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Master	IEP Paris	2013
MA	Bilkent University, IR	2007
BS	METU, IR	2005

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2007-	Ministry of Trade	Trade Expert

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS (selected)

Aksop, Ece. "Trade-Ification of Security." *Journal of Business Economics and Political Science* 4, no. 8 (2015): 13–31.

———. Review of Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader, by Kasra Najji, 2011.

———. "Rüşvetle Mücadelede Ekonomik Boyut ve Uluslararası İşbirliği." *Uluslararası Ekonomik Sorunlar* 32, no. 9 (2009): 44–50.

———. "The Iranian Nuclear Program: The NPT, the West, Iran and Turkey." *Insight Turkey* 8, no. 1 (2006): 64–78.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu çalıřma, mevcut yaptırımlar yazınına yeni bir bakıř aısı getirmeyi amalamaktadır. Mevcut yazın, yaptırımları klasik anlamıyla ele almakta olup, yaptırımların bir lkenin izlediđi politikaları deđiřtirmek amacıyla uygulanan ve savař ncesi bir ařama olarak grmektedir. Yazın, yaptırımları Sođuk Savař sonrasında sıka kullanılan bir yntem olarak deđerlendirmekte; hatta, savař iermediđi iin de grece barıřıl bir yntem olarak benimser bir duruř sergiler gibi durmaktadır.

Bu çalıřmada yeni bir yaptırım tanımı nerilmemekte; nasıl etkin yaptırım uygulamaları kurgulanabileceđine bakılmamakta; yaptırımlar, bir politika alternatifi olarak n plana ıkarılmamaktadır. Ayrıca, yaptırımların uluslararası hukuk dıřında kalan uygulamalar olduđu hususundan hareketle, rneđin savař gibi alternatif fakat uluslararası hukuk atısı altında dzenlenen nlemlerin daha uygun olduđu da nerilmemektedir. Bu çerevede, çalıřmadan hedef lkeleri koruma ya da savunma gibi bir sonu ıkarılması, yaptırım uygulayan lkelerin sulanması gibi bir sonu ıkarılması ile eřlenik bir yanılısam olacaktır. Çalıřma, yaptırımların hangi lkeler tarafından sıka tercih edildiđini ve nasıl uygulandıđını incelemekte, bu incelemeyi Blge Çalıřmaları gzyle, sosyal inřacı teoriler eřliđinde ve disiplinler-arası bir bakıř aısıyla tamamlamayı hedeflemektedir.

Bu çalıřmada, seilen beř farklı lke zerinden yrtlen vaka incelemeleri ile yaptırımlar ele alınmıřtır. Bu lkeler zerinden yapılan analizde, yaptırımların her ne kadar sıcak savař iermese de zellikle sivil halkı savařın da tesine geen sonularla

baş başa bıraktığı görülmüştür. Çalışmada ayrıca savaşın, en azından uluslararası hukuk tarafından düzenlenen bir alan olduğu, buna karşın, yaptırımların hukukta henüz net bir şekilde düzenlenmeyen geniş bir gri alanda kullanıldığı; bu gri alanın da Foucaultcu bir yaklaşımla yaptırım uygulanan ülkeyi terbiye / disipline etme amacıyla şekillendirildiği sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Fransız filozof Michel Foucault, disiplin konusu üzerine yaptığı çalışmalarda, “normal” olanın “diğer” üzerinde güç kullanması gerektiğini savunmakta; güç ilişkisini ve gücün kullanım sürecini de ayrıntılı bir şekilde adım adım aktarmaktadır. Foucault’nun analizi, Orta Çağ’da cüzzam hastalığına karşı verilen mücadeleyi derinlemesine incelemektedir. Söz konusu inceleme “normal”in sağlıklı, “diğer”in de cüzzamlı olma durumu üzerinden kurgulandığı ve herkesin bu iki guruptan birinde yer alacak şekilde etiketlendiği, kapatılıp sınırlandırıldığı bir dönemdeki uygulamayı esas almaktadır. Bu süreçte öncelikle cüzzamlının “diğer” olarak etiketlenmesi, yalnızlaştırılması ve cezalandırılması gerekmektedir. Bu uygulama adım adım takip edilmek suretiyle, hapishaneler, panoptikal yapılar ve disiplinler süreçler için temel alınan, Foucault tarafından da odak noktasına konulan düzenlemeler zincirini teşkil etmektedir.⁸⁷⁸

Her ne kadar normal ve diğer arasındaki ayrım kendi başına büyük bir başlık olsa da, normal olanın diğerini dışlaması kadar normalleştirilmesi için de önemli satır aralıkları içermektedir. Bu dışlama ve akabinde gelen / gelebilecek olan normalleştirme

⁸⁷⁸ Bkz. Foucault, “ ‘Panopticalism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,’ ve yine aynı yazara ait “The Subject and Power.”

süreçleri, bir gücün varlığına ve kullanımına gereksinim duymaktadır. Foucault'ya göre, kullanılmayan gücün bir anlamı yoktur. Diğer bir deyişle, gücün, normal olan tarafından kullanılabilmesi, normal dışı olandaki anormalliklerin düzeltilmesi için elzemdir. Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine yeni dahil olan yapılandırmacı teoriler ve güvenlikleştirme söylemi de, Foucault'nun bu tezleri üzerine kurulmuştur. Biz ile bizden olmayan arasındaki ayırım, ayrıştırma süreci ve söylemlerin, Orta Çağ'da cüzzamla mücadele çabalarının günümüzde vücut bulmuş şekli olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Bu çalışma, yaptırımların uluslararası politika alternatiflerinin toplandığı alet - edevat kutusuna favori bir öge olarak girdiği görüşüne katılmaktadır. Her ne kadar yaptırım uygulanmasına yönelik tercihin ardında yatan ulvi fikir, hedef ülkenin davranışını değiştirmek olsa da, bu çalışmada, söz konusu ulviyetin arkasına gizlenen yaptırımların esas amacının çok daha farklı olduğu savunulmaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, görünen ve ilan edilen gerekçelerin, yaptırımların özünde yatan “diğerini normalleştirme” arzusunu gözlerden kaçırmaya yeterli olmadığı öne sürülmektedir.

Bu çerçevede, klasik yazının odaklandığı alanlardan farklı olarak bu araştırma daha çok yaptırım uygulayan ülkenin zihninde yer aldığı düşünülen örtük fikri ortaya çıkarmaya odaklanmaktadır. Yaptırım uygulayanın izlediği genel politikalar kapsamında uyguladığı “etiketleme, yargılama, tecrit etme ve kontrol etme” süreci, Foucaultcu bir yaklaşım ile adım adım yaptırım önlemlerine dönüşmektedir. Adım adım ama esasen gayet sağlam adımlarla ilerleyen bu politikalar, Doğu'nun Batı'dan soyut ayrılışına dayanan “ikili etiketleme” yaklaşımının doğal uzantıları haline gelmektedir.

Çalışmada Doğu ve Batı kavramları irdelenmemekte; tam tersine hem Doğu'nun hem de Batı'nın kendilerini tanımlamak için ihtiyaç duydukları bir karşı kutup çerçevesinde tartışmanın şekillendiği kabul edilmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Batı'ya yönelik yazın Doğu'nun, Doğu'ya yönelik yazın ise Batı'nın konumlandırılması, tanımlanması ve bir farklılıklar serisi üzerinden kurgulanan üstünlüklere sahip olduğunun dile getirilmesi üzerine kuruludur.⁸⁷⁹ Sabit ve genel geçer kabul görmüş bir Doğu ve bir Batı ayrımı yoktur; tam tersine, gerek Doğu gerekse de Batı dil ve söylem laboratuvarlarında suni olarak üretilmiş yaratıklardır.⁸⁸⁰ Buna rağmen, Doğu'yu Batı'dan ayıran bir kimlik söylemi bulunmaktadır.⁸⁸¹ Söz konusu ayırım, süregelen bir ötekileştirme sürecine dayanır. Bu ötekileştirme süreci de esasen Foucault'nun uzun uzun anlattığı, 17. yüzyılda vebalı bir kasabada uygulanan önlemler gibi tezahür etmektedir.

Michel Foucault, “normal” olmayan, bir başka ifade ile normalleştirilmesi gereken “diğer”i düzeltmek için kullanılan disiplin gücünü çalışmalarında derinlemesine tartışmaktadır. Ancak “diğer”in normal hale getirilebilmesi için öncelikli olarak

⁸⁷⁹ Yurdusev, “From the Eastern Question to the Western Question: Rethinking the Contribution of Toynbee.” Yurdusev makalesinde kötü bir üne sahip Doğu Sorunu kadar Doğu tarafından tartışılan Batı (veya Batılılaşma) Sorunu'nu incelemektedir. Doğu içerisinde değişen Orta Doğu'ya yönelik incelemeler için bkz. Gerges, *The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World*, Hamid, *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East*, ve ayrıca Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*.

⁸⁸⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 146. Ayrıca bkz. Massad, “Orientalism as Occidentalism” ve Leservot, “Occidentalism: Rewriting the West in Marjane Satrapi's *Persépolis*.”

⁸⁸¹ Bu konuda ilginç bir inceleme için bkz. Fokkema, *Perfect Worlds: Utopian Fiction in China and the West*, özl. “Chinese Occidentalism: The Nostalgia for a Utopian Past Gives Way to the Idea of Progress” başlıklı bölüm 12.

“diğer” olduğunun tespit edilmesi ve “diğer” olarak etiketlenmesi gerekir. Başka bir deyişle, disipline edici gücün tatbik edilebilmesi için bir söyleme ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır. Foucault'nun söylem nosyonunu alarak geliştiren Filistin asıllı akademisyen Edward Said, Oryantalizmin, Batı kültürü temel alınarak onun üzerine inşa edilen bir söylem olduğunu savunmaktadır. Burada Batı, başlangıçta Avrupa sonra Amerika başatlığı altında gelişmiştir.⁸⁸² Said'e göre söz konusu söylem, Batı'nın Doğu'yu politik, sosyolojik, askeri, ideolojik ve bilimsel dahil olmak üzere pek çok açıdan yönetmesini ve hatta yeniden üretmesini sağlamıştır.

Bu bakış açısı benimsenmek suretiyle hazırlanan bu çalışmada, beş ayrı ülke üzerinden vaka incelemeleri yapılmıştır. Bunlar, Mısır, İran, Rusya, Afganistan ve Kuzey Kore'dir.

Ele alınan vakalar arasında Kuzey Kore, ayrı bir egemen güç olarak doğuşundan bu yana yaptırımlar altında olması dolayısıyla özel olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Yapılan vaka incelemesinde, Kuzey Kore'nin yürüttüğü nükleer program sebebiyle maruz kaldığı yaptırımlar ele alınmıştır. Dönem dönem, Kuzey Kore ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri liderleri arasında kişisel bir hal alan mevzu, sosyal medya üzerinden yapılan söz düelloları⁸⁸³ ile uluslararası toplumun⁸⁸⁴ daha da dikkatini çekmeyi başarmıştır.

⁸⁸² Said, *Orientalism*, 4.

⁸⁸³ Bir kısa özet için bkz. Samuelson, “Here Are All the Times Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump Insulted Each Other.”

⁸⁸⁴ Terim, farklı bir bağlamda da olsa Hedley Bull tarafından literature eklenmiştir. Bkz. *The Anarchical Society*.

Sözlü gerilimlere rağmen 2018⁸⁸⁵ ve 2019'da⁸⁸⁶ gerçekleşen Trump - Kim görüşmelerini müteakip gerek korona virüs⁸⁸⁷ salgını gerekse Punggye-ri sahasındaki teknik sorunlar dolayısıyla *détente* dönemi yaşanmış, fakat güncel gelişmelere paralel olarak Pyongyang'ın nükleer silah teknolojisine ilişkin çalışmaları devam etmiştir.

Kuzey Kore'ye yönelik yaptırımlar özel olarak tasarlanmış, diğer bir ifadeyle yazında yeni nesil olarak tabir edilen önlemler içermektedir. Örneğin yaptırımlar, yönetime yakın kişileri ve lüks tüketim mallarını içermektedir.⁸⁸⁸ Kuzey Kore halkı, Kore Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin münferit bir yapı halinde ortaya çıkmasına karşın uluslararası alanda tanınmayan bir devlet olarak var oluşundan bu yana yaptırımlar altında yaşamaktadır. Bu itibarla halkın, maruz kaldıkları uygulamalar ile yaşamasını öğrenmiş, yaptırımlara karşı hayatta kalmalarını sağlayacak yöntemleri geliştirmiş oldukları varsayımında bulunmak yersiz olmayacaktır. Sürekli bir olağanüstü hal altında yaşayan bu insanlar, yetersiz yağış ve kuraklık dahil her türlü sorun için Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni suçlamaya alışmıştır.⁸⁸⁹ Sorunlar için dış mihraklar arasından seçilen bu günah keçisini suçlama pratiği ile birlikte, yaptırımlar sebebiyle

⁸⁸⁵ Bu toplantı, beklenen sonuçları vermemiştir. Bkz. Rosenberg, "Trump-Kim Summit was Cut Short after North Korea Demanded an end to Sanctions."

⁸⁸⁶ Kirk, "Second Trump-Kim Summit is a Possibility."

⁸⁸⁷ Bkz. Sönmez, "COVID-19, International Security and the Possible Impacts of COVID-19 on the International System."

⁸⁸⁸ Yaptırımlara rağmen, örneğin lüks otomobiller Kuzey Kore'ye ulaşabilmektedir. 2019 yılına ait bir haberde, Kuzey Kore lideri Kim Jong Un'un yarım milyon dolar değerindeki Mercedes Maybach S600 araçlara sahip olduğu belirtilmektedir. Berlinger, "How did Kim Jong Un get his Mercedes Benzes? New Report Traces Origin of North Korea's Luxury Rides."

⁸⁸⁹ French, *North Korea: A State of Paranoia*, 137.

ülkeye ithal edilemeyen her türlü şeyin piyasası da gelişmiştir. Yani insanlar, duruma uyum sağlayarak hayatta kalabilmelerini sağlayacak mücadeleyi vermelerine yönelik yöntemler geliştirmişlerdir. Bu kapsamda örneğin, çeşitli kaçakçılık yöntemleri ile insandan buzdolabına kadar her şey sınırdan rahatlıkla geçirilmektedir. Yine de, ülkede Nisan 2022'ye dek resmi olarak hiç korona virüs vakası bulunmamasına rağmen gıda güven(siz)liği, yapılmamış aşılama, artan ilaç fiyatları ve evsizlik gibi sorunlar yeni bir insani krizin⁸⁹⁰ sinyallerini vermektedir. Tüm bu resme karşın Kuzey Kore'ye yönelik yaptırımların devam etmesi, Foucaultcu bir yaklaşımın örneği olup, Batı'nın Doğulu gördüğü ülkelere yönelik güç gösterisinin bir uzantısını teşkil etmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle mevcut durum, Batı'nın, nükleer politikaları dolayısıyla Doğulu bir ülkeye yönelik izlediği, yaptırım kisvesi altında saklanmış Foucaultcu disiplinler yöntemlerin bir sonucudur.

Bu çalışmada bulunan vaka incelemelerinden bir diğerini oluşturan İran da, Kuzey Kore benzeri, nükleer projeleri sebebiyle yaptırımlara maruz kalan bir ülkedir. Bir açıdan bakılırsa Kore Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti'ne benzer şekilde İran İslam Cumhuriyeti de doğuşundan bu yana yaptırımlar altındadır. Ancak İran'a yönelik yaptırımlar, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin tek taraflı uygulamalarıyla başlamış, zaman içinde de Birleşmiş Milletler⁸⁹¹ (BM) yaptırımlarına dönüşmüştür. 2015 yılında

⁸⁹⁰ Anonim, "Some Starving' in North Korea as COVID Constrains China Trade, say UN Experts."

⁸⁹¹ Drezner, "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion" başlıklı çalışmasında yaptırımları tetikleyen ülkeyi birincil, sonradan yaptırımlara katılan ülkeleri de ikincil yaptırım uygulayanlar olarak adandırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada ise birincil ve ikincil ayrımı, yaptırım uygulayanlar değil uygulanan yaptırım önlemlerinin kendisi üzerinden tanımlanmış ve kullanılmıştır. Bu kapsamda birincil yaptırımlar, doğrudan hedef ülkeye yönelik olan uygulamalardır. İkincil yaptırımlar ise, hedef ülke ile yaptırımlara ters düşecek şekilde ilişkiyi sürdüren ülke ve gerçek ya da tüzel kişilere yönelik, yani üçüncü tarafları da

BM Güvenlik Konseyi üyesi beş ülke ve Almanya (diğer bir deyişle P5 +1) ile İran arasında imzalanan, 2231 sayılı BM Güvenlik Konseyi Kararı içinde de kendine yer bulan Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı (KOEP) ile birlikte uygulamadan kalkan yaptırımlar, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin 2018'de KOEP'ten çekilmesini müteakip tekrar ve tek taraflı olarak devreye girmiştir.

Yaptırımlar, özellikle İranlı yetkililer tarafından “ekonomik terörizm” olarak anılır olmuş,⁸⁹² yaptırım uygulamaları dolayısıyla firmalar İran ile iş ilişkisine girmekten imtina eder, bankalar ise finansal işlemleri gerçekleştirmekten kaçınır hale gelmiştir. Bu durum, ülkenin ihtiyaç duyduğu yatırımlar için dış dünyadan finansal kaynak yaratmasını engellemektedir. İran devleti ve halkı kadar Batı da mevcut durumun yarattığı sıkıntılardan payını almaktadır. Örneğin, vize ücretini transfer edecek finansal bir yöntem bulamayan Batılılar, vize alamadıkları için ülkeyi ziyaret edememekte, benzer şekilde Batılı firmalar İran'da mevcut iş imkanlarını değerlendirememektedir.⁸⁹³ Böylelikle, esasen, diğer ülkelerle eşit bir oyuncu olarak kabul edilmeyen İran ile barış ortamının tesis edilmesine yönelik uluslararası çabalar da havada asılı kalmaktadır.

içine alan yaptırımlardır. Bkz. Drezner, “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion.”

⁸⁹² Soltanieh, “TRT World Forum 2018 – Closing Ranks.”

⁸⁹³ COVID19'un yeni tip koronavirüs salgını olarak küresel bir sorun haline gelmesi ile, INSTEX mekanizması İran ile Avrupa arasında para gönderimlerinin bir yöntemi olarak ortaya çıkmış ve kullanılmaya başlamıştır. Mekanizma, ABD tarafından uygulanan tek taraflı yaptırımlara maruz kalmadan İran ile Avrupa arasında finansal işlemlerin yapılabileceği bir platform yaratmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu kapsamda ilk işlem Mart 2020'de gerçekleştirilmiş, INSTEX, ticari ilişkilerin sürdürülebileceği bir takas platformu olarak doğmuştur. Anonim, “Europe and Iran Complete First INSTEX Deal Dodging US Sanctions.”

Özellikle COVID19 olarak bilinen yeni tip korona virüs salgını sonrası dönemde İran'da ekonomik sorunlar iyice hissedilir bir hale gelmiştir. Her ne kadar salgın öncesinde de insanlar yaşadıkları maddi sorunlar dolayısıyla böbreklerini satışa çıkarıyor olsa da,⁸⁹⁴ General Kasım Süleymani'nin öldürülmesi ve akabinde İran tarafından yapılan bir hata ile Ukrayna'ya ait bir yolcu uçağının düşürülmesi hadiseleri ülkedeki siyasi ve ekonomik istikrarsızlığı körüklemiş bulunmaktadır. Salgın ile hastaneler, birer virüs yuvası olarak etiketlenmiş; rakamlar itibarıyla Çin'in dışındaki ikinci büyük korona virüs salgını İran'da kendine yer bulmuştur.⁸⁹⁵ Tüm bunlara rağmen İran, tıbbi malzeme ve ilaç temininde büyük sıkıntılar yaşamış, para transferlerini gerçekleştiremediği için ilaç alamamıştır.⁸⁹⁶ Bu noktada atlamadan not etmek gerekir ki İran, sırf transfer gerçekleştirecek mekanizma bulunmadığı için Birleşmiş Milletler üyeliği için gerekli aidatı da ödemekte sorunlar yaşamıştır.⁸⁹⁷

İran'daki durumu bu denli içinden çıkılmaz hale getiren ana unsurun, ülkeye yönelik yaptırımların karakteri olduğunu da vurgulamak etmek gerekir. İran, sadece kendisi değil, kendisiyle işbirliğine giden, ticaret yapan ülke ve gerçek/tüzel kişilerin de yaptırıma tabi tutulduğu bir ülkedir. İran'a yönelik uygulanan yaptırımlar yazında

⁸⁹⁴ Bengali and Mostaghim, “ ‘Kidney for sale’: Iran has a Legal Market for the Organs, but the System Doesn't Always Work.”

⁸⁹⁵ Anonim, “Iran and covid-19: Sickly State,” *The Economist* 434, no. 9185 (14-20 Mart 2020): 27. İran uzunca bir süre salgında netkilenene ilk üç ülke arasında yer almıştır. Anonim “Coronavirus Live Update - Reported Cases and Deaths by Country, Territory, or Conveyance.”

⁸⁹⁶ Gordon, “Crippling Iran: The U.N. Security Council and the Tactic of Deliberate Ambiguity,” 1002.

⁸⁹⁷ Nichols, “Iran Regains U.N. Vote after U.S. Enables U.N. Payment.”

ikincil yaptırım olarak anılmakta; hedef ülke ve kişiler dışında kalan üçüncü tarafları da etkilemektedir. Bu da, Batı'nın disiplin amaçlı kullandığı gücünün hedef ülkenin dışına taşarak, "biz" ile "onlar" arasındaki sınırdan kalmayı, keskin ayrımlardan kaçınmayı tercih edenleri de kapsamına aldığını göstermektedir. Diğer bir ifade ile, her ne kadar yeni nesil yaptırımlarla, yaptırıma maruz olanların özenle seçilmesi hedefleniyor olsa da, ikincil yaptırım uygulaması dolayısıyla, yaptırımların alanı ve kitlesi sonsuz şekilde genişletilmektedir. Böylelikle aslında tüm alanları kapsayan geniş bir ambargo şeklinde uygulanan klasik yaptırımların dahi ötesine geçilerek, üçüncü taraflar da kapsama dahil edilmektedir.

Vaka incelemeleri çerçevesinde bu çalışmada ele alınan bir diğer ülke Mısır'dır. Mısır'a yönelik yaptırımlar, dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Cemal Abdel Nasır'ın bağımsız hareket içinden yavaş yavaş Sovyet bloğuna kaymasını önlemeyi hedeflemiştir. Başka bir deyişle yaptırımlar vesilesi ile istenen yönde davranış değişikliğinin elde edilmesine yönelik bir "terbiye etme" süreci işletilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada incelenen süreç Soğuk Savaş dönemine tekabül ettiği ve Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği'nin veto yetkisi bulunduğu için, Mısır'a yönelik herhangi bir Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Kararı bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca, Mısır'a yönelik açık herhangi bir yaptırım uygulaması da bulunmamaktadır. Bu özellikleri dolayısıyla bu vaka incelemesi, nevi şahsına münhasır bir nitelik taşımaktadır. Çünkü incelenen yaptırım önlemleri, Asvan Barajı'nın inşası için gerekli finansal kaynak musluklarının Batı ülkeleri tarafından kesilmesi şeklindedir. Baraja verilen desteğin

de finansmanın da⁸⁹⁸ kesilmesi, Cumhurbaşkanı Nasır'a hareket alanının sınırlı olduğunu, Batı ile diyalogu bozmaması gerektiğini, Sovyetler Birliği ile flörtleşmesinin Batı tarafından olumlu karşılanmayacağını hatırlatmayı amaçlamaktadır.⁸⁹⁹

Bununla birlikte, Mısır'a yönelik yaptırımlar hedeflenen (daha doğru bir ifade ile, açıkça ilan edilen) bu amaçlar serisinin gerçekleştirilmesinde başarısız kalmıştır. Bu başarısızlığın, hem birbiriyle ilgili hem de birbirinden bağımsız iki ana boyutu vardır. Uygulama açısından ele alındığında, Asvan Barajı Sovyetlerin destekleriyle tamamlanmış; böylelikle, netice itibarıyla bakıldığında yaptırımlar, bağımsızlar hareketinin öncüsü Mısır'ın Doğu Bloğuyla yakınlaşmasını engellememiştir. Teoride açısından ele alındığında ise, yazında yapılan tanımlar çerçevesinde yaptırımların savaşa uzanmayan bir önlem türü olarak benimsenmiş olmasından hareketle, Mısır'a yönelik yaptırımların Süveyş Savaşı ile neticelenmesinden ötürü başarısız olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Başarı veya başarısızlık konusu, bu çalışmanın dışında kalan ayrı bir alandır.⁹⁰⁰ Çalışmada, yaptırımların hedef ülkenin davranışını istenen şekilde değiştirip değiştiremediğine bakılmamaktadır. Çalışma, yaptırımların Doğu ülkelerine yönelik olarak kullanılan disipline edici uygulamalar olduğu savunmaktadır. Bu savdan

⁸⁹⁸ Sullivan ve Jones, *Global Security Watch: A Reference Handbook – Egypt*, 7. ABD ardından, Mısır'ın Sovyet bloğuna kaymasını önlemek amacıyla ülkeye kredi ve Hawk füzeleri vermeyi önermiştir. Kadri, *The Unmaking of Arab Socialism*, 37.

⁸⁹⁹ Bkz. El Mallakh, "Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt," 15.

⁹⁰⁰ Başarılı ve başarısız yaptırımları inceleyen ve yazında sıkça istifade edilen bir çalışma için bkz. Hufbauer v.d., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

hareketle yaptırımlar, Batı ülkelerinin, medenileşmesi, eğitilmesi, diğer bir deyişle Foucaultcu şekilde normalleştirilmesi gereken Doğu ülkelerine yönelik izlediği disipline edici uygulamalar olarak görülmektedir.

Bu çalışma kapsamında söz konusu uygulamaların ele alındığı bir diğer vaka incelemesi, Afganistan'dır. Yukarıda özetlenen İran ve Kuzey Kore vakalarından farklı olarak Afganistan, iki Taliban arası dönemde uluslararası camiada tanınan ve Taliban haricinde yaptırımlara tabi olmayan bir ülkedir. Mısır'dan farklı olarak Afgan hükümeti, dün olduğu gibi bugün de dış yardımlar ile bütçesini şekillendirmektedir. Hükümet, Afgan halkını yaptırımlar döneminden kalma sosyoekonomik sorunlardan çıkaramamıştır. Afganistan hala, sanayileşmesini tamamlayamamış bir tarım ülkesidir; üstelik, 1970'lerde temel tarım ürünü üzüm iken şimdilerde en çok ekilen ve hasat edilen ürün haşhaş olmaktadır.

Söylemler kapsamında Batı'ya güvenlik tehdidi sunan az gelişmiş bir ülke olarak etiketlenmiş olan Afganistan,⁹⁰¹ “biz”den ayrı bir “öteki” haline gelmiştir. Bu ayrım, çalışmada öne sürülen teze paralel olarak, Foucaultcu bir dışlama ve çerçeveleme sürecine zemin hazırlamış, disipline edici yöntemlerinin uygulanarak hedef ülkenin söylem kapsamında normalleşmesine yardım edilmesini kolaylaştırmıştır. Afganlar, ülkelerinin yüzyıllar boyunca yabancı güçlerin istilasına uğradığını ancak istilacı güçlerin hepsi için Afganistan'ın bir mezarlık haline geldiğini belirtirler. Ancak,

⁹⁰¹ Bilgen, “Güvenliksiz Kalkınma, Kalkınmasız Güvenlik Mümkün mü? Güvenlik-Kalkınma İlişkisinin Dönüşüm Süreci ve Farklı Yaklaşımlarla Kavramsallaştırılması,” 31.

Rahim'in dile getirdiği gibi, Afganistan bir mezarlık halindedir ve aslında hiç kimse, bir mezarlıkta yaşamak istemez.⁹⁰²

Afganistan örneği, yaptırımların üçüncü dünya ülkeleri üzerindeki izlerinin görülmesi açısından oldukça önemlidir. 1970'lerden bu yana hükümet krizi içinde savrulan ülke, halen devlet olmanın gerektirdiği temel kurumsal yapıları tam olarak oturtabilmiş değildir. Bu sebeple, idari ve teknik açılardan bakıldığında yaptırımların ülkeye etkisinin asgari seviyede kaldığını öne sürmek mümkün olabilir. Nitekim, yaptırımlar öncesi ve sonrası dönemde belirgin farklılıklar gözlemlenememektedir. Öte yandan, resmi olarak ülke yabancı yardımlara bel bağlamakta ise de, gayri resmi olarak afyon ticareti halen ülkenin temel gelir kalemini oluşturmaktadır. Çiftçiler için ekimi tercih edilen ürün olmasını yanı sıra, Afgan ihracatının ve istihdam olanaklarının ağırlığını da afyon üretimi sırtlanmış durumdadır.⁹⁰³ Üstelik, Taliban'ın da bu süreçte düzenleyici ve gerekli güvenlik tedbirlerini sağlayıcı bir rolü bulunmaktadır.⁹⁰⁴

Afganistan vakası sadece uzatmalı bir disipline edici sürecin değil aynı zamanda Batı'nın, "bir takım yapısal nedenlerle modernleşmeye [Foucault'nun kullandığı terminoloji kapsamında normalleşmeye] direnen"⁹⁰⁵ Doğu ülkelerini hedef alarak,

⁹⁰² Rahim, "The Future of Afghanistan: An Afghan Responsibility," 996.

⁹⁰³ LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, "After the Drug Wars."

⁹⁰⁴ Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 60. Coll'a göre Afgan çiftçiler, küresel pazardaki eroinin %90'ını sağlayacak kadar haşhaş ekimi yapabilmektedir. Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016)*, 266.

⁹⁰⁵ Basu, "World of the Third," 76.

Foucaultcu yöntemleri uygulamaktan imtina etmeyeceğinin bir kez daha dünyanın dikkatine getirilmesinin de güzel bir örneğini sunmaktadır.

Çalışmada ele alınan son vaka incelemesi, Rusya Federasyonu'dur. Evvelki vakalarla nüfus, coğrafi büyüklük, ekonomik güç, askeri ve politik varlık gibi pek çok açıdan aynı sıklıkta olmasa bile Rusya da, Kırım'ı ilhak sürecinin ardından yaptırımlara maruz kalmış bir ülkedir. Enerji, madencilik ve savunma alanlarında yoğunlaşan yaptırımlara rağmen anılan sektörlerde Rusya halen önemli bir aktör olarak varlığını sürdürmektedir. Ayrıca Rusya yaptırımlara karşılık verebilmekte, örneğin uluslararası bankacılık işlemlerinin yürütüldüğü bir platform olan SWIFT sisteminden çıkarılmasına karşılık olarak ödemeleri dolar yerine ruble ile yapmayı önermektedir. Bu öneri kabul edilmediğinde, Rusya ihraç ettiği doğal gazı karşılık ödemelerin dolar yerine ruble ile yapılmasını talep edebilmektedir.⁹⁰⁶ İzlediği bu politikalar sayesinde Rusya, milli para biriminin de değer kaybetmesini önlemiştir.⁹⁰⁷ Her durumda, yaptırımların Rusya için derin yaralar oluşturmadığı, bilakis, kamuoyunda da Kırım'ın ilhakını müteakip Rusya'nın yeniden büyük güç olarak sahneye çıktığı görüşü ağırlık kazanmıştır.⁹⁰⁸

Rusya'da, yaptırımlar neticesinde ağırlık kazanan ithal ikameci ekonomi politikaları ile bağımsız, yerli teknolojiyi dayalı bir üretim düzeni oturtulmak istenmiş; bu politikalar özellikle de savunma sanayiinde takip edilmiştir. Ayrıca, Putin'in destek

⁹⁰⁶ Shagina, "The Sanctions and Moscow's Adaptation Strategy," 194.

⁹⁰⁷ Anonymous, "The IMF Warns of the US Dollar Losing Dominance after Sanctions."

⁹⁰⁸ Janjevic, "Western Sanctions on Russia: Lots of Noise and Little Impact."

oranı ilhaktan sonra oldukça yüksek seviyelere erişmiştir. Bu durum, Rusya’da lider ile halk arasında yeni bir sosyal sözleşme kurulduğu, bu çerçevede “halkın çektiği ekonomik zorluklara karşı Rusya’nın büyük güç olarak yükselişini kabul ettiği” yorumları ortaya çıkmıştır.⁹⁰⁹ Ayrıca, mevcut disipline edici önlemler, Rusların kendilerini daha da gururlu hissetmesini sağlamıştır. Ruslar, ülkelerinin küresel politikalara yön veren büyük güç olarak yeniden doğduğunu düşünmekte; Rus yönetimi de Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin sevmediği rejimlere yönelik olarak renkli devrim ve ekonomik baskı yöntemleri kullandığını değerlendirmektedir.⁹¹⁰

Rusya, kendisini Doğu’nun bir parçası olarak görmek ve tanımlamak istememektedir. Bu tanımın Batı’da, özellikle de bu araştırma kapsamında, karşılık bulduğunu söylemek güçtür. Nitekim bu çalışma, Foucaultcu bir yaklaşım ile yürütülen sistematik etiketlemeyi esas almıştır; bu kapsamda, bir söylemin oluşabilmesi için sadece bir tarafın söylemesi değil, karşı tarafta da dinleyici bulabilmesi önemlidir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bir uluslararası oyuncunun kendini (daha doğrusu, kendi kendine) tanımlaması, bu tanımın oyunda kabul görmesi için yeterli değildir; söz konusu tanımın hedef kitle tarafından da kabulü gerekir. Rusya, kendisini bir parçası olarak gördüğü Batı için “diğer” olagelmıştır. Bu çalışmada öne sürülen savla uyumlu olarak, Rusya tarafından diğer ülkelere yönelik olarak politika ve / veya davranış değişikliğine gidilmesini temin etmek amacıyla kullanılan araçların da, Rusya’nın Batı’nın bir parçası olmadığını gösterdiği görülmektedir.

⁹⁰⁹ Rutland, “The Place of Economics in Russian National Identity Debates,” 357-8.

⁹¹⁰ Gabuev, “Good Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula.”

Gerek Rusya'nın, gerekse Batı'nın, kendi tanımladıkları "diğer"ler bulunmakta; bunların normalleştirilmesi için izledikleri politikalar bulunmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Batı, disipline edici gücünü yaptırımlar kisvesi altında kullanmayı tercih ederken, Rusya, kendi "hastalıklı diğer"lerini düzeltmek için doğrudan savaş ilan etmektedir. Batı, henüz uluslararası hukuk tarafından düzenlenmemiş bir alan olan ve savaşın bir adım önünde durduğu değerlendirilen yaptırımları kullanırken, Rusya hukuk çerçevesi içinde kalmakta ve uluslararası hukukta düzenlenen savaşı yöntem olarak kullanmaktadır. Bazı yazarlar, "Rusya'nın Batı hegemonyasıyla daha az bağlantıda olduğunu, dolayısıyla Batı'nın ideolojilerini daha az yeniden ürettiğini" ifade etmektedir.⁹¹¹ Bu kapsamda, aslında Rusya da kendisini gördüğünden daha az Batılıdır, Rusya'nın kimliği Oryantalizm ile şekillenmiştir. Bu noktadan hareketle Rusya'nın yaptırım uygulanabilecek hastalıklı diğer olarak söylem dahiline alınması ve Batı tarafından alınacak Foucaultcu disipline edici önlemlere maruz kalması mümkün olabilmektedir.

Bu araştırmada, seçilen beş ülke üzerinden yapılan vaka incelemesinde yanıt aranan temel soru, bölge kavramının⁹¹² yaptırımlar için bir öneminin olup olmadığıdır. Varılan sonuç, bölgenin oldukça önemli olduğu yönündedir. Bu çalışmada varılan sonuca göre yaptırımlar, Batılı ülkeler tarafından Batı dışı bölgelerde bulunan ve "diğer" olarak sınıflanan ülkelere yöneltilmektedir.

⁹¹¹ Hopf, "Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics," 329.

⁹¹² Bölge Çalışmaları'nın temel kaynaklarından biri olarak bkz. Volkman, *Crossing Borders: The Case for Area Studies, Ford Foundation Report*; ve yine aynı yazara ait *Crossing Borders: Revitalizing Area Studies*.

Çalışmada yaptırımların şekli (tek ya da çok taraflı), amacı (silahsızlanma, cezalandırma, sınırları eski haline getirme) ve türü (birincil ya da ikincil) gibi farklı boyutlarına bakılmış; vaka incelemeleri ile yaptırım uygulayan ve uygulanan ülkeler arasındaki ilişkiler ile bölgesel farklılıkların, yaptırımları nasıl etkilediği incelenmiştir. Genel olarak, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Kararı bulunan ülkeler hakkında, uygulamayı takip etmek üzere Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından oluşturulan Yaptırımlar Komitesi bulunmaktadır. İran, Kuzey Kore ve Afganistan örneklerinde de görüldüğü üzere bu Komite, yaptırımların işleyişinden sorumludur. Öncelikli, yani açık amaç, yanlış yapanı cezalandırmak veya yanlış davranış için bir tazminat oluşturmak değil, Birleşmiş Milletler Şartı kapsamında uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin yeniden tesis edilmesini sağlamaktır. Ancak, açık amacın bu olmasına karşın, yaptırımların fiiliyatta Batılı ülkeler tarafından Doğu'ya karşı kullanılan Foucaultcu disiplinler araçları olduğu görülmektedir.

Bu çalışmada ele alınan vaka incelemelerinin dördü (Mısır, İran, Afganistan ve Kuzey Kore), kitle imha silahı – nükleer silah arayışını içermektedir. Rusya, doğrudan kitle imha silahı ile bağlantılı bir vaka değildir; ancak, Rusya'ya yönelik yaptırımlar, sınırların eski haline getirilmesi kapsamında değerlendirilebilir. Vaka incelemelerine konu ülkelerin üçü Müslümandır; Rusya ağırlıklı olarak Ortodoks Hristiyan, Kuzey Kore ise Budist ve Konfüçyanist inanca sahip bir nüfus barındırmaktadır. Vakaların sadece biri, yani Mısır, tamamıyla Soğuk Savaş dönemine aittir; ve yine sadece bir vakada, yani Rusya'da, yaptırıma maruz kalan ülkenin karşılık verebilecek güç bulunmaktadır.

Bu kısa özetin çizdiği çerçevede dahilinde, vaka incelemesi için seçilen beş ülkenin kapsamlı bir çalışmaya zemin oluşturabilecek ortak bir noktası bulunmuyor gibi

durmaktadır. Ancak ele alınan tüm bu ülkeler, Batı dışında yer almaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, çalışma kapsamındaki vaka incelemelerine konu tüm ülkelere yönelik yaptırımlar, Batı'dan gelmektedir.

Bu çalışmada varılan sonuçlar, yaptırımların hedef politika ve davranış değişikliğini sağlamakta başarısız olduğunu, ancak sivil halkın günlük hayatına olumsuz etkileri bulunduğunu göstermektedir. Buna karşın, tanım itibarıyla savaş aşamasından önce duran bir önlem olan yaptırımlar, Batı tarafından sıkça tercih edilen bir uygulama haline gelmiştir. Bu tespitler paralelinde, hedef ülkede beklenen politika ve/veya davranış değişikliğini sağlayamayan ve halkın gündelik yaşantısına etki eden yaptırımların neden halen sıkça tercih edilen araçlar olduğu bu çalışmada sorgulanmıştır.

Bu kapsamda, Doğu ve Batı arasında söylem kaynaklı olarak derin bir “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımı bulunduğu; bu ayrımın Batı tarafından kimlik politikaları boyutuyla oluşturulduğu; “onlar”ın ne kadar tehlikeli bir söylemin parçası haline getirilirlirse o kadar disipline edici güç uygulanabileceği görülmüştür. “Onlar,” bir bütün halinde Doğu'dur; Batı, kendisini Doğu'yu eğitmek ve modernleştirmek vazifesini üstlenmiş olarak görmektedir. Bu vazife, kanalizasyon eğitiminden⁹¹³ sınır düzenlemelerine kadar her türlü alanı kapsamaktadır. Bir nevi kolonyalizm olan bu vazife, Beyaz

⁹¹³ Anonim, “Sanitary Administration in Egypt.”

Adamın Yüğü⁹¹⁴ olarak görülmekte; “koyu tenli insanları aydınlığa çıkarma” çabası olarak sunulmaktadır.⁹¹⁵

Bu çalışmada, yaptırımların Foucaultcu disipline edici bir yöntem olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Foucault, etiketleme ve düzeltmenin anormal bireye odaklanan çabalar olduğunu, bu çabaların disipline edici yöntemler gerektirdiğini belirtmektedir.⁹¹⁶ Foucault ayrıca modern devletin bireyi kabullenişinin tek şartının, bireyin kendisini oluşturan bireyselliğinin ve özgünlüğünün belli kalıplar içinde yeniden şekillendirilmesi olduğunu savunmaktadır.⁹¹⁷ Bu, George Orwell’in aktardığı gençlik hatıralarına benzemektedir; Orwell, 1. Dünya Savaşı sırasında savaşa katılmak için çok genç olduğu için orduya alınmamış olmasının, ömrü boyunca taşıyacağı bir “eksik adam” yaftasına yol açtığını; zira hayatta olsa dahi savaş tecrübesini edinmediği için asla tam anlamıyla adam sayılmayacağını;⁹¹⁸ başka bir ifadeyle, sırf bu sebeple dönemdaşlarının tamamladığı kalıpsal şekillenmesi eksik olduğu için, “diğer” haline geldiğini aktarmaktadır.

Oyunun eşit oyuncusu olmayan “diğer,” bu çalışmada ele alınan temel aktördür. Doğu’nun ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak şekillenen söylem kapsamında “diğer,”

⁹¹⁴ Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden, 1899,” *Part 2: The Modern World in the Twentieth Century of World History -II Course Syllabus of University of Delaware*.

⁹¹⁵ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth.”

⁹¹⁶ Foucault, “ ‘Panopticalism’ from ‘Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,’” 5.

⁹¹⁷ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 783.

⁹¹⁸ Orwell, *Kitaplar ve Sigaralar*, 47.

kavramsal olarak geri kalmış, gelişmemiş ve hatta kendi gelişimini sağlayacak devinimi kendi başına oluşturmaktan aciz olarak tanımlanmaktadır.⁹¹⁹ Haliyle Doğu, Orwell'in ifadelerini ödünç alırsak, tam anlamıyla adam olabilmek için Batı'nın yönlendirmelerine ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Yine Orwell'in anılarından devam edersek, bireyde de benzer bir ihtiyacın bulunduğunu görürüz: Orwell, yatılı okulda yatağını ıslattığında ceza olarak dövüldüğünü, dayak sırasında da kullanılan sopanın, kendisine karşı uygulanan şiddet dolayısıyla kırıldığını anlatmaktadır. Anlatımı, dayağın kendisinin başlı başına sorunlu bir yöntem oluşunun veya maruz kaldığı şiddetin orantısızlığının tartışılmasından oldukça uzaktır. İlginç bir şekilde Orwell, kırılan sopadan kendini nasıl mesul hissettiğine odaklıdır. Ona göre, olayların başlangıç noktasında kendisi bulunduğu için, sopanın kırılmış olmasına da kendisi yol açmıştır.⁹²⁰

Bu çalışmada ağırlıklı olarak istifade edilen Foucault da, işte tam bu durumu ifade etmektedir. Disipline edici güç bir rıza ilişkisi gerektirmez; tam tersine, normal ile anormal arasında mevcut, etiketleme ve söylem üzerine kurulu bir şekilde sürdürülen “farklılıklar sistemi” sayesinde bir taraf diğeri üzerinde güç kullanma hakkına sahip olur.⁹²¹ Bu sistem, sürdürülmesi gerekliliği ile ayakta kalır; sistemin sağladığı disipliner güç, sade ve sadece kullanıldığı zaman var olur.⁹²² Esasen Orwell de bu

⁹¹⁹ Kula, *Batı Felsefesinde Oryantalizm ve Türk İmgesi*, özl. 116, 175-6.

⁹²⁰ Orwell, *Kitaplar ve Sigaralar*, 72.

⁹²¹ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 792.

⁹²² Ibid, 788. Ayrıca bkz. Diaz-Bone, “Economics of Convention Meets Foucault.”

görüŖe katılmaktadır; anılarında, arkadaŖ canlısı olduđunu ve öđrencilerinin onu sevdiđini düŖünen öđretmen ile her daim dalga geildiđini; tehlikeli görülmeyen hibir yetiŖkinin ciddiye alınma ihtimali bulunmadıđını söyler.⁹²³

Uluslararası sahneye taŖıdıđımızda, devleti birey olarak alırsak, “biz”e ait norm ve kuralları uygulayan her ülkenin, eŖit egemen aktör olarak oyuna dahil edildiđi; aksi hallerde farklılıklar sisteminin devreye sokulduđu ve disipline edici yöntemlerin uygulandıđını söyleyebiliriz. Bu disipline edici yöntemlerin baŖında, yaptırımlar gelmektedir. Yaptırımlar savaŖ hukukunun devre dıŖında tutulmasını sađladıđı gibi, egemen eŖitliđin temelini teŖkil eden müdahale etmeme ilkesini de iđnemektedir. Söz konusu ilkeler, sadece Batılılar arasında, yani ađdaŖ dünyada geçerlidir.⁹²⁴ Yaptırıma uđrayan taraf, tanım geređi disipline edilmesi gereken “diđer” olduđu için, bu ilkelere tabi deđildir. Batı bir ebeveyn edasıyla,⁹²⁵ ocuk olarak yaklaŖtıđı Dođu’yu terbiye etmeye koyulmaktadır.⁹²⁶ “Biz” ve “onlar” üzerine kurulu söylem, taraflar arasında

⁹²³ Orwell, *Kitaplar ve Sigaralar*, 117.

⁹²⁴ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 86. Her halükarda, medeni Batı’nın da yekpare bir yapı olmadıđına dikkati ekmek gereklidir. Bobo Lo’nun da not ettiđi gibi:

PaylaŖılan deđerler söylemine rađmen, bu deđerlerin esasen kimin deđerleri olduđu ve ne ölçüde paylaŖıldıđı belirsizdir. Trump yönetimi ile Alman Ŗansölye Angela Merkel’in koalisyon hükümeti arasındaki ortak noktalar, farklılıklardan fazla mıdır? ... Bu arada, Trump ile Macar BaŖbakan Viktor Orbán, NATO’daki muhataplarından ziyade otoriter liderlerle ortak noktalara sahiptir.

Lo, “Global Order in the Shadow of the Coronavirus: China, Russia and the West.”

⁹²⁵ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 86.

⁹²⁶ Terim Kuzey Kore için kullanılmıŖtır. Park, “Time for a NATO Strategy on North Korea?,” 1. Benzer Oryantalist eđilimler İran için de mevcuttur; “eleŖtirmenler, KOEP’in İran’a sorun yaratmasına yetecek bir ekonomik refah sađlayacađını düŖünmektedir.” O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran Nuclear Deal: Not So Easy,” 2. Vurgu ilave edilmiŖtir. Rusya da, yayılmacı ve iŖgalci

eşitsizliği kendiliğinden yaratmaktadır; böylelikle hem “onlar”ın davranışlarını düzeltme hakkı doğmakta, hem de gelecekte doğabilecek davranışların da şimdiden düzeltilmesi yükümlülüğü ortaya çıkmaktadır.⁹²⁷

Taraflar arasındaki bu eşitsizlik, Kant’ın⁹²⁸ çizdiği ebedi barış resminde de gizli bir şekilde kendine yer bulmaktadır. Gelişmiş ve demokratik ülkelerden oluşan “biz,” kendi arasında savaşmamakla birlikte “diğer” sözkonusu olduğunda savaş, “o”nun gelişimine katkı olacak bir seçenek olarak görmektedir.⁹²⁹ Bu yorum ile demokratik barış teorisi, radikal politika seçeneklerinin rasyonelleştirilmesine zemin hazırlamaktadır.⁹³⁰ Diğer bir deyişle, teori birdenbire kolonyal bir yapıya bürünmekte; öyle ki, savaşın eleştirilmesine karşı bir kalkan vazifesi görebilecek hale gelmektedir.⁹³¹ Nitekim bu bakış açısı itibarıyla savaş, “diğer”inin gelişmesine ve “biz”im seviyemize erişmesine katkı sağlayacak bir araç ise, “biz” tarafından kullanılması gereken bir araç olup; kullanılmaması, “diğer”inin gelişmesini

ülke sıfatıyla Oryantalizmden üzerine düşen payı almaktadır. Kula, *Batı Felsefesinde Oryantalizm ve Türk İmgesi*, 162.

⁹²⁷ Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 792, 789.

⁹²⁸ Kant, *Ebedi Barış Üzerine Felsefi Deneme*.

⁹²⁹ Kant’ın ebedi barış teorisi, tüm dünya demokrasilerden oluşmadığı için test edilmiş bir teori değildir. Demokrasiler daha az sıklıkta savaşıyor olsa bile “daha demokratik bir dünyanın daha barışçıl olacağı” sonucuna varmak doğru olmayabilir. Hess ve Orphanides, “War and Democracy,” 26. Ayrıca, demokrasiler de kendi aralarında farklılıklar göstermektedir. Örneğin bkz. Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 ‘Özal Dönemi’nde Türkiye’de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*.

⁹³⁰ Fiala, “The Democratic Peace Myth,” 78.

⁹³¹ Ibid, 82-3.

istememek gibi sakat bir çıkarıma varılmasını kolaylaştırarak, savaş karşıtlığını, modernitenin “diğer”e ulaşmasını istemeyen bencillikle eş tutma yolunu açan bir söyleme zemin oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, sosyoekonomik, kültürel, güvenlik ve idari-teknik açılardan yaptırımların, bu ülkeler üzerinde zaman zaman savaşın dahi yol açamayacağı sonuçlara vardığı; üstüne üstlük hedef ülkede istenilen yönde bir politika değişikliği sağlanmasını kolaylaştırmadığı gösterilmek istenmiştir. Tüm bunlara rağmen, yaptırımların, sıkça kullanılan ve başı bilinse dahi sonu öngörülemeyen, bitmek bilmeyen uygulamalar haline geldiği gözlemlenmektedir. Bu kapsamda, çalışmada ele alınan beş farklı ülke ve beş farklı bölgeden varılan ortak sonuç, yaptırımların Batılı ülkeler tarafından Doğulu ülkelere yönelik izlenen uygulamalar oldukları; yapısalcı ve güvenlikleştirici bir söylem neticesinde yaptırım uygulayan ve uygulanan tarafların eşit olmadığı ve eşit olarak da kabul edilmediği, yani derin bir Oryantalizm teorisi ve pratiği etrafında şekillenen disipline edici araçlar olduğudur. Michel Foucault, bu araçların kullanılması gerektiğini; kullanılmaması halinde “normal”in “diğer” üzerindeki gücünü sergileyebileceği imkanlar olmadığını, kullanılmayan gücün de “diğer”in normalleştirilmesi sürecine hiçbir fayda sağlamayacağını not eder. Bu kapsamda yaptırımların, Batı tarafından Foucaultcu disiplinler yöntem olarak sıkça kullanılan favori uygulamalar olmaya devam edeceğini öngörmek mümkündür.

C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences**
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences**
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics**
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics**
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences**

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Aksop
Adı / Name : Ece
Bölümü / Department : Bölge Çalışmaları / Area Studies

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS DISCIPLINARY REGIMES: IMPLEMENTATION OF WESTERN SANCTIONS AND LOCAL RESPONSES IN VARIOUS REGIONS

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans / Master** **Doktora / PhD**

- 1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.**
- 2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. ***
- 3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. ***

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)

(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.